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experimental psychology

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• American Psychological Association - Understanding Experimental Psychology

experimental psychology , a method of studying psychological phenomena and processes. The experimental method in psychology attempts to account for the activities of animals (including humans) and the functional organization of mental processes by manipulating variables that may give rise to behaviour; it is primarily concerned with discovering laws that describe manipulable relationships. The term generally connotes all areas of psychology that use the experimental method.

These areas include the study of sensation and perception , learning and memory , motivation , and biological psychology . There are experimental branches in many other areas, however, including child psychology , clinical psychology , educational psychology , and social psychology . Usually the experimental psychologist deals with normal, intact organisms; in biological psychology, however, studies are often conducted with organisms modified by surgery, radiation, drug treatment, or long-standing deprivations of various kinds or with organisms that naturally present organic abnormalities or emotional disorders. See also psychophysics .

B.A. in Psychology

What Is Experimental Psychology?

The science of psychology spans several fields. There are dozens of disciplines in psychology, including abnormal psychology, cognitive psychology and social psychology.

One way to view these fields is to separate them into two types: applied vs. experimental psychology. These groups describe virtually any type of work in psychology.

The following sections explore what experimental psychology is and some examples of what it covers.

Experimental psychology seeks to explore and better understand behavior through empirical research methods. This work allows findings to be employed in real-world applications (applied psychology) across fields such as clinical psychology, educational psychology, forensic psychology, sports psychology, and social psychology. Experimental psychology is able to shed light on people’s personalities and life experiences by examining what the way people behave and how behavior is shaped throughout life, along with other theoretical questions. The field looks at a wide range of behavioral topics including sensation, perception, attention, memory, cognition, and emotion, according to the  American Psychological Association  (APA).

Research is the focus of experimental psychology. Using scientific methods to collect data and perform research, experimental psychology focuses on certain questions, and, one study at a time, reveals information that contributes to larger findings or a conclusion. Due to the breadth and depth of certain areas of study, researchers can spend their entire careers looking at a complex research question.

Experimental Psychology in Action

The APA  writes about  one experimental psychologist, Robert McCann, who is now retired after 19 years working at NASA. During his time at NASA, his work focused on the user experience — on land and in space — where he applied his expertise to cockpit system displays, navigation systems, and safety displays used by astronauts in NASA spacecraft. McCann’s knowledge of human information processing allowed him to help NASA design shuttle displays that can increase the safety of shuttle missions. He looked at human limitations of attention and display processing to gauge what people can reliably see and correctly interpret on an instrument panel. McCann played a key role in helping determining the features of cockpit displays without overloading the pilot or taxing their attention span.

“One of the purposes of the display was to alert the astronauts to the presence of a failure that interrupted power in a specific region,” McCann said, “The most obvious way to depict this interruption was to simply remove (or dim) the white line(s) connecting the affected components. Basic research on visual attention has shown that humans do not notice the removal of a display feature very easily when the display is highly cluttered. We are much better at noticing a feature or object that is suddenly added to a display.” McCann utilized his knowledge in experimental psychology to research and develop this very important development for NASA. 

Valve Corporation

Another experimental psychologist, Mike Ambinder, uses his expertise to help design video games. He is a senior experimental psychologist at Valve Corporation, a video game developer and developer of the software distribution platform Steam. Ambinder told  Orlando Weekly  that his career working on gaming hits such as Portal 2 and Left 4 Dead “epitomizes the intersection between scientific innovation and electronic entertainment.” His career started when he gave a presentation to Valve on applying psychology to game design; this occurred while he was finishing his PhD in experimental design. “I’m very lucky to have landed at a company where freedom and autonomy and analytical decision-making are prized,” he said. “I realized how fortunate I was to work for a company that would encourage someone with a background in psychology to see what they could contribute in a field where they had no prior experience.” 

Ambinder spends his time on data analysis, hardware research, play-testing methodologies, and on any aspect of games where knowledge of human behavior could be useful. Ambinder described Valve’s process for refining a product as straightforward. “We come up with a game design (our hypothesis), and we place it in front of people external to the company (our play-test or experiment). We gather their feedback, and then iterate and improve the design (refining the theory). It’s essentially the scientific method applied to game design, and the end result is the consequence of many hours of applying this process.” To gather play-test data, Ambinder is engaged in the newer field of biofeedback technology, which can quantify gamers’ enjoyment. His research looks at unobtrusive measurements of facial expressions that can achieve such goals. Ambinder is also examining eye-tracking as a next-generation input method.

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Experimental Psychology

Definition:

Experimental psychology is a subfield of psychology that focuses on scientific investigation and research methods to study human behavior and mental processes. It involves conducting controlled experiments to examine hypotheses and gather empirical data.

Subfields of Experimental Psychology:

Sensory processes:.

Sensory processes in experimental psychology involve understanding how humans perceive and process information through their senses, such as vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch.

Learning and Memory:

This subfield explores how individuals acquire and retain knowledge and skills, including the study of different types of memory, learning strategies, and factors that influence memory processes.

Cognitive Psychology:

Cognitive psychology examines mental processes, including attention, perception, problem-solving, decision-making, language, and thinking. It investigates how individuals process information, solve problems, and make decisions.

Developmental Psychology:

Developmental psychology focuses on the study of human development across the lifespan, from infancy to old age. It investigates how individuals change physically, cognitively, and emotionally as they grow and mature.

Social Psychology:

Social psychology studies how individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by social interactions and social environments. It examines topics such as conformity, persuasion, group dynamics, and intergroup relations.

Personality Psychology:

Personality psychology aims to understand individual differences in behavior, thoughts, and emotions. It investigates various personality traits, their development, and how they influence behavior and well-being.

Psychopathology:

This subfield focuses on the study of mental disorders, their causes, symptoms, and treatments. Psychopathology research is often conducted using experimental methods to examine the effectiveness of therapeutic interventions.

Psychopharmacology:

Psychopharmacology involves studying the effects of drugs on behavior, cognition, and emotions. It examines how different medications impact mental processes and aims to develop effective pharmacological treatments for psychological disorders.

Neuropsychology:

Neuropsychology investigates the relationship between brain function and behavior. It examines how brain damage, genetics, and neurological disorders affect cognitive abilities, emotions, and behavior.

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• Front Psychol

The Practice of Experimental Psychology: An Inevitably Postmodern Endeavor

The aim of psychology is to understand the human mind and behavior. In contemporary psychology, the method of choice to accomplish this incredibly complex endeavor is the experiment. This dominance has shaped the whole discipline from the self-concept as an empirical science and its very epistemological and theoretical foundations, via research practice and the scientific discourse to teaching. Experimental psychology is grounded in the scientific method and positivism, and these principles, which are characteristic for modern thinking, are still upheld. Despite this apparently stalwart adherence to modern principles, experimental psychology exhibits a number of aspects which can best be described as facets of postmodern thinking although they are hardly acknowledged as such. Many psychologists take pride in being “real natural scientists” because they conduct experiments, but it is particularly difficult for psychologists to evade certain elements of postmodern thinking in view of the specific nature of their subject matter. Postmodernism as a philosophy emerged in the 20th century as a response to the perceived inadequacy of the modern approach and as a means to understand the complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the times. Therefore, postmodernism offers both valuable insights into the very nature of experimental psychology and fruitful ideas on improving experimental practice to better reflect the complexities and ambiguities of human mind and behavior. Analyzing experimental psychology along postmodern lines begins by discussing the implications of transferring the scientific method from fields with rather narrowly defined phenomena—the natural sciences—to a much broader and more heterogeneous class of complex phenomena, namely the human mind and behavior. This ostensibly modern experimental approach is, however, per se riddled with postmodern elements: (re-)creating phenomena in an experimental setting, including the hermeneutic processes of generating hypotheses and interpreting results, is no carbon copy of “reality” but rather an active construction which reflects irrevocably the pre-existing ideas of the investigator. These aspects, analyzed by using postmodern concepts like hyperreality and simulacra, did not seep in gradually but have been present since the very inception of experimental psychology, and they are necessarily inherent in its philosophy of science. We illustrate this theoretical analysis with the help of two examples, namely experiments on free will and visual working memory. The postmodern perspective reveals some pitfalls in the practice of experimental psychology. Furthermore, we suggest that accepting the inherently fuzzy nature of theoretical constructs in psychology and thinking more along postmodern lines would actually clarify many theoretical problems in experimental psychology.

Introduction

Postmodernism is, in essence, an attempt to achieve greater clarity in our perception, thinking, and behavior by scrutinizing their larger contexts and preconditions, based on the inextricably intertwined levels of both the individual and the society. Psychology also studies the human mind and behavior, which indicates that psychology should dovetail with postmodern approaches. In the 1990s and early 2000s, several attempts were made to introduce postmodern thought as potentially very fruitful ideas into general academic psychology ( Jager, 1991 ; Kvale, 1992 ; Holzman and Morss, 2000 ; Holzman, 2006 ). However, overall they were met with little response.

Postmodern thoughts have been taken up by several fringe areas of academic psychology, e.g., psychoanalysis ( Leffert, 2007 ; Jiménez, 2015 ; but see Holt, 2005 ), some forms of therapy and counseling ( Ramey and Grubb, 2009 ; Hansen, 2015 ), humanistic ( Krippner, 2001 ), feminist and gender ( Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1988 ; Sinacore and Enns, 2005 ), or cultural psychology ( Gemignani and Peña, 2007 ).

However, there is resistance against suggestions to incorporate postmodern ideas into the methodology and the self-perception of psychology as academic—and scientific!—discipline. In fact, postmodern approaches are often rejected vehemently, sometimes even very vocally. For instance, Gergen (2001) argued that the “core tenets” of postmodernism are not at odds with those of scientific psychology but rather that they can enrich the discipline by opening up new possibilities. His suggestions were met with reservation and were even outright rejected on the following grounds: postmodernism, “like anthrax of the intellect, if allowed [our italics] into mainstream psychology, […] will poison the field” ( Locke, 2002 , 458), that it “wishes to return psychology to a prescientific subset of philosophy” ( Kruger, 2002 , 456), and that psychology “needs fewer theoretical and philosophical orientations, not more” ( Hofmann, 2002 , 462; see also Gergen ’s, 2001 , replies to the less biased and more informed commentaries on his article).

In the following years, and continuing the so-called science wars of the 1990s ( Segerstråle, 2000 ), several other attacks were launched against a perceived rise or even dominance of postmodern thought in psychology. Held(2007 ; see also the rebuttal by Martin and Sugarman, 2009 ) argued that anything postmodern would undermine rationality and destroy academic psychology. Similarly, postmodernism was identified—together with “radical environmentalism” and “pseudoscience” among other things—as a “key threat to scientific psychology” ( Lilienfeld, 2010 , 282), or as “inimical to progress in the psychology of science” ( Capaldi and Proctor, 2013 , 331). The following advice was given to psychologists: “We [psychologists] should also push back against the pernicious creep of these untested concepts into our field” ( Tarescavage, 2020 , 4). Furthermore, the term “postmodern” is even employed as an all-purpose invective in a popular scientific book by psychologist Steven Pinker (2018) .

Therefore, it seems that science and experimental psychology on the one hand and postmodern thinking on the other are irreconcilable opposites. However, following Gergen (2001) and Holtz (2020) , we argue that this dichotomy is only superficial because postmodernism is often misunderstood. A closer look reveals that experimental psychology contains many postmodern elements. Even more, there is reason to assume that a postmodern perspective may be beneficial for academic psychology: First, the practice of experimental psychology would be improved by integrating postmodern thinking because it reveals a side of the human psyche for which experimental psychology is mostly blind. Second, the postmodern perspective can tell us much about the epistemological and social background of experimental psychology and how this affects our understanding of the human psyche.

A Postmodern Perspective on Experimental Psychology

Experimental psychology and the modern scientific worldview.

It lies within the nature of humans to try to find out more about themselves and their world, but the so-called Scientific Revolution of the early modern period marks the beginning of a new era in this search for knowledge. The Scientific Revolution, which has led to impressive achievements in the natural sciences and the explanation of the physical world (e.g., Olby et al., 1991 ; Henry, 1997 ; Cohen, 2015 ; Osterlind, 2019 ), is based on the following principle: to “measure what can be measured and make measurable what cannot be measured.” This famous appeal—falsely attributed to Galileo Galilei but actually from the 19th century ( Kleinert, 2009 )—illustrates the two fundamental principles of modern science: First, the concept of “measurement” encompasses the idea that phenomena can be quantified, i.e., expressed numerically. Second, the concept of “causal connections” pertains to the idea that consistent, non-random relationships can be established between measurable phenomena. Quantification allows that relationships between phenomena can be expressed, calculated, and predicted in precise mathematical and numerical terms.

However, there are two important issues to be aware of. First, while it is not difficult to measure “evident” aspects, such as mass and distance, more complex phenomena cannot be measured easily. In such cases, it is therefore necessary to find ways of making these “elusive” phenomena measurable. This can often only be achieved by reducing complex phenomena to their simpler—and measurable!—elements. For instance, in order to measure memory ability precisely, possible effects of individual preexisting knowledge which introduce random variance and thus impreciseness have to be eliminated. Indeed, due to this reason, in many memory experiments, meaningless syllables are used as study material.

Second, it is not difficult to scientifically prove a causal relationship between a factor and an outcome if the relationship is simple, that is, if there is only one single factor directly influencing the outcome. In such a case, showing that a manipulation of the factor causes a change in the outcome is clear evidence for a causal relationship because there are no other factors which may influence the outcome as well. However, in situations where many factors influence an outcome in a complex, interactive way, proving a causal relationship is much more difficult. To prove the causal effect of one factor in such a situation the effects of all other factors—called confounding factors from the perspective of the factor of interest—have to be eliminated so that a change in the outcome can be truly attributed to a causal effect of the factor of interest. However, this has an important implication: The investigator has to divide the factors present in a given situation into interesting versus non-interesting factors with respect to the current context of the experiment. Consequently, while experiments reveal something about local causal relationships, they do not necessarily provide hints about the net effect of all causal factors present in the given situation.

The adoption of the principles of modern science has also changed psychology. Although the beginnings of psychology—as the study of the psyche —date back to antiquity, psychology as an academic discipline was established in the mid to late 19th century. This enterprise was also inspired by the success of the natural sciences, and psychology was explicitly modeled after this example by Wilhelm Wundt—the “father of experimental psychology”—although he emphasized the close ties to the humanities as well. The experiment quickly became the method of choice. There were other, more hermeneutic approaches during this formative phase of modern psychology, such as psychoanalysis or introspection according to the Würzburg School, but their impact on academic psychology was limited. Behaviorism emerged as a direct reaction against these perceived unscientific approaches, and its proponents emphasized the scientific character of their “new philosophy of psychology.” It is crucial to note that in doing so they also emphasized the importance of the experiment and the necessity of quantifying directly observable behavior in psychological research. Behaviorism quickly became a very influential paradigm which shaped academic psychology. Gestalt psychologists, whose worldview is radically different from behaviorism, also relied on experiments in their research. Cognitive psychology, which followed, complemented, and partly superseded behaviorism, relies heavily on the experiment as a means to gain insight into mental processes, although other methods such as modeling are employed as well. Interestingly, there is a fundamental difference between psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology, which do not rely on the experiment, and the other above-mentioned approaches as the former focus on the psychic functioning of individuals, whereas the latter focus more on global laws of psychic functioning across individuals. This is reflected in the fact that psychological laws in experimental psychology are established on the arithmetic means across examined participants—a difference we will elaborate on later in more detail. Today, psychology is the scientific —in the sense of empirical-quantitative—study of the human mind and behavior, and the experiment is often considered the gold standard in psychological research (e.g., Mandler, 2007 ; Goodwin, 2015 ; Leahey, 2017 ).

The experiment is closely associated with the so-called scientific method ( Haig, 2014 ; Nola and Sankey, 2014 ) and the epistemological tenets philosophy of positivism—in the sense as Martin (2003) ; Michell (2003) , and Teo (2018) explain—which sometimes exhibit characteristics of naïve empiricism. Roughly speaking, the former consists of observing, formulating hypotheses, and testing these hypotheses in experiments. The latter postulates that knowledge is based on sensory experience, that it is testable, independent of the investigator and therefore objective as it accurately depicts the world as it is. This means that in principle all of reality can not only be measured but eventually be entirely explained by science. This worldview is attacked by postmodern thinkers who contend that the world is far more complex and that the modern scientific approach cannot explain all of reality and its phenomena.

The Postmodern Worldview

Postmodern thinking (e.g., Bertens, 1995 ; Sim, 2011 ; Aylesworth, 2015 ) has gained momentum since the 1980s, and although neither the term “postmodernism” nor associated approaches can be defined in a unanimous or precise way, they are characterized by several intertwined concepts, attitudes, and aims. The most basic trait is a general skepticism and the willingness to question literally everything from the ground up—even going so far as to question not only the foundation of any idea, but also the question itself. This includes the own context, the chosen premises, thinking, and the use of language. Postmodernism therefore has a lot in common with science’s curiosity to understand the world: the skeptical attitude paired with the desire to discover how things really are.

Postmodern investigations often start by looking at the language and the broader context of certain phenomena due to the fact that language is the medium in which many of our mental activities—which subsequently influence our behavior—take place. Thus, the way we talk reveals something about how and why we think and act. Additionally, we communicate about phenomena using language, which in turn means that this discourse influences the way we think about or see those phenomena. Moreover, this discourse is embedded in a larger social and historical context, which also reflects back on the use of language and therefore on our perception and interpretation of certain phenomena.

Generally speaking, postmodern investigations aim at detecting and explaining how the individual is affected by societal influences and their underlying, often hidden ideas, structures, or mechanisms. As these influences are often fuzzy, contradictory, and dependent on their context, the individual is subject to a multitude of different causalities, and this already complex interplay is further complicated by the personal history, motivations, aims, or ways of thinking of the individual. Postmodernism attempts to understand all of this complexity as it is in its entirety.

The postmodern approaches have revealed three major general tendencies which characterize the contemporary world: First, societies and the human experience since the 20th century have displayed less coherence and conversely a greater diversity than the centuries before in virtually all areas, e.g., worldviews, modes of thinking, societal structures, or individual behavior. Second, this observation leads postmodern thinkers to the conclusion that the grand narratives which dominated the preceding centuries and shaped whole societies by providing frames of references have lost—at least partially—their supremacy and validity. Examples are religious dogmas, nationalism, industrialization, the notion of linear progress—and modern science because it works according to certain fundamental principles. Third, the fact that different but equally valid perspectives, especially on social phenomena or even whole worldviews, are possible and can coexist obviously affects the concepts of “truth,” “reality,” and “reason” in such a way that these concepts lose their immutable, absolute, and universal or global character, simply because they are expressions and reflections of a certain era, society, or worldview.

