the bhopal gas tragedy case study

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy : Causes, effects and aftermath

The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred at midnight of December 2nd- 3rd December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) pesticide facility in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. This catastrophe affected around 500,000 people along with many animals. People who were exposed are still suffering as a result of the gas leak’s long-term health impacts. Chronic eye difficulties and respiratory problems were some issues due to it. Children who have been exposed have stunted growth and cognitive impairments. 

Table of Content

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Bhopal gas tragedy case study, causes of bhopal gas tragedy, effects of bhopal gas tragedy, aftermath of bhopal gas tragedy.

Union Carbide was an American company that produced pesticides. MIC – methyl isocyanide, a dangerous poisonous gas began to leak at midnight on 2nd December 1984 from the Union Carbide factory. This MIC caused the Bhopal gas tragedy. The Bhopal gas tragedy was a fatal accident. It was one of the world’s worst industrial accidents. 

UCIL was a pesticide manufacturing plant that produced the insecticide carbaryl. Carbaryl was discovered by the American company Union Carbide Corporation, which owned a significant share in UCIL. As an intermediary, UCIL produced carbaryl using methyl isocyanate (MIC). Other techniques for producing the ultimate product are available, but they are more expensive. The very toxic chemical MIC is extremely dangerous to human health. Residents of Bhopal in the area of the pesticide plant began to feel irritated by the MIC and began fleeing the city.

Bhopal UCIL constructed three underground MIC storage tanks which were named E610, E611, and E619. On October 1984, E610 was not able to maintain its nitrogen gas pressure and so the liquid which is present inside the tank would not pump out, because of which 42 tons of MIC in E610 was wasted. The chemical in E610 was left unpumped as they were not able to re-establish its pressure, which later became responsible for Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

The main causes of Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

• During the buildup to the spill, the plant’s safety mechanisms for the highly toxic MIC were not working. The alarm off tanks of the plant had not worked properly.
• Many valves and lines were in disrepair, and many vent gas scrubbers were not working, as was the steam boiler that was supposed to clean the pipes.
• The MIC was stored in three tanks, with tank E610 being the source of the leak. This tank should have held no more than 30 tonnes of MIC, according to safety regulations.
• Water is believed to have entered the tank through a side pipe as technicians were attempting to clear it late that fatal night.
• This resulted in an exothermic reaction in the tank, progressively raising the pressure until the gas was ejected through the atmosphere.

The main effects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

• Thousands had died as a result of choking, pulmonary edema, and reflexogenic circulatory collapse.
• Neonatal death rates increased by 200 percent.
• A huge number of animal carcasses have been discovered in the area, indicating the impact on flora and animals. The trees died after a few days. Food supplies have grown scarce due to the fear of contamination. 
• Fishing was also prohibited.
• In March 1985, the Indian government established the Bhopal Gas Leak Accident Act, giving it legal authority to represent all victims of the accident, whether they were in India or abroad.
• At least 200,000 youngsters were exposed to the gas.
• Hospitals were overcrowded, and there was no sufficient training for medical workers to deal with MIC exposure.

In the United States, UCC was sued in federal court. In one action, the court recommended that UCC pay between $5 million and $10 million to assist the victims. UCC agreed to pay a $5 million settlement. The Indian government, however, rejected this offer and claimed $3.3 billion. In 1989, UCC agreed to pay $470 million in damages and paid the cash immediately in an out-of-court settlement.

Warren Anderson, the CEO and Chairman of UCC was charged with manslaughter by Bhopal authorities in 1991. He refused to appear in court and the Bhopal court declared him a fugitive from justice in February 1992. Despite the central government’s efforts in the United States to extradite Anderson, nothing happened. Anderson died in 2014 without ever appearing in a court of law.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy continues to be an important warning sign for industrialization, for developing countries and in particular India, with human, environmental, and economic pitfalls. The economy of India is growing at a fast rate but at the cost of environmental health as well as public safety.

Frequently Asked Questions

What were the reasons behind bhopal gas tragedy.

The reasons behind Bhopal gas tragedy was a large volume of water had been introduced into the MIC tank and has caused a chemical reaction which did force the pressure release valve, which allowed the gas to leak.

What is the name of Bhopal gas case law?

The name is Union Carbide Corporation v.

Which gas was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy?

The gas which was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy is methyl isocyanate.

Was Bhopal gas tragedy an accident or experiment?

Bhopal gas tragedy was the world’s most worst industrial accident.

How many people died in the Bhopal Gas?

A total of 3,787 deaths were registered related to the gas release in case of Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

What were the four main demands of the Bhopal Gas victims?

The 4 demands of Bhopal Gas victims include: Proper medical treatment. Adequate compensation. Fixation of criminal responsibility Steps for prevention of such disasters in future.

How was Bhopal Gas Tragedy fixed?

Bhopal Gas Tragedy was fixed with construction of a secure landfill for holding the wastes from the two on-site solar evaporation ponds.

