essays on james madison

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Early life and political activities

At a glance: the madison presidency.

• The father of the Constitution
• Madison’s presidency
• Cabinet of President James Madison

What did James Madison accomplish? 

• What led to the War of 1812?
• How did the War of 1812 end?
• Did the War of 1812 have popular support?
• What role did Native Americans play in the War of 1812?

James Madison

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What is James Madison best known for? 

James Madison created the basic framework for the U.S. Constitution and helped write the Bill of Rights . He is therefore known as the Father of the Constitution. He served as the fourth U.S. president , and he signed a declaration of war against Great Britain , starting the War of 1812 . 

Besides creating the basic outline for the U.S. Constitution , James Madison was one of the authors of the Federalist papers . As secretary of state under Pres. Thomas Jefferson , he oversaw the Louisiana Purchase . He and Jefferson founded the Democratic-Republican Party . After leaving the presidency, he wrote the Virginia Resolutions opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts . 

What was James Madison’s education?

James Madison was privately educated before attending the College of New Jersey, which became Princeton University , where he studied classical languages, mathematics , rhetoric , geography , and philosophy as well as Hebrew and political philosophy .

How did James Madison get into politics?

James Madison was elected to Virginia ’s 1776 Revolutionary convention, where he drafted a guarantee of religious freedom. He was later appointed to the Virginia Council of State, and in 1780 he was elected as the youngest member of the Continental Congress .

James Madison (born March 16 [March 5, Old Style], 1751, Port Conway, Virginia [U.S.]—died June 28, 1836, Montpelier, Virginia, U.S.) was the fourth president of the United States (1809–17) and one of the Founding Fathers of his country . At the Constitutional Convention (1787), he influenced the planning and ratification of the U.S. Constitution and collaborated with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in the publication of the Federalist papers . As a member of the new House of Representatives , he sponsored the first 10 amendments to the Constitution , commonly called the Bill of Rights . He was secretary of state under President Thomas Jefferson when the Louisiana Territory was purchased from France . The War of 1812 was fought during his presidency.

Madison was born at the home of his maternal grandmother. The son and namesake of a leading Orange county landowner and squire, he maintained his lifelong home in Virginia at Montpelier, near the Blue Ridge Mountains . In 1769 he rode horseback to the College of New Jersey ( Princeton University ), selected for its hostility to episcopacy. He completed the four-year course in two years, finding time also to demonstrate against England and to lampoon members of a rival literary society in ribald verse. Overwork produced several years of epileptoid hysteria and premonitions of early death, which thwarted military training but did not prevent home study of public law , mixed with early advocacy of independence (1774) and furious denunciation of the imprisonment of nearby Dissenters from the established Anglican church. Madison never became a church member, but in maturity he expressed a preference for Unitarianism .

His health improved, and he was elected to Virginia’s 1776 Revolutionary convention, where he drafted the state’s guarantee of religious freedom. In the convention-turned-legislature he helped Thomas Jefferson disestablish the church but lost reelection by refusing to furnish the electors with free whiskey. After two years on the governor’s council, he was sent to the Continental Congress in March 1780.

Five feet four inches tall and weighing about 100 pounds, small boned, boyish in appearance, and weak of voice, he waited six months before taking the floor, but strong actions belied his mild demeanor . He rose quickly to leadership against the devotees of state sovereignty and enemies of Franco-U.S. collaboration in peace negotiations, contending also for the establishment of the Mississippi as a western territorial boundary and the right to navigate that river through its Spanish-held delta. Defending Virginia ’s charter title to the vast Northwest against states that had no claim to western territories and whose major motive was to validate barrel-of-rum purchases from Indian tribes, Madison defeated the land speculators by persuading Virginia to cede the western lands to Congress as a national heritage.

Following the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, Madison undertook to strengthen the Union by asserting implied power in Congress to enforce financial requisitions upon the states by military coercion. This move failing, he worked unceasingly for an amendment conferring power to raise revenue and wrote an eloquent address adjuring the states to avert national disintegration by ratifying the submitted article. The chevalier de la Luzerne, French minister to the United States , wrote that Madison was “regarded as the man of the soundest judgment in Congress.”

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The Federalist , commonly referred to as the Federalist Papers, is a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison between October 1787 and May 1788. The essays were published anonymously, under the pen name "Publius," in various New York state newspapers of the time.

The Federalist Papers were written and published to urge New Yorkers to ratify the proposed United States Constitution, which was drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. In lobbying for adoption of the Constitution over the existing Articles of Confederation, the essays explain particular provisions of the Constitution in detail. For this reason, and because Hamilton and Madison were each members of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers are often used today to help interpret the intentions of those drafting the Constitution.

The Federalist Papers were published primarily in two New York state newspapers: The New York Packet and The Independent Journal . They were reprinted in other newspapers in New York state and in several cities in other states. A bound edition, with revisions and corrections by Hamilton, was published in 1788 by printers J. and A. McLean. An edition published by printer Jacob Gideon in 1818, with revisions and corrections by Madison, was the first to identify each essay by its author's name. Because of its publishing history, the assignment of authorship, numbering, and exact wording may vary with different editions of The Federalist .

The electronic text of The Federalist used here was compiled for Project Gutenberg by scholars who drew on many available versions of the papers.

One printed edition of the text is The Federalist , edited by Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1961). Cooke's introduction provides background information on the printing history of The Federalist; the information provided above comes in part from his work.

This web-friendly presentation of the original text of the Federalist Papers (also known as The Federalist) was obtained from the e-text archives of Project Gutenberg. Any irregularities with regard to grammar, syntax, spelling, or punctuation are as they exist in the original e-text archives.

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James Madison

By: History.com Editors

Updated: March 22, 2022 | Original: October 29, 2009

James Madison (1751-1836) was a Founding Father of the United States and the fourth American president, serving in office from 1809 to 1817. An advocate for a strong federal government, the Virginia-born Madison composed the first drafts of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights and earned the nickname “Father of the Constitution.” 

In 1792, Madison and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) founded the Democratic-Republican Party, which has been called America’s first opposition political party. When Jefferson became the third U.S. president, Madison served as his secretary of state. In this role, he oversaw the Louisiana Purchase from the French in 1803. During his presidency, Madison led the U.S. into the controversial War of 1812 (1812-15) against Great Britain. After two terms in the White House, Madison retired to his Virginia plantation, Montpelier, with his wife Dolley (1768-1849).

Early Years

James Madison was born on March 16, 1751, in Port Conway, Virginia , to James Madison Sr. and Nellie Conway Madison. The oldest of 12 children, Madison was raised on the family plantation, Montpelier, in Orange County, Virginia. At age 18, Madison left Montpelier to attend the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University).