At this point, however, it is necessary to clarify a common misconception: Interpreting truth, reality, or reason as relative, subjective, and context-dependent—as opposed to absolute, objective, and context-independent—does naturally neither mean that anything can be arbitrarily labeled as true, real, or reasonable, nor, vice versa, that something cannot be true, real, or reasonable. For example, the often-quoted assumption that postmodernism apparently even denies the existence of gravity or its effects as everything can be interpreted arbitrarily or states that we cannot elucidate these phenomena with adequate accuracy because everything is open to any interpretation ( Sokal, 1996 ), completely misses the point.

First, postmodernism is usually not concerned with the laws of physics and the inanimate world as such but rather focuses on the world of human experience. However, the phenomenon itself, e.g., gravity, is not the same as our scientific knowledge of phenomena—our chosen areas of research, methodological paradigms, data, theories, and explanations—or our perception of phenomena, which are both the results of human activities. Therefore, the social context influences our scientific knowledge, and in that sense scientific knowledge is a social construction ( Hodge, 1999 ).

Second, phenomena from human experience, although probably more dependent on the social context than physical phenomena, cannot be interpreted arbitrarily either. The individual context—such as the personal history, motivations, aims, or worldviews—determines whether a certain behavior makes sense for a certain individual in a certain situation. As there are almost unlimited possible backgrounds, this might seem completely random or arbitrary from an overall perspective. But from the perspective of an individual the phenomenon in question may be explained entirely by a theory for a specific—and not universal—context.

As described above, the postmodern meta-perspective directly deals with human experience and is therefore especially relevant for psychology. Moreover, any discipline—including the knowledge it generates—will certainly benefit from understanding its own (social) mechanisms and implications. We will show below that postmodern thinking not only elucidates the broader context of psychology as an academic discipline but rather that experimental psychology exhibits a number of aspects which can best be described as facets of postmodern thinking although they are not acknowledged as such.

The Postmodern Context of Experimental Psychology

Paradoxically, postmodern elements have been present since the very beginning of experimental psychology although postmodernism gained momentum only decades later. One of the characteristics of postmodernism is the transplantation of certain elements from their original context to new contexts, e.g., the popularity of “Eastern” philosophies and practices in contemporary “Western” societies. These different elements are often juxtaposed and combined to create something new, e.g., new “westernized” forms of yoga ( Shearer, 2020 ).

Similarly, the founders of modern academic psychology took up the scientific method, which was originally developed in the context of the natural sciences, and transplanted it to the study of the human psyche in the hope to repeat the success of the natural sciences. By contrast, methods developed specifically in the context of psychology such as psychoanalysis ( Wax, 1995 ) or introspection according to the Würzburg School ( Hackert and Weger, 2018 ) have gained much less ground in academic psychology. The way we understand both the psyche and psychology has been shaped to a great extent by the transfer of the principles of modern science, namely quantitative measurement and experimental methods, although it is not evident per se that this is the best approach to elucidate mental and behavioral phenomena. Applying the methods of the natural sciences to a new and different context, namely to phenomena pertaining to the human psyche , is a truly postmodern endeavor because it juxtaposes two quite distinct areas and merges them into something new—experimental psychology.

The postmodern character of experimental psychology becomes evident on two levels: First, the subject matter—the human psyche —exhibits a postmodern character since mental and behavioral phenomena are highly dependent on the idiosyncratic contexts of the involved individuals, which makes it impossible to establish unambiguous general laws to describe them. Second, experimental psychology itself displays substantial postmodern traits because both its method and the knowledge it produces—although seemingly objective and rooted in the modern scientific worldview—inevitably contain postmodern elements, as will be shown below.

The Experiment as Simulacrum

The term “simulacrum” basically means “copy,” often in the sense of “inferior copy” or “phantasm/illusion.” However, in postmodern usage “simulacrum” has acquired a more nuanced and concrete meaning. “Simulacrum” is a key term in the work of postmodern philosopher Jean Baudrillard, who arguably presented the most elaborate theory on simulacra (1981/1994). According to Baudrillard, a simulacrum “is the reflection of a profound [‘real’] reality” (16/6). Simulacra, however, are more than identical carbon copies because they gain a life of their own and become “real” in the sense of becoming an own entity. For example, the personality a pop star shows on stage is not “real” in the sense that it is their “normal,” off-stage personality, but it is certainly “real” in the sense that it is perceived by the audience even if they are aware that it might be an “artificial” personality. Two identical cars can also be “different” for one might be used as a means of transportation while the other might be a status symbol. Even an honest video documentation of a certain event is not simply a copy of the events that took place because it lies within the medium video that only certain sections can be recorded from a certain perspective. Additionally, the playback happens in other contexts as the original event, which may also alter the perception of the viewer.

The post-structuralist—an approach closely associated with postmodernism—philosopher Roland Barthes pointed out another important aspect of simulacra. He contended that in order to understand something—an “object” in Barthes’ terminology—we necessarily create simulacra because we “ reconstruct [our italics] an ‘object’ in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning [⋯] of this object” ( Barthes, 1963 , 213/214). In other words, when we investigate an object—any phenomenon, either material, mental, or social—we have to perceive it first. This means that we must have some kind of mental representation of the phenomenon/object—and it is crucial to note that this representation is not the same thing as the “real” object itself. All our mental operations are therefore not performed on the “real” object but on mental representations of the object. We decompose a phenomenon in order to understand it, that is, we try to identify its components. In doing so, we effect a change in the object because our phenomenon is no longer the original phenomenon “as it is” for we are performing a mental operation on it, thereby transforming the original phenomenon. Identifying components may be simple, e.g., dividing a tree into roots, trunk, branches, and leaves may seem obvious or even “natural” but it is nevertheless us as investigators who create this structure—the tree itself is probably not aware of it. Now that we have established this structure, we are able to say that the tree consists of several components and name these components. Thus, we have introduced “new” elements into our understanding of the tree. This is the important point, even though the elements, i.e., the branches and leaves themselves “as they are,” have naturally always been “present.” Our understanding of “tree” has therefore changed completely because a tree is now something which is composed of several elements. In that sense, we have changed the original phenomenon by adding something—and this has all happened in our thinking and not in the tree itself. It is also possible to find different structures and different components for the tree, e.g., the brown and the green, which shows that we construct this knowledge.

Next, we can investigate the components to see how they interact with and relate to each other and to the whole system. Also, we can work out their functions and determine the conditions under which a certain event will occur. We can even expand the scope of our investigation and examine the tree in the context of its ecosystem. But no matter what we do or how sophisticated our investigation becomes, everything said above remains true here, too, because neither all these actions listed above nor the knowledge we gain from them are the object itself. Rather, we have added something to the object and the more we know about our object, the more knowledge we have constructed. This addition is what science—gaining knowledge—is all about. Or in the words of Roland Barthes: “the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situation, his freedom and the very resistance which nature offers to his mind” (1963/1972, 214/215).

In principle, this holds truth regarding all scientific investigations. But the more complex phenomena are, the more effort and personal contribution is required on behalf of the investigator to come up with structures, theories, or explanations. Paraphrasing Barthes: When dealing with complex phenomena, more intellect must be added to the object, which means in turn that there are more possibilities for different approaches and perspectives, that is, the constructive element becomes larger. As discussed previously, this does not mean that investigative and interpretative processes are arbitrary. But it is clear from this train of thought that “objectivity” or “truth” in a “positivist,” naïve empiricist “realist,” or absolute sense are not attainable. Nevertheless, we argue here that this is not a drawback, as many critics of postmodernism contend (see above), but rather an advantage because it allows more accurate scientific investigations of true-to-life phenomena, which are typically complex in the case of psychology.

The concepts of simulacra by Baudrillard and Barthes can be combined to provide a description of the experiment in psychology. Accordingly, our understanding of the concept of the “simulacrum” entails that scientific processes—indeed all investigative processes—necessarily need to duplicate the object of their investigation in order to understand it. In doing so, constructive elements are necessarily introduced. These elements are of a varying nature, which means that investigations of one and the same phenomenon may differ from each other and different investigations may find out different things about the phenomenon in question. These investigations then become entities on their own—in the Baudrillardian sense—and therefore simulacra.

In a groundbreaking article on “the meaning and limits of exact science” physicist Max Planck stated that “[a]n experiment is a question which science poses to nature, and a measurement is the recording of nature’s answer” ( Planck, 1949 , 325). The act of “asking a question” implies that the person asking the question has at least a general idea of what the answer might look like ( Heidegger, 1953 , §2). For example: When asking someone for their name, we obviously do not know what they are called, but we assume that they have a name and we also have an idea of how the concept “name” works. Otherwise we could not even conceive, let alone formulate, and pose our question. This highlights how a certain degree of knowledge and understanding of a concept is necessary so that we are able to ask questions about it. Likewise, we need to have a principal idea or assumption of possible mechanisms if we want to find out how more complex phenomena function. It is—at least at the beginning—irrelevant whether these ideas are factually correct or entirely wrong, for without them we would be unable to approach our subject matter in the first place.

The context of the investigator—their general worldview, their previous knowledge and understanding, and their social situation—obviously plays an important part in the process of forming a question which can be asked in the current research context. Although this context may be analyzed along postmodern lines in order to find out how it affects research, production of knowledge, and—when the knowledge is applied—possible (social) consequences, there is a much more profound implication pertaining to the very nature of the experiment as a means to gain knowledge.

Irrespective of whether it is a simple experiment in physics such as Galileo Galilei’s or an experiment on a complex phenomenon from social or cognitive psychology, the experiment is a situation which is specifically designed to answer a certain type of questions, usually causal relationships, such as: “Does A causally affect B?” Excluding the extremely complex discussion on the nature of causality and causation (e.g., Armstrong, 1997 ; Pearl, 2009 ; Paul and Hall, 2013 ), it is crucial to note that we need the experiment as a tool to answer this question. Although we may theorize about a phenomenon and infer causal relationships simply by observing, we cannot—at least according to the prevailing understanding of causality in the sciences—prove causal relationships without the experiment.

The basic idea of the experiment is to create conditions which differ in only one single factor which is suspected as a causal factor for an effect. The influence of all other potential causal relationships is kept identical because they are considered as confounding factors which are irrelevant from the perspective of the research question of the current experiment. Then, if a difference is found in the outcome between the experimental conditions, this is considered as proof that the aspect in question exerts indeed a causal effect. This procedure and the logic behind it are not difficult to understand. However, a closer look reveals that this is actually far from simple or obvious.

To begin with, an experiment is nothing which occurs “naturally” but a situation created for a specific purpose, i.e., an “artificial” situation, because other causal factors exerting influence in “real” life outside the laboratory are deliberately excluded and considered as “confounding” factors. This in itself shows that the experiment contains a substantial postmodern element because instead of creating something it rather re- creates it. This re-creation is of course based on phenomena from the “profound” reality—in the Baudrillardian sense—since the explicit aim is to find out something about this profound reality and not to create something new or something else. However, as stated above, this re-creation must contain constructive elements reflecting the presuppositions, conceptual-theoretical assumptions, and aims of the investigator. By focusing on one factor and by reducing the complexity of the profound reality, the practical operationalization and realization thus reflect both the underlying conceptual structure and the anticipated outcome as they are specifically designed to test for the suspected but hidden or obscured causal relationships.

At this point, another element becomes relevant, namely the all-important role of language, which is emphasized in postmodern thinking (e.g., Harris, 2005 ). Without going into the intricacies of semiotics, there is an explanatory gap ( Chalmers, 2005 )—to borrow a phrase from philosophy of mind—between the phenomenon on the one hand and the linguistic and/or mental representation of it on the other. This relationship is far from clear and it is therefore problematic to assume that our linguistic or mental representations—our words and the concepts they designate—are identical with the phenomena themselves. Although we cannot, at least according to our present knowledge and understanding, fully bridge this gap, it is essential to be aware of it in order to avoid some pitfalls, as will be shown in the examples below.

Even a seemingly simple word like “tree”—to take up once more our previous example—refers to a tangible phenomenon because there are trees “out there.” However, they come in all shapes and sizes, there are different kinds of trees, and every single one of them may be labeled as “tree.” Furthermore, trees are composed of different parts, and the leaf—although part of the tree—has its own word, i.e., linguistic and mental representation. Although the leaf is part of the tree—at least according to our concepts—it is unclear whether “tree” also somehow encompasses “leaf.” The same holds true for the molecular, atomic, or even subatomic levels, where there “is” no tree. Excluding the extremely complex ontological implications of this problem, it has become clear that we are referring to a certain level of granularity when using the word “tree.” The level of granularity reflects the context, aims, and concepts of the investigator, e.g., an investigation of the rain forest as an ecosystem will ignore the subatomic level.

How does this concern experimental psychology? Psychology studies intangible phenomena, namely mental and behavioral processes, such as cognition, memory, learning, motivation, emotion, perception, consciousness, etc. It is important to note that these terms designate theoretical constructs as, for example, memory cannot be observed directly. We may provide the subjects of an experiment a set of words to learn and observe later how many words they reproduce correctly. A theoretical construct therefore describes such relationships between stimulus and behavior, and we may draw conclusions from this observable data about memory. But neither the observable behavior of the subject, the resulting data, nor our conclusions are identical with memory itself.

This train of thought demonstrates the postmodern character of experimental psychology because we construct our knowledge. But there is more to it than that: Even by trying to define a theoretical construct as exactly as possible—e.g., memory as “the process of maintaining information over time” ( Matlin, 2012 , 505) or “the means by which we retain and draw on our past experiences to use this information in the present” ( Sternberg and Sternberg, 2011 , 187)—the explanatory gap between representation and phenomenon cannot be bridged. Rather, it becomes even more complicated because theoretical constructs are composed of other theoretical constructs, which results in some kind of self-referential circularity where constructs are defined by other constructs which refer to further constructs. In the definitions above, for instance, hardly any key term is self-evident and unambiguous for there are different interpretations of the constructs “process,” “maintaining,” “information,” “means,” “retain,” “draw on,” “experiences,” and “use” according to their respective contexts. Only the temporal expressions “over time,” “past,” and “present” are probably less ambiguous here because they are employed as non-technical, everyday terms. However, the definitions above are certainly not entirely incomprehensible—in fact, they are rather easy to understand in everyday language—and it is quite clear what the authors intend to express . The italics indicate constructive elements, which demonstrates that attempts to give a precise definition in the language of science result in fuzziness and self-reference.

Based on a story by Jorge Luis Borges, Baudrillard (1981) found an illustrative allegory: a map so precise that it portrays everything in perfect detail—but therefore inevitably so large that it shrouds the entire territory it depicts. Similarly, Taleb (2007) coined the term “ludic fallacy” for mistaking the model/map—in our context: experiments in psychology—for the reality/territory, that is, a mental or behavioral phenomenon. Similar to the functionality of a seemingly “imprecise” map which contains only the relevant landmarks so the user may find their way, the fuzziness of language poses no problems in everyday communication. So why is it a problem in experimental psychology? Since the nature of theoretical constructs in psychology lies precisely in their very fuzziness, the aim of reaching a high degree of granularity and precision in experimental psychology seems to be unattainable (see the various failed attempts to create “perfect” languages which might depict literally everything “perfectly,” e.g., Carapezza and D’Agostino, 2010 ).

Without speculating about ontic or epistemic implications, it is necessary to be aware of the explanatory gap and to refrain from identifying the experiment and the underlying operationalization with the theoretical construct. Otherwise, this gap is “filled” unintentionally and uncontrollably if the results of an experiment are taken as valid proof for a certain theoretical construct, which is actually fuzzy and potentially operationalizable in a variety of ways. If this is not acknowledged, words, such as “memory,” become merely symbols devoid of concrete meaning, much like a glass bead game—or in postmodern terminology: a hyperreality.

Experiments and Hyperreality

“Hyperreality” is another key term in the work of Jean Baudrillard (1981) and it denotes a concept closely related to the simulacrum. Accordingly, in modern society the simulacra are ubiquitous and they form a system of interconnected simulacra which refer to each other rather than to the real, thereby possibly hiding or replacing the real. Consequently, the simulacra become real in their own right and form a “more real” reality, namely the hyperreality. One may or may not accept Baudrillard’s conception, especially the all-embracing social and societal implications, but the core concept of “hyperreality” is nevertheless a fruitful tool to analyze experimental psychology. We have already seen that the experiment displays many characteristics of a simulacrum, so it is not surprising that the concept of hyperreality is applicable here as well, although in a slightly different interpretation than Baudrillard’s.

The hyperreal character of the experiment can be discussed on two levels: the experiment itself and the discourse wherein it is embedded.

On the level of the experiment itself, two curious observations must be taken into account. First, and in contrast to the natural sciences where the investigator is human and the subject matter (mostly) non-human and usually inanimate, in psychology both the investigator and the subject matter are human. This means that the subjects of the experiment, being autonomous persons, are not malleable or completely controllable by the investigator because they bring their own background, history, worldview, expectations, and motivations. They interpret the situation—the experiment—and act accordingly, but not necessarily in the way the investigator had planned or anticipated ( Smedslund, 2016 ). Therefore, the subjects create their own versions of the experiment, or, in postmodern terminology, a variety of simulacra, which may be more or less compatible with the framework of the investigator. This holds true for all subjects of an experiment, which means that the experiment as a whole may also be interpreted as an aggregation of interconnected simulacra—a hyperreality.

The hyperreal character becomes even more evident because what contributes in the end to the interpretation of the results of the experiment are not the actual performances and results of the individual subjects as they were intended by them but rather how their performances and results are handled, seen, and interpreted by the investigator. Even if the investigator tries to be as faithful as possible and aims at an exact and unbiased measurement—i.e., an exact copy—there are inevitably constructive elements which introduce uncertainty into the experiment. Investigators can never be certain what the subjects were actually doing and thinking so they must necessarily work with interpretations. Or in postmodern terms: Because the actual performances and results of the subjects are not directly available the investigators must deal with simulacra. These simulacra become the investigators’ reality and thus any further treatment—statistical analyses, interpretations, or discussions—becomes a hyperreality, that is, a set of interconnected simulacra which have become “real.”