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Bhopal disaster

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• The University of New Mexico - The Bhopal Disaster of 1984
• University of Massachusetts Amherst - Bhopal Plant Disaster
• National Center for Biotechnology Information - PubMed Central - The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review
• University College London - The Bhopal gas tragedy 1984 to? The evasion of corporate responsibility
• The New York Times - The Bhopal Disaster: How it happened
• The Guardian - 'Bhopal’s tragedy has not stopped': the urban disaster still claiming lives 35 years on
• Academia - The Bhopal Disaster and Its Ramifications: A Brief Overview

What was the Bhopal disaster?

The Bhopal disaster was a chemical leak that occurred on December 3, 1984, in the Indian city of Bhopal. It killed an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people. At the time, it was the worst industrial accident in history.

What was the cause of the Bhopal disaster?

The Bhopal disaster occurred when about 45 tons of the gas methyl isocyanate escaped from a plant owned by a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Union Carbide Corporation. Investigations later established that substandard operating and safety procedures at the understaffed plant had led to the catastrophe.

What was the aftermath of Bhopal disaster?

An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people died as a result of the Bhopal disaster, and some 500,000 survivors suffered respiratory problems, blindness, and other health problems. In 2010 several former executives of the company that operated the Bhopal plant—all Indian citizens—were convicted of negligence.

Recent News

Bhopal disaster , chemical leak in 1984 in the city of Bhopal , Madhya Pradesh state, India . At the time, it was called the worst industrial accident in history.

On December 3, 1984, about 45 tons of the dangerous gas methyl isocyanate escaped from an insecticide plant that was owned by the Indian subsidiary of the American firm Union Carbide Corporation . The gas drifted over the densely populated neighbourhoods around the plant, killing thousands of people immediately and creating a panic as tens of thousands of others attempted to flee Bhopal. The final death toll was estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000. Some half a million survivors suffered respiratory problems, eye irritation or blindness, and other maladies resulting from exposure to the toxic gas; many were awarded compensation of a few hundred dollars. Investigations later established that substandard operating and safety procedures at the understaffed plant had led to the disaster . In 1998 the former factory site was turned over to the state of Madhya Pradesh .

In the early 21st century more than 400 tons of industrial waste were still present on the site. Despite continued protests and attempts at litigation, neither the Dow Chemical Company , which bought out the Union Carbide Corporation in 2001, nor the Indian government had properly cleaned the site. Soil and water contamination in the area was blamed for chronic health problems and high instances of birth defects in the area’s inhabitants. In 2004 the Indian Supreme Court ordered the state to supply clean drinking water to the residents of Bhopal because of groundwater contamination. In 2010 several former executives of Union Carbide’s India subsidiary—all Indian citizens—were convicted by a Bhopal court of negligence in the disaster.

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The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

Edward broughton.

1 Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, 600 W 168th St. New York, NY 10032 USA

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout India.

December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.

In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [ 1 ]. The company built the plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a more sophisticated and hazardous process [ 2 ].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability [ 3 ]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer [ 3 ].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior [ 3 ]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC [ 1 ]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of the plant [ 3 ]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [ 4 ]. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant [ 1 , 5 ]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects were [ 1 ]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with industrial catastrophe [ 5 ].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades [ 6 ]. The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas [ 7 ]. Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table ​ Table1. 1 . summarizes early and late effects on health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up [ 8 ].

Health effects of the Bhopal methyl isocyanate gas leak exposure [8, 30-32].

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [ 1 ].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [ 9 ]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [ 1 ]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [ 10 ]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200 [ 9 ].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [ 8 ]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [ 11 ]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [ 11 ]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers [ 8 , 11 - 13 ].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal [ 1 , 14 ].

Lessons learned

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences [ 4 ]. The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries [ 1 ]. Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India [ 15 ]. National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations [ 16 ]. Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation [ 17 ].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city [ 3 ]. Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs [ 18 ]. Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.

Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years [ 19 ].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate of over 8% per year [ 20 ]. Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution [ 19 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream [ 21 ].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant [ 22 ].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built [ 23 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound [ 24 ].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events of Bhopal [ 25 ].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls [ 26 , 27 ].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits [ 1 ]. The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage". [ 28 ].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [ 24 ].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial concerns". [ 29 ].

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

Competing interests

The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests.

Acknowledgements

J. Barab, B. Castleman, R Dhara and U Misra reviewed the manuscript and provided useful suggestions.

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Kartiki Vaidya’s Case Study on the Bhopal Gas Tragedy

In 1984, the toxic compound methyl isocyanate leaked from a local pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, causing a mass casualty incident. The event affected over 500,000 people, leading to thousands of deaths and long-term illnesses. Vulnerable populations, including women, children, the elderly, and those with pre-existing health conditions, faced exceptionally adverse health effects.

In this case study, Vaidya highlights the leadership failures that led to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, highlighting weak oversight at the pesticide plant, the overarching corporation, and government officials in disaster response. Through the analysis, Vaidya describes the disaster prevention and management approaches that emerged from the tragedy that are helping to prevent similar events from taking place. 

