adverse possession land law essay

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Land Law: Adverse Possession

Adverse possession.

Adverse possession enables a person who occupies or ‘squats’ on another person’s land to acquire property rights. These can potentially become stronger than the original owner’s rights. It arises from the principle of relativity of title. A person who takes possession of land immediately gains a freehold interest in it: one which is inferior to pre-existing ownership interests.

Adverse possession has two elements: factual possession and intention to possess .

Possession in Fact

The adverse possessor must first show that they actually possess the land. This means establishing sufficient physical control over the land. What is sufficient depends on the land’s nature and normal use: Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App Cas 273.

The essential test is that the adverse possessor must have been occupying the land ‘as an occupying owner might’: Thorpe v Frank [2019] EWCA Civ 150.

The possession must be exclusive: Leigh v Jack (1870) 5 Ex D 264. It must also be ‘adverse’ – the adverse possessor cannot have the owner’s permission to be there: BP Properties Ltd v Buckler (1988) 55 P & CR 337.

The possession must be open and not concealed: JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. There is no need for the original owner to be aware of it, however: Powell v MacFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452.

Fencing, ‘keep out’ signs, installing locks, and other attempts to exclude others is good evidence of exclusive possession: Buckingham County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623.

To establish possession in fact, it is also necessary to show that the original owner no longer occupies the land. This can be either because they have been dispossessed by the adverse possessor or because they discontinued their possession before the adverse possessor arrived: Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452.

Intention to Possess

The adverse possessor must also show that they intended to possess the land and exclude the whole world, including the original owner: JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. They do not need to intend to own or gain ownership of the land, however, nor do they need to deny that another owns the land.

This test is objective: would a hypothetical, informed observer perceive the adverse possessor as communicating an intention to possess the land and exclude all others?: Wynne-Finch v Natural Resources Body for Wales [2020] EWHC 1924. Much of the same evidence that establishes factual possession can establish intention to possess: such as locks and fences.

The Consequences of Adverse Possession

The legal consequences of adverse possession depend on whether the land is registered or unregistered .

Those with a greater right in unregistered land than the adverse possessor are time-barred from bringing an action to evict them after 12 years of continuous adverse possession: Limitation Act 1980 , s.15. The original owner’s title is then extinguished: s.17. This leaves the adverse possessor with the best title to the land: Fairweather v St Marylebone Property Co Ltd [1963] AC 510. There are some exceptions to this, such as where the owner is incapable or there is fraud: s.28.

By contrast, after ten years the adverse possessor of registered land merely gains the right to ask the Land Register to register them as the new owner: Land Registration Act 2002 , schedule 6. The registered owner is then given notice of the application. If they do not respond, the adverse possessor is entitled to be registered as owner. The original owner’s title is then extinguished. If they do respond, then the application is contested.

The original owner of unregistered land cannot stop their title being extinguished. By contrast, if an application to be registered as owner of registered land is contested, the adverse possessor will only succeed if one of the following conditions are met: schedule 6, para 5.

• The existence of proprietary estoppel makes it unconscionable to evict the adverse possessor and ‘the circumstances are such that the applicant ought to be registered as the proprietor.’
• The adverse possessor has some reason (other than adverse possession) that they are entitled ot be registered as owner.
• The parties are owners of neighbouring land engaged in a boundary dispute, and a) the boundary line has not been determined under the rules of s.60 of the Land Registration Act 2002; b) the adverse possessor reasonably believed for the last ten years that the relevant land belonged to them; and c) the relevant land was registered more than a year prior to the application date.

If the application fails but the adverse possessor somehow manages to stay in possession without being subject to eviction proceedings, they can apply again in two years. At this point, they are entitled to be registered as proprietor and the original owner cannot object: paras 6-7.

Terminating Possession

To gain best title, the adverse possessor must be in adverse possession for the full 10/12 years. There are various ways in which possession can end or the possession period can be restarted:

• If the adverse possessor leaves possession, they must start again from scratch.
• The possession period will also restart if the adverse possessor gives formal, signed and written notice acknowledging the owner’s title: Limitation Act 1980, ss.29-30.
• The original owner can end adverse possession by evicting the adverse possessor or giving them permission to stay (since this makes the possession non-adverse): Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1306.

Criminal Possession

The fact that the adverse possession was criminal (e.g. the offence of residential squatting under s.144 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishing of Offenders Act 2012 ) does not prevent the adverse possessor from gaining title to the land: Best v Chief Land Registrar [2015] EWCA Civ 17.

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Letter to the editor

The role of adverse possession in modern land law.

• Yui Nga Natalie Tsang

Who Needs Adverse Possession?

Adverse possession is one of property law’s most central doctrines. Yet, this Article contends, the need it answers has been largely misunderstood. Adverse possession’s doctrinal effects are clear—and stark: when its requirements are met, an owner loses her land to an invader. To explain a doctrine instituting such a radical result, scholars resort to property law’s major philosophical theories. These theories, they argue, at times demand that an owner lose her land to another person who is more committed to that land. The problem with these prevailing justifications of adverse possession, this Article shows, is that they imagine a very specific case of adverse possession: a squatter putting invaded land to a meaningful use. In reality, however, very few adverse possession cases nowadays involve homesteading squatters. Instead, most consist of neighbors bickering over the boundary separating their lots. Thus, adverse possession now functions as a tool for adjusting boundaries, often to the tune of a mere few inches or feet. For this actual, as opposed to imagined, role of adverse possession, justifications grounded in philosophical theories focused on the abstract concept of property are not fully satisfactory. The justification for a doctrine performing such a mundane function must be more practical. Adverse possession must be compared, and shown to be superior, to alternative tools that can perform the same boundary-drawing function. This Article conducts such a comparison. It explains that American law retains adverse possession because, contrary to popular belief, our formal system of property boundaries—which uses map lines—is unreliable, indeed unworkable. The choice to retain this dysfunctional boundary system, some of whose imperfections necessitate adverse possession, is probably not socially efficient, but it serves the interests of a powerful industry bred by the existing system: the title insurance industry. This Article thus supplements the somewhat inapposite philosophical accounts of adverse possession’s function in American law with a practical one. It then stresses the normatively troubling aspects of that function. Based on this critique, this Article further advocates for judicial and legislative reforms to better reflect and regulate adverse possession’s true function in current American law.

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Law Faculty Publications

Rethinking adverse possession: an essay on ownership and possession.

Carol N. Brown , University of Richmond Follow

In the wake of the present real estate crisis, there has been prolonged discussion of the wrongdoing that led to systemic failures in the national real estate market. The mortgage crisis caught the nation’s attention because of its large scale and its rippling effect throughout the economy. Equally nefarious is the impact of adverse possession on the rights of individual property owners. While a single adverse possession does not affect the national market in the same way as the mortgage crisis did, to the individual owner, the wrongdoing, in the form of a trespass, that ripens into title, is just as devastating. We should reexamine, more broadly, concepts such as adverse possession that result in loss of ownership and move away from those whose foundation is in wrongdoing. The article begins with a brief discussion of foundational concepts inherent in the adverse possession doctrine. It then analyzes four examples that demonstrate the impact of adverse possession: 1) the purchaser and the bona fide donee; 2) the co-owners; 3) the squatters; and 4) the erroneous deed. The article concludes by summarizing the policies that justify abrogating the adverse possession doctrine.

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Co-authored with Serena M. Williams.

Recommended Citation

Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse Possession , 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 583 (2010).

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The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law

Table of contents.

McGill Law Journal ~ Revue de droit de McGill

THE MORAL PARADOX OF ADVERSE POSSESSION: SOVEREIGNTY AND REVOLUTION IN PROPERTY LAW

Larissa Katz*

On what grounds can we justify the trans- formation of squatters into owners? To under- stand the moral significance of adverse posses- sion, the author proposes an analogy. Much of the moral analysis of adverse possession has proceeded on the basis that adverse possessors are land thieves. The author first explains why the analogy of adverse possessor to land thief is misleading. Then, she argues that there is a much closer analogy between adverse posses- sion and revolution or, more precisely, a blood- less coup dtat. The recognition of the adverse possessors (private) authority solves the moral problem created by an agendaless object just as the recognition of the existing governments (public) authority, whatever its origin, solves the moral problem of a stateless people. The morality of adverse possession, seen this way, does not turn on any particularized evaluation of the squatters deserts or her uses of the land. The author thus does not propose that adverse possession is justified in the same way that some argue a conscientious revolutionary is jus- tified in resisting an oppressive or otherwise un- just sovereign. Rather, the morality of adverse possession is found where we might least expect it: in its positivist strategy of ratifying the claims to authority of a squatter without regard to the substantive merits of her agenda or her personal virtue.

limportance morale

lvaluation morale de

Quelle justification peut-on offrir pour transformer des squatteurs en propritaires ? pour Lauteure comprendre la possession adversative. Elle explique dabord pourquoi possesseurs adversatifs et voleurs de terre, qui sert souvent de prmisse la possession adversative, est trompeuse. Elle soutient ensuite quune bien meilleure analogie existe entre la possession adversative et une rvolution ou, plutt, un coup dtat sans effusion de sang. Le problme pos par la chose sans objet est rsolu par la reconnaissance de lautorit (prive) du possesseur adversatif sur ladite chose, tout comme le problme moral pos par un peuple sans tat est rsolu par la reconnaissance de (publique) du gouvernement prsent. De ce point de vue, la moralit de la possession adversative ne dpend pas des mrites du squatteur, ni de lusage quil fait du terrain. Ainsi, lauteure ne suggre pas de justifier le possesseur adversatif comme certains rvolutionnaire consciencieux parce quil rsiste un rgime abusif ou injuste. La moralit de la possession adversative se trouve plutt l o lon sy attend le moins : dans la stratgie positiviste de ratification des revendications dautorit du squatteur sans gard ni aux mrites de ses objectifs, ni sa vertu personnelle.

* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queens University. I am indebted to Eduardo Penalver, Michael Pratt, Arthur Ripstein, Malcolm Thorburn, and reviewers at the McGill Law Journal for their excellent comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Christine Ashbourne for research assistance.

Citation: (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 47 ~ Rfrence : (2010) 55 R.D. McGill 47

Larissa Katz 2010

48 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

Introduction

Three Models of Adverse Possession A. A Proceduralist Approach B. A Legal Moralist Approach C. An Inconsistent Use Model

Revolution and Rehabilitation A. Justifying Adverse Possession B. Imperfect States, Imperfect Owners

52 52 60 63

THE MORAL PARADOX OF ADVERSE POSSESSION

Property law is remarkably stable over time. Innovations in the form and content of ownership, for instance, are few and slow to catch on.1 But that is not to say that property law, through its long history, has produced a clear and unequivocal understanding of what these fundamental con- cepts are. The idea of ownership around which the law of property is or- ganized is itself a subject of controversy.2 Adverse possession is one aspect of property law that is caught in this controversy over the nature of ownership. Our idea of ownership influ- ences how we answer basic questions about what it takes to succeed as an adverse possessor as well as more complicated questions about the moral- ity of adverse possession. Seen one way, the law of adverse possession produces a radical transformation in the position of squatters pre and postlimitation period, in some cases turning land thieves into owners. This approach, which I associate with the majority of American jurisdic- tions, sees adverse possession as morally paradoxical and so invites re- strictions on deliberate squatting.3

Seen another way, the law of adverse possession concerns not the ac- quisition of new ownership rights by the squatter, but rather the extinc- tion of the original owners superior right to possess due to her own inac- tion.4 The squatter, on this view, does not acquire a new kind of right but is successful by default. This approach, found in current English law, downplays the radical change in the squatters position pre and post limitation period, thus avoiding some of the appearance of a moral para- dox. But at the same time, the English approach ignores important con- ceptual differences between owner and possessor, treating them both simply as holders of rights to possess of differing strengths.

1 See e.g. Eduardo Pealver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws (2007) 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1095 at 1133. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0 (2008) 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1047 (proposing changes to the form of ownership).

2 For a conception of ownership as an organizing idea, see Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law (2008) 58 U.T.L.J. 275 [Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity]. For controversy as to what ownership means, see ibid.; J.E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711; Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). For the Eng- lish lawyers perspective on the idea of ownership with respect to land, see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

3 Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for Bad Faith Adverse Possession

(2006) 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037 at 1046 [Fennell, Efficient Trespass].