On the level of the discourse wherein the experiment is embedded, another curious aspect also demonstrates the hyperreal character of experimental psychology. Psychology is, according to the standard definition, the scientific study of mental and behavioral processes of the individual (e.g., Gerrig, 2012 ). This definition contains two actually contradictory elements. On the one hand, the focus is on processes of the individual. On the other hand, the—scientific—method to elucidate these processes does not look at individuals per se but aggregates their individual experiences and transforms them into a “standard” experience. The results from experiments, our knowledge of the human psyche, reflect psychological functioning at the level of the mean across individuals. And even if we assume that the mean is only an estimator and not an exact description or prediction, the question remains open how de-individualized observations are related to the experience of an individual. A general mechanism, a law—which was discovered by abstracting from a multitude of individual experiences—is then ( re -)imposed in the opposite direction back onto the individual. In other words, a simulacrum—namely, the result of an experiment—is viewed and treated as reality, thus becoming hyperreal. Additionally, and simply because it is considered universally true, this postulated law acquires thereby a certain validity and “truth”—often irrespective of its actual, factual, or “profound” truth—on its own. Therefore, it can become impossible to distinguish between “profound” and “simulacral” truth, which is the hallmark of hyperreality.

Measuring the Capacity of the Visual Working Memory

Vision is an important sensory modality and there is extensive research on this area ( Hutmacher, 2019 ). Much of our daily experience is shaped by seeing a rich and complex world around us, and it is therefore an interesting question how much visual information we can store and process. Based on the development of a seminal experimental paradigm, Luck and Vogel (1997) have shown that visual working memory has a storage capacity of about four items. This finding is reported in many textbooks (e.g., Baddeley, 2007 ; Parkin, 2013 ; Goldstein, 2015 ) and has almost become a truism in cognitive psychology.

The experimental paradigm developed by Luck and Vogel (1997) is a prime example of an experiment which closely adheres to the scientific principles outlined above. In order to make a very broad and fuzzy phenomenon measurable, simple abstract forms are employed as visual stimuli—such as colored squares, triangles, or lines, usually on a “neutral,” e.g., gray, background—which can be counted in order to measure the capacity of visual working memory. Reducing the exuberant diversity of the “outside visual world” to a few abstract geometric forms is an extremely artificial situation. The obvious contrast between simple geometrical forms and the rich panorama of the “real” visual world illustrates the pitfalls of controlling supposed confounding variables, namely the incontrollable variety of the “real” world and how we see it. Precisely by abstracting and by excluding potential confounding variables it is possible to count the items and to make the capacity of the visual working memory measurable. But in doing so the original phenomenon—seeing the whole world—is lost. In other words: A simulacrum has been created.

The establishment of the experimental paradigm by Luck and Vogel has led to much research and sparked an extensive discussion how the limitation to only four items might be explained (see the summaries by Brady et al., 2011 ; Luck and Vogel, 2013 ; Ma et al., 2014 ; Schurgin, 2018 ). However, critically, several studies have shown that the situation is different when real-world objects are used as visual stimuli rather than simple abstract forms, revealing that the capacity of the visual working memory is higher for real-world objects ( Endress and Potter, 2014 ; Brady et al., 2016 ; Schurgin et al., 2018 ; Robinson et al., 2020 ; also Schurgin and Brady, 2019 ). Such findings show that the discourse about the mechanisms behind the limitations of the visual working memory is mostly about an artificial phenomenon which has no counterpart in “reality”—the perfect example of a hyperreality.

This hyperreal character does not mean that the findings of Luck and Vogel (1997) or similar experiments employing artificial stimuli are irrelevant or not “true.” The results are true—but it is a local truth, only valid for the specific context of specific experiments, and not a global truth which applies to the visual working memory in general . That is, speaking about “visual working memory” based on the paradigm of Luck and Vogel is a mistake because it is actually about “visual working memory for simple abstract geometrical forms in front of a gray background.”

Free Will and Experimental Psychology

The term “free will” expresses the idea of having “a significant kind of control [italics in the original] over one’s actions” ( O’Connor and Franklin, 2018 , n.p.). This concept has occupied a central position in Western philosophy since antiquity because it has far-reaching consequences for our self-conception as humans and our position in the world, including questions of morality, responsibility, and the nature of legal systems (e.g., Beebee, 2013 ; McKenna and Pereboom, 2016 ; O’Connor and Franklin, 2018 ). Being a topic of general interest, it is not surprising that experimental psychologists have tried to investigate free will as well.

The most famous study was conducted by Libet et al. (1983) , and this experiment has quickly become a focal point in the extensive discourse on free will because it provides empirical data and a scientific investigation. Libet et al.’s experiment seems to show that the subjective impression when persons consciously decide to act is in fact preceded by objectively measurable but unconscious physical processes. This purportedly proves that our seemingly voluntary actions are actually predetermined by physical processes because the brain has unconsciously reached a decision already before the person becomes aware of it and that our conscious intentions are simply grafted onto it. Therefore, we do not have a free will, and consequently much of our social fabric is based on an illusion. Or so the story goes.

This description, although phrased somewhat pointedly, represents a typical line of thought in the discourse on free will (e.g., the prominent psychologists Gazzaniga, 2011 ; Wegner, 2017 ; see Kihlstrom, 2017 , for further examples).

Libet’s experiment sparked an extensive and highly controversial discussion: For some authors, it is a refutation or at least threat to various concepts of free will, or, conversely, an indicator or even proof for some kind of material determinism. By contrast, other authors deny that the experiment refutes or counts against free will. Furthermore, a third group—whose position we adopt for our further argumentation—denies that Libet’s findings are even relevant for this question at all (for summaries of this complex and extensive discussion and various positions including further references see Nahmias, 2010 ; Radder and Meynen, 2013 ; Schlosser, 2014 ; Fischborn, 2016 ; Lavazza, 2016 ; Schurger, 2017 ). Libet’s own position, although not entirely consistent, opposes most notions of free will ( Roskies, 2011 ; Seifert, 2011 ). Given this background, it is not surprising that there are also numerous further experimental studies on various aspects of this subject area (see the summaries by Saigle et al., 2018 ; Shepard, 2018 ; Brass et al., 2019 ).

However, we argue that this entire discourse is best understood along postmodern lines as hyperreality and that Libet’s experiment itself is a perfect example of a simulacrum. A closer look at the concrete procedure of the experiment shows that Libet actually asked his participants to move their hand or finger “at will” while their brain activity was monitored with an EEG. They were instructed to keep watch in an introspective manner for the moment when they felt the “urge” to move their hand and to record this moment by indicating the clock-position of a pointer. This is obviously a highly artificial situation where the broad and fuzzy concept of “free will” is abstracted and reduced to the movement of the finger, the only degree of freedom being the moment of the movement. The question whether this is an adequate operationalization of free will is of paramount importance, and there are many objections that Libet’s setup fails to measure free will at all (e.g., Mele, 2007 ; Roskies, 2011 ; Kihlstrom, 2017 ; Brass et al., 2019 ).

Before Libet, there was no indication that the decision when to move a finger might be relevant for the concept of free will and the associated discourse. The question whether we have control over our actions referred to completely different levels of granularity. Free will was discussed with respect to questions such as whether we are free to live our lives according to our wishes or whether we are responsible for our actions in social contexts (e.g., Beebee, 2013 ; McKenna and Pereboom, 2016 ; O’Connor and Franklin, 2018 ), and not whether we lift a finger now or two seconds later. Libet’s and others’ jumping from very specific situations to far-reaching conclusions about a very broad and fuzzy theoretical construct illustrates that an extremely wide chasm between two phenomena, namely moving the finger and free will, is bridged in one fell swoop.

In other words, Libet’s experiment is a simulacrum as it duplicates a phenomenon from our day-to-day experience—namely free will—but in doing so the operationalization alters and reduces the theoretical construct. The outcome is a questionable procedure whose relationship to the phenomenon is highly controversial. Furthermore, the fact that, despite its tenuous connection to free will, Libet’s experiment sparked an extensive discussion on this subject reveals the hyperreal nature of the entire discourse because what is being discussed is not the actual question—namely free will—but rather a simulacrum. Everything else—the arguments, counter-arguments, follow-up experiments, and their interpretations—built upon Libet’s experiment are basically commentaries to a simulacrum and not on the real phenomena. Therefore, a hyperreality is created where the discourse revolves around entirely artificial phenomena, but where the arguments in this discussion refer back to and affect the real as suggestions are made to alter the legal system and our ideas of responsibility—which, incidentally, is not a question of empirical science but of law, ethics, and philosophy.

All of the above is not meant to say that this whole discourse is meaningless or even gratuitous—on the contrary, our understanding of the subject matter has greatly increased. Although our knowledge of free will has hardly increased, we have gained much insight into the hermeneutics and methodology—and pitfalls!—of investigations of free will, possible consequences on the individual and societal level, and the workings of scientific discourses. And this is exactly what postmodernism is about.

As shown above, there are a number of postmodern elements in the practice of experimental psychology: The prominent role of language, the gap between the linguistic or mental representation and the phenomenon, the “addition of intellect to the object,” the simulacral character of the experiment itself in its attempt to re-create phenomena, which necessarily transforms the “real” phenomenon due to the requirements of the experiment, and finally the creation of a hyperreality if experiments are taken as the “real” phenomenon and the scientific discourse becomes an exchange of symbolic expressions referring to the simulacra created in experiments, replacing the real. All these aspects did not seep gradually into experimental psychology in the wake of postmodernism but have been present since the very inception of experimental psychology as they are necessarily inherent in its philosophy of science.

Given these inherent postmodern traits in experimental psychology, it is puzzling that there is so much resistance against a perceived “threat” of psychology’s scientificness. Although a detailed investigation of the reasons lies outside the scope of this analysis, we suspect there are two main causes: First, an insufficient knowledge of the history of science and understanding of philosophy of science may result in idealized concepts of a “pure” natural science. Second, lacking familiarity with basic tenets of postmodern approaches may lead to the assumption that postmodernism is just an idle game of arbitrary words. However, “science” and “postmodernism” and their respective epistemological concepts are not opposites ( Gergen, 2001 ; Holtz, 2020 ). This is especially true for psychology, which necessarily contains a social dimension because not only the investigators are humans but also the very subject matter itself.

The (over-)reliance on quantitative-experimental methods in psychology, often paired with a superficial understanding of the philosophy of science behind it, has been criticized, either from the theoretical point of view (e.g., Bergmann and Spence, 1941 ; Hearnshaw, 1941 ; Petrie, 1971 ; Law, 2004 ; Smedslund, 2016 ) or because the experimental approach has failed to produce reliable, valid, and relevant applicable knowledge in educational psychology ( Slavin, 2002 ). It is perhaps symptomatic that a textbook teaching the principles of science for psychologists does not contain even one example from experimental psychology but employs only examples from physics, plus Darwin’s theory of evolution ( Wilton and Harley, 2017 ).

On the other hand, the postmodern perspective on experimental psychology provides insight into some pitfalls, as illustrated by the examples above. On the level of the experiment, the methodological requirements imply the creation of an artificial situation, which opens up a gap between the phenomenon as it is in reality and as it is concretely operationalized in the experimental situation. This is not a problem per se as long as is it clear—and clearly communicated!—that the results of the experiment are only valid in a certain context. The problems begin if the movement of a finger is mistaken for free will. Similarly, being aware that local causalities do not explain complex phenomena such as mental and behavioral processes in their entirety also prevents (over-) generalization, especially if communicated appropriately. These limitations make it clear that the experiment should not be made into an absolute or seen as the only valid way of understanding the psyche and the world.

On the level of psychology as an academic discipline, any investigation must select the appropriate level of granularity and strike a balance between the methodological requirements and the general meaning of the theoretical concept in question to find out something about the “real” world. If the level of granularity is so fine that results cannot be tied back to broader theoretical constructs rather than providing a helpful understanding of our psychological functioning, academic psychology is in danger of becoming a self-referential hyperreality.

The postmodern character of experimental psychology also allows for a different view on the so-called replication crisis in psychology. Authors contending that there is no replication crisis often employ arguments which exhibit postmodern elements, such as the emphasis on specific local conditions in experiments which may explain different outcomes of replication studies ( Stroebe and Strack, 2014 ; Baumeister, 2019 ). In other words, they invoke the simulacral character of experiments. This explanation may be valid or not, but the replication crisis has shown the limits of a predominantly experimental approach in psychology.

Acknowledging the postmodern nature of experimental psychology and incorporating postmodern thinking explicitly into our research may offer a way out of this situation. Our subject matter—the psyche —is extremely complex, ambiguous, and often contradictory. And postmodern thinking has proven capable of successfully explaining such phenomena (e.g., Bertens, 1995 ; Sim, 2011 ; Aylesworth, 2015 ). Thus, paradoxically, by accepting and considering the inherently fuzzy nature of theoretical constructs, they often become much clearer ( Ronzitti, 2011 ). Therefore, thinking more along postmodern lines in psychology would actually sharpen the theoretical and conceptual basis of experimental psychology—all the more as experimental psychology has inevitably been a postmodern endeavor since its very beginning.

Author Contributions

RM, CK, and CL developed the idea for this article. RM drafted the manuscript. CK and CL provided feedback and suggestions. All authors approved the manuscript for submission.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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What is Experimental Psychology?

Bryn Farnsworth

Table of Contents

The mind is a complicated place. Fortunately, the scientific method is perfectly equipped to deal with complexity. If we put these two things together we have the field of experimental psychology, broadly defined as the scientific study of the mind. The word “experimental” in this context means that tests are administered to participants, outcomes are measured, and comparisons are made.

More formally, this means that a group of participants are exposed to a stimulus (or stimuli), and their behavior in response is recorded. This behavior is compared to some kind of control condition, which could be either a neutral stimulus, the absence of a stimulus, or against a control group (who maybe do nothing at all).

Experimental psychology is concerned with testing theories of human thoughts, feelings, actions, and beyond – any aspect of being human that involves the mind. This is a broad category that features many branches within it (e.g. behavioral psychology , cognitive psychology). Below, we will go through a brief history of experimental psychology, the aspects that characterize it, and outline research that has gone on to shape this field.

A Brief History of Experimental Psychology

As with anything, and perhaps particularly with scientific ideas, it’s difficult to pinpoint the exact moment in which a thought or approach was conceived. One of the best candidates with which to credit the emergence of experimental psychology with is Gustav Fechner who came to prominence in the 1830’s. After completing his Ph.D in biology at the University of Leipzig [1], and continuing his work as a professor, he made a significant breakthrough in the conception of mental states.

Scientists later wrote about Fechner’s breakthrough for understanding perception: “An increase in the intensity of a stimulus, Fechner argued, does not produce a one-to-one increase in the intensity of the sensation … For example, adding the sound of one bell to that of an already ringing bell produces a greater increase in sensation than adding one bell to 10 others already ringing. Therefore, the effects of stimulus intensities are not absolute but are relative to the amount of sensation that already exists.” [2]

This ultimately meant that mental perception is responsive to the material world – the mind doesn’t passively respond to a stimulus (if that was the case, there would be a linear relationship between the intensity of a stimulus and the actual perception of it), but is instead dynamically responsive to it. This conception ultimately shapes much of experimental psychology, and the grounding theory: that the response of the brain to the environment can be quantified .

Fechner went on to research within this area for many subsequent years, testing new ideas regarding human perception. Meanwhile, another German scientist working in Heidelberg to the West, began his work on the problem of multitasking, and created the next paradigm shift for experimental psychology. The scientist was Wilhem Wundt, who had followed the work of Gustav Fechner.

Wilhem Wundt is often credited with being “the father of experimental psychology” and is the founding point for many aspects of it. He began the first experimental psychology lab, scientific journal, and ultimately formalized the approach as a science. Wundt set in stone what Fechner had put on paper.

The next scientist to advance the field of experimental psychology was influenced directly by reading Fechner’s book “ Elements of Psychophysics ”. Hermann Ebbinghaus, once again a German scientist, carried out the first properly formalized research into memory and forgetting, by using long lists of (mostly) nonsense syllables (such as: “VAW”, “TEL”, “BOC”) and recording how long it took for people to forget them.

Experiments using this list, concerning learning and memory, would take up much of Ebbinghaus’ career, and help cement experimental psychology as a science. There are many other scientists’ whose contributions helped pave the way for the direction, approach, and success of experimental psychology (Hermann von Helmholtz, Ernst Weber, and Mary Whiton Calkins, to name just a few) – all played a part in creating the field as we know it today. The work that they did defined the field, providing it with characteristics that we’ll now go through below.

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What Defines Experimental Psychology?

Defining any scientific field is in itself no exact science – there are inevitably aspects that will be missed. However, experimental psychology features at least three central components that define it: empiricism, falsifiability, and determinism . These features are central to experimental psychology but also many other fields within science.

Empiricism refers to the collection of data that can support or refute a theory. In opposition to purely theoretical reasoning, empiricism is concerned with observations that can be tested. It is based on the idea that all knowledge stems from observations that can be perceived, and data surrounding them can be collected to form experiments.

Falsifiability is a foundational aspect of all contemporary scientific work. Karl Popper , a 20th century philosopher, formalized this concept – that for any theory to be scientific there must be a way to falsify it. Otherwise, ludicrous, but unprovable claims could be made with equal weight as the most rigorously tested theories.

For example, the Theory of Relativity is scientific, for example, because it is possible that evidence could emerge to disprove it. This means that it can be tested. An example of an unfalsifiable argument is that the earth is younger than it appears, but that it was created to appear older than it is – any evidence against this is dismissed within the argument itself, rendering it impossible to falsify, and therefore untestable.

Determinism refers to the notion that any event has a cause before it. Applied to mental states, this means that the brain responds to stimuli, and that these responses can ultimately be predicted, given the correct data.

These aspects of experimental psychology run throughout the research carried out within this field. There are thousands of articles featuring research that have been carried out within this vein – below we will go through just a few of the most influential and well-cited studies that have shaped this field, and look to the future of experimental psychology.

Classic Studies in Experimental Psychology

Little albert.

One of the most notorious studies within experimental psychology was also one of the foundational pieces of research for behaviorism. Popularly known as the study of “Little Albert”, this experiment, carried out in 1920, focused on whether a baby could be made to fear a stimulus through conditioning (conditioning refers to the association of a response to a stimulus) [3].

The psychologist, John B. Watson , devised an experiment in which a baby was exposed to an unconditioned stimulus (in this case, a white rat) at the same time as a fear-inducing stimulus (the loud, sudden sound of a hammer hitting a metal bar). The repetition of this loud noise paired with the appearance of the white rat eventually led to the white rat becoming a conditioned stimulus – inducing the fear response even without the sound of the hammer.

While the study was clearly problematic, and wouldn’t (and shouldn’t!) clear any ethical boards today, it was hugely influential for its time, showing how human emotional responses can be shaped intentionally by conditioning – a feat only carried out with animals prior to this [4].