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy and the Development of Environmental Jurisprudence in India

This article is written by Stuti Mishra.

More than 30 years have passed since the dreadful night of December 3 rd 1984 when a gas leak killed thousands of people and permanently disabled the survivors. The Bhopal Gas leak disaster is still fresh in the minds of all those who survived and inherited the suffering from their predecessors. The immediate effects of the gas killed 3787 people and several thousand over the next decade. The government, representing the victims, secured 470 million USD as compensation from the Union Carbide Corporation. The amount is considered too meagre when compared to the magnitude of damage caused. Following the incident, the state enacted several legislations including, the EPA, 1986, Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 etc. Judicial Activism covered the loopholes and evolved the ‘absolute liability’ doctrine. Tighter regulations were framed but enforcement is still a problem, even though the situation has improved as compared to the pre-disaster period. While economic growth is being observed, the unregulated industries continue to threaten public safety and environmental balance. Sustainable development and fixing corporate liability is the way ahead.

INTRODUCTION

Often named as the world’s worst industrial disaster, the Bhopal Gas Tragedy has been the focus of many research papers, articles, documentaries, debates and disputes. This project attempts to report and analyze the development of environmental policy in India after the Bhopal Gas tragedy. Chapter I contains the details about the disaster and its immediate consequences. Chapter II deals with the litigation involved in the determination of compensation. Chapter III examines the probable causes of the disaster explaining the role of the corporation as well as the state.  Chapter IV briefly discusses the standards that were already in place before the disaster and then describes the different changes initiated as a response to the disaster. Finally, the project concludes by mentioning the lessons learnt from the disaster.

The disaster

In 1970, the American enterprise, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) established a pesticide plant in the densely populated region on Bhopal due to its central location and transportation network. The specific site within the city was to be utilized for light industrial and commercial activities and not hazardous industries [i] . In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Selvin at one-quarter of its capacity due to decreased demand of the pesticide [ii] . Due to the decreased productivity, UCIL made plans to dismantle the key production units and transport it to another country. In the meantime, the plant kept up production but due to low profits, safety standards were the lowest priority. Although the local government was aware of the lower standards, it was reluctant to impose strict controls on a struggling industry, which was also a large employer [iii] .

At around 1:00 pm on December 3, 1984, massive amounts of Methyl isocyanide quickly engulfed the city. Within hours, a large number of humans and animals died due to inhaling the poisonous gas. According to an estimate, around 3787 people died immediately [iv] . Local hospitals were packed with clueless patients and doctors alike. In the first few days, the death count reached 10,000 followed by 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths in the subsequent decade [v] .  A large proportion of people who survived suffered from acute multi-system morbidities with the eyes and lungs being the target organs. The ICMR estimated that approx. 62.58% of the population of Bhopal suffered from inhalational toxicity [vi] . The population that survived developed morbidity of varying degree over the next 25 years [vii] .

When the hospitals started receiving patients, they had no idea about what was affecting them and the treatment that would be necessary. The doctors still do not know about the toxin or its antidote. The problem could have been more efficiently handled if the government had more information. UCC refused to divulge any information about the exact composition of the leaked gases citing trade secrecy as an excuse [viii] , which forced the treatment to be symptomatic.

The consequences

After the incident, UCC started distancing itself from its Indian subsidiary intending to evade liability by transferring the blame to UCIL. The operations at the plant were discontinued.

The gas leak claimed the lives of thousands of people, animals and carried over its devastating effects to the next generations. People suffered from various ocular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, reproductive and neurological disorders. [ix] Among the injured were pregnant women who experienced abortions, had premature delivery and gave birth to infants with fetal abnormalities.

The injury was also inflicted on the environment. Even after the death of so many people, the corporation refused to take active responsibility and restore the healthy environment. During the company’s production years, it dumped huge amounts of toxic waste outside and inside the plant site. Almost 350 tons of toxic waste and residue of old pesticides still remain at the plant site [x] . These wastes degrade slowly and pollute the soil and groundwater. This threatens a larger number of people and will keep spreading unless it is properly disposed of. In May 1999, Greenpeace collected soil and water samples from the site and found that the water and soil and breast milk contamination is toxic to humans [xi] .

Aftermath: Litigation

The government, observing the increasing number of cases in courts, promulgated the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (the Bhopal Act) on 29 March 1985. The Bhopal Act gave the Central government the exclusive right to represent and act (in India or overseas) on the behalf of the persons entitled to make claims in relation to the Bhopal gas leak. It gave authority to the Central government to represent the interests of those affected by the gas leak as ‘parens patriae’.  The government-owned stakes at UCIL, which would make it partially liable for the tragedy. This action of the government was criticised as a way to evade responsibility by stopping the victims to initiate action against the state [xii] . This act was challenged before the Supreme Court which justified the act and held it to be valid.