4 See E.H. Burn & J. Cartwright, eds., Cheshire and Burns Modern Law of Real Prop-

erty, 17th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) (relativity of title).

50 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

There is a third approach to adverse possession that I will argue makes sense of the morality of adverse possession without weakening the concept of ownership at work in the law. A basic component of this third approach is still the law in some Canadian jurisdictions and until recently had currency in much of the common law world, including England and Australia.5 This is the inconsistent use test, according to which a squatter succeeds in a claim for adverse possession only where she establishes, by acts of possession that are inconsistent with the owners intended uses of the land, that the original owner lacks effective authority over the land.6 This standard presents a significant hurdle for most adverse possessors. A conventional reading of the inconsistent use test reflects our moral intuition that deliberate squatters are land thieves, undeserving of re- ward.7 On this reading, the inconsistent use test appears to respond to the same considerations that motivate the current consensus view in the United States. But, I will argue, it would be a mistake to construe the in- consistent use test as just a reflection of our distaste, on moral grounds, for acquisitive squatters. Rather, the inconsistent use test suggests a very different moral foundation for the law of adverse possession. On this ap- proach, the morality of adverse possession is not a particularized moral- ity, concerned with the relative deserts of the owner and squatter or the relative merits of the uses they have for the land. We are evaluating the wrong thing if we look to the nature of the use or the user to establish the morality of adverse possession. Rather, the morality of adverse possession is indirectly established through the role of adverse possession in allowing property law to serve its moral function. A system of property puts an owner in charge of an object. Where no one has the authority to be in charge of an object, users may manage to avoid conflict in practice. But it is the potential for conflict that is avoided when one person (or group, in the case of communal property) has the su- preme authority over an object of property.8 An owner authoritatively co-

5 For a Canadian case, see e.g. Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 680, 72 D.L.R. (3d)

182 (C.A.) [Keefer cited to O.R.]. See also infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.

6 Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at

7 Canadian cases have tended to draw this interpretation from the following cases: Keefer, supra note 5; Fletcher v. Storoschuk (1981), 35 O.R. (2d) 722, 128 D.L.R. (3d) 59 (C.A.) [Fletcher cited to O.R.]. As a result, there is one strand of case law that is increas- ingly unwilling to allow deliberate squatters to prevail under any circumstances. See in- fra note 67 and accompanying text.

8 See infra note 133. Property systems perform a moral function in this way because they provide the assurances necessary for the owner to assert her own opinion and to ignore the opinions of others, something which one arguably has a moral duty to forbear from doing in a state of nature. See Larissa Katz, A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of

ordinates uses of an object by setting the agenda for it.9 A squatters in- consistent use exposes a vacancy in the property systeman object of property over which the original owner no longer has effective authority. The squatter justifiably succeeds insofar as he fills that vacancy.

This study of the law and morality of adverse possession suggests a new analogy for understanding the role of adverse possessor, not as a land thief nor as a deserving labourer, but rather as something akin to the leader of a bloodless coup dtat.10 A successful adverse possessor assumes the mantle of ownership for much the same reason that a successful coup dtat produces a government whose authority to rule is undiminished by the initial illegality of its path to power. The possibility of social order re- quires that someone wield ownership authority in the former case, and public authority in the latter. Adverse possession solves the moral prob- lem of agendaless objects just as the recognition of the existing govern- ment (whatever its origins) solves the moral problem of stateless people.

The relationship between adverse possession and the legitimacy of post-revolution government is mostly one of analogy. But it is also more than this. Ownership, I will argue, is also a part of the larger system of public authority. It is part of the way that the state orders society. Of all the ways that the state relies on owners, the most important is the owners function of setting the agenda for an object and so setting a framework that organizes the uses others can make of it.11 Insofar as the social order is in part constituted by owners, the state needs to ensure

Right [unpublished, online: SSRN , Katz, Abuse of Right] (arguing that in a state of nature there is a duty to forbear from acting unilater- ally on ones opinion about how best to distribute goods).

9 See Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 2. 10 I will use coup dtat and revolution interchangeably, although by coup dtat I mean a special kind of revolutionone in which a powerful elite takes over the government without necessarily acting in the name of the people and without dismantling, but rather taking over, the existing institutions. See also Part II.B (distinguishing the ad- verse possessor from the conscientious revolutionary who claims to represent the will of the people and who seeks not just to oust the current office holder but to introduce a new order). I am grateful to Arthur Ripstein for suggesting that the analogy of adverse possession to revolution is more accurately described as an analogy to a coup dtat.

11 See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. This explains what Henry Sumner Maine called the presumption … that everything ought to have an owner, characteris- tic of modern property systems: Ancient Law (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1888) at 249 [emphasis in original]. There are many other reasons why a society may not toler- ate vacancies, related to the obligations that the state imposes on owners. See e.g. Edu- ardo Penalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon [unpublished, online: SSRN , Penalver, Illusory Right]. For a different take on the service that owners provide the state, see Larissa Katz, Governing through Owners [on file with the author, Katz, Governing].

52 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

that owners are doing what the state promises they will do (or else face a breakdown in the social order). The adverse possessor, having asserted ef- fective authority over the object and displaced the original owner, as- sumes an indispensable role in the property system and also the larger system of public authority of which the property system is a part. This paper proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I will provide an overview

of the three models of adverse possession. In Part II, I will develop the analogy between adverse possession and a successful coup dtat in order to explain the morality of adverse possession.

I. Three Models of Adverse Possession

The common law has produced a rich and complex debate about the law of adverse possession and the concepts of possession and ownership on which it is based. I will begin by examining in more detail the models of adverse possession that dominate this debate and the strikingly differ- ent conceptions of ownership and possession on which they rely.

A. A Proceduralist Approach

The first model, recently adopted in England,12 emphasizes the non- adversarial and procedural nature of adverse possession. On this view, the adverse possessor succeeds where she possesses and intends to pos- sess the land (in the ordinary sense) for the requisite time period. The dispossession of the true owner is simply the result of sufficient acts of possession by the adverse possessor rather than any intentional ouster of the true owner. Possession by the squatter logically entails dispossession by the owner because possession, by its very nature, is exclusive and sin- gle.13 Nothing more is needed: no intent to own, and no hostility or con- flict with the owner.14 As a result, an owner can inadvertently lose title to her land even in circumstances where she has not abandoned or forgotten

12 Australia has also recently adopted this approach. See e.g. Adrian J. Bradbrook, Susan V. MacCallum & Anthony P. Moore, Australian Real Property Law, 4th ed. (Pyrmont, N.S.W.: Lawbook, 2007) at 688-94. See also Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 6th ed. (London, U.K.: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) at 501-503, 510.

13 J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham, [2002] UKHL 30, [2003] 1 A.C. 419 at para. 38, [2002]

3 W.L.R. 221 [Pye].

14 For cases rejecting an intent to own and emphasis on owners future plans, see Powell v. McFarlane (1979), 38 P. & C.R. 452 (Ch.D.) [Powell]; Laing and Laing v. Moran and Moran, [1952] O.R. 215, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 468 (C.A.); Pye, supra note 13; Beaulane Prop- erties Limited v. Palmer, [2005] EWHC 817, [2005] 4 All E.R. 461 (Ch.) [Beaulane Prop- erties].

about it.15 The original owner loses her right to regain possession simply by failing to act on her right in a timely fashion. When the original owners right to re-enter is extinguished, the squatter by default is left with a right to possess the land that is better than anyone elses.16 Ad- verse possession, on this model, is procedural rather than substantive be- cause it sets out the process by which the owners rights are extinguished to the benefit of the possessor but does not carve out new rights for the possessor.17

The introduction of this model of adverse possession in England was a response to an older model of adverse possession based on a version of the inconsistent use test.18 An English Court of Appeal decision from 1879, Leigh v. Jack,19 set out the basic principle that if an owner has not aban- doned or forgotten entirely about the land, the adverse possessor will suc- ceed only by ousting him through inconsistent use.20 A century later, there were rumblings that perhaps English courts, following Leigh, had gotten the law wrong.21 In 1833, the English had reformed their statute of limita-

15 The new position on adverse possession raises the possibility of a conflict with the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free- doms (20 March 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 at 262, Eur. T.S. 5 [Convention]), which pro- tects against disproportionate interference with property rights. See Beaulane Proper- ties, supra note 14 (finding a violation of art. 1 of the Convention). But see J.A. Pye (Ox- ford) Ltd. and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd. v. United Kingdom, no. 44302/02 (30 August 2007) (Grand Chamber) [Pye (E.C.H.R.)] (finding no such violation).

16 For this interpretation, see e.g. John M. Lightwood, A Treatise on Possession of Land

(London, U.K.: Stevens & Sons, 1894):

The old Statutes of Limitation of the English law were purely negative. They barred the remedy of the true owner, but they did not touch his title. The possessor, therefore, acquired a title indirectly only, and this might be de- feated if the true owner in any way lawfully came to the possession again. The present statutes, too, are negative, but … they at once bar the remedy and extinguish the right, and practically they create a perfect title in the pos- sessor (at 153).

17 Thus, in an action by the owners in Pye (E.C.H.R.) (supra note 15) in the European Court of Human Rights, the lawyers for the government resisted any claim that the state had expropriated or taken the rights of the true owner and transferred them to the adverse possessor.

18 For my discussion of this development, see Larissa Katz, Bertha Wilsons Property Ju- risprudence in Kim Brooks, ed., Justice Bertha Wilson: One Womans Difference (Van- couver: UBC Press, 2009) 39.

19 (1879), 5 Exch. Div. 264 [Leigh]. 20 Further discussion of the inconsistent use test will be found at infra notes 24-38 and

accompanying text.

21 For cases in England following Leigh (supra note 19), see e.g. Littledale v. Liverpool Col- lege (1899), [1900] 1 Ch. 19, 16 T.L.R. 44 (C.A.); Williams Bros. Direct Supply Stores Ltd. v. Raftery, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 931, [1957] 3 All E.R. 593 (C.A.).

54 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

tions.22 The 1833 statute, on which the modern English, Ontario, and other Canadian statutes are based, stipulated that time starts to run against an owner from the moment that he discontinued possession or was dispossessed.23 One interpretation of this statute that has become the current English view is that it did away with the requirement of adver- sity or ouster.24 In 1977, Justice Slade in Powell delivered a strong cri- tique of Leighs requirement of inconsistent use on the basis that it mis- construed the concept of possession.25 The gist of his view was that an owner is dispossessed where the squatter is able to show that she and she

22 See e.g. Percy Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse Possession (1923) 33 Yale L.J. 1 at 7, n. 61 (citing Blackstone to argue that the old English view that there can be no pre- scription to land was mere semantics; in any case, the reforms of 1833 unequivocally in- troduced prescription to land). See also Harold Potter, The Modern Law of Real Prop- erty and Chattels Real (London, U.K.: Sweet & Maxwell, 1929):

The Statutes of Limitation which were in force before 1834, only extin- guished the remedy of the person out of possession; they did not confer a right to the land on the person in possession, but the Acts now in force actu- ally create an interest in the land, because the right and title of the real owner are completely extinguished (at 605-606).

23 Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 27, s. 3. For more recent statutes, see Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (U.K.), 1980, c. 24, s. 4; Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-15, s. 5(1) [Limitations Act (Ont.)]; Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-8, s. 31; Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, s. 11(a). Note that many provinces in Canada have done away with the doctrine of adverse possession. See e.g. British Columbias Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, s. 12; Saskatchewans The Land Titles Act, 2000, S.S. 2000, c. L-5.1, s. 21.

24 See Teis v. Ancaster (Town of) (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 216 at 226, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 304 (C.A.) [Teis]. Laskin J. noted that the Ontario statute, based on the 1833 statute, does not contain the phrase adverse possession. See also Oliver Radley-Gardner, Civilized Squatting (2005) 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 727 at 732, citing Frederick Pollock & Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888): Pollock states that the result, and doubtless the intended result, is greatly to diminish the importance of the character in which and the intention with which acts of apparent ownership are done. A rival view is that the 1833 reforms did away with the fiction that a deliberate possessor acts with the implied permission of the owner. Lord Denning tried to resurrect the implied permission theory: Walliss Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd. v. Shell-Mex and BP Ltd., [1974] 3 W.L.R. 387, [1974] 3 All E.R. 575 [Walliss Cayton Bay]. The effect of the implied permission theory is that delib- erate squatters are deemed to be acting non-adversely and so can never succeed. See Masidon Investments Ltd. v. Ham (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 563 at 568, 31 R.P.R. 200 (C.A.) [Masidon Investments], citing Leigh, supra note 19 at 273:

Before 1833, some acts of possession were deemed to be acts on behalf of the owner and hence not adverse. As a consequence of the reforming statutes of the 1830s, adverse possession is established where the claimant’s use of the land is inconsistent with the owners enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he intended to use it.