Did you know? Montpelier, James Madison's Virginia plantation home, was established by his grandfather in 1723. An estimated 100 enslaved people lived at Montpelier when Madison owned it. The property was sold after this death. Today the estate, which covers some 2,600 acres, is open to the public.

After graduation, Madison took an interest in the relationship between the American colonies and Britain, which had grown tumultuous over the issue of British taxation. When Virginia began preparing for the American Revolutionary War (1775-83), Madison was appointed a colonel in the Orange County militia. Small in stature and sickly, he soon gave up a military career for a political one. In 1776, he represented Orange County at the Virginia Constitution Convention to organize a new state government no longer under British rule.

During his work in the Virginia legislature, Madison met lifelong friend Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), author of the Declaration of Independence and the third president of the United States. As a politician, Madison often fought for religious freedom, believing it was an individual’s right from birth.

In 1780, Madison became a Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. He left Congress in 1783 to return to the Virginia assembly and work on a religious freedom statute, though he would soon be called back to Congress to help create a new constitution.

Father of the Constitution

After the colonies declared independence from Britain in 1776, the Articles of Confederation were created as the first constitution of the United States. The Articles were ratified in 1781 and gave most of the power to the individual state legislatures who acted more like individual countries than a union. This structure left the national Congress weak, with no ability to properly manage federal debt or maintain a national army.

Madison, after undertaking an extensive study of other world governments, came to the conclusion that America needed a strong federal government in order to help regulate the state legislatures and create a better system for raising federal money. He felt the government should be set up with a system of checks and balances so no branch had greater power over the other. Madison also suggested that governors and judges have enhanced roles in government in order to help manage the state legislatures.

In May 1787, delegates from each state came together at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, and Madison was able to present his ideas for an effective government system in his “Virginia Plan,” which detailed a government with three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. This plan would form the basis of the U.S. Constitution . Madison took detailed notes during debates at the convention, which helped to further shape the U.S. Constitution and led to his moniker: “Father of the Constitution.” (Madison stated the Constitution was not “the off-spring of a single brain,” but instead, “the work of many heads and many hands.”)

Ratifying the Constitution and the Bill of Rights

Once the new constitution was written, it needed to be ratified by nine of the 13 states. This was not an easy process, as many states felt the Constitution gave the federal government too much power. Supporters of the Constitution were known as Federalists , while critics were called Anti-Federalists.

Madison played a strong role in the ratification process and wrote a number of essays outlining his support for the Constitution. His writings, along with those penned by other advocates, were released anonymously under the title “The Federalist,” a series of 85 essays produced between 1787 and 1788. After extensive debate, the U.S. Constitution was signed by members of the Constitutional Convention in September 1787. The document was ratified by the states in 1788 and the new government became functional the following year.

Bill of Rights

Madison was elected to the newly formed U.S. House of Representatives , where he served from 1789 to 1797. In Congress, he worked to draft the Bill of Rights , a group of 10 amendments to the Constitution that spelled out fundamental rights (such as freedom of speech and religion) held by U.S. citizens. The Bill of Rights was ratified by the states in 1791.

In the new, more powerful Congress, Madison and Jefferson soon found themselves disagreeing with the Federalists on key issues dealing with federal debt and power. For example, the two men favored states’ rights and opposed Federalist leader Alexander Hamilton ’s (c. 1755-1804) proposal for a national bank, the Bank of the United States . 

In 1792, Jefferson and Madison founded the Democratic-Republican Party, which has been labeled America’s first opposition political party. Jefferson, Madison and James Monroe (1758-1831) were the only Democratic-Republicans ever to become U.S. presidents, as the party divided into competing factions in the 1820s.

Dolley Madison

Madison also had a new development in his personal life: In 1794, after a brief courtship, the 43-year-old Madison married 26-year-old Dolley Payne Todd (1768-1849), an outgoing Quaker widow with one son. Dolley’s personality contrasted sharply with that of the quiet, reserved Madison. She loved entertaining and hosted many receptions and dinner parties during which Madison could meet other influential figures of his time. During the couple’s 41-year marriage, Dolley Madison and James Madison were reportedly rarely apart.

James Madison, Secretary of State: 1801-09

Through the years, Madison’s friendship with Jefferson would continue to thrive. When Jefferson became the third president of the United States, he appointed Madison as secretary of state. In this position, which he held from 1801 to 1809, Madison helped acquire the Louisiana Territory from the French in 1803. The Louisiana Purchase doubled the size of America.

In 1807, Madison and Jefferson enacted an embargo on all trade with Britain and France. The two European countries were at war and, angered by America’s neutrality, they had begun attacking U.S. ships at sea. However, the embargo hurt America and its merchants and sailors more than Europe, which did not need the American goods. Jefferson ended the embargo in 1809 as he left office.

James Madison, Fourth President and the War of 1812

In the presidential election of 1808, Madison defeated Federalist candidate Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (1745-1825) to become the nation’s fourth chief executive. Madison continued to face problems from overseas, as Britain and France had continued their attacks on American ships following the embargo. In addition to impeding U.S. trade, Britain took U.S. sailors for its own navy and began supporting American Indians in battles against U.S. settlers.

In retaliation, Madison issued a war proclamation against Britain in 1812. However, America was not ready for a war. Congress had not properly funded or prepared an army, and a number of the states did not support what was referred to as “Mr. Madison’s War” and would not allow their militias to join the campaign. Despite these setbacks, American forces attempted to fight off and attack British forces. The U.S. met defeat much of the time both on land and at sea, but its well-built ships proved to be formidable foes.

As the War of 1812 continued, Madison ran for re-election against Federalist candidate DeWitt Clinton (1767-1828), who was also supported by an anti-war faction of the Democratic-Republican Party, and won. Despite the victory, Madison was often criticized and blamed for the difficulties stemming from the war. Trade stopped between the U.S. and Europe, hurting American merchants once again. New England threatened secession from the Union. The Federalists undermined Madison’s efforts; and Madison was forced to flee Washington, D.C., in August 1814 as British troops invaded and burned buildings, including the White House , the Capitol and the Library of Congress .

Finally, weary from battle, Britain and the U.S. agreed to negotiate an end to the war. The Treaty of Ghent was signed in December 1814 in Europe. Before word of the peace agreement reached America, a major victory for U.S. troops at the Battle of New Orleans (December 1814-January 1815) helped shine a positive light on the controversial war. Though the war was mismanaged, there were some key victories that emboldened the Americans. Once blamed for the errors in the war, Madison was eventually hailed for its triumphs.

Final Years

After two terms in office, Madison left Washington, D.C., in 1817, and returned to Montpelier with his wife. Despite the challenges he encountered during his presidency, Madison was respected as a great thinker, communicator and statesman. He remained active in various civic causes, and in 1826 became rector of the University of Virginia, which was founded by his friend Thomas Jefferson. Madison died at Montpelier on June 28, 1836, at the age of 85, from heart failure.