The central government filed a complaint against UCC before Southern District Court of New York, USA, where it argued the inability of the Indian Courts to deal effectively with the situation and that the matter should be dealt with in US courts. The company, however, pushed for the matter to be dealt with in Indian Courts, knowing that the compensation is likely to be higher in the US courts. The court dismissed the claims on the grounds of forum non-conveniens.

In September 1986, the Union of India filed a complaint in a district court of Bhopal seeking interim compensation of 3.5 billion rupees which the Madhya Pradesh High Court reduced to 2.5 billion rupees. UCC appealed to the Supreme Court. The court ordered UCC to pay 470 million dollars (approximately 750 crore rupees) ‘in full settlement of all claims, rights and liabilities related to and arising out of the Bhopal gas disaster’ [xiii] . In terms of settlement all civil proceedings were concluded and all criminal proceedings were quashed.

The government’s original claim involved a compensation of 3 billion USD but the company agreed to the mere sum of 470 million USD. The sum is grossly inadequate for people who lost their family or are permanently disabled.

This settlement received widespread criticism for the quashing of the criminal proceedings and the amount of compensation. In 1989, the Supreme Court clubbed several petitions and revived the criminal proceedings and held that if there is any shortage in the amount of compensation the state is bound to bridge the gap. [xiv]

During 1990, the first five-year plan; the central government sanctioned a 258 crore rupees fund for medical, economic, social and environmental rehabilitation of the victims [xv] .

In June 2010, seven former employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and fine of 2000 USD.

CHAPTER III

It seems that the UCIL was trying to minimize cost by compromising with the health and safety standards. There is no sensitivity towards the environment or the wellbeing of the locals residing around the plant. The loss could have been significantly less if only UCC had a crisis management plan. Instead, the plant focused on evading liability, withholding information and ignoring the impact. It accepted moral responsibility but denied legal liability [xvi] .

UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of the 3rd December 1984: [xvii] · Tank temperatures were not logged; · The vent gas scrubber (VGS) was not in use; · The cooling system was not in use; · A slip bind was not used when the pipes were washed; · The concentration of chloroform in Tank 610 was too high; · The tank was not pressurised; · Iron was present because of corrosion; · The tank’s high-temperature alarm was not functioning; · Tank 619 (the evacuation tank) was not empty.

This shows how the safety of the workers as well as the city was taken casually. The company was reluctant in investing more in the safety standards as the plant was already in loss. Further, it seems that the lack of governmental pressure and monitoring did not invoke any sense of urgency for the company.

The responsibility for the incident lies majorly with the company but the state has neglected its own part too.

In the Constitution of India, it is clearly stated that it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country’ Environment has also been discussed in the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Department of Environment was established in India in 1980 to ensure a healthy environment for the country.

The state failed in monitoring the industry properly. It should not have granted permission for a hazardous plant to be in operation in such a populated area. Even if the plant operates within the city, it is the duty of the state to closely monitor its activities in order to ensure compliance of safety standards. The state should have a mechanism in place for an emergency situation. A gas leak is a reasonably foreseeable event. The government should have gathered information on the type of gases that the company uses. It should have organised mock drills and ensured that the public is aware of the dangers. Stringent action should have been taken in case of any non-compliance.

Standards in place

The legislation in place were the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. These acts were not very effective to check non-compliance [xviii] .  The acts provided that firms not complying with pollution control regulations will be fined. Organisations found it economically advantageous to avoid compliance with the law and pay the penalty. If based on torts, the organisations will just pay the damages and continue the violation. Criminal proceedings were complex and uncertain. The industries were able to freely discharge their effluents into water without an Environmental Impact Assessment. There was no compulsion to have an EIA.

Steps taken after the disaster

It is a sad truth that such a tragic incident had to happen for us to realise the importance of safety standards.

In response to the disaster, the government brought forth various legislations. This marked the shift in the consciousness with regard to environmental issues. The legislative developments are outlined below.

The principle of absolute liability

The English Principle of strict liability as laid down by Ryland vs Fletcher [xix] , was the governing principle in India before M.C Mehta vs Union of India [xx] . In this case, the Supreme Court increased the bar of tortious liability when it held that an enterprise engaging in any harmful or inherently dangerous activity had an absolute and ‘ non-delegable’ duty to ensure that no one was harmed, and if anyone was harmed, they were to be compensated. The Supreme Court did not accept the exceptions which had evolved in English jurisprudence regarding strict liability. Bhagwati. J states in the case that, “ We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concomitant to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England.”

This ruling was significant in that the Supreme Court determined the effective control in the Indian scenario ‘to regulate an environment in which industrial growth was not matched with necessary legal reform’ [xxi]

The Environment Protection Act was enacted in 1986. The act defines the environment and authorizes the central government to take all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purposes of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution [xxii] . In this connection, the central government has the authority to issue direct written orders including orders to close, prohibit, or regulate any industry, operation or process or to stop or regulate the supply of electricity, water or any other service [xxiii] . The act conforms to the commitments made by the Stockholm Declaration, 1972.