Watson, later referred to by a previous professor of his as a person “who thought too highly of himself and was more interested in his own ideas than in people” [5], was later revered and reviled in equal measure [2]. While his approach has since been rightly questioned, the study was a breakthrough for the conception of human behavior .

Asch’s Conformity Experiment

Three decades following Watson’s infamous experiment, beliefs were studied rather than behavior. Research carried out by Solomon Asch in 1951 showed how the influence of group pressure could make people say what they didn’t believe.

The goal was to examine how social pressures “induce individuals to resist or to yield to group pressures when the latter are perceived to be contrary to fact” [6]. Participant’s were introduced to a group of seven people in which, unbeknownst to them, all other individuals were actors hired by Asch. The task was introduced as a perceptual test, in which the length of lines was to be compared.

Sets of lines were shown to the group of participants – three on one card, one on another (as in the image above). The apparent task was to compare the three lines and say which was most like the single line in length. The answers were plainly obvious, and in one-on-one testing, participants got a correct answer over 99% of the time. Yet in this group setting, in which each actor, one after the other, incorrectly said an incorrect line out loud, the answers of the participants would change.

On average, around 38% of the answers the participants gave were incorrect – a huge jump from the less than 1% reported in non-group settings. The study was hugely influential for showing how our actions can be impacted by the environment we are placed in, particularly when it comes to social factors.

The Invisible Gorilla

If you don’t know this research from the title already, then it’s best experienced by watching the video below, and counting the number of ball passes.

The research of course has little to do with throwing a ball around, but more to do with the likelihood of not seeing the person in a gorilla costume who appears in the middle of the screen for eight seconds. The research, carried out in 1999, investigated how our attentional resources can impact how we perceive the world [7]. The term “ inattentional blindness ” refers to the effective blindness of our perceptions when our attention is engaged in another task.

The study tested how attentional processing is distributed, suggesting that objects that are more relevant to the task are more likely to be seen than objects which simply have close spatial proximity (very roughly – something expected is more likely to be seen even if it’s further away, whereas something unexpected is less likely to be seen even if it’s close).

The research not only showed the effect of our perceptions on our experience, but also has real-world implications. A replication of this study was done using eye tracking to record the visual search of radiologists who were instructed to look for nodules on one of several X-rays of lungs [8]. As the researchers state “A gorilla, 48 times the size of the average nodule, was inserted in the last case that was presented . Eighty-three percent of the radiologists did not see the gorilla.”

The original study, and research that followed since, has been crucial for showing how our expectations about the environment can shape our perceptions. Modern research has built upon each of the ideas and studies that have been carried out across almost 200 years.

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The Future of Experimental Psychology

The majority of this article has been concerned with what experimental psychology is, where it comes from, and what it has achieved so far. An inevitable follow-up question to this is – where is it going?

While predictions are difficult to make, there are at least indications. The best place to look is to experts in the field. Schultz and Schultz refer to modern psychology “as the science of behavior and mental processes instead of only behavior, a science seeking to explain overt behavior and its relationship to mental processes.” [2].

The Association for Psychological Science (APS) asked for forecasts from several prominent psychology researchers ( original article available here ), and received some of the following responses.

Lauri Nummenmaa (Assistant professor, Aalto University, Finland) predicts a similar path to Schultz and Schultz, stating that “a major aim of the future psychological science would involve re-establishing the link between the brain and behavior”. While Modupe Akinola (Assistant professor, Columbia Business School) hopes “that advancements in technology will allow for more unobtrusive ways of measuring bodily responses”.

Kristen Lindquist (Assistant professor of psychology, University of North Carolina School of Medicine) centers in on emotional responses, saying that “We are just beginning to understand how a person’s expectations, knowledge, and prior experiences shape his or her emotions. Emotions play a role in every moment of waking life from decisions to memories to feelings, so understanding emotions will help us to understand the mind more generally.”

Tal Yarkoni (Director, Psychoinformatics Lab, University of Texas at Austin) provides a forthright assessment of what the future of experimental psychology has in store: “psychological scientists will have better data, better tools, and more reliable methods of aggregation and evaluation”.

Whatever the future of experimental psychology looks like, we at iMotions aim to keep providing all the tools needed to carry out rigorous experimental psychology research.

I hope you’ve enjoyed reading this introduction to experimental psychology. If you’d like to get an even closer look at the background and research within this field, then download our free guide to human behavior below.

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[1] Shiraev, E. (2015). A history of psychology . Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

[2] Schultz, D. P., & Schultz, S. E. (2011). A History of Modern Psychology . Cengage, Canada.

[3] Watson, J.B.; Rayner, R. (1920). “Conditioned emotional reactions”. Journal of Experimental Psychology . 3 (1): 1–14. doi:10.1037/h0069608.

[4] Pavlov, I. P. (1928). Lectures on conditioned reflexes . (Translated by W.H. Gantt) London: Allen and Unwin.

[5] Brewer, C. L. (1991). Perspectives on John B. Watson . In G. A. Kimble, M. Wertheimer, & C. White (Eds.), Portraits of pioneers in psychology (pp. 171–186). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

[6] Asch, S.E. (1951). Effects of group pressure on the modification and distortion of judgments . In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership and men(pp. 177–190). Pittsburgh, PA:Carnegie Press.

[7] Simons, D. and Chabris, C. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception , 28(9), pp.1059-1074.

[8] Drew, T., Võ, M. L-H., Wolfe, J. M. (2013). The invisible gorilla strikes again: sustained inattentional blindness in expert observers. Psychological Science, 24 (9):1848–1853. doi: 10.1177/0956797613479386.

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Experimental Method In Psychology

Saul McLeod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

The experimental method involves the manipulation of variables to establish cause-and-effect relationships. The key features are controlled methods and the random allocation of participants into controlled and experimental groups .

What is an Experiment?

An experiment is an investigation in which a hypothesis is scientifically tested. An independent variable (the cause) is manipulated in an experiment, and the dependent variable (the effect) is measured; any extraneous variables are controlled.

An advantage is that experiments should be objective. The researcher’s views and opinions should not affect a study’s results. This is good as it makes the data more valid  and less biased.

There are three types of experiments you need to know:

1. Lab Experiment

A laboratory experiment in psychology is a research method in which the experimenter manipulates one or more independent variables and measures the effects on the dependent variable under controlled conditions.

A laboratory experiment is conducted under highly controlled conditions (not necessarily a laboratory) where accurate measurements are possible.

The researcher uses a standardized procedure to determine where the experiment will take place, at what time, with which participants, and in what circumstances.

Participants are randomly allocated to each independent variable group.

Examples are Milgram’s experiment on obedience and  Loftus and Palmer’s car crash study .

• Strength : It is easier to replicate (i.e., copy) a laboratory experiment. This is because a standardized procedure is used.
• Strength : They allow for precise control of extraneous and independent variables. This allows a cause-and-effect relationship to be established.
• Limitation : The artificiality of the setting may produce unnatural behavior that does not reflect real life, i.e., low ecological validity. This means it would not be possible to generalize the findings to a real-life setting.
• Limitation : Demand characteristics or experimenter effects may bias the results and become confounding variables .

2. Field Experiment

A field experiment is a research method in psychology that takes place in a natural, real-world setting. It is similar to a laboratory experiment in that the experimenter manipulates one or more independent variables and measures the effects on the dependent variable.

However, in a field experiment, the participants are unaware they are being studied, and the experimenter has less control over the extraneous variables .

Field experiments are often used to study social phenomena, such as altruism, obedience, and persuasion. They are also used to test the effectiveness of interventions in real-world settings, such as educational programs and public health campaigns.

An example is Holfing’s hospital study on obedience .

• Strength : behavior in a field experiment is more likely to reflect real life because of its natural setting, i.e., higher ecological validity than a lab experiment.
• Strength : Demand characteristics are less likely to affect the results, as participants may not know they are being studied. This occurs when the study is covert.
• Limitation : There is less control over extraneous variables that might bias the results. This makes it difficult for another researcher to replicate the study in exactly the same way.

3. Natural Experiment

A natural experiment in psychology is a research method in which the experimenter observes the effects of a naturally occurring event or situation on the dependent variable without manipulating any variables.

Natural experiments are conducted in the day (i.e., real life) environment of the participants, but here, the experimenter has no control over the independent variable as it occurs naturally in real life.

Natural experiments are often used to study psychological phenomena that would be difficult or unethical to study in a laboratory setting, such as the effects of natural disasters, policy changes, or social movements.

For example, Hodges and Tizard’s attachment research (1989) compared the long-term development of children who have been adopted, fostered, or returned to their mothers with a control group of children who had spent all their lives in their biological families.

Here is a fictional example of a natural experiment in psychology:

Researchers might compare academic achievement rates among students born before and after a major policy change that increased funding for education.

In this case, the independent variable is the timing of the policy change, and the dependent variable is academic achievement. The researchers would not be able to manipulate the independent variable, but they could observe its effects on the dependent variable.

• Strength : behavior in a natural experiment is more likely to reflect real life because of its natural setting, i.e., very high ecological validity.
• Strength : Demand characteristics are less likely to affect the results, as participants may not know they are being studied.
• Strength : It can be used in situations in which it would be ethically unacceptable to manipulate the independent variable, e.g., researching stress .
• Limitation : They may be more expensive and time-consuming than lab experiments.
• Limitation : There is no control over extraneous variables that might bias the results. This makes it difficult for another researcher to replicate the study in exactly the same way.

Key Terminology

Ecological validity.

The degree to which an investigation represents real-life experiences.

Experimenter effects

These are the ways that the experimenter can accidentally influence the participant through their appearance or behavior.

Demand characteristics

The clues in an experiment lead the participants to think they know what the researcher is looking for (e.g., the experimenter’s body language).

Independent variable (IV)

The variable the experimenter manipulates (i.e., changes) is assumed to have a direct effect on the dependent variable.

Dependent variable (DV)

Variable the experimenter measures. This is the outcome (i.e., the result) of a study.

Extraneous variables (EV)

All variables which are not independent variables but could affect the results (DV) of the experiment. EVs should be controlled where possible.

Confounding variables

Variable(s) that have affected the results (DV), apart from the IV. A confounding variable could be an extraneous variable that has not been controlled.

Random Allocation

Randomly allocating participants to independent variable conditions means that all participants should have an equal chance of participating in each condition.

The principle of random allocation is to avoid bias in how the experiment is carried out and limit the effects of participant variables.

Order effects

Changes in participants’ performance due to their repeating the same or similar test more than once. Examples of order effects include:

(i) practice effect: an improvement in performance on a task due to repetition, for example, because of familiarity with the task;

(ii) fatigue effect: a decrease in performance of a task due to repetition, for example, because of boredom or tiredness.

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What is Experimental Psychology?

Experimental psychology is an interesting subdiscipline of psychology.

On the one hand, it refers to an approach to studying human behavior – the standardized methods and techniques used to collect and analyze data.  On the other hand, experimental psychology is a unique branch, an applied field of psychology that explores theoretical questions about human behavior.

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So, while virtually all psychologists can engage in experimental psychology in one form or another, there are also professionals who spend their entire careers conducting applied experimental research in the field of psychology. This is what deems professionals in this field experimental psychologists.

In this guide, we’ll explore how experimental psychology developed and review some of the methods that are used in conducting studies of behavior. We’ll also discuss types of experiments, survey a few types of psychological experiments, and go over career-related information for experimental psychologists as well.

Let’s get started!

What is The History of Experimental Psychology?

Cognitive psychology is one of the most fascinating fields today. Questions about the nature of human behavior and the connection of the body and mind go back to classic philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. Likewise, the debate over nature vs nurture raged long before experimental psychologists came along in their formal and modern form.

But the centuries of philosophizing about why people behave in the manners in which they behave sparked the interest of scientific researchers to study human behavior in an empirical manner. If the principles of the scientific methods could be used for the study of behavior, perhaps scientists could provide definitive answers to the age-old questions surrounding human behavior.

This is precisely why the experimental psychologist was born.

The first experimental psychology lab in the world was founded in Leipzig, Germany, in 1879 by Wilhelm Wundt. There, Wundt primarily studied feelings and sensations in a structured manner using objective, systematized measures and controls. This mathematical and experimental approach set the precedent for the scientific methods that experimental psychologists and research centers use today. 

For example, Wundt used his background in physiology to design an experiment on sensory processes in which each participant was exposed to the same stimulus, such as the sound of a metronome. Each participant was then asked to provide a report of the sensations they experienced, a process called introspection.

The goal of this experiment was to understand the underlying structure of sensory processes. That is, Wundt was interested in analyzing each of the elements of the human experience involved in sensing the stimulus – the thoughts, senses, feelings, and so forth.

Wundt believed that breaking down the process of a behavior – in this case, sensing a sound – could be done much like a chemist analyzes a chemical compound. If you examine the individual components, you can learn more about the structure underneath the individual components.

While Wundt’s process of introspection didn’t remain a long-lasting approach to studying psychological processes, his insistence on controlling the experimental environment has had a long-term impact on how psychological research is conducted.

The experiments he devised used the same conditions for the experimental subjects – the same stimuli, the same setting, the same lighting, and so forth. By controlling the environment in which research is taking place, Wundt was able to minimize potential confounding variables. Doing so is critically important for any research.

Because Wundt’s laboratory was the first in the world, he is often considered the father of modern psychology. That is, his contributions to the field shifted psychology from a philosophical pursuit to a scientific one.

In the United States, experimental psychology grew out of the efforts of G. Stanley Hall and George Trumbull Ladd .

• Stanley Hall is credited with developing the first experimental psychology lab in the United States, which was located at Johns Hopkins University. Though his career mostly focused on child development and evolutionary psychology, his most significant contribution to psychology was overseeing the early development of the field in the United States. He was the first American to get a doctorate in psychology and he oversaw 11 of the first 14 doctorates to be awarded in the U.S., including those to John Dewey, Lewis Terman, and James McKeen Cattell, each of whom went on to become influential figures in the field in their own rite.

Meanwhile, George Trumbull Ladd, who was a professor of psychology at Yale University, established one of the earliest experimental labs for psychology in the U.S. He is also credited with publishing the first experimental psychology textbook, entitled Elements of Physiological Psychology.

Another important figure in the history of experimental psychology was Wundt’s American contemporary, William James.

His textbook, The Principles of Psychology , is perhaps the most seminal work in the history of psychology. Published in 1890, the book offers insights into the experiments James performed over the course of his career teaching at Harvard. However, the book is not a manual on experimental psychology. In fact, James wasn’t particularly interested in experimental research.

Despite this, James was the first American to teach a psychology course in the United States. He also helped found functionalism, which was one of the earliest schools of thought in psychology. As a result of this, James is often referred to as the father of American psychology.

What is The Methodology of Experimental Psychology?

Almost everyone is familiar with certain experiments, such as a mouse trying to navigate a maze or a primate trying to figure out a puzzle. However, human experiments are much more complex. For example, the experimental psychologist must take into account extraneous variables, environmental conditions, and experimenter bias as potentially skewing the data that’s collected.

Additionally, experimental psychologists must choose an appropriate sample size, correctly define the operations of the experiment, and use sound statistical analyses. Experimental methods must be completely controlled and perfectly executed in order to stand up to peer review, which is one of the foundations of all scientific endeavors.

An experimental method in psychology can take several forms:

• Laboratory experiments , in which researchers carefully control every aspect of the experiment. This includes where, when, and how the experiment will take place, the number and type of participants, standardized procedures, and assignment of participants to the control or experimental group. Lab experiments are easy to replicate and do a good job of controlling for confounding variables. However, lab experiments can produce unnatural behaviors due to the artificial setting and experimenter bias can be an issue.
• Natural experiments , in which researchers conduct their experiments in a real-life setting. This type of research offers no control over the independent variable (and no control over potential confounding variables, either). However, because the research is conducted in a natural environment, it has better ecological validity than lab experiments and it can be used to study behaviors that would be unethical to study in a lab setting, again because the independent variable is naturally occurring. 
• Field experiments , in which research is conducted in a real-life setting, but with the ability to manipulate the independent variable. While this type of research doesn’t allow for control over confounding variables, it offers the advantage of most closely reflecting real behaviors with a lesser likelihood of demand characteristics influencing the final results.

What is The Science of Experimental Psychology?

Experimental psychologists and scientists all believe in the same basic four principles. First, determinism means that all phenomena have some sort of systematic cause. Second, empiricism means that objective observation is the key to interpreting the world around us. Third, parsimony means that scientists prefer a minimalist approach to developing and researching theories. That is, science embraces the principle of Occam’s razor, which means that the theory with the fewest assumptions should be the logical conclusion. Finally, the fourth principle is testability. All theories must be empirically tested with applied falsifiability.

In other words, experimental psychology follows the same maxims of the physical sciences. The purpose is to use the principles of the scientific method to empirically study human behavior to arrive at testable and repeatable conclusions.

To do so, experimental research methods must be reliable and valid. Reliability refers to the consistency of observations, or the repeatability of an observation. Examples of tests of reliability include the split-half method (in which the results from one half of participants is compared to the other half) and the test-retest method (in which measurements are taken of the same group multiple times to see if the results are consistent.

Validity refers to how well a test measures what it’s intended to measure. So, an intelligence test is a valid measure of intelligence. It is not, however, a valid measure of honesty.

Additionally, the science of experimental psychology is rooted in research design. There are many types of designs that experimental psychologists can use, including:

• Within-subjects designs , in which participants in the study are exposed to more than one condition, thereby allowing researchers to compare different data points on the same subject.
• Between-subjects designs , in which participants are exposed to only one condition, which enables researchers to compare data between different subjects.
• One-way designs , in which there is a single independent variable and often just two groups, one of which serves as the control group (which is not exposed to the treatment) and the experimental group (which is exposed to the treatment).
• Factorial designs , which feature two or more independent variables which occur at all levels and in combination with every other independent variable. These experiments are quantified based on their factorial design, such as a 2×3 design. This design has two independent variables, one of which has two levels and the other of which has three.

What Are Some Experiment Examples?

Since experimental psychologists are involved in every branch of psychology, there is an impressive variety of experimental categories.

Social psychology uses field experiments and objective observation to understand collective behavior. For example, researchers might construct a simulated scenario that tests how participants engage in altruistic behavior, such as helping an injured stranger.

On the other hand, cognitive psychologists can use complex equipment and software to analyze the neurological reactions of participants as they watch scary or violent images.

Finally, psychologists studying abnormal behavior, such as phobias or personality disorders, could test participants with these conditions against groups of people that have not been diagnosed with these disorders.