25 Powell, supra note 14.

alone is in possession, in the ordinary sense of the word.26 An owners fu- ture plans, which may or may not materialize, do not count as continued acts of possession in the ordinary sense. Justice Slade also thought that the line of cases following Leigh wrongly understood animus possidendi to mean the intent to oust the true owner: a squatter cannot form the intent to oust the owner because she does not have the authority in law to do so. It would be impossible to require the squatter to intend to do what she is not in a position to do.27 Thus, the intent to possess, on Justice Slades view, can mean only the intent to exclude others insofar as it is reasona- bly practicable and permitted by law.

Justice Slades decision in Powell, it has turned out, was an early sign of discomfort in England with what the inconsistent use test implies about the concept of ownership and its vulnerability. In 2004, the House of Lords in Pye overturned Leigh and applauded Justice Slades decision in Powell.28 The House of Lords affirmed that any talk of ouster miscon- strues what the law actually requires following the 1833 reforms, finding that ouster is derived from the old law of adverse possession [pre-1833] and has overtones of confrontational, knowing removal of the true owner from possession.29 On the current English model, the squatter does not engineer a take- over of the owners position and does not acquire a new ownership right at the end of the day.30 This model of adverse possession rests on a particular

26 Ibid. at 470. This was the approach taken by the House of Lords in Pye (supra note 13). Note that the intent to possess can be inferred from the fact of possession and of course, on this view, no intent to own is necessary.

27 It is possible to wish for what one cannot do but it is not possible to decide or intend to do what one cannot do. This basic distinction is found in Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics (Book III, c. 3, 1112a18-33).

28 Pye, supra note 13. See also Buckinghamshire County Council v. Moran, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 152, [1989] 2 All E.R. 225 (also endorsing Slade J.s approach in Powell (supra note 14)); Martin Dockray, Adverse Possession and Intention (1982) Conv. & Prop. Law. (N.S.) 256 at 257.

29 Pye, supra note 13 at para. 38. The old statute of limitations (pre-1833) clearly re- quired adversity. See also Lightwood, supra note 16 at 160: [The statute] ran so soon as there was an adverse possession, and this was defined to mean a possession incon- sistent with the title of the true owner … or a possession taken with intention to claim title (citing Cholmondeley v. Clinton (1820), 2 Jac. & W. 1 at 164, 37 E.R. 527 at 586 and other sources).

30 Brian Bucknall, Teis v. Ancaster: Knowledge, the Lack of Knowledge and the Running of a Possessory Title Period, Case Comment, (1998) 13 R.P.R. (3d) 68 at 68; Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 162; Pollock & Wright, supra note 24 at 91. Historically, the title that the adverse possessor acquired postlimitation period was called parliamentary title but this was not meant to indicate that any statute confers on the adverse possessor a new right. Rather, the adverse possessors right becomes indefeasible once the owners right is extinguished

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understanding of ownership and its place in the common law. It fits with the old (feudal) view that the English common law does not have a con- cept of ultimate ownership of land.31 Instead of ownership, on this view, there is just a hierarchy of rights to possess that are, relative to one an- other, either stronger or weaker.32 To own is just to wield a right to pos- sess that is good against all others.33 A squatter who takes possession of land has a right to possess that is good against all others except someone with a prior and better right, such as the true owner and those claiming through him. Even though the squatter is a trespasser, the law will pro- tect him from dispossession by anyone other than the true owner.34 What is more, third parties cannot challenge his right on the grounds that someone other than he is the true owner.35 Relative to the owner, the squatters right to possess is weak and defeasible until the limitation pe-

(ibid. at 95). The English historically distinguished and continue to distinguish between rights acquired by prescription and the extinguishment of rights on the one hand, and remedies by the statute of limitation on the other. The quality of the squatters posses- sion is of course crucial to the former, but not really relevant to the latter. See Wonna- cott, supra at 136. See also Bordwell, supra note 22 at 7. The introduction of the re- quirement that the possession be open, notorious, and non-violent emphasizes the ac- quisition of ownership through adverse possession and not merely the extinguishment of the original owners right.

31 See generally infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. 32 Pollock & Wright, supra note 24 at 93 (the adverse possessor has a right in the nature of property which is valid against every one who cannot show a prior and better right). The notion of ultimate ownership slipped into the common law through the availability of the jus tertii defence in limited circumstances; that is, if the defendant did not forcibly dispossess the plaintiff, she can raise the existence of a third partys better title to de- feat the plaintiffs action to eject. See Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2d ed. (London, U.K.: Methuen & Co., Sweet & Maxwell, 1966) vol. 7 at 65-68, cited in McNeil, supra note 2 at 50.

33 Any loss of rights by the owner, on this view, is due to the owners own inaction, not to a

taking by the state or another. See Pye (E.C.H.R.), supra note 15 at para. 65.

34 Even the owner is limited in what she can do to regain possession: the owner has the right to enter and repossess her land only before the statutory period expires and only without violence. See A.H. Oosterhoff & W.B. Rayner, eds., Anger and Honsberger Law of Real Property, 2d ed. (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1985) vol. 2 at 1497. See also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies (New York: Foundation Press, 2007) at 198; Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property, 5th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2002) at 125-26. The owner cannot force the squatter but, if she meets resistance, must bring an action to reject. See Anne Warner La Forest, ed., Anger & Honsberger Law of Real Property (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2008) (the right to enter and retake possession independent of court action but any violence might amount to assault). See also Powell, supra note 14 at 476: Until the possession of land has actually passed to the trespasser, the owner may exercise the remedy of self-help against him. Once possession has actually passed to the trespasser, this remedy is not available to the owner.

35 Ziff, supra note 6 at 139-40 (discussing jus tertii defence); Merrill & Smith, supra note

34 at 226-27; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 34 at 110.

riod runs. But relative to third parties, the squatter has a right to possess that is no different from that of the owner. When the owners right to re- gain possession is extinguished with the passage of time, the squatter simply enjoys a more robust protection of his own right to possess: he no longer faces the threat of re-entry by the owner. A significant conceptual shortcoming of this approach is that it relies on an unsatisfactorily weak conception of ownership. The emphasis on relativity of title to explain the owners position suggests a parity between the position of the adverse possessor (as holder of a right to possess good against the whole world except someone with a superior right to possess) and the position of the owner (as holder of a right to possess that is good against the whole world including the possessor).36 Of course, this model does, in a limited sense, distinguish between owner and possessor. For one thing, the model picks up on differences in the mode of acquisition. Thus, the adverse possessor has an original right to possess, acquired through the fact of possession, whereas the owner, in the usual case, has derivative title acquired through transfer or inheritance. This model also picks up on differences in the vulnerability of the owners and the squat- ters respective rights. The owners right to possess is good against all comers whereas the squatters right has more limited exigibility, good against all but the true owner. But the model fails to acknowledge the es- sential differences in the nature of the owners and the squatters rights, in keeping with the view that English law, unlike civilian law, gets by without the idea of ownership. The perception that our system of property works without the concept

of ownership is the product of property laws roots in feudalism. The feu- dal origins of English property law produced a system of estates in which the legal rights in land were always held of someone higher up the feudal chain and ultimately held of the Crown. As Professor J.W. Harris wrote, [s]ince what is conveyed is always an estate in the land, it has been widely assumed that ownership of land, as such, is not a conception in- ternal to English land law.37 But it would be a mistake to conclude that Anglo-American law has not produced a robust concept of ownership, al-

36 This emphasis on relativity of title is motivated by the view that ownership is not really a legal concept, and that all anyone can have is a right to possession. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.

37 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 69. See also Ber- nard Rudden, Notes Towards a Grammar of Property (1980) Conv. & Prop. Law. (N.S.) 325; A.D. Hargreaves, Modern Real Property (1956) 19 Mod. L. Rev. 14. See also McNeil, supra note 2 at 8-9, 74-75; Dixon, supra note 12 at 501; Burn & Cart- wright, supra note 4 at 114-15; William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, 3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1964) at 68 (early English common law blurred the concep- tual distinction between ownership and possession).

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beit one that we need to glean from a wide array of property rules and doctrines.38 It is of course true that the idea of ownership in the common law is rarely defined or directly discussed in property jurisprudence.39 But this on its own should not lead us to overlook the concept of ownership within our legal system. We have, for instance, no evidence that Roman law, touted as the source of the civil law idea of dominium or complete ownership, contained any explicit articulation of the idea of ownership.40 As one scholar of Roman law put it, [i]t is well known that no ancient le- gal text contains a Roman definition of ownership.41 As I discuss else- where, the concept of ownership in Anglo-American property law emerges from the way in which various property doctrines, taken together, estab- lish and preserve the special position of the owner as the agenda-setting authority.42 Harris similarly locates the concept of ownership in the com- mon law, arguing that ownership is quite simply an incident of legal es- tates in land.43 As earlier property writers like H.W. Challis wrote, [a fee simple] confers, and since the beginning of legal history it always has con- ferred, the lawful right to exercise over, upon, and in respect to, the land, every act of ownership which can enter into the imagination … and, for all practical purposes [the right] of ownership.44 Of course feudalism compli- cates the idea of ownership that we find in English law,45 but even in that

38 See Harris, supra note 37 at 69-72 (arguing that the idea of ownership of land is inter- nal to the common law and has been so since at least the medieval period). See also Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law: Before the Time of Edward I, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923) vol. 2 at 2-6 (noting that medieval jurists like Bracton ascribed to the tenant in demesne ownership and nothing less than ownership at 6). Holdsworth, on narrower doctrinal grounds, thought that modern property law does contain the idea of ownership. His argument was that the law permits a qualified jus tertii defence, a limited appeal to the existence of a true owner in circumstances where the defendant did not forcibly dispossess the plaintiff. For a discussion, see McNeil, supra note 2 at 50-51.

39 An important exception is in the context of U.S. takings cases, where the Supreme Court of the United States has struggled to define property rights coherently. See Mi- chael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Property (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 1163 at 1202-17.

40 For the argument that the idea of unfettered ownership picked up by civilians in the nineteenth century is not found in Roman law but in Byzantine law (Justinians Code), see Alan Rodger, Owners and Neighbours in Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 1-37.

41 Ibid. at 1. 42 See Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 2 at 290. 43 Harris, supra note 37 at 70-71. 44 See Charles Sweet, ed., Challiss Law of Real Property: Chiefly in Relation to Convey-

ancing, 3d ed. (London, U.K.: Butterworths, 1911) at 218.

45 The complexity of the real action encouraged owners to assert their rights qua possessor (and to use the much simpler action of ejectment, through which conflicting claims to possession were resolved). See Maine, supra note 11 at 282-83.

context, the law understood and protected ownership. This is what Pro- fessor Baker meant when he wrote, by the thirteenth century the tenant was in reality the owner of the land. 46 The Crown by that point had cre- ated the safeguards that enabled tenants to exercise agenda-setting au- thority with respect to the land without interference by their overlords.47 The weakness of the current English approach to adverse possession is

that it overlooks the existence of a robust conception of ownership in the common law; it suggests in its place a difference more of degree than of kind between the position of owner and possessor. This apparent symme- try between the positions of the possessor and owner, on this model, ac- counts for why the squatter need not aim to take over from the owner or intend to acquire a position other than the one she occupies already. A right to possess is all the possessor has to start with and all that she or anyone can have at the end of the day. As we have seen, the recent English approach to adverse possession sidesteps the moral paradox by emphasizing the relativity of title. There is, on this view, no usurpationno private takingbut simply the natu- ral defeasibility of the owners right to possess where he fails to take ac- tion, thus leaving the adverse possessors right to possess that much stronger.48 On the English view, as we saw above, we do not have a thief one minute and an owner the next, but rather someone whom the law recognizes as having a right to possess before the statutory period expires, and an even stronger right to possess thereafter. With respect to the owner himself, the squatter maintains a right to possess until the owner

46 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London, U.K.: Butter- worths, 2002) at 237. See Harris, supra note 37 at 70, citing Pollock & Maitland, supra note 38 at 2-6.