The Factories Act was amended to include the list of hazardous industries [xxiv] and the provision to locate an industry [xxv] . The Central and State Pollution Control Board laid down comprehensive industrial standards for the control of effluents and emissions.

The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 is another act with an aim to provide immediate relief to the victims affected by accidents while handling hazardous substances and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act incorporates a provision making it mandatory for the industrial units that every owner shall take out before he starts handling any hazardous substance, one or more insurance policies and renews it or them from time to time before the expiry of validity [xxvi] . It will allow the victims of such incidents to get compensation immediately, which will not bar them to seek larger compensation. The act recognises the ‘absolute liability or no-fault liability’ doctrine.

Acknowledging the need to deal with the cases related to the environment effectively and expeditiously, the government established a National Green Tribunal in 2010 through the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. The tribunal exclusively deals with the cases arising out of environmental issues.

After the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the importance of environmental regulation became starkly evident. The inadequate measures and the vacuum in the legal system were also exposed. The Supreme Court, in order to fill such loopholes, applied Judicial Activism. The scope of Article 21 was considerable widened to include the right to a clean environment. This way, environmental concerns became the part of the constitution as well as the rights of the citizens.

The Environment Impact Assessment Notification in 1994 was also a significant step to calculate risks associated with any project which will determine whether or not it is granted clearance.

Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 , provide for means of safe storage and disposal of “hazardous waste” (which is listed in its schedules) with the help of central and state pollution control boards [xxvii] .

Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response) Rules, 1996 was also enacted, which address gas leaks and similar events. The Chemical Accidents Rules seem to have been framed for the exact purpose of monitoring plants or industries like the UCC in Bhopal [xxviii] .

The state pollution control boards are required to give the industry consent to establish and then consent to operate. But all that the pollution boards do is to process the consent and authorisation. They do not have time to monitor compliance with standards for pollution or enforce their directions [xxix] .

There is also no deterrence in the system. The maximum penalty imposed by courts under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act is Rs 10,000 and under EPA, it is Rs 1 lakh. But only courts can impose this penalty. So all the boards can do is to either deny the consent to operate or issue closure notice for 30 days [xxx] .

These problems need to be fixed before it is too late to save the environment.

India is a developing nation and hence is open to foreign investors so as to induce growth in its economy.  Industrialization is encouraged in order to be globalised. However, we should not lose sight of the effect these industries have in the long run on the environment and the health of the people. India needs to rigid when it comes to enforcement of the legislation in place so that we do not pay such a heavy price again. UCIL got away with such blatant violations because the enforcement was too weak to serve as a deterrent.

Are human lives in India so disposable that we are ready to pass off the incident as an unfortunate accident? There is no way to replace the thousands of lives lost all that can be done is to ensure that the ones that have been left behind can lead a comfortable life and cope up with the loss. The industrial disaster catalyzed a paradigm shift in terms of environmental awareness, environmental policy, judicial activism and human rights. It forced the government and public alike to treat these issues with utmost priority.

Are the legislation enough?

As discussed in the previous chapter, the controls in place are not adequate. The State Pollution Control Board has does not have the time to monitor the industries and impose regulations. The legislations contain various loopholes that need to be taken care of. The lack of efficient deterrence is also a problem.

Is India in a better position to deal with a disaster of such a magnitude now?

While the controls we have in place are not top-notch, we are certainly in a better position to deal with any such disaster. The state is sufficiently alert to ensure that a disaster like Bhopal does not happen again. It has taken active steps right after the disaster to protect the citizens from such a fate. With the EPA, 1986, the EIA notifications, the amendments in Air Act, Water Act and the Factories Act, we are certainly in a better position. Apart from this, the communication channels and the emergency warning systems have ensured that proper evacuation can take place before any disaster can strike.

What is the responsibilities of and the obligations on the state?

When we are so liberal with granting approvals for the projects that are essential for the growth of the nation, why shouldn’t we exercise the same liberality when the rights of the citizens are so casually violated. The grown of a nation should not come at the expense of the safety of its inhabitants. It is the duty of the state to ensure that such violations are prevented and punished. Corporations must not be allowed to cut costs and jeopardize the lives of the people associated. While it is a truth that the corporations want to establish production units in India because the labor is cheap but they should keep in mind that their lives are not disposable. In case of violations, criminal liability must be placed on the corporation. If necessary, the corporate veil must be lifted and the culpability determined. “ The boards of companies must realise that human beings have a value that is higher than the value of shares” [xxxi] . The companies must also enable and assist the recipient country to do a full-scale environmental impact assessment and risk analysis of the proposed installation and to define the conditions under which the facility should operate.