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James Madison and the Bill of Rights

Written by: bill of rights institute, by the end of this section, you will:.

• Explain the differing ideological positions on the structure and function of the federal government

Suggested Sequencing

This Narrative should be assigned to students at the beginning of their study of Chapter 4. This reading can be used in conjunction with the Actions of the First Congress Lesson or following the Lesson to reinforce main ideas.

In early 1787, when Virginia Congressman James Madison was preparing for the Constitutional Convention, he wrote an essay entitled “Vices of the Political System,” detailing the flaws of the Articles of Confederation. One of the main problems with the Articles, in Madison’s view, was that tyrannical majorities in the states passed unjust laws violating the rights of numerical minorities. He had seen the oppression of religious dissenters in Virginia and became the leading advocate for the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. But injustice was occurring in all the states. As a result, Madison drafted the Virginia Plan, which greatly strengthened the power of the central government and laid the groundwork for the debates at the Constitutional Convention.

James Madison as portrayed by Gilbert Stuart in about 1805-1807. Madison was a dominant force at the Constitutional Convention and took notes that have served as an indispensable source for historians, who call him the “Father of the Constitution.”

At the Constitutional Convention, Madison advocated for constitutional principles of separation of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism , and federalism, which would limit government and protect individual liberties. However, he lost one central feature of his plan of government – a national veto over state laws, meant to prevent majority tyranny in the states.

On September 12, 1787, during the last days of the Constitutional Convention, fellow Virginia delegate George Mason rose and proposed a bill of rights, a list of rights belonging to the people that government could not violate. The delegates were wrapping up their business and worried that a prolonged debate on a bill of rights could endanger the success of their project. Roger Sherman of Connecticut also reassured the convention that the states had their own bills of rights and so had no need for a national bill of rights. The convention unanimously rejected Mason’s idea.

When the Constitution was sent to the state conventions for ratification, the Anti-Federalists who were opposed to it agreed on the need for a bill of rights to protect the liberties of the people. Several Federalists, or those who supported the new Constitution, disagreed. On October 6, Pennsylvanian James Wilson delivered a speech at the state house in which he argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because the new national government had limited, enumerated (i.e., specified) powers and had no power to violate liberties in the first place. In Federalist Paper No. 84, Alexander Hamilton warned that a bill of rights could even be dangerous, because defining certain rights vaguely would leave them subject to misinterpretation or violation, where previously no such power had existed. Moreover, some important rights would be left out and therefore endangered. Most importantly, Hamilton argued that “the constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS” because of the principle of limited government.

During the ratification debate, Federalists in many states had to make compromises. Although they were able to prevent the addition of “conditional amendments” prior to ratification, they had to promise to pass a bill of rights after the Constitution had been ratified. Madison opposed even this and thought “the amendments are a blemish.”

Madison conducted an extensive correspondence over several months with his friend Thomas Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time. Jefferson lamented the absence of a bill of rights in the Constitution and asserted, “A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth.” Madison waffled on the issue. He did not believe the “omission a material defect.” In a republican form of government rooted upon popular sovereignty, the majority could act tyrannically by violating the rights of the minority. Among his several reasons for opposing a bill of rights was that such documents were often just “parchment barriers” that overbearing majorities violated in the states regardless of whether the written protections for minority rights existed. As he wrote in Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison also believed that a large republic would have many contending factions that would prevent a majority from violating the rights of minorities. Nevertheless, he began to change his mind.

Madison was deeply concerned about the continuing strength of the Anti-Federalists after ratification. Anti-Federalists were still calling for structural changes and a second constitutional convention to limit the powers of the national government and deny it power over taxation and the regulation of commerce. Madison feared this would lead to chaos and fought against it. He also sought greater consensus and harmony around constitutional principles by reaching out to the opponents of the new government. He ran in a hard-fought campaign against James Monroe for a seat in the House of Representatives and made a campaign promise to support a bill of rights, particularly an amendment protecting the liberty of conscience. Finally, Madison wrote President George Washington’s Inaugural Address, which indicated support for a bill of rights to be acted upon in the First Congress.

Representative Madison became the champion for a bill of rights in the First Congress, but the idea met a hostile reception. Most representatives and senators thought Congress had more important work to do setting up the new government or passing tax bills for revenue. Many thought the bill of rights was a “tub to the whale” or a distraction, like the empty tub sailors would use to draw away a whale’s attention. Madison was undeterred and dedicated himself to the cause of protecting the people’s liberties.

On June 8, 1789, dressed in black as always, Madison rose on the floor of the House to deliver a speech in favor of a bill of rights. His arguments were founded on the goal of a harmonious political order and the ideals of justice. A bill of rights would extinguish the apprehensions of Anti-Federalists and convince them of the “principles of amity and moderation” held by the other side, now prepared to fulfill a sacred promise made during the ratification debate. Rhode Island and North Carolina, which had withheld their ratification of the Constitution until a bill of rights was added, would also be welcomed into the union. Most importantly, the Bill of Rights would “expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution.”

The first U.S. Congress met in Federal Hall in New York City for one year before moving to Philadelphia in 1790.

Madison then skillfully guided the amendments through the Congress. He and his committee reconciled all the amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions and discarded any that would alter the structure of the Constitution or the new government. Limiting himself to those protecting essential liberties, Madison developed a list of nineteen amendments and a preamble. He wanted them to be woven into the text of the Constitution, not simply affixed to the end of the document as amendments, and he sought a key amendment to protect from violation by state governments religious freedom, a free press, and trial by jury. He lost both these provisions but prudentially and moderately continued to support the Bill of Rights he had proposed.

On August 24, the House sent seventeen amendments to the Senate after approving them by more than the required two-thirds margin. By September 14, two-thirds of the Senate had approved twelve amendments, removing the limitations on state governments. President Washington sent the amendments to the states, endorsing them even though the president did not have a formal role in their adoption.

Over the next two years, eleven states ratified the Bill of Rights to meet the three-fourths constitutional threshold, including North Carolina and Rhode Island. Virginia became the last state to ratify on December 15, 1791. The Bill of Rights fulfilled Madison’s goals of reconciling its opponents to the Constitution and protecting individual liberties. However, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment and later Supreme Court cases in the twentieth century reversed this decision and applied the Bill of Rights to the states through the principle known as “incorporation.”