47 It is worthwhile pointing out that civilians, facing a similar challenge, came up with the distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile to explain ownership in the context of feudalism. See Robert Feenstra, Dominium and ius in re aliena: The Origins of a Civil Law Distinction in Peter Birks, ed., New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 111 at 112-13.

48 Pye (E.C.H.R.), supra note 15. Note the parallel in the way that a surviving joint tenant experiences an enlargement of her rights on the other tenants death. Joint tenants do not acquire new rights or more rights on the death of the joint tenant; rather, they are simply in a stronger position insofar as the rights of their former joint tenant do not survive death. Contrast this with the common view, in the American context, that ad- verse possession is a kind of takings or transfer of rights by the state from one person to the next. See e.g. Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 (Background govern- mental power, not any acquisitive thoughts in the mind of the new owner, dispossesses the original owner at 1055). See also Richard A. Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozicks Minimal State: The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political Theory (2005) 22 Social Phi- losophy and Policy 286 at 305-307 (statutes of limitations produce forced exchanges, but are justified because they also produce Pareto improvements).

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extinguishes it by re-entry.49 And vis–vis the rest of the world, the law not only treats the squatter as having a right to possess but forbids men- tion of the better right of the true owner in a dispute with a third party.50 Thus, although the adverse possessor is clearly a trespasser in English law before the statutory period expires, he occupies a position in law that is not at such a distance conceptually from the owners own. By emphasiz- ing the relativity of title, the English do not treat the squatter as wholly damned as a wrongdoer one minute and wholly embraced by the law the next. However, the English view avoids the moral paradox in the law of adverse possession only by weakening the concept of ownership and set- ting up the fiction that the adverse possessor does not take over the owners position, but simply continues on in his own.

B. A Legal Moralist Approach

American approaches to adverse possession reveal a much greater concern with the effect of adverse possession in transforming squatters into owners.51 Adverse possession in American case law and commentary is commonly described as a form of private taking or land theft, with the apparently anomalous result that the law through adverse possession sanctions theft.52 This perceived shift in the laws attitude to the squatter

49 There is a debate about whether the adverse possessor has a right to possess depending on material fact of possession or a form of seisen that continues until the disseisee ter- minates it by re-entry. See McNeil, supra note 2 (discussing Holdsworth).

50 For a discussion of the jus tertii defence, see McNeil, supra note 2 at 50-51. See also Pol- lock & Wright, supra note 24 at 91. It is not unwaveringly the case that the common law forbids a defence based on the better right of a third party: where the defendant has not forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff (for instance, the latters right to possess is not founded on actual possession), the defendant can defeat the plaintiffs claim by raising a jus tertii defence. Holdsworth took this as evidence that the modern common law has an idea of (absolute) ownership that is distinct from (relative) possession: McNeil, supra note 2 at 50-51.

51 See Bordwell, supra note 22 at 12-13 (emphasizing the acquisition of new rights by the squatter). This is so notwithstanding the fact that the law of adverse possession in the U.S. is grounded in statutes of limitation that, as in England, technically produce this effect by extinguishing the original owners ability to bring an action to eject the squat- ter. Many U.S. scholars of property law have decried this characterization of adverse possession (quite rightly as I will argue below) and have argued in favour of the proce- duralist, non-adversarial approach that I have described above. See e.g. H.W. Bal- lantine, Title by Adverse Possession, (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 135 at 141-42. See also Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property, 6th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2006) at 115.

52 See e.g. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 2419 at 2420 (The doctrine effects a transfer of state-sanctioned rights in land from owners to nonowners without the consent of the owner). See Ballantine, supra note 51 at 141 (identifying and then disagreeing with the view that adverse possession

pre and postlimitation period has led American courts and commenta- tors increasingly to view the law of adverse possession primarily as a tool to correct the mistakes of good faith squatters:53 deliberate squatters are, on this view, morally undeserving of the disproportionate reward that ad- verse possession is seen to deliver.54 This has had an impact on the way in which the law of adverse possession has evolved in the United States. Few jurisdictions require that squatters deliberately challenge the title of the original owner in order to succeed, and some have gone so far as to limit the availability of adverse possession to good faith squatters.55 Historically, this was not the case. American approaches to adverse possessionand property generallywere and remain strongly respon- sive to utilitarian concerns. There was a time, particularly when the West was being settled, when it was seen as socially beneficial to encourage land-hungry locals to take over from absentee paper title holders.56 As a result, many U.S. jurisdictions historically either did not inquire into the mental state of the squatter or even required that squatters have a hostile intent in order to prevail.57 Over time, as unsettled land became increas-

amounts to the statutory confiscation of property or a parliamentary taking). For more sources, see Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1053-56.

53 R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent (1983) 61 Wash. U.L.Q. 331 at 332-33 (showing the negative reaction of judges to deliberate squatters, even in juris- dictions where good faith is not required); Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property (2007) 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849 at 1876.

54 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession (1984-1985) 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1122 (arguing for a liability rule protection for owners in the case of bad faith squatters to reduce the size of the reward).

55 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 34 at 127. Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1047 (describing bad faith requirements for adverse possession as a minority ap- proach that is increasingly losing favour and describing the dominant objective ap- proach).

56 Pealver & Katyal, supra note 1 at 1106-107, 1109. A supporting rationale was that a squatter grows attached to the land she possesses and comes to consider it her own. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2005) c. 6 at 206ff.; Lightwood, supra note 16 at 152-53 (noting a policy to [withhold] from one who has slept upon his right … [rather] than to take away from the other what he has long been allowed to consider as his own, and on the faith of which the plans in life, habits, and expenses of himself and his family may have been unalterably formed and established). Of course, attitudes toward adverse possession are cyclical. Henry Sumner Maine wrote in 1861 that [p]rescriptions were viewed by the modern lawyers, first with repugnance, afterwards with reluctant approval (supra note 11 at 276).

57 See Pealver & Katyal, supra note 1 at 1110-11 (explaining how the doctrinal develop- ments supporting bad faith adverse possession was one way in which the courts sided with squatters against absentee landlords in the West). The common law approach in the state of Maine is the best example of this approach: adverse possessors had to show a hostile intent, and good faith squatters were thus often disqualified if they could not

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ingly scarce, deliberate squatting came to be seen in a different light, namely, as an attack on the security of ownership and as morally repre- hensible.58 The deliberate squatter came to be cast in the judicial imagina- tion as a land thief to whom protection is offered only reluctantly, with a utilitarians eye to the larger ills avoided by doing so.59 On this view, the apparent windfall enjoyed by a deliberate squatter who is transformed into the owner at the end of the day is justified, if at all, on the basis that adverse possession (1) prompts lazy owners to use their land or sell it off; (2) roots out stale claims while the evidence is still fresh so that title searches are simpler and less costly; and (3) respects the expectations of third parties who have relied on appearances.60 American instrumentalism held the moral paradox of adverse posses- sion at bay for some time. So long as adverse possession performed an im- portant service (e.g., rooting out stale claims, third party reliance, or the improved efficiency of land use), we suffered the moral incoherence of ad- verse possession.61 Recently, however, American commentators have sug- gested that many of the supposed benefits of adverse possession are either not sufficiently valuable to offset the costs of rewarding theft, or better

show an intent to own what was not theirs. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 34 at 142-44; Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation (1986) 64 Wash. U.L.Q. 739 at 746-47; Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1039, n. 9.

58 See e.g. Merrill, supra note 54 at 1876 (adverse possessors are seen as bad people ac- cording to the simple moral code that underlies property law). For the views of property scholars on the morality of deliberate squatting, see Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1048 (citing Richard Epstein, Thomas Merrill, Richard Helmholz, Richard Posner, and others on the immorality of deliberate squatting).

59 Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Prop- erty (1986) 64 Wash. U.L.Q. 667 at 679-80, 685; Stake, supra note 52 (a cost of the doc- trine of adverse possession is that it creates an opportunity to steal land, a behaviour we do not want to encourage at 2433). See also Walls v. Grohman, 337 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. 1985) (We have concluded that a rule which requires the adverse possessor to be a thief in order for his possession of the property to be adverse is not reasonable at 562), cited in Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1040, n. 11.

60 Merrill, supra note 54 at 1128-33. See also Dixon, supra note 12 at 502. 61 The idea that adverse possession is inconsistent with the idea of ownership rights and yet justified for instrumental reasons is an old one, and one to which Hegel and others felt obliged to respond. See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by Al- len W. Wood, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 94:

Prescription, therefore, has not been introduced into right merely because of an external consideration at variance with right in its strict sensethat is, in order to terminate the disputes and confusions with which old claims would threaten the security of property, etc. On the contrary, prescription is based on the determination of the reality of property, of the wills need to express it- self in order to possess something [emphasis in original].

achieved through other legal mechanisms.62 For instance, as Professor Fennell has argued, the interests of third parties are adequately protected by tort action for detrimental reliance, and land registries and recording systems now preserve evidence of title and so ensure the marketability of title previously threatened by old claims.63 Others point out that it is no longer self-evident that adverse possession leads to more efficient uses of land because our society no longer straightforwardly prefers development and active uses of land over conservation and passive uses.64 Not being able to locate the benefits of adverse possession for deliberate squatters in utilitarian terms, American courts and commentators have become in- creasingly responsive to what they see as the moral paradox of adverse possession.65 As a result, judicial practice increasingly favours inadvertent or good faith squatters even in jurisdictions where adverse intent is for- mally no bar to a successful claim based on adverse possession.66

C. An Inconsistent Use Model

There is a third approach to adverse possession that acknowledges this radical transformation of squatters into owners without collapsing into a moral paradox. Although this approach is not perfectly articulated in any jurisdiction, its crucial componentthe inconsistent use testwas once found throughout the common law world and is still the law in Can- ada. It is, however, increasingly under attack and wrongly so, as I think this paper will show.67 According to the inconsistent use test, adverse pos-

62 Cf. Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1084 (arguing that, while the conven- tional utilitarian arguments in favour of adverse possession are not convincing, it is ef- ficient to allow deliberate squatters to acquire property rights through adverse posses- sion in some circumstances).

63 See ibid. at 1063-64 (articulating other areas of law that protect against detrimental re-

liance, etc.). See also Stake, supra note 52 at 2448.

64 See e.g. Abraham Bell, Private Takings (2009) 76 U. Chicago L. Rev. 517. 65 Fennells response is that there are benefits of deliberate adverse possession that have gone unnoticed. See Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1073-76. On Fennells functionalist approach, we bracket questions about the morality of adverse possession so long as there are efficiency-based reasons for adverse possession.

66 Helmholz, supra note 53 at 332-33; Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1046. 67 For cases applying the inconsistent use test, see Mueller v. Lee (2007), 59 R.P.R. (4th) 199, 158 A.C.W.S. (3d) 827 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [Mueller cited to R.P.R.] (recognizing, in obiter, that the inconsistent use test applies to advertent squatters and is an element of the intent requirement). See also Laurier Homes (27) Ltd. v. Brett (2005), 42 R.P.R. (4th) 86, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 46; Masidon Investments, supra note 24. For cases criticizing the inconsistent use test, see Beaudoin v. Aubin (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 604 at 609, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 277 (holding that no subjective intent to own or to exclude the true owner is required and that where acts of possession are unequivocal, the requisite animus possi- dendi is to be inferred). See also Fazio v. Pasquariello (1999), 23 R.P.R. (3d) 157, 93

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session is successful only when the possessor has used the land in a man- ner inconsistent with the original owners agenda for it.68 The inconsistent use test requires the squatter to show that she has in effect ousted and in- tended to oust the true owner.69 A friendly or amicable relationship be- tween the adverse possessor and the owner will tend to rule out adverse possession.70 The inconsistent use test thus preserves a wide scope for the owner to pursue the ends of her choosing insofar as she is immune from all but the most direct and confrontational challenge to her authority (which in a way limits, rather than introduces, overtones of confronta- tion71 into the law).72 The effect of the inconsistent use test is that an owner is quite secure in her position even if her plans for the land do not include present uses of it, so long as the possessor does not make use of

O.T.C. 99 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)); Raso v. Lonergan (1998), 114 O.A.C. 335, 83 A.C.W.S. (3d) 494, (C.A.); Gorman v. Gorman (1998), 110 O.A.C. 87, 16 R.P.R. (3d) 173 (C.A.) (affirm- ing the animus possidendi requirement set out in Keefer (supra note 5) and upheld in Masidon (supra note 24)). Cf. Bradford Investments (1963) Ltd. v. Fama (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 127, 34 R.P.R. (4th) 16 (Sup. Ct. J.) [Bradford Investments cited to O.R.]. This case considered the criticisms in Pye (supra note 13) approvingly but was precedent-bound to follow Keefer (supra note 5). Gibbins v. Gibbins (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 45, 1 R.F.L. (2d) 352 (S.C.(C.A.)) (showing how the old approach to adverse possession, in which we look to the quality of the possession, was reintroduced into Canadian case law notwithstanding that the modern limitation act was meant to avoid a discussion of adverse versus non- adverse possession).