Honoring the basic rights of the citizens should be the first priority of the state and these corporations. The public health department needs to be upgraded, maintained and prepared for emergency circumstances. During the disaster, there was no lack of hospitals but a lack of treatment. The government needs to step in and clear the untreated waste responsible for contaminating water and soil. Adequate resources should be devoted towards advance planning in case of foreseeable disasters. Social-action and community groups can play a powerful role in the risk-management process [xxxii] . They are often best equipped to understand, articulate, and protect the interests of local communities. The Bhopal disaster might have initiated several effective changes in the policy, their proper implementation remains to be seen. Although the Indian economy is growing, sustainable development should be the guiding principle.

Right to a clean and healthy environment is a pre-requisite to enjoying all the other rights [xxxiii] . This right is included as a fundamental right in India. Therefore, it is the duty of the state and the citizen to protect and conserve the environment. The state must strengthen the current regulations and involve the local population in conservation plans. It is the only way we can respect the thousands of innocent lives that the negligence of the authorities claimed. We must do whatever we can to ensure that such a horrific incident never becomes the part of India’s history.

[i] Edward Broughton, The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review, Environmental Health: A Global Access Science Source, 10 May 2005

[iv] Bhopal Gas Tragedy, Relief and rehabilitation Department, Bhopal Madhya Pradesh, https://web.archive.org/web/20120518020821/http://www.mp.gov.in/bgtrrdmp/relief.htm

[v] Supra note 1

[vi] Disaster Management In India by Ministry of Home Affairs, Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Bhopal Gas Tragedy, at 127

[viii] B. Dinham and S. Sarangi,   The Bhopal gas tragedy 1984 to? The evasion of corp.responsibility . Environment and Urbanization, 2002, 14 (1), pp.89-99.

[ix] Supra note 1

[x] Sunita Narain & Chandra Bhushan, 30 years of Bhopal gas tragedy: A continuing disaster, Down to Earth, December 2014, http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/30-years-of-bhopal-gas-tragedy-a-continuing-disaster-47634

[xi] Malini Nair, Bhopal Gas Tragedy : A Social, Economic, Legal and Environmental Analysis, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, March 2015, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/37856

[xii] Zia Modi, 10 Judgments that changed India, 44, {2013}

[xiv] Supra note 12

[xv] Supra note 6

[xvi] P Shrivastava.,. Industrial/environmental crises and corporate social responsibility . The Journal of Socio-Economics, 1995, 24(1), pp.211-227.

[xvii] Ingrid Eckerman, The Bhopal Saga – Causes and Consequences of the World’s Largest Industrial Disaster, 13, {2004}

[xviii] B Bowonder & S S Arvind Environmental regulations and litigation in India , Project Appraisal,, 1989,  182-196, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02688867.1989.9726733

[xix] Supra note 12

[xxi] Supra note 12

[xxii] Abhishek Kumar, Bhopal Gas Tragedy Aftemath: Development of Environmental Policy in India , The World Journal of Juristic Polity, 2016, at 3,

[xxiii] Id.

[xxiv] Supra note 18

[xxv]   Id.

[xxvi] Supra note 22

[xxvii] Apoorva & Shreeja Sen , Industrial disasters: Is India better prepared than it was in 1984? , Livemint, December 2 2014, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/NtYcWmazGAis6CEpj4yAkP/Industrial-disasters-Is-India-better-prepared-than-it-was-i.html

[xxviii] Id.

[xxix] Supra note 10

[xxx] Supra note 10

[xxxi] Supra note 17

[xxxii] Supra note 10

[xxxiii] Human Rights and the Environment, United Nations Environment Programme, http://web.unep.org/divisions/delc/human-rights-and-environment

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Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study

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• Published: 10 May 2005

The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

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On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout India.

Peer Review reports

December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.

In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [ 1 ]. The company built the plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a more sophisticated and hazardous process [ 2 ].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability [ 3 ]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer [ 3 ].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior [ 3 ]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC [ 1 ]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of the plant [ 3 ]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [ 4 ]. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant [ 1 , 5 ]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects were [ 1 ]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with industrial catastrophe [ 5 ].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades [ 6 ]. The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas [ 7 ]. Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table 1 . summarizes early and late effects on health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up [ 8 ].

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [ 1 ].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [ 9 ]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [ 1 ]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [ 10 ]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200 [ 9 ].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [ 8 ]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [ 11 ]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [ 11 ]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers [ 8 , 11 – 13 ].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal [ 1 , 14 ].

Lessons learned

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences [ 4 ]. The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries [ 1 ]. Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India [ 15 ]. National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations [ 16 ]. Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation [ 17 ].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city [ 3 ]. Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs [ 18 ]. Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.

Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years [ 19 ].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate of over 8% per year [ 20 ]. Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution [ 19 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream [ 21 ].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant [ 22 ].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built [ 23 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound [ 24 ].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events of Bhopal [ 25 ].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls [ 26 , 27 ].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits [ 1 ]. The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage". [ 28 ].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [ 24 ].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial concerns". [ 29 ].