Review Questions

1. Which delegate to the Constitutional Convention first proposed a bill of rights?

• Thomas Jefferson
• James Madison
• George Mason
• James Monroe

2. One of James Madison’s constitutional principles was rejected. This principle would have given

• the Federal government a veto over state legislation
• the Executive Branch more authority than the other two branches of government
• more authority to the governor of each state
• explicit rights to the people

3. After the submission of the Constitution to the states for ratification, James Madison’s greatest concern grew from

• his fear of the growing divide between the North and South
• the endless debate over the need for a bill of rights
• the strength of resistance to the Constitution expressed by the Anti-Federalists
• the passage of tax bills that would disproportionately harm the small states

4. Which individual helped changed James Madison’s opposition to a bill of rights?

• George Washington

5. Alexander Hamilton’s major argument against a bill of rights was that

• a specific list of rights could be misinterpreted and violated
• it was too burdensome for the federal government to enforce
• it would be abused and interpreted differently by the different states
• the rights would be redundant because states already had their own bills of rights

6. One major reason James Madison initially believed a bill of rights was unnecessary was that

• the United States would be broken into many factions and the majority could not violate the rights of the minority
• individual rights were implied in the body of the Constitution
• a bill of rights would give the people too much authority

7. Which of the following was not a reason that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention omitted adding a bill of rights to the original document?

• Many delegates believed a bill of rights would be unnecessary because all the states had their own.
• There was a strong belief that individual rights were implied in the document they had already created.
• A debate over adding a bill of rights would have prolonged the Convention and could have endangered the work they were about to complete.
• A bill of rights would have been next to impossible to enforce in a nation as large as the United States.

Free Response Questions

• Explain James Madison’s evolving support for the Bill of Rights.
• Describe the debate over the addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution.

AP Practice Questions

“IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. . . . The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked that the constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament. I add that New York is of the number. And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things: one is that, though the constitution of New York has no bill of rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance amount to the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not expressed in it, are equally secured. To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the convention contains, as well as the constitution of this State, a number of such provisions.”

Publius (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist Papers: No. 84 , 1788

1. The argument made by Publius in the excerpt

• explains the need for a strong bill of rights in the Constitution
• argues that a bill of rights would be too restrictive
• argues there is no need for a bill of rights because the different states do not agree on what to include
• argues that a bill of rights is implied in the body of the Constitution and is therefore unnecessary

2. Supporters of adding a bill of rights to the Constitution were most likely influenced by

• the violations of the “Rights of Englishmen” at the hands of the British in the years before the American Revolution
• the failure of the government to come to the aid of Massachusetts during Shays’ Rebellion
• fear of the lack of authority in the central government
• the inherent weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation

3. The concepts expressed in the Bill of Rights have most in common with the ideas of

• the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768
• the Olive Branch Petition
• the English Bill of Rights
• the Declaration of Rights and Grievances published by the Stamp Act Congress

Primary Sources

Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist #84 . May 28, 1788. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0247

Madison, James. Letter to Thomas Jefferson. October 17, 1788. https://founders.archives.gov/?q=bill%20of%20rights%20Recipient%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Author%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22%20Period%3A%22Confederation%20Period%22&s=1511311111&r=27

Madison, James. “Speech in Congress on the Bill of Rights.” June 8, 1789. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=221

Suggested Resources

Berkin, Carol. The Bill of Rights: The Fight to Secure America’s Liberties . New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015.

DeRose, Chris. Founding Rivals: Madison vs. Monroe: The Bill of Rights and the Election That Saved a Nation . Washington, DC: Regnery, 2011.

Goldwin, Robert A. From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights to Save the Constitution . Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1997.

Labunski, Richard. James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Levy, Leonard W. Origins of the Bill of Rights . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

Rutland, Robert Allen. The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791 . Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983.

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James Madison's Argument in The Federalist 10: Defending Against Factions

An analysis of james madison's argument on factions and government..

James Madison, one of the founding fathers of the United States, was a key figure in the drafting of the Constitution and the author of several essays in The Federalist Papers. In Federalist 10, Madison presents his argument against factions and explains how a large republic can help mitigate their negative effects on government and society.

Madison begins by defining factions as groups of citizens who are united by a common interest or passion, which is contrary to the rights of other citizens or the interests of the community as a whole. He argues that factions are inevitable in a free society, as people will always have differing opinions and interests. However, Madison asserts that the greatest danger posed by factions is their potential to undermine the stability and effectiveness of government.

Madison's main concern is that factions can lead to the tyranny of the majority, where a powerful faction imposes its will on the rest of society. He believes that this can result in the erosion of individual rights and the suppression of minority opinions. To counteract this threat, Madison proposes a large republic as a solution.

In a large republic, with a diverse population and a wide range of interests, Madison argues that it would be difficult for any single faction to gain enough power to dominate the government. The sheer size and diversity of the country would make it challenging for factions to form a majority coalition that could impose its will on others. Instead, the government would be forced to consider the interests of various factions and strive for compromise and consensus.

Madison also emphasizes the role of representation in a large republic. By electing representatives to make decisions on their behalf, citizens can ensure that their interests are taken into account in the legislative process. This system of representation serves as a safeguard against the tyranny of the majority, as it allows for the protection of minority rights and prevents any one faction from gaining too much power.

Furthermore, Madison argues that the separation of powers and checks and balances in the American system of government provide additional protection against the dangers of factions. By dividing government authority among different branches and giving each branch the means to check the powers of the others, the Constitution ensures that no single faction can wield unchecked power.

In conclusion, James Madison's argument in The Federalist 10 revolves around the idea that a large republic, with representation, separation of powers, and checks and balances, is the best defense against the dangers of factions. By dispersing power and promoting compromise and consensus, a large republic can help safeguard individual rights and prevent the tyranny of the majority. Madison's insights continue to be relevant today, as we grapple with the challenges of governing a diverse and divided society.

The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 10.

Madison begins perhaps the most famous essay of The Federalist Papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines factions as groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interest and infringe upon the rights of others.

Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact, the situation is so problematic that people are disillusioned with all politicians and blame the government for their problems. Consequently, any form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.

Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amounts of property, they will continue to fraternize with those people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions, but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property. Men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those of business owners. Governments must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but also must successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property.

To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man, so we must accept their existence and deal with their effects. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.

The framers established a representative form of government: a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.

If the new plan of government is adopted, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men,­ the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good for temporary conditions, but the opposite could happen. Men who are members of particular factions or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public offices will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but rather to guard against the rule of the mob.

In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. In this country, leaders of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies ­as the states, far from being abolished, retain much of their sovereignty. If the framers had abolished the state governments, then opponents of the proposed government would have had a legitimate objection.

The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capital, but in terms of safety and protection, they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.

Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandoning the idea of coming together in strength—after all, the states still have common interests. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."

James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic were set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, then these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor. Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. Rather, he wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself to break down the dichotomy of rich and poor, thereby guaranteeing both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."