68 Tecbuild Ltd. v. Chamberlain (1969), 20 P. & C.R. 633 (C.A.) (distinguishing between an intent to exclude the true owner and an intent merely to derive some enjoyment from the land wholly consistent with such use as the true owner might wish to make of it at 643).

69 Keefer, supra note 5 at 692. 70 Ibid.; St. Clair Beach Estates Ltd. v. MacDonald (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 482, 50 D.L.R. (3d) 650 (Ont. H.C.J.). But note the mutual and unilateral mistake cases in Ontario, which create a different set of requirements responding to the befuddled neighbour paradigm of adverse possession. See e.g. Teis, supra note 24; Key v. Latsky (2006), 39 R.P.R. (4th) 160, 206 O.A.C. 116; Wood v. Gateway of Uxbridge Properties (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 769, 14 R.P.R. (2d) 262 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)).

71 Beaulane Properties, supra note 14 at para. 91. 72 See Bucknall, supra note 30 at 71-72:

Should the holder of paper title be forced into an aggressive, and potentially litigious, position (with all the expense that it might entail) when the holder sees no harm being done? Should the holder [of] paper title instead be al- lowed to assume that its rights are unimpaired until a genuine conflict de- velops?

See also Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1293, [2001] 2 E.G.L.R. 69 (C.A.), Neuberger J. (asking why we should expect an owner to spring into action if he has no real use for the property). This approach limits the requirement to keep on speaking or lose title: Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property (1985) 52 U. Chicago L. Rev. 73 at 79 [emphasis in original].

the land in a manner that is inconsistent with her plans for it. Possession is not adverse where it does not defeat the owners plans for the property.

The inconsistent use test construes adverse possession as a bid to oust the owner from his position of authority.73 The squatters acts of posses- sion are sufficient for this purpose, only when they are inconsistent with the owners intended use and so pose a true challenge to the owners posi- tion. This understanding of possession may be at odds with the current English view of the ordinary meaning of the word, but it has deep roots. There are some similarities between the kind of possession required to de- feat ownership on the inconsistent use test, and the idea of possession found in Roman law. On the Roman law conception, possession means roughly to [sit] in power or to hold in the manner of an owner.74 Thus, the Romans distinguished between detention, which is occupation without the intention to own, and possession.75 Possession, on the Roman view, requires both acts of possession and intention, animus possidendi. If pos- session means to hold in the manner of owner, then it follows that animus possidendi means the intent to own for oneself.76 This understanding of possession complicates the position of deliberate squatters. For a deliber- ate possessor to sit in power or to hold in the manner of owner, he must in effect set out to displace the existing owner. Perhaps to avoid en- couraging intentional ouster, Roman law limited the availability of ad- verse possession to good faith squatters.77 The inconsistent use test takes

73 Fletcher, supra note 7. 74 For the distinction between ownership and possession, see Barry Nicholas, An Intro- duction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) at 105, 107-108. Relativity of ti- tle still matters in that possession is protected by the fact that a person who has posses- sion has an action against a dispossessor (ibid. at 108). Romans understood possession to mean the holding of a thing in the manner of an owner, the exclusive holding of a thing (ibid. at 111). Nicholas explains the etymology of the word possession and notes that the literal translation could be sitting in power (ibid. at 111, n. 1). Thus, the les- see does not hold in the manner of an owner. His holding acknowledges the superior right of the lender. Conversely if … he ceases to acknowledge that right and attempts to hold adversely to the lender, he then acquires possession (ibid. at 111 [emphasis added]).

75 Ibid. See also Maine, supra note 11 at 281 (possession signifies physical detention cou-

pled with the intention to hold the thing detained as ones own).

76 For a discussion of German jurists interpretation of the act and intention requirements

in the Roman law of possession, see Radley-Gardner, supra note 24 at 734-39.

77 Justinians Institutes, trans. by Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, (London, U.K.: Duckworth, 1987) Inst. 2.6. This excludes those who have an animus furandi but en- ables good faith purchasers who assert ownership over land they believe to be their own, but who are mistaken as to the validity of their title, to prevail in some circum- stances. See also Maine, supra note 11 at 278 (stating that good faith is required for usucaption, in keeping with the view that the function of adverse possession was to cure defects in title).

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the same bold understanding of what it means to possess but omits the moral safeguards that we find in Roman law against ouster by bad faith squatters.78 On the inconsistent use approach, adverse possession is not restricted to good faith squatters but, on the contrary, is most readily achieved by deliberate squatters who challenge the owners claim of au- thority. The inclusion of deliberate squatters in the law of adverse posses- sion makes good sense, given what I will argue below is the special func- tion of adverse possession in property law: ensuring that everything capa- ble of being owned is in fact effectively owned by someone.79 The inconsistent use approach suggests that there is a distinction in

kind (and not just in degree of exigibility) between a possessor and an owner. From the perspective of the layman,80 the special status of own- ers seems so obvious that we should expect nothing less from the law than its recognition as such. The key to understanding the distinction between owner and mere squatter is to understand the role of possession in estab- lishing and maintaining their respective rights. Ownership does not de- pend on physical possession.81 A person can own without ever having taken possession of the land in a physical sense. Actual possession, by contrast, is the underlying material manifestation of the squatters right to possess.82 This is not to say that ownership is a matter purely of formal right. The owners position also depends on a material manifestation. But the material fact on which ownership depends is not actual possession but rather the effective authority to control the agenda.83 The importance of effective authority as the basis for ownership explains why in Keefer, the

78 See Part II, Revolution and Rehabilitation, below. 79 Infra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the function of adverse possession). 80 Ackerman, supra note 2 at 97-100. 81 See e.g. Bordwell, supra note 22 (It is common knowledge that the owner of land does not cease to have legal possession by his moving off the land and allowing it to lie idle at 2).

82 For the Roman law distinction between ownership and possession, see Nicholas, supra note 74 (possession is a fact in the sense that there is and must be a material manifes- tation of it, whereas ownership is not a fact but a right. Ownership exists whether or not there is any material manifestation of it at 115).

83 See Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 2 at Part III (arguing that ownership is a special position of agenda-setting authority). This is true of all forms of ownership, including a commons. See Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock (2010) 23 Can. J.L. & Jur. 99 (distinguishing between use-rights and an ownership stake in the commons and citing Elinor Ostroms example of irrigation systems, where owners of dry land have rights to use water but are not co-owners of the water insofar as they are not repre- sented in the decision-making process about how it is used and allocated).

owner is secure against the possessor so long as her agenda for the land is unaffected by her rivals acts of possession.84 Because the underlying material manifestation of ownership is not or- dinary possession but rather effective authority, mere acts of possession by a squatter that are not otherwise inconsistent with the owners plans do not present a sufficient challenge to the owners position. In order to take over as owner, an adverse possessor must not only exclusively occupy the land but must also defeat the owners agenda, which may or may not itself involve a physical presence on the land.85 Thus, on this approach, an adverse possessor ousts the owner from her position of authority not by merely squatting but by taking possession in the manner of an owner and establishing that the original owner lacks effective authority. What this approach requires of the adverse possessor is both the intent to own and acts of ownership.86 The possessor, to meet the inconsistent use test, must aim to take over from the true owner and to step into her shoes. It is not enough for him simply to intend to carry on in his own shoes as pos- sessor, as it is on the current English approach.87

The importance of effective authority to the owners position continues the analogy between ownership and sovereignty.88 Just as a rulers posi- tion primarily rests on authority and not coercion, the owners position rests on authority and not the brute fact of possession.89 Ownership does

84 Keefer, supra note 5 at 691. 85 The obvious weight given to an owners agenda-setting function, as opposed to the owners present use and occupation of the property, generated some of the criticism we see of the inconsistent use test that I discuss below. See infra note 96 (discussing the concern that the inconsistent use test insulates investors from adverse possession).

86 Hughes v. Griffin, [1969] 1 All E.R. 460 at 464, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 23; Booker v. Palmer, [1942] 2 All E.R. 674 at 677 (C.A.) (holding that the trespasser must intend to become an owner, and cannot become an owner without intending to); Ricard v. Williams, 20 U.S. 59, 5 L. Ed. 398 (1822) (where possession under a lease that turned out to be void cannot ripen into title under adverse possession because possession must be adverse; there is a distinction between mere squatting and possession qua owner, with an intent to own).

87 On this view, adverse possession is acquisitive. See e.g. Feenstra, supra note 47 at 121. The adverse possessor does not derive her right from the former owner (as would be the case in a transfer of rights by sale or gift, but rather acquires a new right). See e.g. Pot- ter, supra note 22 at 606 (squatter does not take the estate of the former owner; on the contrary he acquires a new estate).

88 Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 2 at 278. 89 The expression possession is nine-tenths of the law refers to a presumption that a possessor is also the owner. As an evidentiary matter, it helps to sort out title in the ab- sence of land titles systems. See Cambridge Idioms Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. possession is nine-tenths of the law. This expression does not, however, refer to the importance of possession itself to the concept of ownership.

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not normally require that an owner actively possess the land; what it means to take charge as owner is to exercise the authority to set the agenda for a resource.90 Authority, however, must be effective or its very legitimacy will be undermined.91 This is true of a sovereign but also of an owner. Ordinarily, an owners authority to set the agenda for her land will be effective even in the absence of physical acts of possession. Where oth- ers accept her as owner, they accept also that her plans for the future use of the land, as well as her present uses, deserve deference.92 But this is not to say that possession in the ordinary sense has no role to play in preserving ownership. The role of possession in preserving agenda-setting authority is analogous to the importance of coercion to preserving the states effective authority. Generally, the state exercises its power by making laws or rules that people have reason to obey. The states power is primarily a function of its authority and not of its coercive force.93 But where people disobey the law and so challenge the states au- thority, the state will need to resort to coercion to bolster the effectiveness of its authority.94 Similarly, where others disregard an owners authority by challenging his agenda through inconsistent use, an owner may have to resort to actual possession to remain in power with respect to his land.95

The inconsistent use test is typically applied in resolving a contest be- tween a deliberate squatter and an owner-occupier. There has been some confusion in the case law about how to extend this approach in two other contexts: where the owner is an investor or speculator who does not make present use of the land, and where the adverse possessor acts in good faith. One complaint often levelled against the inconsistent use test is that investors with plans to develop land in the future are, vis–vis an adverse possessor, in a better position than an owner who is making pre-

90 Insofar as it is possible to abandon land, an owner abandons where she fails to take charge. Thus, where she forgets about the land or simply fails to form any plans for it, she stands to lose her property to a squatter. This would amount, in the context of ad- verse possession, to a discontinuance of possession by the owner. See Penalver, Illusory Right, supra note 11 at 21, n. 57; McNeil, supra note 2 at 70-71.

91 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1979) at 9, 28.