Over the years, there have been many highly influential psychological experiments using various scientific methods. And while their influence has had far-reaching ramifications on our understanding of human behavior, some of these experiments are now viewed as having been unethical. While an experimental psychologist can make a big difference in the world after a successful experimental, their experimental methods do still have to be rational and fair. Psychology research is pointless if people are getting hurt. 

Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment:

In short, the goal of the experiment was to determine how people conform to social roles. To study this, Zimbardo constructed a makeshift jail in the basement of the psychology building on the Stanford campus. He then recruited 24 male students, each of which were randomly assigned to be a guard or a prisoner.

Prisoners were rounded up and brought to the “prison,” where they were booked and supervised by the group assigned to be guards. Both groups quickly adapted to the roles to which they had ben assigned, with some of the guards engaging in psychological torture of their charges. The experiment ended after just six days because the situation had become so intense and so dangerous.

Despite the questionable ethics of the experiment, it did shed light on conformity and social roles, and how people can very quickly and easily adopt roles they are expected to play, especially when those roles are highly stereotyped

What Are The Careers Options for Experimental Psychology?

According to the American Psychological Association , experimental psychologists seek to answer basic questions about human behavior and mental processes through applied research. These professional perform research to bring light to many topics.

For example, the most popular research topics include memory, emotion, perception and sensation. Typically, experimental psychologists work work in university research centers, but also work for private companies or even the government. Other experimental psychologists may also work in subfields. This may include education (to teach psychology courses), human resources and health care.

Whatever the work setting, you will need a doctorate in psychology to be an experimental psychologist. What’s more, you’ll need to specialize in a particular area of research and pursue post-doctoral studies in that area.

The job outlook for psychology as a whole is about average for the next few years. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimates that all psychology jobs will grow at a rate of three percent through 2029 . The BLS doesn’t provide data specific to experimental psychology, but it’s reasonable to assume that job growth in this field will be on par with the field of psychology as a whole.

In other words, with average job growth for the coming years, competition for experimental psychology jobs will likely be fierce. This is all the more reason to learn about the field, carefully plan your education, and seek out ways in which you can get real-world experience in experimental psychology. The better your combination of education and experience, the more likely you are to stand out in a crowd of other experimental psychology graduates.

Sean Jackson

B.A. Social Studies Education | University of Wyoming

M.S. Counseling | University of Wyoming

B.S. Information Technology | University of Massachusetts

Updated August 2021

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Experimental psychology, the journal for experimental research in psychology.

• ISSN L: 1618-3169
• ISSN Print: 1618-3169
• ISSN Online: 2190-5142

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As its name implies, Experimental Psychology publishes innovative, original, high-quality experimental research in psychology.

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To get more detailed information, read the Editorial by Andreas B. Eder and Christian Frings.

What makes Experimental Psychology special?

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Announcing the Peer Community in Registered Reports Experimental Psychology is proud to be a founding participant journal in the recently launched Peer Community in Registered Reports (PCI-RR). After a preprint is posted on a server and submitted for review at PCI, it follows the usual rounds of reviews and revisions. Once authors have their Registered Report recommended by PCI-RR, they have the option to publish their article in a growing list of “PCI-RR-friendly” journals that have committed to accepting PCI-RR recommendations without further peer review – one of them is Experimental Psychology. Click here for more information.

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Article highlights

Recent Editorial

Message From Your New Editor Raymond M. Klein Experimental Psychology, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 173-174

Editor’s Picks

(A)symmetries in Memory and Directed Forgetting of Political Stimuli Andrew Franks, Hajime Otani, and Gavin T. Roupe Experimental Psychology, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 68-80

Probing the Dual-Route Model of the SNARC Effect by Orthogonalizing Processing Speed and Depth Daniele Didino, Matthias Brandtner, Maria Glaser, and André Knops Experimental Psychology, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 1–13

Raymond Klein

Editor-in-chief

Department of Psychology and Neuroscience

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Dalhousie University

1355 Oxford St.

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Swasti Arora Department of Psychology and Neuroscience Faculty of Science Dalhousie University 1355 Oxford St. Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4R2 Canada Send email

Associate editors

Ullrich Ecker School of Psychological Science University of Western Australia Perth 6009 Australia Send email Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia. His main interests lie in episodic memory, working memory, feature binding, memory updating, as well as the processing of misinformation and its effects on memory and reasoning. He uses mainly behavioural experimentation, augmented by neuroimaging methods (event-related potentials, fMRI) and computational modelling.

Gesa Hartwigsen Lise Meitner Research Group Cognition and Plasticity Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences Stephanstraße 1a 04103 Leipzig Germany Send email Lise Meitner Research Group Leader at the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig (Germany). Her main interest is the potential for adaptive systems plasticity in neural networks for cognitive functions, with a focus on the healthy and lesioned language network. Her group combines neurostimulation and neuroimaging techniques to probe interactions between domain-specific and domain-general networks.

Manuel Perea University of València Av. Blasco Ibáñez, 21 46010 Valencia Spain Send email Professor of Psychology at the University of Valencia (Spain). His main fields of interest are psychology of language, lexical-semantic memory, and cognitive neuroscience.

James R. Schmidt Université de Bourgogne LEAD-CNRS UMR 5022 Pole AAFE 11 Esplanade Erasme 21000 Dijon France Send email Full Professor at the Université de Bourgogne, working in the Laboratoire d'Etude de l'Apprentissage et du Développement (LEAD; Laboratory for Research on Learning and Development). His main research interests are implicit learning, music learning, cognitive control, and neural networks.

Alexander Schütz University of Marburg Department of Psychology Gutenbergstr. 18 35032 Marburg Germany Send email Professor of Experimental Psychology at the University of Marburg (Germany). His main research interests are visual perception, eye movements and their interaction in active perception.

Editorial board

The expertise of the international editorial board covers a broad range of subject areas. All papers submitted to the journal are subject to full peer-review by members of the board and external reviewers. Hartmut Blank, University of Portsmouth, UK (memory (misinformation and social influence), hindsight bias and meta-analysis) Arndt Bröder, University of Mannheim, Germany (memory and metamemory, judgment and decision making) Roberto Dell'Acqua, Università degli Studi di Padova, Italy (visual attention, visual working memory, attentional blink) Edgar Erdfelder, Universität Mannheim, Germany (episodic memory, judgment/reasoning, cognitive modeling, design/power analysis) Christian Frings, University of Würzburg, Germany (action control, perception-action Integration, inhibition (negative priming), multisensory perception) Morris Goldsmith, University of Haifa, Israel (object-based attention, memory accuracy, and metamemory-metacognition) Dirk Kerzel, Université de Genève, Switzerland (visual search, visual working memory, and motion perception) Andrea Kiesel, University of Freiburg, Germany (cognitive control, multitasking, cognitive-motor interference) Iring Koch, RWTH Aachen, Germany (attention & cognitive control (task switching specifically), bilingualism, sequence learning) Joachim I. Krueger, Brown University, RI, USA (social cognition, JDM, free will) Dominique Lamy, Tel Aviv University, Israel (visual search, visual attention, conscious vs. unconscious visual perception)

Stephen Lindsay, University of Victoria, Canada (memory, eyewitness memory, response bias) Ben Newell, University of New South Wales, Australia (judgment, decision making, choice) Klaus Oberauer, Universität Zürich, Switzerland (working memory, executive functions, episodic memory) Michel Regenwetter, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA (order-constrained Inference, decision making, probabilistic choice) Rainer Reisenzein, Universität Greifswald, Germany (emotion, surprise, motivation, temporal order) Jeffrey N. Rouder, University of Missouri, MO, USA (methods (Bayesian in particular), individual differences, attention) David Shanks, University College London, UK (learning, memory, and unconscious processes)

Christoph Stahl, University of Cologne, Germany (evaluative conditioning, implicit/unconscious learning, false memory)

Sarah Teige-Mocigemba, University of Marburg, Germany (social cognition, implicit measures, priming)

Sebastien Tremblay, Université Laval, Canada (cognitive limitations, human performance, problem solving, decision making) Christian Unkelbach, Universität zu Köln, Germany (social cognition, person perception, evaluative learning & conditioning, sport psychology) Eva Walther, Universität Trier, Germany (evaluative learning, conditioning, contingency memory) Peter A. White, Cardiff University, UK (causal judgment, causal perception, temporal aspects of perception)

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Psychology (Experimental)

• Admissions Requirements
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• Studying at Oxford

Course overview

UCAS code: C830 Entrance requirements: A*AA Course duration: 4 years (MSci in Experimental Psychology); 3 years (BA).

Subject requirements

Required subjects: Not applicable Recommended subjects: One or more science subjects (including Psychology) or Maths Helpful subjects: Not applicable

Other course requirements

Admissions tests:  TSA (Section 1) Written Work: None

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Interviewed: 35% Successful: 12% Intake: 50 *3-year average 2021-23

Tel: +44 (0) 1865 271353 Email:  [email protected]

Unistats information for this course can be found at the bottom of the page

Please note that there may be no data available if the number of course participants is very small.

About the course

Psychology has been defined as the science of mental life and its scope includes a wide variety of issues. It addresses such questions as: how do we perceive and understand the world around us? How do children acquire language? What predisposes two people to get on with each other? What causes schizophrenia?

Psychology at Oxford is a scientific discipline, involving the rigorous formulation and testing of ideas. It works through experiments and systematic observation rather than introspection.

The Oxford Experimental Psychology Department is widely regarded as one of the leading psychology departments in the UK. The department’s size and its commitment to excellence in teaching and research means there are typically four or five research seminars each week, in addition to undergraduate lectures and classes. 

At present, there are particularly strong research groups in the fields of human cognitive processes, neuroscience, language, developmental psychology, social psychology and psychological disorders.

Students can elect to graduate after three years with a BA degree. Alternatively, they can decide to remain for an optional fourth year composed of a research-intensive, clinically-focused or translation-focused extended project.

Students who complete the fourth year will graduate with a Master’s degree in Experimental Psychology. 

Fieldwork/international opportunities

A wide choice of research projects is available to students in their third and fourth years, including experimental, clinical or translational projects involving collaborations with other departments and outside the University.

Experimental Psychology has excellent facilities and very close links with neuroscience, including neurophysiology and neurology, as well as the Philosophy and Linguistics Departments.

Students benefit from the department being one of Britain’s most active centres for psychological research, with an outstanding international reputation.

Unistats information

Discover Uni  course data provides applicants with Unistats statistics about undergraduate life at Oxford for a particular undergraduate course.

Please select 'see course data' to view the full Unistats data for Psychology. 

Please note that there may be no data available if the number of course participants is very small. 

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Visit the Experimental Psychology website for more detail on the selection criteria for this course.

Experimental Psychology graduates enter a wide range of careers including:

• professional psychology
• the health services
• information technology

Both the BA in Experimental Psychology (EP) and the MSci in EP degrees are accredited by the British Psychological Society for the Graduate Basis for Chartered Membership, provided you achieve the minimum standard of second class honours as well as pass the experimental project element in the third or fourth year of study.

During her time as a client consultant at Nunwood, Experimental Psychology graduate, Rachel said:

‘Since graduating I have worked for two large market research companies specialising in brands and advertising research. My degree helped me to develop my analytical skills as well as gaining project management experience which have been invaluable in my chosen career path.’

Whilst working as a Graduate Research Assistant at Oxford’s Department of Experimental Psychology, Lauren said:

‘Studying EP gave me the opportunity to conduct my own research project from its inception, from recruiting participants, to collecting and analysing data, and writing it up in a report. These skills have been invaluable to me in my job as a research assistant, as it involves co-ordinating a large number of participants taking part in a randomised control trial, and handling large amounts of data.’

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Home / Discover Psychology Careers / Experimental Psychologist

How to Become an Experimental Psychologist

Step 1: complete an experimental psychology degree, step 2: become licensed as an experimental psychologist, step 3: apply for an experimental psychologist job, step 4: learn about experimental psychologist salaries.

Even though the mind is crucial to our life, we know relatively little about the way it works. Nevertheless, we continue to discover more about the mind and how it operates every year. The study of cognitive functions and the human brain, the drivers of personality and particular actions, how past experiences shape present perspectives on life, and the core characteristics that makeup character are all topics covered in the discipline of experimental psychology (sometimes known as "research psychology").

Experimental psychology can be a fascinating, challenging, and rewarding discipline for those who are interested in this career path. Becoming an experimental psychologist isn't difficult if you follow the procedures and recommendations outlined below.

Experimental psychologist candidates normally require a master's or higher degree to work in their profession. Bachelor's degree holders sometimes help other researchers with the planning and execution of investigations, but they're seldom given the chance to publish or take the reins of experiments themselves. A master's degree increases control over the process, while a Ph.D. — the highest degree presently given in the subject — prepares people to take on leadership responsibilities.

Students must naturally complete a bachelor's degree before applying to master's programs. Before a student can apply to a master's program, extra post-baccalaureate prerequisites must be satisfied if their bachelor's degree was not in psychology or a closely related discipline. Ph.D. applicants typically require a master's degree; however, in rare situations, combined master's/ doctoral programs enable students to seamlessly combine the two degrees, making bachelor's degree holders eligible to apply for both degrees simultaneously.

• Associate's Degree – A two-year degree that can provide an introduction to experimental psychology.
• Bachelor's Degree – A f our-year degree that will provide the basic education for an experimental psychologist.
• Master's Degree – The minimum education required for a licensed experimental psychologist. You will need a bachelor’s degree and an additional two years of study.
• Doctorate Degree – The highest level of education an experimental psychologist can achieve. You will be required either a bachelor’s degree or master’s degree, and an additional three to six years of study, and a number of hours working as an intern.

License requirements always apply to experimental psychology. For more information on getting your license, speak with the psychology board for your state, which will oversee your licensing exam (see below).

Internship / Practicum Experience

An internship is usually required for those working toward a master’s degree or doctorate in experimental psychology. The number of hours required will vary depending on the state in which you will be practicing.

Examination

The psychology board in your state will oversee your licensing exam. Contact a university psychology program for assistance if you're unsure of where the board is located. Typically the exam taken for licensure will be the Examination for Professional Practice in Psychology (EPPP). There will be a fee involved, and depending on the state, you may need to retake the exam every few years.

State Requirements

Not all state requirements are the same, but most will usually require a master’s degree or higher, a number of hours worked as an intern, passing an exam, and an application for licensure. Contact the psychology board for your state for additional information on obtaining your license. If you don't know where the board is, get in touch with a local university psychology department, and they can point you in the right direction.

The majority of experimental psychologists devote a significant amount of their daily time to interacting with the subjects of their research, outlining the goals of the study, conducting experiments, and debriefing subjects afterward.

Experimental psychologists require a broad range of abilities, character qualities, and knowledge to perform their vast range of tasks, including possessing:

• A complete understanding of the scientific method

• An excellent moral compass

• Knowledge of psychological principles and techniques

• Outstanding powers of observation, problem-solving, and communication

• The capacity to execute sophisticated analyses

• Compassion and endurance with subjects

• The capacity to raise money and support organizations

• Enthusiasm for pursuing theoretical issues

Experimental psychologists have to create tests, gather materials, get cooperation from students or colleagues, evaluate data, and write academic articles for publication in peer-reviewed journals in addition to actually performing tests. Many devote effort to writing proposals in order to get funding and grants for future research.

It should be noted that money is more likely to be granted to those who make a convincing case for study in the interests of public safety or successful results for mental health.

What Careers Can I Pursue With an Experimental Psychology Degree?

An experimental psychologist does much of the same work as clinical psychologists but in different contexts. The experimental psychologist could collaborate with clinical psychologists at these organizations if, for example, the population they picked for their research is made up of people who are confined to mental health facilities.

Police forces, crime labs, or governmental organizations are good places for experimental psychologists to obtain employment if they have an interest in the legal system or criminal justice. These psychologists might look for commonalities among offenders and make inferences that could assist in finding and apprehending them.

Many experimental psychologists limit themselves to the academic world, where they spend some of their time teaching and the rest of the time doing scientific research. Given that entry into a profession in psychology often entails some kind of clinical training or apprenticeship, the fact that experimental psychologists can find work on college campuses indicates a range of alternatives exists for individuals still pursuing their education.

Where Can I Work With an Experimental Psychology Degree?

With their broad range of duties, experimental psychologists may operate in a number of settings, and their areas of specialty can be quite varied.

Experimental psychologists are present in:

• Hospitals

• Assisted living facilities

• Nursing homes

• Public health centers

Some experimental psychologists concentrate their research on certain populations, such as children, teenagers, young adults, or the elderly. Others may concentrate on patterns that result from particular interactions, such as those between couples, parents and children, or caretakers and the elderly. As a result, an experimental psychologist could work at:

• A retirement community

• A similar institution for people of a certain age

Some experimental psychologists often visit workplaces to get greater insight into how people behave at work and respond to various settings.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects that from 2019 until 2029, employment prospects for psychologists as a whole will grow at a rate that's comparable to the national average for all jobs. Median annual salaries for "all other" psychologists (a category that includes experimental psychologists) were $102,900 in the United States as of 2021. BLS reported that "all other" psychologists earn median annual salaries as high as $113,040 in Alaska and as low as $106,200 in Iowa, states that have some of the highest employment levels for this job category.

Because research is the primary emphasis of experimental psychologists, the federal government, colleges, universities, and professional schools, as well as management, scientific, and technical consulting firms, are some of the top employers for this field. Additionally, there are some experimental psychologists that have their own consulting businesses.

Other Psychology Career Profiles

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS article

The practice of experimental psychology: an inevitably postmodern endeavor.

• Department of Psychology, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany

The aim of psychology is to understand the human mind and behavior. In contemporary psychology, the method of choice to accomplish this incredibly complex endeavor is the experiment. This dominance has shaped the whole discipline from the self-concept as an empirical science and its very epistemological and theoretical foundations, via research practice and the scientific discourse to teaching. Experimental psychology is grounded in the scientific method and positivism, and these principles, which are characteristic for modern thinking, are still upheld. Despite this apparently stalwart adherence to modern principles, experimental psychology exhibits a number of aspects which can best be described as facets of postmodern thinking although they are hardly acknowledged as such. Many psychologists take pride in being “real natural scientists” because they conduct experiments, but it is particularly difficult for psychologists to evade certain elements of postmodern thinking in view of the specific nature of their subject matter. Postmodernism as a philosophy emerged in the 20th century as a response to the perceived inadequacy of the modern approach and as a means to understand the complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the times. Therefore, postmodernism offers both valuable insights into the very nature of experimental psychology and fruitful ideas on improving experimental practice to better reflect the complexities and ambiguities of human mind and behavior. Analyzing experimental psychology along postmodern lines begins by discussing the implications of transferring the scientific method from fields with rather narrowly defined phenomena—the natural sciences—to a much broader and more heterogeneous class of complex phenomena, namely the human mind and behavior. This ostensibly modern experimental approach is, however, per se riddled with postmodern elements: (re-)creating phenomena in an experimental setting, including the hermeneutic processes of generating hypotheses and interpreting results, is no carbon copy of “reality” but rather an active construction which reflects irrevocably the pre-existing ideas of the investigator. These aspects, analyzed by using postmodern concepts like hyperreality and simulacra, did not seep in gradually but have been present since the very inception of experimental psychology, and they are necessarily inherent in its philosophy of science. We illustrate this theoretical analysis with the help of two examples, namely experiments on free will and visual working memory. The postmodern perspective reveals some pitfalls in the practice of experimental psychology. Furthermore, we suggest that accepting the inherently fuzzy nature of theoretical constructs in psychology and thinking more along postmodern lines would actually clarify many theoretical problems in experimental psychology.