It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in attendance at the Philadelphia Convention. His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular Constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, was based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in 1787. But Madison's greatness as a statesman also rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience within the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations.

His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests constituted a guarantee of stability and justice under the new Constitution. When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in 1752, that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay, Hume decried any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments" which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world. " At the end of Hume's essay was a discussion that was of interest to Madison. The Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world." Hume said that "in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest." Hume's analysis here had turned the small-territory republic theory upside down: if a free state could once be established in a large area, it would be stable and safe from the effects of faction. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic.

In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April 1787, eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights? Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general . . . good" second, "respect for character" and finally, religious scruples. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party.

When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The facile domination of faction had been a commonplace in English politics for a hundred years, as Whig and Tory vociferously sought to fasten the label on each other. But the Scot, very little interested as a partisan and very much so as a social scientist, treated the subject therefore in psychological, intellectual, and socioeconomic terms. Throughout all history, he discovered, mankind has been divided into factions based either on personal loyalty to some leader or upon some "sentiment or interest" common to the group as a unit. This latter type he called a "Real" as distinguished from the "personal" faction. Finally, he subdivided the "real factions" into parties based on "interest, upon principle," or upon affection."

Hume spent well over five pages dissecting these three types; but Madison, while determined to be inclusive, had not the space to go into such minute analysis. Besides, he was more intent now on developing the cure than on describing the malady. He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The tenth Federalist reads" "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex ad oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good." It is hard to conceive of a more perfect example of the concentration of idea and meaning than Madison achieved in this famous sentence.

The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

how are conflictstoo often decided in unstable government? Whose rights are denied when this happens?

In a typical non-democratic government with political instability, the conflicts are often decided by the person highest in power, who abuse powers or who want to seize power. Rival parties fight each other to the detriment of the country.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

What specific claim are you referring to?

Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

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Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
• Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
• Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
• The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
• Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers

Lesson Plan for The Federalist Papers

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E-Text of The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers e-text contains the full text of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

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Wikipedia Entries for The Federalist Papers

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Notes for the national gazette essays, [ca. 19 december 1791–3 march 1792], notes for the national gazette essays.

[ca. 19 December 1791–3 March 1792]

Influence of the size of a nation on Government

Plato limits the number of Citizens to five thousand and forty. Montesquieu tom. II c. 16, 17 1

L’experience a fait voir que le nombre des hommes en etat de porter les armes, ne doit être ici (dans une republique sagement reglee) ni fort au dessus, ni fort au dessous de vingt mille. Anach: vol. [II] p: 117 & citation. 2

See Convention Notes 3 —letter to Mr. Jefferson on a federal negative on State laws 4 Federalists No. X et alia:—Case of popular confiscation in Switzerland, mentioned in Encyclop: Method: 5 Plunder of rich Citizens by democracy of Megara. Anacharsis vol. 3. p. 409 instances of proscriptions of rich in Antient & Italian Republics—Exiles so numerous as to return sometimes and seize the Govt. Aristotle Repub. book 5. cap. 5. 6 Anacharsis vol. 5 page 268

(a) All overgrown empires have betrayed first tyranny—then impotency, as the Assyrian—Persian—Macedonian—Roman—that of Charlemagne—

In order to temper an aristocracy into a mild Govt. the state should like those of Switzerland be so small as to admit a ready combination of the people agst. oppression, as in order to temper a Republic, it ought to be so large, as to impede a combination of the people for the purpose of oppression. See p. 10. See Anacharsis as to oligarchy of Rhodes—vol. 6 p. 240.

For the extent of antient republics & confederacies—see Encyclopae. Ant: Geograp: Anacharsis with the Maps —

The best provision for a stable and free Govt. is not a balance in the powers of the Govt. tho’ that is not to be neglected, but an equilibrium in the interests & passions of the Society itself, which can not be attained in a small Society. Much has been said on the first. The last deserves a thorough investigation. (see p 2. (a))

The larger a community, the more respectable the whole & the less the share of importance felt by each member—the more submissive consequently each individual to the general will.

Whatever facilitates a general intercommunication of sentiments & ideas among the body of the people, as a free press, compact situation, good roads, interior commerce &c. is equivalent to a contraction of the orbit within wch. the Govt. is to act: and may favor liberty in a nation too large for free Govt. or hasten its violent death in one too small & so vice versa. Could the people of G. Britain be contracted into one of its Counties it would be scarcely possible for the monarchical branch to support itself agst. the popular branch. Could they be spread over 10 times the present area, or the communion of sentiments be obstructed by an abolition of the press &c. the reverse would happen. The extent of France & heterogeneousness of its component provinces have been among the principal causes of the monarchical usurpations. See Robertson’s Chs. V. notes. 7

The Roman Empire was more than 2,000 miles from N. to S. & [more] than 3000 from W to E. Its population about 120,000[,]000 including slaves (who amounted to about one half)—this more than the population of all Europe. See Gibbon 8

In monarchies, the danger is twofold. 1. that the eyes of a good prince cannot see all that he ought to know—2 that the hands of a bad one cannot be sufficiently tied by the fear of easy combinations against him. Both these considerations prove, contrary to the received opinion, that a very great extent of Country is not suited to that form of Government: In a Representative Republic the eyes of the Government see every thing; and the danger arising cheifly from easy combinations under the impulse of misinformed or corrupt passions—it appears on the other hand, equally agst. the received opinion, that such a form of Govt. may be extended over a great Country, and cannot succeed in a small one.

The influence of this circumstance, is strongly enforced by attending to the extremes of size. Among 3 men in a Wilderness, two would never obey one—nor perhaps the one escape the oppression of the two should any real or fancied interest unite them agst. him. On the other hand, were all Europe formed into one society, the mighty mass, being unable to govern themselves wd be necessaryly governed by a few or one, and being also incapable of uniting agst. oppression, would be sure to be oppressed by their Governors.

(a) see p 1.—(Natural divisions exist in all political societies, which should be made mutual checks on each other. But it does not follow that artificial distinctions, as kings & nobles, should be created, and then formed into checks and balances with each other & with the people. This reasoning in politics, would be as inadmissible as it would be in Ethics, to say that new vices ought be promoted that they may control each other, because this use may be made of existing vices—avarice and vanity—cowardice & malice—&c)

The danger of oppression to the minority from unjust combinations of the majority, and which is the disease of small States is illustrated by various instances.

By the case of Debtors & Creditors in Rome & Athens

By that of the Patricians & Plebeians & the Rich & poor, in the latter, in Florence & the other free Cities of Italy

By the Spartans & Helots

By the case of Black slaves in Modern times

By religious persecutions every where

By the tender & other unjust laws in U. S.