92 Waldron, supra note 2. 93 See Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 71-75. 94 See Raz, supra note 91 at 86. 95 An owner can bring an action to eject within the statutory time period rather than ac- tually repossessing the land herself, which is just to say that she has the option of call- ing on the state to exercise its coercive powers on her behalf: Keefer, supra note 5 at 692.

sent use of her land.96 An investment-driven agenda, it is thought, is less likely to be threatened by a squatters present acts of possession because few present uses will be inconsistent with plans to sell or to develop the land in the future. The concern is that the inconsistent use test protects rather than discourages absentee ownership.97 This would of course be problematic because absentee owners fail to discharge the most basic ob- ligation of ownership: the duty to assume fully the position of owner.98 But the inconsistent use test, properly understood, is not a mechanism for pro- tecting absentee owners. There is, first of all, a distinction between a speculator and an investor with actual plans to develop property in the fu- ture. An owner with actual investment plans is subject to the discipline of the threat of adverse possession just as much as the owner who is pres- ently using the land.99 If I, for example, plan to erect a building on vacant land, my development plans require that the land remain vacant. An ad- verse possessor who occupies the land and, in particular, who erects a structure on it interferes with my plans to keep the land vacant until such a time as I begin construction. The developer is not relieved of the burden to occupy his position fully as owner on the inconsistent use test. It is just that what it means to occupy the position of owner is to maintain agenda- setting authority rather than to engage in an immediate, active use. A de- veloper is forced to pay attention to her holdings and to exercise her au- thority with respect to them just as much as an owner-occupier is. But this obligation is fulfilled by establishing the agenda for the land, even if that entails postponing active use of it. A developer who has set an agenda for itone that a squatter can indeed interfere withis not an absentee owner. By contrast, the speculator who has no plans for the land herself, but rather holds on to it in anticipation of its value to others, is a kind of absentee owner. But the inconsistent use test need not be inter- preted as providing greater protection to the speculator than to the inves- tor-developer or owner-occupier. One approach found in the case law is to impute to the speculator, who has no intended use, the intention that no

96 Objections to the inconsistent use test are often triggered by the protection that it offers to investors or other speculators who leave the land vacant. See e.g. Bradford Invest- ments, supra note 67 at para. 89.

97 See Jeffrey W. Lem, Annotation of Murray Township Farms Ltd. v. Quinte West (City

of) (2006), 50 R.P.R. (4th) 266 at 268-69, 28 M.P.L.R. (4th) 148.

98 On the recent English view, owners have a positive duty to possess the land. In Pye (E.C.H.R.) (supra note 15), the government argued that the owners loss of rights was due to their own inaction. The Irish government, as a third party intervenor, argued that ownership of land brings duties as well as rights, and the duty to take some action to maintain possession was not unreasonable (ibid. at para. 51).

99 See Keefer, supra note 5 at 691; Masidon Investments, supra note 24 at 572-73; Ziff, su-

pra note 6 at 129 (describing how a developers agenda can be foiled by present use).

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one use the land.100 A better approach, which does not rely on a distortion of the facts, is simply to treat the speculator as having in effect discontin- ued possession by failing to exercise agenda-setting authoritya state of affairs that makes her formal title vulnerable to an adverse possessor who does exercise actual authority in her place. Let me now turn to the problem of the good faith squatter. The good

faith squatter honestly but mistakenly believes that he owns the property and so is unaware of the existence of a true owner. Some courts have found the inconsistent use test difficult to apply in these cases. The good faith squatter cannot form an intent to oust the owner and to assert au- thority in her stead if he is unaware of the owners existence. And in cases of mutual mistake, the good faith squatter cannot have been said to have acted inconsistently with the true owners agenda because the true owner would not, in that case, have been in a position to form one. The obstacles that the inconsistent use test presents for the good faith squatter are hard to explain if we see adverse possession through the lens of legal moralism, which demands that there be some connection between the reward of ownership through adverse possession and the individual desert of the squatter. As a result, jurisdictions that have adopted the inconsistent use test in the context of deliberate squatters have subjected good faith squat- ters to a much less rigorous test for adverse possession than deliberate squatters.101

There is, however, a way of extending the inconsistent use test in the context of the good faith squatter that neither disqualifies her in every case nor treats her good faith as a count in her favour. An approach based on inconsistent use need not be read as requiring that a squatter oust the owner in every case. The inconsistent use test simply resolves, as between two contenders, the question of who in fact has authority. The inadvertent squatter should be able to succeed in the limited circumstances where ad- verse possession can proceed without ouster because the true owner does not claim authority over the land but rather has discontinued posses- sion.102 This is one way to resolve cases of mutual mistake, where the true

100 See e.g. Georgco Diversified v. Lakeburn Land Capital (1993), 31 R.P.R. (2d) 185 at para. 17, 40 A.C.W.S. (3d) 340 (Gen. Div.) (rejecting the claim that an owner is insu- lated against adverse possession simply by having no intended use of the land). In that case, rather than finding the owner has discontinued use, the court read in an intention on the part of the owner that no one use the land, and found that the squatters uses were necessarily inconsistent with such an agenda.

101 The standard for good faith squatters is an intent to exclude the whole world, including

the true owner. See Teis, supra note 24 at 225-26.

102 Dispossession is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession and discontinuance is where the person in possession goes out and is followed into pos- session by other persons: Rains v. Buxton (1880), 14 Ch. D. 537 at 539-40.

owner fails to claim agenda-setting authority because she is unaware that she is in fact the owner.103 Where the owner has no intended use of the land because she does not know it is hers, she has, in a sense, vacated the position, leaving it open to the inadvertent squatter to assume the posi- tion in her place.104 This analysis would apply equally in cases where the owner is unilaterally mistaken about her rights: by failing to exercise her authority, she has created a vacancy that may be exploited by either a knowing or inadvertent squatter. Where, however, the owner has not discontinued use, a squatter must establish that he has ousted the owner and has effective authority. In cases of unilateral mistake, where a good faith squatter believes he is the owner but where the true owner continues to exercise effective authority over the land, the squatter has not taken over the position of owner. It is true enough that the good faith squatter in cases of unilateral mistake will find it next to impossible to satisfy the inconsistent use test. But this is problematic only if we think that there ought to be some connection be- tween the virtue of the squatter and the reward of adverse possession. It is precisely this kind of legal moralism that I challenge in the discussion that follows, where I will argue that it is not on the merits of the use or the user that adverse possession is justified, but rather on the imperative in any property system to guard against vacancies in the position of owner.

The inconsistent use approach avoids the conceptual blandness of the English approach but risks being mired in the moral paradox to which the American approach is so sensitive. As we have seen, there is a current model in English law that distinguishes between owners and possessors not in kind, but in degree, primarily in terms of the exigibility of the right (exigible against all others in the case of the owner, and against all but those with a superior right to possess in the case of the possessor).105 The inconsistent use test, by contrast, sets us up a much sharper distinction between owners and possessors. At the same time, it presents a startling shift in the laws attitude toward the adverse possessor pre and post

103 This appears to have been the thinking in Mueller (supra note 67 at para. 26). It is eas- ier for a squatter to prevail in cases of mutual mistake because the owner who is not aware of her rights lacks animus possidendi.

104 In this regard, we can distinguish the inconsistent use test from the implied permission test, which was developed by Lord Denning and abolished by statute. Walliss Cayton Bay (supra note 24) is the case in which Lord Denning tried to resurrect the implied permission test. On the implied permission test, adverse possession is impossible if the landowner has no plans for the land. The squatter is deemed to possess with the per- mission of the owner in that case.

105 See Harris, supra note 37 at 81-84 (ownership and possession as concepts in the com-

mon law). See also McNeil, supra note 2 at 74-77.

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limitation period from a mere possessor (with no legal right to oust the owner) to owner with full protection.106

II. Revolution and Rehabilitation On what grounds can we justify the transformation of squatters into owners? To understand the moral significance of adverse possession, we need to begin with the proper analogy. Much of the moral analysis of ad- verse possession has proceeded on the basis that adverse possessors are land thieves. I will begin here by explaining why it is inapt to think of ad- verse possessors as land thieves. Following that, I will present an analogy between adverse possession and revolution or, more precisely, a bloodless coup dtat, which better illuminates the nature of the adverse possessors claim and also what justifies the laws recognition of it. The recognition of the adverse possessors (private) authority solves the moral problem cre- ated by an agendaless object, just as the recognition of the existing gov- ernments (public) authority, whatever its origin, solves the moral prob- lem of a stateless people. The morality of adverse possession, seen this way, does not turn on any particularized evaluation of the squatters de- serts or her uses of the land. I am thus not proposing that adverse posses- sion is justified in the same way that some argue a conscientious revolu- tionary is justified in resisting an oppressive or otherwise unjust sover- eign.107 Rather, the morality of adverse possession is found where we might least expect it, in its positivist strategy of ratifying the claims to au- thority of a squatter without regard to the substantive merits of her agenda or her personal virtue. What distinguishes theft or robbery from adverse possession? Con- sider for a moment the characteristic modus operandi of the thief: the thief achieves his goalspermanent control of someone elses property either by force or by stealth.108 The thiefs method tells us something about the character of his claim to the object. The thief takes physical possession of the object with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession without making a counterclaim of authority. The thief does not enter into a contest for legitimate authority over the object, but rather, as the robbers resort to force or the thiefs secrecy reveals, it is an assertion of control in spite of their recognition of the owners superior authority

106 I will discuss this in Part II.A below. 107 See e.g. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) at paras. 222, 225. This concept has been adopted into the constitutions of several American states. See e.g. N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. 10; Tenn. Const. art. I, 2.

108 George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978) at 38

(the core of theft, common law larceny, was a forcible or stealthful taking).

over the object. The thief aims to get away with wrongful possession in spite of someone elses acknowledged authority. What is significant about this is that the thief is not inviting an evaluation of a competing claim to authority nor is he demanding to be judged the owner as a result of his actions. Insofar as the thief controls the object of property, his aim is to dupe society into thinking he is the owner, which is something quite dif- ferent from trying to elicit a judgment that he is in fact the owner. Contrast the character of the thiefs claims with the character of the adverse possessors claims. The adverse possessor demands public recog- nition of her authority as owner, which she achieves only where she mani- festly has authority over the land in place of the original owner. Thus, ad- verse possession is successful only where it is peaceful, open, and notori- ous.109 Stealth or force undermines the adverse possessors claims because by sneaking or forcibly removing the original owner, she in effect reveals that she herself lacks effective authority.

The character of an adverse possessors claim is much more like that of a new government following a coup dtat than that of a thief. An ad- verse possessor does not merely circumvent the authority of the original owner but rather displaces it by asserting his own claim to authority. The adverse possessor claims exclusive and supreme authority, as does a new government, whatever its origins. This explains the public nature of an adverse possessors authority. His claim amounts to a challenge to the owners position of authority through the assertion of his own authority, which is necessarily a public act. (By contrast, in a model in which the squatter is not cast as a challenger to the owners position, public claims of this sort are not a significant feature of adverse possession.)110 The na- ture of an adverse possessors claim as a public assertion of authority also explains why an offer to purchase land or other written acknowledgments of the true owners status has the effect that the squatters possession, up until the acknowledgement or offer, is deemed to be possession on behalf of the owner.111 The significance of such a written acknowledgement is not that it reveals the squatters awareness of the original owners claims and

109 See Teis, supra note 24 at 221: Possession must be open and notorious, not clandestine, for two reasons. First, open possession shows that the claimant is using the property as an owner might. See also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 34 at 139-44; Rose, supra note 72 at 79-80. For more on open and notorious, see Sherren v. Pearson (1887), 14 S.C.R. 581 at 585; Powell, supra note 14 at 478.

110 On the possibility of clandestine adverse possession, see Wonnacott, supra note 30 at 127. See also Beaulane Properties, supra note 14 at para. 109 (dispossession is possible even where the squatters acts are consistent with the owners plans and not readily apparent to the owner).

111 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 34; Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra note 34; Ziff, supra

note 6 at 128 (noting the effect of an offer to purchase on adverse possession).

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so his bad faith. Of course, a deliberate squatter knows that someone else has paper title to the land in question, just as the leader of a coup dtat knows that there is a government with a right to rule (perhaps because it was democratically elected). Rather, an acknowledgment or offer to pur- chase is significant because it amounts to acceptance of the true owners claims to legitimate authority inconsistent with the possessors own public assertions of authority (made notwithstanding the owners formal title).112

The analogy between adverse possession and a coup dtat helps to clarify the significance of the retroactive nature of the claim that the squatter makes. An adverse possessor and the leader of a coup dtat un- dergo a transformation once they succeed in displacing the existing au- thority. The adverse possessor becomes owner, and the leaders of a coup dtat become the new government. This transformation is retroactive: just as a new governments legitimacy is immune from challenge on the ground that it came to power illegally, so too is an owner immune from challenge on the ground that she once was an adverse possessor.113 We look back and retroactively construe the squatter as the owner from the outset just as we construe the leaders of the coup as the government from the moment they have acquired effective authority.114 The difficulty in as- certaining the original owners and the former governments loss of au- thority (but also the importance of so doing) explains why there is a time lag in the laws validation of the squatters and the new governments au- thority.115 The squatter must establish that the owner lacks effective au- thority on day one but then must still wait out the time period set by the statutory period before the law recognizes that she has taken over from

112 La Forest, supra note 34 at 1542-46. See also Matthew Noah Smith, Rethinking Sover- eignty, Rethinking Revolution (2008) 36 Phil. & Publ. Aff. 405 at 408 (describing revo- lution as necessarily a public spectacle).