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

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Broughton, E. The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environ Health 4 , 6 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1186/1476-069X-4-6

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The world's worst industrial disaster harmed people even before they were born

Rhitu Chatterjee

Members of the Bengaluru Solidarity Group in Support of the Bhopal Struggle take part in a candlelight vigil to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Bhopal gas disaster in Bangalore on December 2, 2014. Manjunath Kiran/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Members of the Bengaluru Solidarity Group in Support of the Bhopal Struggle take part in a candlelight vigil to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Bhopal gas disaster in Bangalore on December 2, 2014.

Editor's note: A new Netflix series tells the story of the 1984 gas leak in Bhopal, India, considered the world's worst industrial disaster, and of the courageous "railway men" who risked everything to save others. Earlier this year, a large study concluded that the disaster's toxic legacy spans at least a generation, and continues to impact the survivors. This story was originally published on June 17, 2023.

Shortly after midnight on December 3, 1984, about 40 tons of deadly gas leaked out of a pesticide factory in the central Indian city of Bhopal. The highly toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) – used as an intermediary chemical for making pesticides – drifted across the city, exposing nearly half a million residents.

Thousands of people died over the next several days, and it's estimated that many thousands more have died from related health issues since. Survivors who are alive today still struggle with a range of debilitating chronic health issues, from cancer to lung disorders to neurological damage.

Now, a new study shows that the accident – often considered the worst industrial disaster in history – affected not just those who were exposed to the gas that night but also the generation of babies still in the womb when the accident happened. In fact, men born in Bhopal in 1985 have a higher risk of cancer, lower education accomplishment and higher rates of disabilities compared with those born before or after 1985.

"The paper is one of the first papers to demonstrate clearly this link between a huge industrial disaster and the effect on children in utero," says Jishnu Das , a public policy professor at Georgetown University and a fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.

The results inform an ongoing discussion about "what is owed to future generations" affected by disasters.

The study also found the accident affected health outcomes for people living much farther from the factory than previously known. Most previous studies looked for impacts in people living a few miles away; people as far as 62 miles from Bhopal were affected by the disaster, according to the new study, which received support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (a funder of NPR and this blog).

A survivor's story

Rehana Bi was 16 years old in 1984 when the accident happened. She lived in a neighborhood right near the pesticide plant along with her three brothers, father and mother, who was eight months pregnant at the time.

The family was fast asleep when some neighbors banged on their door, calling out her father's name, urging him to wake, says Bi. When her parents opened the door, they saw that it was hazy outside.

"There were a lot of people standing outside," she says. "They were all coughing, and no one could see very well."

Their eyes and lungs were burning. "It was as if someone was burning chilies," adds Bi.

She and her family tried to run away from the gas that now filled the air in the neighborhood but the crowds and the chaos meant they didn't get far. Her pregnant mother struggled to move quickly. "So we sat on the side of the road until the morning," she says.

By the end of the day, Rehana Bi's parents and her 3-year-old brother were among the thousands of people who died. In haunting detail, Bi recalls that some relatives saw the 8-month-old fetus in her dead mother's womb moving until the next morning. It was only then, she says, that they were able to find someone to wash the bodies and bury them in keeping with Muslim tradition.

Nearly 39 years later, she herself struggles with high blood pressure and diabetes as does her husband Shamimuddin, whom she married a year after the gas accident. Their health issues keep them from working these days, so the family depends on the earnings of her two sons, who work as daily wage laborers.

Her neighborhood is filled with survivors struggling with a range of health issues in the decades since the disaster, says Rehana Bi, especially cancer.

"There's a lot of people who have cancer," she says. "Many of them have died."

The Bhopal train station was overwhelmed as families fled the city following the leak disaster. Alain Nogues/Sygma via Getty Images hide caption

The Bhopal train station was overwhelmed as families fled the city following the leak disaster.

A multigenerational toxic legacy

The range of chronic health issues among survivors of the Bhopal gas accident have been documented by previous studies . But most of those studies have been limited to people directly exposed to methyl isocyanate that night and to people very close to the factory run by Union Carbide India Limited, a subsidiary of an American company.

"A lot of the studies focus on the populations that lived within three kilometers of the site," says Prashant Bharadwaj , an economist at University of California San Diego and an author of the new study.

Bharadwaj and his colleagues used data collected in 2015-2016 by the National Family Health Survey, which asks every family across the country about health, education and economic outcomes.

"It's interviewing women, getting all of their life history, including when they had children, whether those children survived, when those women themselves were born, their educational attainment, their level of health," says study co-author Gordon McCord, also an economist at UCSD. The survey interviewed men, too.

"So we were able to piece all these together to say, okay, let's look at the children who were born in the years right before 1984, in '85, and then afterward," says McCord.

Then they compared the people born in 1985 to those born before and after the accident to see if there was anything distinct about the 1985 cohort, which was exposed to the accident in utero.

They found an increase in pregnancy loss, which they expected, based on previous research.

But the analysis also illuminated something new about those pregnancy losses – the losses were likely to involve male fetuses.

"That 1985 birth cohort was very strange because it had a much lower male-to-female sex ratio" compared to the other birth cohorts in the study, says McCord.