By the law of St: Marino which requires its Judges to be foreigners

By the law de medietate 9 in England

By the law agst. admitting a member of Corporation to be on a jury where the Corporation is party.

The danger is still greater where geographical distinctions enforce the others, as appears

Influence of external danger on Government

Fear & hatred of other nations, the greatest cement, always appealed to by rulers when they wish to impose burdens or carry unpopular points. Examples in Engd. & France abound. See Federalist No. VII & XXX. Roman Senate quelled popular commotions by exciting foreign wars—

See (a) under the preceding head page 1. Extensive Governments have fallen to pieces not more from the inadequacy of Govt. to the Extent—than from the security agst. external danger.

Quere; if an insulated people be found on the Globe united under one Govt.? However small the number, they must be divided into hostile nations, that mutual fear may support Govt. in each.

In small states external danger tends to aristocracy (see p. 1.) a concentration of the Public will being necessary, and that degree of concentration being sufficient. The many can not govern on acct. of the emergencies which require the constant vigilance & provisions of a few , but on account of the smallness of the Society the facility of the combinations of the many moderates the power of the few, & the few themselves oppose the usurpation of a single tyrant. In Thessaly, intersected by Mountainous barriers into a number of small cantons, the Governments were for the most part oligarchical—see Thucidides 1. 4. c. 78 10 —see Anachar. v. 3. p. 352.

For the effect of the situation of Crete on its internal divisions—see Id. v. 6. p. 257.

Sicily, tho a part of a moderate Kingdom, always when free divided into separate & hostile communities see Thucidides Livy &c

Influence of Stage of Society on Government.

Influence of public opinion on Government

Public opinion, sets bounds to every Government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.

As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the Government, so there are cases, where, not being fixed, it may be influenced by the Government. This distinction, if kept in view, would prevent or decide many debates on the respect due from the Government to the sentiments of the people.

If the British Government be as excellent as represented, it is less because so in itself, than because so in the public opinion. Its boasted equilibrium is preserved more by this cause, than by the distribution of its powers. If the nation favored absolute monarchy its representatives would at once surrender the public liberty; if republicanism, the monarchical branch could not maintain its independence. If the public opinion was neutral only, the ambition of the House of Commons would easily strip the Prince of his prerogatives. The provision to be made at every accession , for the Civil list, shews at once his dependence on the popular branch, and its dependence on the public opinion. Were the establishment to be from year to year instead of for life, the Monarchy would dwindle into a name. But the nation would in such a case take the side of the King agst. its own representatives. Those who ascribe the character of the British Government to the form alone in which its powers are distributed & counterpoised, forget the changes which its form has undergone. Compare its primitive with its present form; a King at the head of 7 or 8 hundred Barons sitting together in their own right, or (admitting another Hypothesis) some in their own right, others as representatives of a few lesser barons, but still sitting together as one House—& the Judges holding during the pleasure of the King; with a King at the head of a Legislature consisting of two Houses, each jealous of the other, one sitting in their own right, the other representing the body of the people, and the Judges forming a distinct & independent department; in the first case the Judiciary united with the Executive, the legislature not divided into separate branches; in the latter, the Legislative Executive & Judiciary distinct, and the Legislature itself divided into rival parts. What can be more contrasted than these forms? If the one be self-balanced, the other could have no balance at all. Yet the one subsisted as well as the other, and lasted longer than the other has yet been tried. It was supported by the opinion of the times, like many of the intermediate forms thro’ which, the B. Govt. has passed, and as the future forms will probably be supported, thro’ which changes of circumstances and opinions are yet to conduct it.

Not only Theoretical writers as Plato (Republic), but more practical ones as Swift &c. remark that the natural rotation in Government is from the abuses of Monarchy to Aristocracy, from the oppression of aristocracy to democracy, and from the licentiousness of Democracy back to Monarchy. Many examples, as well as the reason of the King, shew this tendency. Yet it appears from Aristotle that under the influence of public opinion, the rotation was very different in some of the States of Greece. See Arist: Repub. b. 5 c. 12.

In proportion as Government is influenced by opinion, must it be so by whatever influences opinion. This decides the question concerning a bill of rights, which acquires efficacy as time sanctifies and incorporates it with the public sentiment.

Influence of Education on Government

Influence of Religion on Government.

For the cave of Jupiter in Crete where Minos, Epimenides & Pythagoras pretended to have recd. a divine sanction to their laws & see Anacharsis v. 6. p. 248

Influence of domestic slavery on Government

See proportion of slaves in Grecian & Roman Republics—

See private life of Romans by —— 11

do. of Athenians & Lacedemonians in Anacharsis

In Arcadia 300,000 slaves. Anacharsis—vol. 4. p. 298.

In proportion as slavery prevails in a State, the Government, however democratic in name, must be aristocratic in fact. The power lies in a part instead of the whole; in the hands of property, not of numbers. All the antient popular governments, were for this reason aristocracies. The majority were slaves. Of the residue a part were in the Country and did not attend the assemblies, a part were poor and tho in the city, could not spare the time to attend. The power, was exercised for the most part by the rich and easy. Aristotle (de rep: lib. 3. cap. 1 & 4.) defines a Citizen or member of the sovereignty, to be one who is sufficiently free from all private cares, to devote himself exclusively to the service of his Country—See also Anacharsis, vol. 5. p. 280/1. The Southern States of America, are on the same principle aristocracies. In Virginia the aristocratic character is increased by the rule of suffrage, which requiring a freehold in land excludes nearly half the free inhabitants, and must exclude a greater proportion, as the population increases. At present the slaves and non-freeholders amount to nearly ¾ of the State. The power is therefore in about ¼. Were the slaves freed and the right of suffrage extended to all, the operation of the Government might be very different. The slavery of the Southern States, throws the power much more into the hands of property, than in the Northern States. Hence the people of property in the former are much more contented with their establishd. Governments, than the people of property in the latter.

Influence of dependent dominions on Government

Mais c’est principalement aux victoires que les Atheniens remporterent contre les Perses, qu’on doit attribuer la ruine de l’ancienne Constitution. (Arist: de rep: 1. 2. cap. 12.) Apres la bataille de Platée, on ordonna que le citoyens de derniers classes exclus par Solon de principales magistratures, auroient desormais le droit d’y parvenir. Le sage Aristides, qui presenta ce decret (Plut: in aris) 12 donna le plus funeste des examples a ceux qui lui succederent dans le commandement. Il leur fallut d’abord flatter la multitude, et ensuite ramper devant elle. Anarch: vol. 1. p. 147/8

See Hist: of Grecian Colonies 13 —Roman Provinces—dependencies in E. & W. Indies—

The principal part of the Revenues of Athens consisted of tributes from her dependencies Anacharsis Vol. 4. p. 429.