113 For the doctrine of relation back in adverse possession, see Dukeminier & Krier, su- pra note 34 at 128-29. See also Fennell, Efficient Trespass, supra note 3 at 1051, n. 65, 1054. The legal claim that an adverse possessors or the new governments law is the law of the land, has a close analogue in Kants view that there is a moral duty not to in- quire into the pedigree of a state: Christine M. Korsgaard, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution in Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman & Christine M. Korsgaard, eds., Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 297 at 306-307.

114 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 118. 115 Property theorists have long been puzzled by the importance of the lapse of time to the success of a squatters claim. See e.g. Maine, supra note 11 (why it was that lapse of time created a sentiment of respect for his possession … are questions really deserving the profoundest examination at 248). My account shows why it is not the adverse pos- sessors reliance established over a long period of possession, nor the expectations of third parties so much as systemic reasons that explain the time requirement. See notes 56, 60 and accompanying text (discussing reliance as a rationale for adverse posses- sion).

the original owner. This period is necessary to determine whether the original owner has in fact failed to exert effective authority from day one. The loss of authority cannot be, as Hart put it, verified or falsified … in short spaces of time.116 It is difficult to pin down precisely when de facto authority actually ceases to exist simply because authority survives some resistance or interruption.117

The retroactive nature of adverse possession confirms that ownership authority is conclusive and not provisional. The adverse possessors de facto authority does not compete with the owners de jure authority dur- ing the statutory period. Rather, as we confirm after the waiting period, there was all along but a single person whose decisions about the object are authoritative. The retroactive nature of adverse possession also ex- plains why the successful squatter, like the leaders of a successful coup dtat, cannot be held to account for wrongdoing. The adverse possessor is recognized as owner from day one even though, had he not succeeded, he would have been liable for trespass, just as the leaders of a failed coup dtat would have been liable for treason.118

A. Justifying Adverse Possession

What justifies adverse possession on this approach? At first glance, the analogy of adverse possession to a coup dtat appears to raise as many moral worries as the analogy of adverse possession to land theft. The positivists answerthat the adverse possessor, like the new ruler, in fact wields authoritydoes not seem to provide an answer to why we ought to recognize the adverse possessors (or the new rulers) claims to authority. There are, however, good justificatory reasons for the attention that the law pays to facts on the ground in the case of adverse possession, just as there are good justificatory reasons for recognizing the new gov- ernments post-revolution rule.

116 Hart, supra note 114 at 119-20. 117 Ibid. See also Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kants Legal and Political Philoso-

phy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 387.

118 Thus, a former adverse possessor (one who has succeeded in taking over as owner) is immune from any claims by the ex-owner for rents or damage arising from her pre limitation period trespass: Beaulane Properties, supra note 14 at paras. 70-71. See Limitations Act (Ont.), supra note 23, s. 5 (the owners right is deemed to have arisen from the moment of dispossession by the squatter). When this right is extinguished, the squatter is not liable for rent or damages from the moment of dispossession onwards, even though she is liable before the statutory period expires. In the United States, this is known as the doctrine of relation back (Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 34 at 128- 29).

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Let me start by explaining the positivists claim that a new govern- ment has legitimate authority in spite of the wrongfulness of its route to power and in spite of the existence of another organization with the right to rule but without effective authority. The existence of authority is not purely a question of law but also one of fact. Of course, international law or the law of a given nation may recognize or validate a new governments assertion of authority, but this has no effect on the new governments status in relation to its people. Hart made this point when he argued that an English law declaring Tsarist laws to be the law of Russia would in no way change the fact that the Communist Party was the government of Russia.119 It simply would mean that, in cases decided by English law that bear on Russian events, English courts would apply Tsarist law. We can- not resolve the question of whether a legal system continues to exist purely as a question of law.120

There are also moral reasons for recognizing the fact of the matter when a new government claims authority (and has effective authority). The moral quality of our relations with others depends on our ability to work out collectively what justice requires and to implement policies that reflect these collective decisions.121 Seen in one way, the state provides an indispensable moral service: it provides authoritative solutions to coordi- nation problems that otherwise would lead to disagreement and factional- ism.122 Through law, the state helps us to achieve what we have reason to achieve better than if we were to act on the balance of reasons that oth- erwise apply to us.123 It does so in part by providing good answers to com- mon problems (for instance when the government regulates dangerous substances) but even more importantly, it does so simply by providing a single answer when we might, in exercising our individual practical rea- soning, come up with many reasonable but diverging answers. A state of

119 Hart, supra note 114 at 119-20. 120 But see Smith, supra note 112 (arguing that there is the possibility of decentralized au-

121 Some have attributed a similar view to Kant. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, Kants Legal Positivism (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1535 (arguing that there is a need for a single, de- terminate community position on the matterone whose enforcement is consistent with the integrity and univocality of justice at 1540).

122 This is the Razian view that the legitimacy of the state rests on its contribution to solv- ing the problems presented by disagreement about how social actors ought to coordi- nate and cooperate: Raz, supra note 91 at 50-52. See also Jeremy Waldron, Kants Theory of the State in Pauline Kleingeld, ed., Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writ- ings on Politics, Peace, and History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 179 at 192 (the coordination aspect of Razs normal justification thesis for authority is also the key to the Kantian theory of the state).

123 Raz, supra note 91 at 24-25.

nature is marked by a plurality of opinion, some of which may prove espe- cially influential but there is no authority that can provide a single an- swer that is final. It is only a state that speaks for all of us that can close the debate on how to conduct our common affairs. To deny the authority of the new government is to deprive the people of this mechanism for co- ordination and, in effect, to thrust them back into a state of nature. Adverse possession can be justified on analogous grounds. Adverse possession solves the moral problem of agendaless objects just as the rec- ognition of a new government post-revolution solves the moral problem of a lawless people. The moral significance of adverse possession thus plays the role of ensuring that ownership serves its primary function.124 The owners primary function in a system of property is to take charge of an object by setting the agenda for it. Within the constraints set by the gov- ernments own agenda, owners have the authority to ignore the interests and opinions of others and to set what they think is a worthwhile agenda for the object in light of their own interests. The exclusive agenda-setting authority of owners does not require that others exclude themselves en- tirely from an object but rather that they act in harmony with the owners agenda or at least the agenda that the law imputes to her.125 Ownership resolves conflicts not by keeping everyone except the owner out, but rather by ensuring that others defer to the owners decisions.126 The effect of ownership is to provide a hierarchical structure for decision making about a thing: the owner, within the constraints set by government, makes the ultimate decisions about the agenda for an object and others non-owners and subordinate rights-holdersmust fall in line. Ownership as a supreme position of agenda-setting authority thus avoids the potential for conflict among users that exists when there is no one clearly in charge of an object. If the original owner were to lack effec- tive authority and the adverse possessor were denied de jure authority, there would be no authoritative resolution to questions about use with re- spect to that object. The function of ownership to coordinate uses of an ob- ject would be unfulfilled in that case. When there is a vacancy in the posi- tion of owner (because there is no one with effective authority), we are thrust back into a mini state of nature in our relations with respect to that object. The law of adverse possession is just one way of ensuring that there is always someone in charge in the eyes of the law, and thus no de- stabilizing vacancies. This is why the law validates the adverse posses-

124 It is not just the law of adverse possession that accomplishes this. The law of abandon- ment also restricts the ability of an owner to divest herself of responsibility for land. See Pealver, Illusory Right, supra note 11.

125 Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 2 at 278. 126 For a fuller development of this point, see ibid.

78 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

sors claims only where the owner can be shown actually to have lost ef- fective authority. This is also why the owner defeats the squatters claims by showing that he continues to be in charge of an object. Ultimately, the laws most pressing concern is not who is owner but rather that the office of owner is filled.127

B. Imperfect States, Imperfect Owners

The legitimacy of adverse possession, on this account, is not tied to the relative merits of the agenda that an adverse possessor sets for the object any more than the legitimacy of a government depends on the merits of each of its directives.128 The aim of adverse possession is not to ensure that the most deserving user of the object owns it any more than a system of property generally guarantees that any particular owner has the best moral claim to own that particular thing. The morally relevant aspects of a squatters claim concern not the abuses of the original owner or her fail- ure to set a sufficiently valuable agenda, but rather the original owners failure to occupy fully the role of owner.

I thus make no attempt to vindicate the adverse possessor on the basis of her moral standing as a conscientious revolutionary, one who stands outside the legal system to resist the bad exercise of authority by others. There are cases outside the law of adverse possession where squatters or others who challenge the owners authority do so in the manner of a revo- lutionary.129 These are property outlaws: e.g., civil rights leaders organiz- ing sit-ins in segregated restaurants,130 squatters taking over vacant pub-

127 A similar point explains the importance of the rule against perpetuities. See ibid. at 306. There are other benefits to guarding against vacancies in the property system. I discuss elsewhere the advantages to the state in having a system of private ownership in place: the power that a state that defines property rights has to press owners into its service. See Katz, Governing, supra note 11.

128 See Raz, supra note 91 at 31-32 (authority does not depend on perfectly guiding our ac-

tion in all cases).

129 This is the strategy that Eduardo Penalver and Sonia Katyal take in Property Out- laws (supra note 1 at 1170, 1172) to justify resistance to the formal property system. Lee Fennell points out the difficulties in distinguishing between good and bad out- laws: Lee A. Fennell, Order With Outlaws?, Response, (2007) 156 PENNumbra, online: PENNumbra . See also Korsgaard, su- pra note 113 at 320 (notwithstanding the absence of a right to revolt, the conscientious revolutionary is justified by her success on the grounds that she has in fact promoted the cause of justice on earth).

130 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248 (1961); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 83 S. Ct. 1122 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374, 83 S. Ct. 1311 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375, 83 S. Ct. 1311 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 83 S. Ct. 1130 (1963); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S. Ct. 1814 (1964).

lic housing en masse in London,131 and environmentalists chaining them- selves to trees in British Columbia.132 The demands of a property outlaw, like those of the revolutionary, are not just to be put in the place of the owner but rather are for institutional changechange to what can be owned privately, change to how we define the scope of an owners author- ity, and change to the way in which entitlements are distributed. In the case of the property outlaw, the attack goes much deeper than a dis- agreement about the use to which the current owner puts the land. It is an attack on the very institutions that support the owners authority to do as she does. The property outlaw appeals to moral reasons to justify her attack on the system of property much as the conscientious revolutionary does for her attack on existing government.

The property outlaw, however, is not the paradigmatic case of the ad- verse possessor, and we need not justify adverse possession on similar moral grounds. We do not throw the original owner over for the adverse possessor on the grounds that the latter will do a better job any more than we reject the authority of the state on the grounds that it has not provided perfect guidance in all cases. Whether or not we allow for the possibility of revolutionaries to assert their own opinions of what is just and right, it would be much harder to make the case for the moral standing of a non- owner to act on her extralegal judgment about the quality of an individual owners tenure and his own suitability as a replacement. One reason is that this extralegal stance would undermine the function of a property system, which is to provide the assurances that allow a person to set the agenda for an object of property without attending to the opinions of oth- ers.133 It would be quite another matter if a system of property were meant to guarantee the best possible agenda for a resource or to direct ob- jects to their highest-value user.134 The conscientious adverse possessor might then declare that he is morally justified in helping along the ends that justify the system of property, assuming that he can get a judge or some other official to agree that his agenda for the land represents a more valuable use than that of the original owner. Owners who have exercised their authority badly, by failing to select the highest-value use of land,

131 London Borough of Southwark v. Williams (1970), [1971] 2 W.L.R. 467, [1971] 2 All

E.R. 175 (C.A.).