A range of previous studies have shown that, in general, male fetuses are more vulnerable to any adverse effects in utero , says McCord. "And so when you get an adverse health shock to pregnant women, the likelihood of losing the male fetus is a bit higher."

And the males born in 1985 in Bhopal were unlike those who were born before or after, he adds. In fact, they are worse off in terms of health and employment even when compared to those who lived through the disaster.

"They have a higher likelihood of reporting to have cancer," he says. "They have a higher likelihood of reporting a disability that prevents them from being employed. And they on average have two years less of education."

That is "a really big deal" he adds, "because it goes beyond health to saying that these people have broader consequences for their lives, that prevent them from living full out, thriving lives."

The study doesn't prove that in-utero exposure to MIC caused these long-term health and economic impacts, which the study authors acknowledge. Other factors such as lack of access to health care and other aid following the disaster may have also played a role

However, the study is "the best kind of observational study that we can get on the question 'Did the Bhopal disaster lead to deficits in outcomes for children who were in utero at the time?' " says Das.

"The second thing that they show is that the radius of impact is closer to 100 kilometers [62 miles] rather than five," he adds. "That's worth thinking about too."

What does the world owe victims who weren't yet born?

No one in Rehana Bi's family has cancer yet, but she believes that her own exposure to MIC affected the health of her children who were born years later. She's lost two adult children in the last several years – a son who died from tuberculosis and a daughter who died during childbirth. Her remaining daughter is struggling with fertility issues, which Bi thinks is a generational effect of the industrial accident.

"Not only are we finding high rates of cancers, but also all kinds of immunological issues, neuro skeletal issues, musculoskeletal issues and huge number of birth defects in children being born to gas-exposed parents," says Rachna Dhingra, who works with the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal , an advocacy organization.

The new study "just vindicates our stand that not just people of Bhopal but their children are also going to face a high number of disabilities and diseases in their life," she says.

This is not the first study to suggest that the impacts of the Bhopal disaster go beyond those directly exposed. A controversial, unpublished Indian study had also documented other intergenerational impacts of the Bhopal industrial accident.

Conducted by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) in 2016 , the study found that women who were exposed to MIC themselves, as well as the daughters of women survivors, had a 7 times higher risk of giving birth to a baby with birth defects compared to women who had no history of exposure to MIC.

But that ICMR study has remained mired in controversy over government and cooperate responsibility for the disaster, and has done little to help the families of survivors and their kids. The results were never published in a peer reviewed journal or released publicly. The results came to light only after Dhingra and other activists obtained the findings through India's Right to Information Act.

"Not a single child who was in utero or born after the disaster was ever compensated," says Dhingra.

The Supreme Court in India in March also rejected a plea for more compensation of survivors of the Bhopal accident. "The damages to the people who were directly exposed — all the curtains have been closed," says Dhingra.

But the curtain is still open for figuring out "damages to the next generation," she adds. And that's where she hopes the new study's findings will make a difference.

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Bhopal gas tragedy: Supreme Court rejects more money for victims

India's Supreme Court has rejected a plea seeking more compensation for victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster.

The court said the issue could not be "raked up three decades after the settlement".

Thousands of people died after a leak from Union Carbide's plant in the Madhya Pradesh state capital.

Dow Chemicals, which bought Union Carbide in 1999, said that a settlement agreed upon in 1989 was fair and final.

The Bhopal gas disaster is considered the world's worst industrial disaster.

The Indian government says some 3,500 people died within days of the gas leak and more than 15,000 in the years since.

Campaigners put the death toll as high as 25,000 and say the effects of the gas continue to this day.

In 2010, an Indian court had convicted seven former managers at the plant, handing down minor fines and brief prison sentences.

But many victims and campaigners have felt justice has still not been served against Union Carbide.

• Bhopal compensation 'not enough'
• In pictures: Bhopal 35 years on

The matter so far

In 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay $470m (£386.5m) to settle the initial fight for compensation. The government, which argued on behalf of the survivors, had asked for $3.3bn (£2.7bn).

The victims appealed the judgement in the Supreme Court which upheld the settlement but ordered Union Carbide to fund a hospital for victims costing about $17m.

In June 2010, the government decided to review the compensation after an outcry over UCIL's former executives receiving just two-year prison sentences and minor fines.

India's attorney general filed a curative petition, asking the case to be reopened, and to increase the settlement to $1.1bn.

The government argued the initial compensation was based on incorrect figures and failed to capture the enormity of damage caused to human lives and the environment. The petition demanded the additional compensation should be paid by the successor firms of Union Carbide.

However, the Supreme Court on Tuesday dismissed the plea, saying it was "not maintainable in law and lacked merits on the facts of this case".

"The question of compensation can't be raked up three decades after the settlement," the five-judge Constitution bench said.

A separate 2011 plea by India's federal investigation agency seeking a retrial of the case had been dismissed by the Supreme Court, saying there was "no satisfactory explanation" for such a plea 14 years after the initial judgment.

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