Dependent Colonies are to the superior State, not in the relation of Children and parent according to the common language, but in that of slaves and Master; and have the same effect with slavery on the character of the Superior. They cherish pride, luxury, and vanity. They make the labor of one part tributary to the enjoyment of another.

Dependent territories are of two kinds. 1 those which yield to the superior State at once a monopoly of their useful productions, and a market for its superfluities. These may excite & employ industry and may be a source of riches. The West-Indies are an example. 2. those which, tho yielding in some degree a monopoly and a market, are lucrative by the wealth which they administer to individuals and which is transported to the Superior State. Their wealth resembles that drawn not from industry, but from mines, and may produce like consequences. The East Indies are an example.

The influence of the E. & W. Indies & other dependencies belonging to G. Britain, on the side of the Crown, is an adventitious circumstance, which like the National debt, weighs much.

See “History of the Colonization of the free States of Antiquity applied to the present Contest between G. B. & her American Colonies. With reflections concerning the future settlement of these Colonies.[”] London, printed for T. Cadell on the Strand. M.DCC.LXXVII. 14

See Remarks on an essay entitled “The History &c &c—and her Amr. Colonies.” By John Symonds. LLD. Professor of Mod. Hist: in the Univy. of Cambridge. London: printed by J. Nichols, successor to W. Bowyer; and sold by T. Payne, Mewsgate; W. Owen[,] Temple. Bar P. Elmsly. Strand; T. Evans Pat: Nost: row; J. Woodyer Cambridg & J. Fletcher Oxford. 1778 15

The money with which Pericles decorated Athens, was raised by Aristides on the confederates of Athens for common defence, and on pretext of danger at Delos which was the common depository, removed to Athens, where it was soon regarded as the tribute of inferiors instead of the common property of associates, and applied by Pericles accordingly. See Remarks by J. Symonds above, & authors there cited. p. 42.

Checks devised in Democracies marking self-distrust

In Athens all laws were to be agreed to in the Senate before they could be deliberated in the popular assembly.

The first speakers in the assembly were to be 50 years of age at least. Æschines in Timarc. 16 Anachar: Vol. 1. p. 106

No orator was allowed to engage in public affairs, until he had undergone an examination relative to his character, and every Citizen was permitted to prosecute an Orator who had found means to withold the irregularity of his manners from the severity of this examination. Æschin: ibid et Suid in ρὴτορ 17

The Areopagus for life &c. 18

With The prayers at the commencement of public deliberations were mingled frightful imprecations agst. the Orator who shd. have recd presents, to deceive the people, or the Senate, or the Tribunal of the Heliastes. 19 See Anacharsis—& the citations II, p. 281. For other cautions agst. the undue influence of Orators—see id: p. 287.

Ostracism, Petalism, 20 Dictatorship, punishment of unsuccessful propositions of new laws.

In Athens death was decreed by the people to the Orator who should propose to apply to the public defence, the money destined to pay for the seats of the poor at the Spectacles. Anacharsis vol. 4. p. 430/1

In the Republic of the Italian Locris, it was ordained by Zaleucus, 21 that whoever proposed a new law, or repeal or alteration of an old one, should do it with a rope about his neck, that if unsuccessful, he might be immediately executed. * Ubbo Emmius, tom 3. p. 353 22

The Augurs in Rome—College of Heralds with Negative on war & peace, instituted by Numa. See Moyle on Rom: Govt. p. 46 23 —& Dionysius Halycarnassus. 24

True reasons for keeping great departments of power separate

Federal Governments

See Federalist Vol. 1. pg—

The Governments of the cantons of Greece were federal—composed of the Govts. of Towns, of which the principal usually gave law to the rest—see Anacharsis. vol. 4. p. 345

For the Beotian Confederacy—see Anacharsis, vol. 3. p. 309.

(a) For the Amphyctionic do. see do. vol. 3. 336 & seq.

For the confederacies of Thessaly see Anacharsis vol. p. 352 & seq.

For Union of Calmar see—

For Saxon Heptarchy see—

For confederation of 4 N. England Colonies—see Hazard collection of papers— 25

For the Etolian Confederacy see Anacharsis vol. 3 p. 405.

For Acarnanian do. see do. p. 404.

For Achæan do.—see do. p. 463—

For the Confederacy of Elis see do. p. 470. Of Messenia do.

(a) neither Thucidides nor Xenophon’s continuation of him make the least allusion to the Amphyctionic Council, altho’ Athens & Lacedemon were under its Authority. That the Pelopponesian War, so distinguished for its duration its belligerent parties and its consequences, should have been carried on without any interference or mention of that institution is a remarkable proof of its insignificancy.

For the Arcadian Confederacy see Anacharsis vol. 4. page 298

For the Argive do. see Strabo lib. 8 26 —Anacharsis vol. 4. p. 346.

For the three confederacies of the Asiatic Greeks—see Id. vol. 6. p. 203/4—209/10

For the Syncretism of Crete. Id. vol. 6. p. 259.

For the Albany project see Franklin’s works 27 also Pownal’s Colonies 28

For Hanseatic League, see

For the Germanic Belgic & Achean see Meerman’s prize discourse 29 belongg. to Mr. Jefferson.

Government of United States—

See Federalist, passim—particularly No. 51.

Here is the most characteristic trait in the Govt. of the U. S.—The powers surrendered by the people of America, are divided into two parts, one for the State, the other for the Genl. Govt. & each subdivided into Legislative Ex. & Judiciary. As in a single Govt. the Legislative Ex. & Judicy. ought to be kept separate by defensive armour for each. So ought the two Govts. federal & State. If this should be found practicable, it must be a happy discovery for mankind. As far as the security agst. power lies in a division of it, the security must be increased, by a system which doubles the number of parts. It must be confessed that the difficulty of dividing power between two Govts. is greater than between the several departmts. of the same Govt. as well as the difficulty of maintaining the division. It is more easy to divide from each other the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers, wch. are distinct in their nature, than to divide the legislative powers wch. are of the same nature, from each other—as well as do the same with the Executive & Judiciary powers.

Best distribution 30 of people in Republic

A perfect Theory on this subject would be useful, not because it could be reduced to practice by any plan of legislation; but because it would be a model to which successive spontaneous improvements might approximate the condition of the Society.

That is the best distribution, which would most favor health, virtue, intelligence, and competency of fortune in the Citizens, and best secure the Republic agst. external dangers.

The life of the husbandman is most, that of the seaman least favorable to the comfort & happiness of the individual.

Among manufacturers, those employed on necessaries, are first to be secured. The remaining classes to be decided on by the preceding criteria.

The class of literati is not less necessary than any other. They are the cultivators of the human mind—the manufacturers of useful knowledge—the agents of the commerce of ideas—the censors of public manners—the teachers of the arts of life and the means of happiness.