Introduction

Postmodernism is, in essence, an attempt to achieve greater clarity in our perception, thinking, and behavior by scrutinizing their larger contexts and preconditions, based on the inextricably intertwined levels of both the individual and the society. Psychology also studies the human mind and behavior, which indicates that psychology should dovetail with postmodern approaches. In the 1990s and early 2000s, several attempts were made to introduce postmodern thought as potentially very fruitful ideas into general academic psychology ( Jager, 1991 ; Kvale, 1992 ; Holzman and Morss, 2000 ; Holzman, 2006 ). However, overall they were met with little response.

Postmodern thoughts have been taken up by several fringe areas of academic psychology, e.g., psychoanalysis ( Leffert, 2007 ; Jiménez, 2015 ; but see Holt, 2005 ), some forms of therapy and counseling ( Ramey and Grubb, 2009 ; Hansen, 2015 ), humanistic ( Krippner, 2001 ), feminist and gender ( Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1988 ; Sinacore and Enns, 2005 ), or cultural psychology ( Gemignani and Peña, 2007 ).

However, there is resistance against suggestions to incorporate postmodern ideas into the methodology and the self-perception of psychology as academic—and scientific!—discipline. In fact, postmodern approaches are often rejected vehemently, sometimes even very vocally. For instance, Gergen (2001) argued that the “core tenets” of postmodernism are not at odds with those of scientific psychology but rather that they can enrich the discipline by opening up new possibilities. His suggestions were met with reservation and were even outright rejected on the following grounds: postmodernism, “like anthrax of the intellect, if allowed [our italics] into mainstream psychology, […] will poison the field” ( Locke, 2002 , 458), that it “wishes to return psychology to a prescientific subset of philosophy” ( Kruger, 2002 , 456), and that psychology “needs fewer theoretical and philosophical orientations, not more” ( Hofmann, 2002 , 462; see also Gergen ’s, 2001 , replies to the less biased and more informed commentaries on his article).

In the following years, and continuing the so-called science wars of the 1990s ( Segerstråle, 2000 ), several other attacks were launched against a perceived rise or even dominance of postmodern thought in psychology. Held(2007 ; see also the rebuttal by Martin and Sugarman, 2009 ) argued that anything postmodern would undermine rationality and destroy academic psychology. Similarly, postmodernism was identified—together with “radical environmentalism” and “pseudoscience” among other things—as a “key threat to scientific psychology” ( Lilienfeld, 2010 , 282), or as “inimical to progress in the psychology of science” ( Capaldi and Proctor, 2013 , 331). The following advice was given to psychologists: “We [psychologists] should also push back against the pernicious creep of these untested concepts into our field” ( Tarescavage, 2020 , 4). Furthermore, the term “postmodern” is even employed as an all-purpose invective in a popular scientific book by psychologist Steven Pinker (2018) .

Therefore, it seems that science and experimental psychology on the one hand and postmodern thinking on the other are irreconcilable opposites. However, following Gergen (2001) and Holtz (2020) , we argue that this dichotomy is only superficial because postmodernism is often misunderstood. A closer look reveals that experimental psychology contains many postmodern elements. Even more, there is reason to assume that a postmodern perspective may be beneficial for academic psychology: First, the practice of experimental psychology would be improved by integrating postmodern thinking because it reveals a side of the human psyche for which experimental psychology is mostly blind. Second, the postmodern perspective can tell us much about the epistemological and social background of experimental psychology and how this affects our understanding of the human psyche.

A Postmodern Perspective on Experimental Psychology

Experimental psychology and the modern scientific worldview.

It lies within the nature of humans to try to find out more about themselves and their world, but the so-called Scientific Revolution of the early modern period marks the beginning of a new era in this search for knowledge. The Scientific Revolution, which has led to impressive achievements in the natural sciences and the explanation of the physical world (e.g., Olby et al., 1991 ; Henry, 1997 ; Cohen, 2015 ; Osterlind, 2019 ), is based on the following principle: to “measure what can be measured and make measurable what cannot be measured.” This famous appeal—falsely attributed to Galileo Galilei but actually from the 19th century ( Kleinert, 2009 )—illustrates the two fundamental principles of modern science: First, the concept of “measurement” encompasses the idea that phenomena can be quantified, i.e., expressed numerically. Second, the concept of “causal connections” pertains to the idea that consistent, non-random relationships can be established between measurable phenomena. Quantification allows that relationships between phenomena can be expressed, calculated, and predicted in precise mathematical and numerical terms.

However, there are two important issues to be aware of. First, while it is not difficult to measure “evident” aspects, such as mass and distance, more complex phenomena cannot be measured easily. In such cases, it is therefore necessary to find ways of making these “elusive” phenomena measurable. This can often only be achieved by reducing complex phenomena to their simpler—and measurable!—elements. For instance, in order to measure memory ability precisely, possible effects of individual preexisting knowledge which introduce random variance and thus impreciseness have to be eliminated. Indeed, due to this reason, in many memory experiments, meaningless syllables are used as study material.

Second, it is not difficult to scientifically prove a causal relationship between a factor and an outcome if the relationship is simple, that is, if there is only one single factor directly influencing the outcome. In such a case, showing that a manipulation of the factor causes a change in the outcome is clear evidence for a causal relationship because there are no other factors which may influence the outcome as well. However, in situations where many factors influence an outcome in a complex, interactive way, proving a causal relationship is much more difficult. To prove the causal effect of one factor in such a situation the effects of all other factors—called confounding factors from the perspective of the factor of interest—have to be eliminated so that a change in the outcome can be truly attributed to a causal effect of the factor of interest. However, this has an important implication: The investigator has to divide the factors present in a given situation into interesting versus non-interesting factors with respect to the current context of the experiment. Consequently, while experiments reveal something about local causal relationships, they do not necessarily provide hints about the net effect of all causal factors present in the given situation.

The adoption of the principles of modern science has also changed psychology. Although the beginnings of psychology—as the study of the psyche —date back to antiquity, psychology as an academic discipline was established in the mid to late 19th century. This enterprise was also inspired by the success of the natural sciences, and psychology was explicitly modeled after this example by Wilhelm Wundt—the “father of experimental psychology”—although he emphasized the close ties to the humanities as well. The experiment quickly became the method of choice. There were other, more hermeneutic approaches during this formative phase of modern psychology, such as psychoanalysis or introspection according to the Würzburg School, but their impact on academic psychology was limited. Behaviorism emerged as a direct reaction against these perceived unscientific approaches, and its proponents emphasized the scientific character of their “new philosophy of psychology.” It is crucial to note that in doing so they also emphasized the importance of the experiment and the necessity of quantifying directly observable behavior in psychological research. Behaviorism quickly became a very influential paradigm which shaped academic psychology. Gestalt psychologists, whose worldview is radically different from behaviorism, also relied on experiments in their research. Cognitive psychology, which followed, complemented, and partly superseded behaviorism, relies heavily on the experiment as a means to gain insight into mental processes, although other methods such as modeling are employed as well. Interestingly, there is a fundamental difference between psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology, which do not rely on the experiment, and the other above-mentioned approaches as the former focus on the psychic functioning of individuals, whereas the latter focus more on global laws of psychic functioning across individuals. This is reflected in the fact that psychological laws in experimental psychology are established on the arithmetic means across examined participants—a difference we will elaborate on later in more detail. Today, psychology is the scientific —in the sense of empirical-quantitative—study of the human mind and behavior, and the experiment is often considered the gold standard in psychological research (e.g., Mandler, 2007 ; Goodwin, 2015 ; Leahey, 2017 ).

The experiment is closely associated with the so-called scientific method ( Haig, 2014 ; Nola and Sankey, 2014 ) and the epistemological tenets philosophy of positivism—in the sense as Martin (2003) ; Michell (2003) , and Teo (2018) explain—which sometimes exhibit characteristics of naïve empiricism. Roughly speaking, the former consists of observing, formulating hypotheses, and testing these hypotheses in experiments. The latter postulates that knowledge is based on sensory experience, that it is testable, independent of the investigator and therefore objective as it accurately depicts the world as it is. This means that in principle all of reality can not only be measured but eventually be entirely explained by science. This worldview is attacked by postmodern thinkers who contend that the world is far more complex and that the modern scientific approach cannot explain all of reality and its phenomena.

The Postmodern Worldview

Postmodern thinking (e.g., Bertens, 1995 ; Sim, 2011 ; Aylesworth, 2015 ) has gained momentum since the 1980s, and although neither the term “postmodernism” nor associated approaches can be defined in a unanimous or precise way, they are characterized by several intertwined concepts, attitudes, and aims. The most basic trait is a general skepticism and the willingness to question literally everything from the ground up—even going so far as to question not only the foundation of any idea, but also the question itself. This includes the own context, the chosen premises, thinking, and the use of language. Postmodernism therefore has a lot in common with science’s curiosity to understand the world: the skeptical attitude paired with the desire to discover how things really are.

Postmodern investigations often start by looking at the language and the broader context of certain phenomena due to the fact that language is the medium in which many of our mental activities—which subsequently influence our behavior—take place. Thus, the way we talk reveals something about how and why we think and act. Additionally, we communicate about phenomena using language, which in turn means that this discourse influences the way we think about or see those phenomena. Moreover, this discourse is embedded in a larger social and historical context, which also reflects back on the use of language and therefore on our perception and interpretation of certain phenomena.

Generally speaking, postmodern investigations aim at detecting and explaining how the individual is affected by societal influences and their underlying, often hidden ideas, structures, or mechanisms. As these influences are often fuzzy, contradictory, and dependent on their context, the individual is subject to a multitude of different causalities, and this already complex interplay is further complicated by the personal history, motivations, aims, or ways of thinking of the individual. Postmodernism attempts to understand all of this complexity as it is in its entirety.

The postmodern approaches have revealed three major general tendencies which characterize the contemporary world: First, societies and the human experience since the 20th century have displayed less coherence and conversely a greater diversity than the centuries before in virtually all areas, e.g., worldviews, modes of thinking, societal structures, or individual behavior. Second, this observation leads postmodern thinkers to the conclusion that the grand narratives which dominated the preceding centuries and shaped whole societies by providing frames of references have lost—at least partially—their supremacy and validity. Examples are religious dogmas, nationalism, industrialization, the notion of linear progress—and modern science because it works according to certain fundamental principles. Third, the fact that different but equally valid perspectives, especially on social phenomena or even whole worldviews, are possible and can coexist obviously affects the concepts of “truth,” “reality,” and “reason” in such a way that these concepts lose their immutable, absolute, and universal or global character, simply because they are expressions and reflections of a certain era, society, or worldview.

At this point, however, it is necessary to clarify a common misconception: Interpreting truth, reality, or reason as relative, subjective, and context-dependent—as opposed to absolute, objective, and context-independent—does naturally neither mean that anything can be arbitrarily labeled as true, real, or reasonable, nor, vice versa, that something cannot be true, real, or reasonable. For example, the often-quoted assumption that postmodernism apparently even denies the existence of gravity or its effects as everything can be interpreted arbitrarily or states that we cannot elucidate these phenomena with adequate accuracy because everything is open to any interpretation ( Sokal, 1996 ), completely misses the point.

First, postmodernism is usually not concerned with the laws of physics and the inanimate world as such but rather focuses on the world of human experience. However, the phenomenon itself, e.g., gravity, is not the same as our scientific knowledge of phenomena—our chosen areas of research, methodological paradigms, data, theories, and explanations—or our perception of phenomena, which are both the results of human activities. Therefore, the social context influences our scientific knowledge, and in that sense scientific knowledge is a social construction ( Hodge, 1999 ).

Second, phenomena from human experience, although probably more dependent on the social context than physical phenomena, cannot be interpreted arbitrarily either. The individual context—such as the personal history, motivations, aims, or worldviews—determines whether a certain behavior makes sense for a certain individual in a certain situation. As there are almost unlimited possible backgrounds, this might seem completely random or arbitrary from an overall perspective. But from the perspective of an individual the phenomenon in question may be explained entirely by a theory for a specific—and not universal—context.

As described above, the postmodern meta-perspective directly deals with human experience and is therefore especially relevant for psychology. Moreover, any discipline—including the knowledge it generates—will certainly benefit from understanding its own (social) mechanisms and implications. We will show below that postmodern thinking not only elucidates the broader context of psychology as an academic discipline but rather that experimental psychology exhibits a number of aspects which can best be described as facets of postmodern thinking although they are not acknowledged as such.

The Postmodern Context of Experimental Psychology

Paradoxically, postmodern elements have been present since the very beginning of experimental psychology although postmodernism gained momentum only decades later. One of the characteristics of postmodernism is the transplantation of certain elements from their original context to new contexts, e.g., the popularity of “Eastern” philosophies and practices in contemporary “Western” societies. These different elements are often juxtaposed and combined to create something new, e.g., new “westernized” forms of yoga ( Shearer, 2020 ).

Similarly, the founders of modern academic psychology took up the scientific method, which was originally developed in the context of the natural sciences, and transplanted it to the study of the human psyche in the hope to repeat the success of the natural sciences. By contrast, methods developed specifically in the context of psychology such as psychoanalysis ( Wax, 1995 ) or introspection according to the Würzburg School ( Hackert and Weger, 2018 ) have gained much less ground in academic psychology. The way we understand both the psyche and psychology has been shaped to a great extent by the transfer of the principles of modern science, namely quantitative measurement and experimental methods, although it is not evident per se that this is the best approach to elucidate mental and behavioral phenomena. Applying the methods of the natural sciences to a new and different context, namely to phenomena pertaining to the human psyche , is a truly postmodern endeavor because it juxtaposes two quite distinct areas and merges them into something new—experimental psychology.

The postmodern character of experimental psychology becomes evident on two levels: First, the subject matter—the human psyche —exhibits a postmodern character since mental and behavioral phenomena are highly dependent on the idiosyncratic contexts of the involved individuals, which makes it impossible to establish unambiguous general laws to describe them. Second, experimental psychology itself displays substantial postmodern traits because both its method and the knowledge it produces—although seemingly objective and rooted in the modern scientific worldview—inevitably contain postmodern elements, as will be shown below.

The Experiment as Simulacrum

The term “simulacrum” basically means “copy,” often in the sense of “inferior copy” or “phantasm/illusion.” However, in postmodern usage “simulacrum” has acquired a more nuanced and concrete meaning. “Simulacrum” is a key term in the work of postmodern philosopher Jean Baudrillard, who arguably presented the most elaborate theory on simulacra (1981/1994). According to Baudrillard, a simulacrum “is the reflection of a profound [‘real’] reality” (16/6). Simulacra, however, are more than identical carbon copies because they gain a life of their own and become “real” in the sense of becoming an own entity. For example, the personality a pop star shows on stage is not “real” in the sense that it is their “normal,” off-stage personality, but it is certainly “real” in the sense that it is perceived by the audience even if they are aware that it might be an “artificial” personality. Two identical cars can also be “different” for one might be used as a means of transportation while the other might be a status symbol. Even an honest video documentation of a certain event is not simply a copy of the events that took place because it lies within the medium video that only certain sections can be recorded from a certain perspective. Additionally, the playback happens in other contexts as the original event, which may also alter the perception of the viewer.

The post-structuralist—an approach closely associated with postmodernism—philosopher Roland Barthes pointed out another important aspect of simulacra. He contended that in order to understand something—an “object” in Barthes’ terminology—we necessarily create simulacra because we “ reconstruct [our italics] an ‘object’ in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning [⋯] of this object” ( Barthes, 1963 , 213/214). In other words, when we investigate an object—any phenomenon, either material, mental, or social—we have to perceive it first. This means that we must have some kind of mental representation of the phenomenon/object—and it is crucial to note that this representation is not the same thing as the “real” object itself. All our mental operations are therefore not performed on the “real” object but on mental representations of the object. We decompose a phenomenon in order to understand it, that is, we try to identify its components. In doing so, we effect a change in the object because our phenomenon is no longer the original phenomenon “as it is” for we are performing a mental operation on it, thereby transforming the original phenomenon. Identifying components may be simple, e.g., dividing a tree into roots, trunk, branches, and leaves may seem obvious or even “natural” but it is nevertheless us as investigators who create this structure—the tree itself is probably not aware of it. Now that we have established this structure, we are able to say that the tree consists of several components and name these components. Thus, we have introduced “new” elements into our understanding of the tree. This is the important point, even though the elements, i.e., the branches and leaves themselves “as they are,” have naturally always been “present.” Our understanding of “tree” has therefore changed completely because a tree is now something which is composed of several elements. In that sense, we have changed the original phenomenon by adding something—and this has all happened in our thinking and not in the tree itself. It is also possible to find different structures and different components for the tree, e.g., the brown and the green, which shows that we construct this knowledge.

Next, we can investigate the components to see how they interact with and relate to each other and to the whole system. Also, we can work out their functions and determine the conditions under which a certain event will occur. We can even expand the scope of our investigation and examine the tree in the context of its ecosystem. But no matter what we do or how sophisticated our investigation becomes, everything said above remains true here, too, because neither all these actions listed above nor the knowledge we gain from them are the object itself. Rather, we have added something to the object and the more we know about our object, the more knowledge we have constructed. This addition is what science—gaining knowledge—is all about. Or in the words of Roland Barthes: “the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situation, his freedom and the very resistance which nature offers to his mind” (1963/1972, 214/215).

In principle, this holds truth regarding all scientific investigations. But the more complex phenomena are, the more effort and personal contribution is required on behalf of the investigator to come up with structures, theories, or explanations. Paraphrasing Barthes: When dealing with complex phenomena, more intellect must be added to the object, which means in turn that there are more possibilities for different approaches and perspectives, that is, the constructive element becomes larger. As discussed previously, this does not mean that investigative and interpretative processes are arbitrary. But it is clear from this train of thought that “objectivity” or “truth” in a “positivist,” naïve empiricist “realist,” or absolute sense are not attainable. Nevertheless, we argue here that this is not a drawback, as many critics of postmodernism contend (see above), but rather an advantage because it allows more accurate scientific investigations of true-to-life phenomena, which are typically complex in the case of psychology.

The concepts of simulacra by Baudrillard and Barthes can be combined to provide a description of the experiment in psychology. Accordingly, our understanding of the concept of the “simulacrum” entails that scientific processes—indeed all investigative processes—necessarily need to duplicate the object of their investigation in order to understand it. In doing so, constructive elements are necessarily introduced. These elements are of a varying nature, which means that investigations of one and the same phenomenon may differ from each other and different investigations may find out different things about the phenomenon in question. These investigations then become entities on their own—in the Baudrillardian sense—and therefore simulacra.

In a groundbreaking article on “the meaning and limits of exact science” physicist Max Planck stated that “[a]n experiment is a question which science poses to nature, and a measurement is the recording of nature’s answer” ( Planck, 1949 , 325). The act of “asking a question” implies that the person asking the question has at least a general idea of what the answer might look like ( Heidegger, 1953 , §2). For example: When asking someone for their name, we obviously do not know what they are called, but we assume that they have a name and we also have an idea of how the concept “name” works. Otherwise we could not even conceive, let alone formulate, and pose our question. This highlights how a certain degree of knowledge and understanding of a concept is necessary so that we are able to ask questions about it. Likewise, we need to have a principal idea or assumption of possible mechanisms if we want to find out how more complex phenomena function. It is—at least at the beginning—irrelevant whether these ideas are factually correct or entirely wrong, for without them we would be unable to approach our subject matter in the first place.

The context of the investigator—their general worldview, their previous knowledge and understanding, and their social situation—obviously plays an important part in the process of forming a question which can be asked in the current research context. Although this context may be analyzed along postmodern lines in order to find out how it affects research, production of knowledge, and—when the knowledge is applied—possible (social) consequences, there is a much more profound implication pertaining to the very nature of the experiment as a means to gain knowledge.

Irrespective of whether it is a simple experiment in physics such as Galileo Galilei’s or an experiment on a complex phenomenon from social or cognitive psychology, the experiment is a situation which is specifically designed to answer a certain type of questions, usually causal relationships, such as: “Does A causally affect B?” Excluding the extremely complex discussion on the nature of causality and causation (e.g., Armstrong, 1997 ; Pearl, 2009 ; Paul and Hall, 2013 ), it is crucial to note that we need the experiment as a tool to answer this question. Although we may theorize about a phenomenon and infer causal relationships simply by observing, we cannot—at least according to the prevailing understanding of causality in the sciences—prove causal relationships without the experiment.

The basic idea of the experiment is to create conditions which differ in only one single factor which is suspected as a causal factor for an effect. The influence of all other potential causal relationships is kept identical because they are considered as confounding factors which are irrelevant from the perspective of the research question of the current experiment. Then, if a difference is found in the outcome between the experimental conditions, this is considered as proof that the aspect in question exerts indeed a causal effect. This procedure and the logic behind it are not difficult to understand. However, a closer look reveals that this is actually far from simple or obvious.

To begin with, an experiment is nothing which occurs “naturally” but a situation created for a specific purpose, i.e., an “artificial” situation, because other causal factors exerting influence in “real” life outside the laboratory are deliberately excluded and considered as “confounding” factors. This in itself shows that the experiment contains a substantial postmodern element because instead of creating something it rather re- creates it. This re-creation is of course based on phenomena from the “profound” reality—in the Baudrillardian sense—since the explicit aim is to find out something about this profound reality and not to create something new or something else. However, as stated above, this re-creation must contain constructive elements reflecting the presuppositions, conceptual-theoretical assumptions, and aims of the investigator. By focusing on one factor and by reducing the complexity of the profound reality, the practical operationalization and realization thus reflect both the underlying conceptual structure and the anticipated outcome as they are specifically designed to test for the suspected but hidden or obscured causal relationships.

At this point, another element becomes relevant, namely the all-important role of language, which is emphasized in postmodern thinking (e.g., Harris, 2005 ). Without going into the intricacies of semiotics, there is an explanatory gap ( Chalmers, 2005 )—to borrow a phrase from philosophy of mind—between the phenomenon on the one hand and the linguistic and/or mental representation of it on the other. This relationship is far from clear and it is therefore problematic to assume that our linguistic or mental representations—our words and the concepts they designate—are identical with the phenomena themselves. Although we cannot, at least according to our present knowledge and understanding, fully bridge this gap, it is essential to be aware of it in order to avoid some pitfalls, as will be shown in the examples below.

Even a seemingly simple word like “tree”—to take up once more our previous example—refers to a tangible phenomenon because there are trees “out there.” However, they come in all shapes and sizes, there are different kinds of trees, and every single one of them may be labeled as “tree.” Furthermore, trees are composed of different parts, and the leaf—although part of the tree—has its own word, i.e., linguistic and mental representation. Although the leaf is part of the tree—at least according to our concepts—it is unclear whether “tree” also somehow encompasses “leaf.” The same holds true for the molecular, atomic, or even subatomic levels, where there “is” no tree. Excluding the extremely complex ontological implications of this problem, it has become clear that we are referring to a certain level of granularity when using the word “tree.” The level of granularity reflects the context, aims, and concepts of the investigator, e.g., an investigation of the rain forest as an ecosystem will ignore the subatomic level.

How does this concern experimental psychology? Psychology studies intangible phenomena, namely mental and behavioral processes, such as cognition, memory, learning, motivation, emotion, perception, consciousness, etc. It is important to note that these terms designate theoretical constructs as, for example, memory cannot be observed directly. We may provide the subjects of an experiment a set of words to learn and observe later how many words they reproduce correctly. A theoretical construct therefore describes such relationships between stimulus and behavior, and we may draw conclusions from this observable data about memory. But neither the observable behavior of the subject, the resulting data, nor our conclusions are identical with memory itself.

This train of thought demonstrates the postmodern character of experimental psychology because we construct our knowledge. But there is more to it than that: Even by trying to define a theoretical construct as exactly as possible—e.g., memory as “the process of maintaining information over time” ( Matlin, 2012 , 505) or “the means by which we retain and draw on our past experiences to use this information in the present” ( Sternberg and Sternberg, 2011 , 187)—the explanatory gap between representation and phenomenon cannot be bridged. Rather, it becomes even more complicated because theoretical constructs are composed of other theoretical constructs, which results in some kind of self-referential circularity where constructs are defined by other constructs which refer to further constructs. In the definitions above, for instance, hardly any key term is self-evident and unambiguous for there are different interpretations of the constructs “process,” “maintaining,” “information,” “means,” “retain,” “draw on,” “experiences,” and “use” according to their respective contexts. Only the temporal expressions “over time,” “past,” and “present” are probably less ambiguous here because they are employed as non-technical, everyday terms. However, the definitions above are certainly not entirely incomprehensible—in fact, they are rather easy to understand in everyday language—and it is quite clear what the authors intend to express . The italics indicate constructive elements, which demonstrates that attempts to give a precise definition in the language of science result in fuzziness and self-reference.

Based on a story by Jorge Luis Borges, Baudrillard (1981) found an illustrative allegory: a map so precise that it portrays everything in perfect detail—but therefore inevitably so large that it shrouds the entire territory it depicts. Similarly, Taleb (2007) coined the term “ludic fallacy” for mistaking the model/map—in our context: experiments in psychology—for the reality/territory, that is, a mental or behavioral phenomenon. Similar to the functionality of a seemingly “imprecise” map which contains only the relevant landmarks so the user may find their way, the fuzziness of language poses no problems in everyday communication. So why is it a problem in experimental psychology? Since the nature of theoretical constructs in psychology lies precisely in their very fuzziness, the aim of reaching a high degree of granularity and precision in experimental psychology seems to be unattainable (see the various failed attempts to create “perfect” languages which might depict literally everything “perfectly,” e.g., Carapezza and D’Agostino, 2010 ).

Without speculating about ontic or epistemic implications, it is necessary to be aware of the explanatory gap and to refrain from identifying the experiment and the underlying operationalization with the theoretical construct. Otherwise, this gap is “filled” unintentionally and uncontrollably if the results of an experiment are taken as valid proof for a certain theoretical construct, which is actually fuzzy and potentially operationalizable in a variety of ways. If this is not acknowledged, words, such as “memory,” become merely symbols devoid of concrete meaning, much like a glass bead game—or in postmodern terminology: a hyperreality.

Experiments and Hyperreality

“Hyperreality” is another key term in the work of Jean Baudrillard (1981) and it denotes a concept closely related to the simulacrum. Accordingly, in modern society the simulacra are ubiquitous and they form a system of interconnected simulacra which refer to each other rather than to the real, thereby possibly hiding or replacing the real. Consequently, the simulacra become real in their own right and form a “more real” reality, namely the hyperreality. One may or may not accept Baudrillard’s conception, especially the all-embracing social and societal implications, but the core concept of “hyperreality” is nevertheless a fruitful tool to analyze experimental psychology. We have already seen that the experiment displays many characteristics of a simulacrum, so it is not surprising that the concept of hyperreality is applicable here as well, although in a slightly different interpretation than Baudrillard’s.

The hyperreal character of the experiment can be discussed on two levels: the experiment itself and the discourse wherein it is embedded.

On the level of the experiment itself, two curious observations must be taken into account. First, and in contrast to the natural sciences where the investigator is human and the subject matter (mostly) non-human and usually inanimate, in psychology both the investigator and the subject matter are human. This means that the subjects of the experiment, being autonomous persons, are not malleable or completely controllable by the investigator because they bring their own background, history, worldview, expectations, and motivations. They interpret the situation—the experiment—and act accordingly, but not necessarily in the way the investigator had planned or anticipated ( Smedslund, 2016 ). Therefore, the subjects create their own versions of the experiment, or, in postmodern terminology, a variety of simulacra, which may be more or less compatible with the framework of the investigator. This holds true for all subjects of an experiment, which means that the experiment as a whole may also be interpreted as an aggregation of interconnected simulacra—a hyperreality.

The hyperreal character becomes even more evident because what contributes in the end to the interpretation of the results of the experiment are not the actual performances and results of the individual subjects as they were intended by them but rather how their performances and results are handled, seen, and interpreted by the investigator. Even if the investigator tries to be as faithful as possible and aims at an exact and unbiased measurement—i.e., an exact copy—there are inevitably constructive elements which introduce uncertainty into the experiment. Investigators can never be certain what the subjects were actually doing and thinking so they must necessarily work with interpretations. Or in postmodern terms: Because the actual performances and results of the subjects are not directly available the investigators must deal with simulacra. These simulacra become the investigators’ reality and thus any further treatment—statistical analyses, interpretations, or discussions—becomes a hyperreality, that is, a set of interconnected simulacra which have become “real.”

On the level of the discourse wherein the experiment is embedded, another curious aspect also demonstrates the hyperreal character of experimental psychology. Psychology is, according to the standard definition, the scientific study of mental and behavioral processes of the individual (e.g., Gerrig, 2012 ). This definition contains two actually contradictory elements. On the one hand, the focus is on processes of the individual. On the other hand, the—scientific—method to elucidate these processes does not look at individuals per se but aggregates their individual experiences and transforms them into a “standard” experience. The results from experiments, our knowledge of the human psyche, reflect psychological functioning at the level of the mean across individuals. And even if we assume that the mean is only an estimator and not an exact description or prediction, the question remains open how de-individualized observations are related to the experience of an individual. A general mechanism, a law—which was discovered by abstracting from a multitude of individual experiences—is then ( re -)imposed in the opposite direction back onto the individual. In other words, a simulacrum—namely, the result of an experiment—is viewed and treated as reality, thus becoming hyperreal. Additionally, and simply because it is considered universally true, this postulated law acquires thereby a certain validity and “truth”—often irrespective of its actual, factual, or “profound” truth—on its own. Therefore, it can become impossible to distinguish between “profound” and “simulacral” truth, which is the hallmark of hyperreality.

Measuring the Capacity of the Visual Working Memory

Vision is an important sensory modality and there is extensive research on this area ( Hutmacher, 2019 ). Much of our daily experience is shaped by seeing a rich and complex world around us, and it is therefore an interesting question how much visual information we can store and process. Based on the development of a seminal experimental paradigm, Luck and Vogel (1997) have shown that visual working memory has a storage capacity of about four items. This finding is reported in many textbooks (e.g., Baddeley, 2007 ; Parkin, 2013 ; Goldstein, 2015 ) and has almost become a truism in cognitive psychology.

The experimental paradigm developed by Luck and Vogel (1997) is a prime example of an experiment which closely adheres to the scientific principles outlined above. In order to make a very broad and fuzzy phenomenon measurable, simple abstract forms are employed as visual stimuli—such as colored squares, triangles, or lines, usually on a “neutral,” e.g., gray, background—which can be counted in order to measure the capacity of visual working memory. Reducing the exuberant diversity of the “outside visual world” to a few abstract geometric forms is an extremely artificial situation. The obvious contrast between simple geometrical forms and the rich panorama of the “real” visual world illustrates the pitfalls of controlling supposed confounding variables, namely the incontrollable variety of the “real” world and how we see it. Precisely by abstracting and by excluding potential confounding variables it is possible to count the items and to make the capacity of the visual working memory measurable. But in doing so the original phenomenon—seeing the whole world—is lost. In other words: A simulacrum has been created.

The establishment of the experimental paradigm by Luck and Vogel has led to much research and sparked an extensive discussion how the limitation to only four items might be explained (see the summaries by Brady et al., 2011 ; Luck and Vogel, 2013 ; Ma et al., 2014 ; Schurgin, 2018 ). However, critically, several studies have shown that the situation is different when real-world objects are used as visual stimuli rather than simple abstract forms, revealing that the capacity of the visual working memory is higher for real-world objects ( Endress and Potter, 2014 ; Brady et al., 2016 ; Schurgin et al., 2018 ; Robinson et al., 2020 ; also Schurgin and Brady, 2019 ). Such findings show that the discourse about the mechanisms behind the limitations of the visual working memory is mostly about an artificial phenomenon which has no counterpart in “reality”—the perfect example of a hyperreality.

This hyperreal character does not mean that the findings of Luck and Vogel (1997) or similar experiments employing artificial stimuli are irrelevant or not “true.” The results are true—but it is a local truth, only valid for the specific context of specific experiments, and not a global truth which applies to the visual working memory in general . That is, speaking about “visual working memory” based on the paradigm of Luck and Vogel is a mistake because it is actually about “visual working memory for simple abstract geometrical forms in front of a gray background.”

Free Will and Experimental Psychology

The term “free will” expresses the idea of having “a significant kind of control [italics in the original] over one’s actions” ( O’Connor and Franklin, 2018 , n.p.). This concept has occupied a central position in Western philosophy since antiquity because it has far-reaching consequences for our self-conception as humans and our position in the world, including questions of morality, responsibility, and the nature of legal systems (e.g., Beebee, 2013 ; McKenna and Pereboom, 2016 ; O’Connor and Franklin, 2018 ). Being a topic of general interest, it is not surprising that experimental psychologists have tried to investigate free will as well.

The most famous study was conducted by Libet et al. (1983) , and this experiment has quickly become a focal point in the extensive discourse on free will because it provides empirical data and a scientific investigation. Libet et al.’s experiment seems to show that the subjective impression when persons consciously decide to act is in fact preceded by objectively measurable but unconscious physical processes. This purportedly proves that our seemingly voluntary actions are actually predetermined by physical processes because the brain has unconsciously reached a decision already before the person becomes aware of it and that our conscious intentions are simply grafted onto it. Therefore, we do not have a free will, and consequently much of our social fabric is based on an illusion. Or so the story goes.

This description, although phrased somewhat pointedly, represents a typical line of thought in the discourse on free will (e.g., the prominent psychologists Gazzaniga, 2011 ; Wegner, 2017 ; see Kihlstrom, 2017 , for further examples).

Libet’s experiment sparked an extensive and highly controversial discussion: For some authors, it is a refutation or at least threat to various concepts of free will, or, conversely, an indicator or even proof for some kind of material determinism. By contrast, other authors deny that the experiment refutes or counts against free will. Furthermore, a third group—whose position we adopt for our further argumentation—denies that Libet’s findings are even relevant for this question at all (for summaries of this complex and extensive discussion and various positions including further references see Nahmias, 2010 ; Radder and Meynen, 2013 ; Schlosser, 2014 ; Fischborn, 2016 ; Lavazza, 2016 ; Schurger, 2017 ). Libet’s own position, although not entirely consistent, opposes most notions of free will ( Roskies, 2011 ; Seifert, 2011 ). Given this background, it is not surprising that there are also numerous further experimental studies on various aspects of this subject area (see the summaries by Saigle et al., 2018 ; Shepard, 2018 ; Brass et al., 2019 ).

However, we argue that this entire discourse is best understood along postmodern lines as hyperreality and that Libet’s experiment itself is a perfect example of a simulacrum. A closer look at the concrete procedure of the experiment shows that Libet actually asked his participants to move their hand or finger “at will” while their brain activity was monitored with an EEG. They were instructed to keep watch in an introspective manner for the moment when they felt the “urge” to move their hand and to record this moment by indicating the clock-position of a pointer. This is obviously a highly artificial situation where the broad and fuzzy concept of “free will” is abstracted and reduced to the movement of the finger, the only degree of freedom being the moment of the movement. The question whether this is an adequate operationalization of free will is of paramount importance, and there are many objections that Libet’s setup fails to measure free will at all (e.g., Mele, 2007 ; Roskies, 2011 ; Kihlstrom, 2017 ; Brass et al., 2019 ).

Before Libet, there was no indication that the decision when to move a finger might be relevant for the concept of free will and the associated discourse. The question whether we have control over our actions referred to completely different levels of granularity. Free will was discussed with respect to questions such as whether we are free to live our lives according to our wishes or whether we are responsible for our actions in social contexts (e.g., Beebee, 2013 ; McKenna and Pereboom, 2016 ; O’Connor and Franklin, 2018 ), and not whether we lift a finger now or two seconds later. Libet’s and others’ jumping from very specific situations to far-reaching conclusions about a very broad and fuzzy theoretical construct illustrates that an extremely wide chasm between two phenomena, namely moving the finger and free will, is bridged in one fell swoop.