See with the mark (J. M.) Freneau’s National Gazette 31

Ms notebook ( DLC : Madison Miscellany). The notebook is a bound volume of 100 pages, with table of contents on the verso of the first page and the rest of the pages consecutively numbered 1–99. Many of the pages are otherwise blank. Four loose sheets of notes are interleaved in the volume but not printed here: (1) in Jefferson’s hand, ca. 1801–9, “Washington. Highways,” “some citizens whose disaffection to our form of govmt …,” “Agenda,” and mathematical calculations; (2) Lt. Horace C. Story to JM, 8 Apr. 1822; (3) notes for calculating interest, in Jefferson’s hand; (4) “Books sent by Mr. Jefferson for Dr. Curry,” in JM’s hand. Conjectured date of notebook assigned by comparison with five essays published in the National Gazette , for which parts of these notes must have served as preliminary drafts (see Madison’s National Gazette Essays, 19 Nov. 1791–20 Dec. 1792 ). Most of the short titles cited below arc fully described in PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville, Va., 1977—). description ends , IX, 22–24 ; X, 282–83 .

1 .  Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Neumann ed.), II, bk. XVII, p. 11, which cited Plato, Republic , bk. V.

2 .  Barthélemy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis (2d ed.).

3 .  Notes on Debates at the Federal Convention ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville, Va., 1977—). description ends , X, passim).

4 .  JM to Jefferson, 24 Oct. 1787 ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville, Va., 1977—). description ends , X, 205–20 ).

5 .  Panckoucke, Encyclopédie methodique .

6 .  Aristotle, Politics .

7 .  Robertson, History of Charles V (3d ed.).

8 .  Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire . JM drew the information cited here from his earlier Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies, ante 30 Nov. 1787 ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville, Va., 1977—). description ends , X, 281 ).

9 .  De medietate linguæ was an English common law provision for a jury, when one party to a suit was a non-English-speaking alien, to be composed of six Englishmen and six of the alien’s countrymen ( Black’s Law Dictionary [5th ed. rev.], p. 387).

10 .  Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War , Loeb Classical Library (1919–23; 4 vols.; Cambridge, Mass., 1965 reprint), II, 347. According to the chapter JM cited here, the Thessalians were “under the sway of a few powerful men, as is usual in that country, rather than under a free democracy.”

11 .  Jean Rodolphe d’Arnay, De la vie privée des Romains (Lausanne, 1757).

12 .  JM referred to the biography of Aristides in Plutarch’s Lives .

13 .  Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, Its Colonies and Conquests .

14 .  The author of this anonymous pamphlet was William Barron, a Scottish economist and professor at the University of St. Andrews.

15 .  JM’s citation of this work indicates his use of books owned by Jefferson, whose copy of this pamphlet was bound together with Barron’s work noted above (Sowerby, Catalogue of Jefferson’s Library , III, 215–16).

16 .  JM referred to Aeschines’ oration Against Timarchus .

17 .  Suidæ Lexicon, Græce & Latine (3 vols.; Cambridge, 1705), III, 258. JM referred to the article in this work, “ ῥητορικὴ γραφή ,” which described the form of legal action that an orator could plead, or that could be brought against an orator.

18 .  The Areopagus was the ancient Athenian advisory and judicial council composed of former archons (annual magistrates) who served for life.

19 .  The heliaia was a court of appeals in ancient Athens.

20 .  Petalism: “A method of temporary banishment (for five years) practised in ancient Syracuse, in imitation of the ostracism of Athens, but effected by writing the name of the person on an olive-leaf” ( OED description begins Oxford English Dictionary. description ends ).

21 .  Zaleucus gave to Locri, a Greek colony in southeastern Italy, the first written law code in Europe, ca. 660 B.C.

22 .  Emmius, Vetus Græcia .

23 .  Walter Moyle, A Select Collection of Tracts … Containing, I. An Essay upon the Roman Government … (Glasgow, 1750).

24 .  Dionysius Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities .

25 .  Hazard, Historical Collections .

26 .  Strabo, Geography .

27 .  Franklin, Political, Miscellaneous, and Philosophical Pieces .

28 .  [Thomas Pownall], The Administration of the Colonies . JM owned a two-volume edition (probably 5th ed.; London, 1774). See Memorandum of Books, ca. August 1790 , PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville, Va., 1977—). description ends , XIII, 286 .

29 .  Johan Meerman, Discours qui a remporté le prix de l’Academic royale des inscriptions et belles-lettres, de Paris (The Hague, 1784). See Sowerby, Catalogue of Jefferson’s Library , III, 210.

30 .  JM interlined “arrangement” over this word.

31 .  JM probably added this sentence at a later time. He referred to his bound volume of the National Gazette (now in the Library of Congress) in which he initialed his essays.

Authorial notes

[The following note(s) appeared in the margins or otherwise outside the text flow in the original source, and have been moved here for purposes of the digital edition.]

*   What ignorance & susceptibility of delusion in the people of Locris, is ⟨impl⟩ied by such a precaution! J. M.

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• Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 18, 1797, Partly Illegible

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• -  Correspondence
• Correspondence
• -  Partly Illegible

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• series: Series 1: General Correspondence. 1651-1827
• Microfilm Reel: 020

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• Manuscript Division
• http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib008818

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• The Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress: Series 1: General Correspondence. 1651 to 1827 (25,885)
• Thomas Jefferson Papers, 1606 to 1827 (26,691)
• Manuscript Division (166,436)
• American Memory (437,438)
• Manuscript/Mixed Material

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The following items are included in this Collection with permission:

The essay " American Sphinx: The Contradictions of Thomas Jefferson " by Joseph J. Ellis was originally published in the November-December 1994 issue of Civilization: The Magazine of the Library of Congress and may not be reprinted in any other form or by any other source.

The essay " The Jamestown Records of the Virginia Company of London: A Conservator's Perspective " by Sylvia R. Albro and Holly H. Krueger was originally published in a slightly different form in Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the Institute of Paper Conservation, 6-9 April 1997 and may not be reprinted in any other form or by any other source.

Rembrandt Peale's 1800 Thomas Jefferson portrait on the Thomas Jefferson Time Line is from the White House Collection, courtesy of the White House Historical Association.

The image of Thomas Jefferson on the home page is from a photomechanical print held in the Library of Congress's Prints and Photographs Division, Presidential File, and is a reproduction of the popular 1805 Rembrandt Peale portrait in the collection of the New-York Historical Society.

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Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Partly Illegible . -05-18, 1797. Manuscript/Mixed Material. https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib008818/.

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Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Partly Illegible . -05-18, 1797. Manuscript/Mixed Material. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib008818/>.