In other words, Libet’s experiment is a simulacrum as it duplicates a phenomenon from our day-to-day experience—namely free will—but in doing so the operationalization alters and reduces the theoretical construct. The outcome is a questionable procedure whose relationship to the phenomenon is highly controversial. Furthermore, the fact that, despite its tenuous connection to free will, Libet’s experiment sparked an extensive discussion on this subject reveals the hyperreal nature of the entire discourse because what is being discussed is not the actual question—namely free will—but rather a simulacrum. Everything else—the arguments, counter-arguments, follow-up experiments, and their interpretations—built upon Libet’s experiment are basically commentaries to a simulacrum and not on the real phenomena. Therefore, a hyperreality is created where the discourse revolves around entirely artificial phenomena, but where the arguments in this discussion refer back to and affect the real as suggestions are made to alter the legal system and our ideas of responsibility—which, incidentally, is not a question of empirical science but of law, ethics, and philosophy.

All of the above is not meant to say that this whole discourse is meaningless or even gratuitous—on the contrary, our understanding of the subject matter has greatly increased. Although our knowledge of free will has hardly increased, we have gained much insight into the hermeneutics and methodology—and pitfalls!—of investigations of free will, possible consequences on the individual and societal level, and the workings of scientific discourses. And this is exactly what postmodernism is about.

As shown above, there are a number of postmodern elements in the practice of experimental psychology: The prominent role of language, the gap between the linguistic or mental representation and the phenomenon, the “addition of intellect to the object,” the simulacral character of the experiment itself in its attempt to re-create phenomena, which necessarily transforms the “real” phenomenon due to the requirements of the experiment, and finally the creation of a hyperreality if experiments are taken as the “real” phenomenon and the scientific discourse becomes an exchange of symbolic expressions referring to the simulacra created in experiments, replacing the real. All these aspects did not seep gradually into experimental psychology in the wake of postmodernism but have been present since the very inception of experimental psychology as they are necessarily inherent in its philosophy of science.

Given these inherent postmodern traits in experimental psychology, it is puzzling that there is so much resistance against a perceived “threat” of psychology’s scientificness. Although a detailed investigation of the reasons lies outside the scope of this analysis, we suspect there are two main causes: First, an insufficient knowledge of the history of science and understanding of philosophy of science may result in idealized concepts of a “pure” natural science. Second, lacking familiarity with basic tenets of postmodern approaches may lead to the assumption that postmodernism is just an idle game of arbitrary words. However, “science” and “postmodernism” and their respective epistemological concepts are not opposites ( Gergen, 2001 ; Holtz, 2020 ). This is especially true for psychology, which necessarily contains a social dimension because not only the investigators are humans but also the very subject matter itself.

The (over-)reliance on quantitative-experimental methods in psychology, often paired with a superficial understanding of the philosophy of science behind it, has been criticized, either from the theoretical point of view (e.g., Bergmann and Spence, 1941 ; Hearnshaw, 1941 ; Petrie, 1971 ; Law, 2004 ; Smedslund, 2016 ) or because the experimental approach has failed to produce reliable, valid, and relevant applicable knowledge in educational psychology ( Slavin, 2002 ). It is perhaps symptomatic that a textbook teaching the principles of science for psychologists does not contain even one example from experimental psychology but employs only examples from physics, plus Darwin’s theory of evolution ( Wilton and Harley, 2017 ).

On the other hand, the postmodern perspective on experimental psychology provides insight into some pitfalls, as illustrated by the examples above. On the level of the experiment, the methodological requirements imply the creation of an artificial situation, which opens up a gap between the phenomenon as it is in reality and as it is concretely operationalized in the experimental situation. This is not a problem per se as long as is it clear—and clearly communicated!—that the results of the experiment are only valid in a certain context. The problems begin if the movement of a finger is mistaken for free will. Similarly, being aware that local causalities do not explain complex phenomena such as mental and behavioral processes in their entirety also prevents (over-) generalization, especially if communicated appropriately. These limitations make it clear that the experiment should not be made into an absolute or seen as the only valid way of understanding the psyche and the world.

On the level of psychology as an academic discipline, any investigation must select the appropriate level of granularity and strike a balance between the methodological requirements and the general meaning of the theoretical concept in question to find out something about the “real” world. If the level of granularity is so fine that results cannot be tied back to broader theoretical constructs rather than providing a helpful understanding of our psychological functioning, academic psychology is in danger of becoming a self-referential hyperreality.

The postmodern character of experimental psychology also allows for a different view on the so-called replication crisis in psychology. Authors contending that there is no replication crisis often employ arguments which exhibit postmodern elements, such as the emphasis on specific local conditions in experiments which may explain different outcomes of replication studies ( Stroebe and Strack, 2014 ; Baumeister, 2019 ). In other words, they invoke the simulacral character of experiments. This explanation may be valid or not, but the replication crisis has shown the limits of a predominantly experimental approach in psychology.

Acknowledging the postmodern nature of experimental psychology and incorporating postmodern thinking explicitly into our research may offer a way out of this situation. Our subject matter—the psyche —is extremely complex, ambiguous, and often contradictory. And postmodern thinking has proven capable of successfully explaining such phenomena (e.g., Bertens, 1995 ; Sim, 2011 ; Aylesworth, 2015 ). Thus, paradoxically, by accepting and considering the inherently fuzzy nature of theoretical constructs, they often become much clearer ( Ronzitti, 2011 ). Therefore, thinking more along postmodern lines in psychology would actually sharpen the theoretical and conceptual basis of experimental psychology—all the more as experimental psychology has inevitably been a postmodern endeavor since its very beginning.

Author Contributions

RM, CK, and CL developed the idea for this article. RM drafted the manuscript. CK and CL provided feedback and suggestions. All authors approved the manuscript for submission.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Keywords : postmodernism, experimental psychology, experiment, methodology, philosophy of science

Citation: Mayrhofer R, Kuhbandner C and Lindner C (2021) The Practice of Experimental Psychology: An Inevitably Postmodern Endeavor. Front. Psychol. 11:612805. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.612805

Received: 30 September 2020; Accepted: 26 November 2020; Published: 12 January 2021.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2021 Mayrhofer, Kuhbandner and Lindner. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Roland Mayrhofer, [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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Major Branches of Psychology

18 Psychological Areas You Can Study

Verywell / Ran Zheng

Abnormal Psychology

Behavioral psychology, biopsychology, clinical psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, counseling psychology, cross-cultural psychology, developmental psychology, educational psychology, experimental psychology, forensic psychology, health psychology, industrial-organizational psychology, personality psychology, school psychology, social psychology, sports psychology.

Psychology is such a broad field that conveying its depth and breadth can be difficult. As a result, a number of unique and distinctive branches of psychology have emerged, each one dealing with specific psychological areas within the study of the mind, brain, and behavior.

Understanding what these subtopics represent can help you decide where your interests may lie. Here is more information about 18 major types of psychology if you are interested in studying, earning your degree , or creating a career in this expansive field.

Overview of the Branches of Psychology

The major areas of psychology include:

• Abnormal psychology
• Behavioral psychology
• Clinical psychology
• Cognitive psychology
• Comparative psychology
• Counseling psychology
• Cross-cultural psychology
• Developmental psychology
• Educational psychology
• Experimental psychology
• Forensic psychology
• Health psychology
• Industrial-organizational psychology
• Personality psychology
• School psychology
• Social psychology
• Sports psychology

Each of these psychological areas looks at questions and problems from a different perspective. While they all have their own focus, they still share a common goal of studying and explaining human thought and behavior.

Because human behavior is so varied, the number of subfields in psychology is constantly growing and evolving. Some of these subfields have been firmly established as areas of interest, and many colleges and universities offer courses and degree programs in these topics. 

Each type of psychology represents a specific area of study focused on a particular topic. Oftentimes, psychologists specialize in one of these as a career. The following are just some of the major branches of psychology. For many of these, working in that specific area requires graduate study in that particular field.

2 Main Areas of Psychology

Psychology can be roughly divided into two major areas:

• Research,  which seeks to increase our knowledge base
• Practice , through which our knowledge is applied to solving problems in the real world

Abnormal psychology looks at psychopathology and abnormal behavior. It involves the study of people's emotional, thought, and behavior patterns to identify, understand, and potentially resolve any issues that may be negatively affecting a person's life.

Mental health professionals in this branch of psychology assess, diagnose, and treat a wide variety of psychological disorders , including anxiety and depression. Counselors, clinical psychologists, and psychotherapists often work directly in this field.

Behavioral psychology , also known as behaviorism, is a theory of learning based on the idea that all behaviors are acquired through conditioning. Behavioral strategies such as classical conditioning and operant conditioning are often utilized to teach or modify behaviors.

For example, a teacher might use a reward system to teach students to behave during class. When students are good, they receive gold stars, which can then be turned in for some sort of special privilege.

While this type of psychology dominated the field during the first part of the twentieth century, it became less prominent during the 1950s. However, behavioral techniques remain a mainstay in therapy, education, and many other areas.

Biopsychology is a psychological area focused on how the brain, neurons, and nervous system influence thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. The biopsychology field draws upon many different disciplines, including basic psychology, cognitive psychology, experimental psychology, biology, physiology, and neuroscience.

People who work in this type of psychology often study how brain injuries and brain diseases impact human behavior.

Biopsychology is also sometimes referred to as physiological psychology, behavioral neuroscience, or psychobiology. So, if you are interested in studying or earning a degree in this psychology branch, you may want to look for courses or programs with these names.

Clinical psychology  is the branch of psychology concerned with the assessment and treatment of mental illness, abnormal behavior, and psychiatric disorders. Clinicians often work in private practices, but many also work in community centers or at universities and colleges.

You can even find clinical psychology professionals in hospital settings and mental health clinics. In these organizations, they often work as part of a collaborative team that may include physicians, psychiatrists, and other mental health professionals.

Cognitive psychology is a psychological area that focuses on internal mental states. This area has continued to grow since it emerged in the 1960s and is centered on the science of how people think, learn, and remember.

Professionals who work in this type of psychology typically study cognitive functions such as perception, motivation, emotion, language, learning, memory, attention, decision-making , and problem-solving .

Cognitive psychologists often use an information-processing model to describe how the mind works, suggesting that the brain stores and processes information much like a computer.

Comparative psychology is the branch of psychology concerned with the study of animal behavior. This is important because the study of how animals behave can lead to a deeper and broader understanding of human psychology.

This psychology subtype has its roots in the work of researchers such as Charles Darwin and George Romanes and has grown into a highly multidisciplinary subject. In addition to psychologists contributing to this field, so do biologists, anthropologists, ecologists, geneticists, and several others.

Counseling psychology is one of the largest areas of psychology. It is centered on treating clients in mental distress who may be experiencing a wide variety of psychological symptoms.

The Society of Counseling Psychology explains that professionals working in this type of psychology can improve their clients' interpersonal functioning throughout life. They do this by improving the client's social and emotional health, as well as addressing concerns about health, work, family, marriage, and more.

Cross-cultural psychology is a branch of psychology that looks at how cultural factors influence human behavior. This may involve looking at differences between collective and individualist cultures , for instance. Cross-cultural psychologists might also look at how cultures vary in terms of emotion, personality, or child development.

The International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) was established in 1972. This type of psychology has continued to grow and develop since that time, with increasing numbers of psychologists investigating how behavior differs among cultures throughout the world.

Developmental psychology focuses on how people change and grow throughout life. This area of psychology seeks to understand and explain how and why people change. Developmental psychologists study physical growth, intellectual development, emotional changes, social growth, and perceptual changes that occur throughout the lifespan.

Some professionals may specialize in infant, child, adolescent, or geriatric development, while others might primarily study the effects of developmental delays. This psychology branch covers a huge range of topics, ranging from  prenatal development  to Alzheimer's disease .

Educational psychology is the branch of psychology concerned with schools, teaching psychology, educational issues, and student concerns. Educational psychologists often study how students learn. They may also work directly with students, parents, teachers, and administrators to improve student outcomes.

Professionals in this type of psychology sometimes study how different variables influence individual students. They may also study learning disabilities , giftedness, and the instructional process.

8 Things to Know About Educational Psychology

Experimental psychology is the psychological area that utilizes scientific methods to research the brain and behavior. Many of these techniques are also used in other psychology areas to study everything from childhood development to social issues.

This type of psychology is often viewed as a distinct subfield, but experimental techniques and methods are used extensively throughout every branch. Some of the methods used include experiments, correlational studies , case studies , and naturalistic observation .

Experimental psychologists work in a wide variety of settings, including colleges, universities, research centers, government, and private businesses. They utilize the scientific method to study a range of human behaviors and psychological phenomena.

Forensic psychology deals with issues related to psychology and the law. Those who work in this branch apply psychological principles to legal issues. This may involve studying criminal behavior and treatment or working directly in the court system.

Forensic psychologists perform a wide variety of duties, including providing testimony in court cases, assessing children in suspected child abuse cases, preparing children to give testimony, and evaluating the mental competence of criminal suspects.

In many cases, people working in forensic psychology aren't necessarily "forensic psychologists." These individuals might be clinical psychologists, school psychologists, neurologists, or counselors who lend their psychological expertise to provide testimony, analysis, or recommendations in legal or criminal cases.

Health psychology (also sometimes called medical psychology or behavioral medicine) focuses on how biology, psychology, behavior, and social factors influence health and illness. This area of psychology involves the promotion of health across a wide variety of domains, as well as the prevention and treatment of disease and illness.

Health psychologists often deal with health-related issues such as weight management, smoking cessation , stress management , and nutrition. They might also research how people cope with illnesses, helping patients learn more effective coping strategies .

Some professionals in this branch of psychology assist with the design of disease prevention and public awareness programs, while others work within the government to improve health care policies.

Industrial-organizational psychology applies psychological principles to workplace issues. This psychological area, often referred to as I/O psychology, seeks to improve productivity and efficiency in the workplace while maximizing the well-being of employees. It includes areas such as human factors.

Human factors psychology focuses on human error, product design, ergonomics, human capability, and human-computer interaction. Its goal is to improve how people interact with products and machines. This might involve helping to design products intended to minimize injury or creating workplaces that promote greater accuracy and safety.

Research in I/O psychology is known as  applied research  because it seeks to solve real-world problems. These types of psychologists study topics such as worker attitudes, employee behaviors, organizational processes, and leadership.

Personality psychology is the branch of psychology that focuses on the study of thought patterns, feelings, and behaviors that make each individual unique. Classic theories of personality include Freud's psychoanalytic theory of personality and Erikson's theory of psychosocial development.

Personality psychologists might look at how different factors (such as genetics, parenting, and social experiences) influence personality development and change. They may also be involved in the creation or administration of personality tests .

School psychology is a type of psychology that involves working in schools to help kids deal with academic, emotional, and social issues. School psychologists also collaborate with teachers, students, and parents to help create a healthy learning environment.

Most school psychologists work in elementary and secondary schools, but others can be found in private clinics, hospitals, state agencies, and universities. Some go into private practice and serve as consultants—especially those with a doctoral degree in school psychology.

Social psychology seeks to understand and explain social behavior. It looks at diverse topics including group behavior, social interactions and perceptions, leadership, nonverbal communication, and social influences on decision-making.

Social influences on behavior are a major interest in social psychology, but these types of psychologists are also focused on how people perceive and interact with others. This branch of psychology also includes topics such as conformity, aggression, and prejudice.

Sports psychology is the study of how psychology influences sports, athletic performance, exercise, and physical activity. Individuals may work with a sports psychologist to improve their focus, develop mental toughness, increase motivation, or reduce sports-related anxiety .

Some sports psychologists work with professional athletes such as pro sports players and top Olympians. Others utilize exercise and sports to enhance the health and well-being of non-athletes throughout their lifespan.

Psychology is always evolving and new fields and branches continue to emerge. It is important to remember that no single branch of psychology is more important or better than any other. Each area contributes to our understanding of the many different psychological factors that influence who we are, how we behave, and how we think.

By conducting research and developing new applications for psychological knowledge, professionals working in all branches of psychology are able to help people better understand themselves, confront the problems they may face, and live better lives.

American Psychological Association. Biological psychology .

American Psychological Association. Society of Counseling Psychology .

International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. Home page .

Gray PO, Bjorklund, D. Psychology .

Hockenbury SE, Nolan SA. Psychology .

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Pursuing a Career in Experimental Psychology

All About Experimental Psychology

Why do we behave in certain ways? What influences our behavior? How can our behavior shape our experiences throughout our lives? 

These are just a few examples of the types of questions that experimental psychologists seek to answer through basic and applied research. In a sense, all psychologists are experimental psychologists because of the discipline’s focus on a research base for all their work. However, experimental psychologists often devote their full-time professional lives to conducting and publishing research — often spending years on a specific research question. These psychologists have a passion for solving problems and exploring theoretical questions. They study a wide range of behavioral topics among humans and animals, including sensation, perception, attention, memory, cognition, emotion and more.

What You Can Do

Experimental psychologists use scientific methods to collect data and perform research. They can work in varied settings, including universities, research centers, the government and private businesses. The exact type of research an experimental psychologist performs may depend on a number of factors, including his or her educational background, interests and area of employment. Often, psychologists with training in experimental psychology contribute across subfields , using scientific research to provide insights that improve teaching and learning, create safer workplaces, and promote healthy child development, to list a few examples. 

Those who work in academia often teach psychology courses in addition to performing research and publishing their findings in psychological journals.

Making It Happen

A career as an experimental psychologist starts out with a bachelor’s degree in psychology. Math skills and a strong grounding in how to collect and analyze data are critical to becoming an experimental psychologist. 

Some people choose to work in a lab or on other research teams after earning their master’s degree. After a few years of first-hand experience, many return to school to earn a doctoral degree. 

In addition, specialty areas such as human factors psychology and industrial and organizational (IO) psychology often have a very strong research focus, and professionals who work in these areas often make experimentation and research the major focus of their careers.

What You Can Earn

According to APA’s 2009 salary survey , annual salaries for doctoral-level experimental psychologists ranged from $76,090 to $116,343 depending on the psychologist’s position. The survey captured salary data for experimental psychologists working in faculty positions, research positions, research administration and applied psychology.

Helpful Resources

Division 3: Society for Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science Members of APA’s Division 3 promote scientific inquiry through teaching and research, and support experimental psychology through the advocacy and educational programs.

Research in Psychology Explore the ins and outs of psychology research with information about research tools and methods, research ethics, publishing and funding.

Division 21: Applied Experimental and Engineering Psychology Division 21 is at the intersection of psychology and technology. Applied experimental and engineering psychology aims at developing human-centered approaches to the design of myriad objects, machines and systems. It is a growing field with immense potential for rewarding career opportunities.