132 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson (1994), 92 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 148

(B.C.C.A.).

133 There are of course important constraints on the exercise of this authority, the most important of which is the principle of abuse of right. An owner exercises her authority abusively where she selects her agenda for a reason other than her subjective determi- nation of the best use of the object in light of her interests. See Katz, Abuse of Right, supra note 8.

134 See Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, supra note 83 at 46-50.

80 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

ought not to be (and in law are generally not treated as) more vulnerable to adverse possessors than those who have exercised their authority well. The adverse possessor thus looks very little like the conscientious revolu- tionary on my account and much more like the leader of a coup dtat, whose reasons for assuming power may well be opaque to those from whom it demands recognition as the new government.

Immanent in a model based on inconsistent use is both the conceptual basis for distinguishing between owners and adverse possessors (lacking in the recent English approach to adverse possession) as well as the theo- retical basis for overcoming the moral paradox of deliberate adverse pos- session (missing from the consensus American view). Rather than land theft, adverse possession is more akin to a bloodless coup dtat, in which a new ruler ousts the old office holder and steps into her place. Just as the leaders of a successful coup dtat turn into a new government that has authority over its subjects, so too is a successful adverse possessor retro- actively transformed into an owner and immunized on this basis from li- ability for her initially wrongful invasion of anothers land. The rehabili- tation of the adverse possessor avoids vacancies in the property system just as the rehabilitation of the new ruler following a coup dtat main- tains the possibility of political authority and so civil society.

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Comparative Overview On The Transformative Effect Of Acquisitive Prescription And Adverse Possession: Morality, Legitimacy, Justice

Acquisitive prescription in civil law and adverse possession in common law produce particularly strong effects in law since they are means whereby property may be gained through the passage of time. Good faith plays a relatively modest role in acquisitive prescription/adverse possession, which does not necessarily means that acquisitive prescription or adverse possession are immoral. Not only good faith has a certain role, both substantial and formal, but there are theoretical justifications that justify acquisitive prescription/adverse possession and renders those mechanisms legitimate. Aside from justifications founded upon moral and economical arguments, what justifies it above all is a justification founded on social order related to the public interest. Moreover, additionally to a theoretical legitimacy, acquisitive prescription/adverse possession has an utility or practical legitimacy, especially in traditions where registration of rights are essentially a matter of opposability to third parties, but also to a lesser extend in Torrens-like registration systems. Finally, the argument can be made according to which acquisitive prescription is a form of private expropriation. A compensation of the disposed owner could then infuse greater legitimacy to the law of acquisitive prescription/adverse possession. La prescription acquisitive du doit civil et la possession adverse de la common law produisent des effets juridiques importants, puisqu’ils permettent d’acquérir la propriété suite au passage du temps. La bonne foi joue un rôle relativement modeste dans la prescription acquisitive ou dans l’adverse possession, ce qui n’implique toutefois pas l’immoralité de ces mécanismes. Non seulement la bonne foi joue un certain rôle, tant d’un point de vue substantiel que formel, mais il existe des arguments théoriques qui justifient la prescription acquisitive et la possession adverse et rendent ces mécanismes légitimes. Aux côtés de justifications fondées sur des arguments moraux et économiques, ce qui permet principalement de les légitimer est un argument fondé sur l’ordre social relié à l’intérêt public. Par ailleurs, en plus d’une justification théorique, la prescription acquisitive et la possession adverse ont une utilité ou légitimité pratique, spécialement dans les traditions où la publicité des droits est essentiellement une question d’opposabilité aux tiers, mais aussi dans une moindre mesure dans les traditions qui ont adopté le système de publicité Torrens. Finalement, on peut se demander si la prescription acquisitive peut être analysée comme une forme d’expropriation privée. La compensation du propriétaire dépossédé pourrait alors infuser une plus grande légitimité au droit de la prescription acquisitive et de la possession adverse.

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Acquisitive prescription (a civil law institute) and Adverse Possession, its equivalent in the common law system is alreadya consolidated private law institute. It is recognised from the legal systems of almost each country in the world and is among the most important original ways of gaining ownership.Its constitutionality and the fact that should it be recognized from a legal system or not was brought in question in 2002, sparking a debate between lawyers in the world. The debate rose after the announcement of the decision of the ECHR (European. Court of Human Rights) in the case JA Pye ( Oxford) Ltd vs Graham. The Fourth Chamber of the ECHR held that acquisitive prescription is actually an &#39;uncompensated deprivation. First, we will analyze the main theories on the basis of which this institute is justified. The question to be raised for the review of the article is whether prescription is morally and legally justified, especially in the case of prescription in bad faith. In t...

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One of the most acute charges against private property observes that ownership generates a trespassory duty of exclusion that far exceeds the requirements of a commitment to values such as freedom and well-being, and accordingly there exists an analytical mismatch between the form of protecting ownership and the functions that this protection may serve.This article develops a novel account of ownership's normativity, maintaining that, apart from the functions it may render to external values, the form of ownership is in itself a source of value, in virtue of the society it may engender between free and equal persons. Any gap between the form and the function of ownership need not plague private ownership, because the functions of ownership do not exhaust the explanation of its good.The formal core of private property is a distinctively social one, even in the most isolated case of trespass to property. SETTING THE STAGE: THE CHARGE OF NORMATIVE ARBITRARINESS The charge of normative arbitrariness that I shall explore at this stage of the argument arises from the gap between the right to private ownership and its grounds. It will prove helpful to introduce this charge by reference to the familiar analogy between the two kinds of trespass tort – to the person and to the property of another.As it is often observed, the duties against committing trespass upon the person and property of another share an almost identical structure. Both duties may, in principle, extend to capture even a prohibition against making an unauthorised, though harmless contact with the body and property of another, respectively. 1 However, the structural similarity between the two torts is, at best, just that – it merely points out the morphology (or characterisation) of trespass torts.It becomes notorious, let alone a form of 'a serious travesty,' insofar as it purports to do the normative work of explaining how it is that the tort of trespass to property protects the right-holder with a more or less similar severity and strictness as the tort of trespass to the person of another does. 2 Indeed, whereas there is a strong sense that harmlessly using the person of another is, nonetheless, a form of wronging that person by treating her as a means rather than also as an end itself,nothing of this sort of explanation can be extended as a matter of course to make sense of the way in which property is protected by the common law tort, including in particular cases where using the property of another is inconsequential. *Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law. I would like to thank Eric Claeys, Hanoch Dagan, and the MLR anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

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This paper presents a general framework of the property right seen in the Constitutional Review and the standard of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such harassment came to me not because such an anchor was not previously elaborated by the professors or the practice of the law, but because of the lack of a sensible, juridical remedy to this right not only by the citizens but also by the organs state and law enforcement agencies. It is for this very fact that I have been dealing with the analysis of the genesis of this right, specifically in the constitution of the republic of Albania and European Convention on Human Rights. It should be said that ownership issues, especially in Albania, constitute one of the most comprehensive and influential challenges in many sectors of a country due to the still informal ownership situation in Albania where ALUIZNI enjoys an important position and as such has pushed me to touch and illustrate the problems with prominent judicial decisions to present a framework of judicial practice in defining how clearer the material and procedural aspects of the norms related to property and property issues related to informal constructions. At the end of this paper, conclusions and solutions to the problems arising from different legal situations regarding property rights will be reflected, trying to bring Albania together in a context and context consistent with the standards of the European Court of Human Rights. Since Article 11 of the first part entitled "The economic system of the Republic of Albania" is based on private and public property, as well as on the market economy and the freedom of economic activity." In the second paragraph of this article states that private and public property is protected by law. After that in the provision of Construction of Albania is expressed that the right to private property is guaranteed. Ways of acquiring ownership according to it are: donation, inheritance, purchase and any other classical manner provided for in the Civil Code. The fact that the ways of gaining property are summarily foreseen and in the Constitution states the importance of ways of gaining ownership of civil law. In detail, the ways of gaining ownership are provided by the Civil Code respectively from Article 164 and onwards. For the purpose of the article we will not deal in detail with the ways of gaining ownership because the subject of our analysis will be the law no. 9482, dated 03.04.2006 amended "On legalization, urbanization and integration of illegal constructions" as a special way of gaining ownership. If we analyze Article 17 of the Constitution, we will conclude that any restriction of human rights and fundamental freedoms is carried out only by law. In this context, the aforementioned law for a category of subjects is a way of gaining property, while for another category there is a restriction of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Constitution states that the right to private property is guaranteed, but this guarantee is not absolute (Daci, 2011: 297). Although the right to private property is listed in the catalog of freedoms and constitutional rights, the grouping of personal rights can not be absoluteized as a completely individual right and has an important social character. It directly influences the general social well-being and must therefore be restrictive. The public interest or social function of property is a constitutional concept that justifies the external limitation that has been imposed on the right to property through the law. In the rule of law, interference with private property must be set at the constitutional level that guarantees the individual's full respect for this property. Restriction of a fundamental right such as property by law is an expression of the right and the obligation that the legislator enjoys, in the name of a legitimate aim in the public interest, to respond to the dynamics of the country's development, as well as to the realization of the reforms required by time (Rama, 2010: 97). If we analyze Article 41 of the Constitution, we conclude that the criteria of the constitutionality of an expropriation policy, which at the same time constitute restrictive criteria for the right to private property, are: a) Expropriation should be provided by law; b) Be undertaken for the public interest or in defense of the rights of other persons; c) The existence of a fair reward. In addition to these special criteria set out in Article 41 of the Constitution, where the recognition, protection and at the same time the limitation of the right of private property as a self-right, the sovereign in its Article

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• > Journals
• > Journal of African Law
• > Volume 32 Issue 1
• > The Land Use Act and the State of Nigerian Land Law

Article contents

The land use act and the state of nigerian land law.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

The Land Use Act, 1978, is a product of the inherent contradictions of the colonial and neo-colonial dependent, pseudo-capitalist economic structures established in Nigeria since colonial times. By the 1970s these contradictions became so seŕious that they threatened to become a clog on the growth of the capitalist economy. If such contradictions were allowed to reach a nodal point, conditions for the self-negation of the existing socio-economic and legal order would have ensued. The legislature, it would seem, narrowly identified the problem with private ownership of lands from its own class perspective, that is without a scientific conception of the problems in terms of ownership in the theory of social relations. A scientific conception of the problems would have revealed the essence of the difficulties as relating, not merely to the procedural aspects of private ownership of the lands, such as certainty of title, registration of title, etc., but concerning the institution of private ownership as an economic and legal category around which the exploitation of man by man is organised in class-divided societies.

Such a scientific perception of the problems would have demanded a lasting solution that not only abolished private ownership rights in land but also abolished private ownership of other means of production. The socialisation of all means of production would have amounted to a holistic approach to the solution of the problems in the interest of the nation as a whole.

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1 Customary right of occupancy is defined under section 50(1) as “the right of a person or community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with customary law and includes a customary right of occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Decree.”

Statutory right of occupancy is also defined under the same section as “a right of occupancy granted by the Military Governor under this Decree.”

2 Ezejiofor , G. , “The Land Use Decree: A Critique.” Paper presented at an International Seminar in New York, 09 , 1980 Google Scholar .

3 See Balogun v. Oshodi ( 1929 ) 10 N.L.R. 36 at 42 Google Scholar .

4 See Yu. Plentnikov , K. , “Social Relations”, (in) Philosophy in the U.S.S.R.: Problems of Historical Materialism , Moscow , 1981 , 52 at 64 Google Scholar .

5 See for example, Lewis v. Bankole ( 1901 ) 1 N.L.R. 82 Google Scholar ; Balogun v. Oshodi ( 1929 ) 10 N.L.R. 36 Google Scholar ; Coker v. Animashawun [ 1960 ] L.L.R. 71 Google Scholar ; Alade v. Aborishade [ 1962 ] W.N.L.R. 74 etc Google Scholar .

6 Elias , T. O. , Nigerian Land Law , London , 1971 , 7 Google Scholar .

7 Bentsi-Enchill , Kwamena , Ghana land law , London , 1964 , 41 Google Scholar . See also Sarbah , J. M. , Fanti Customary Laws , London , 1968 , 3rd ed. , 62 Google Scholar , where he writes: “ The village community is a corporate body, of which the members are families, or family groups, residing in the several household, and including the joint as well as patriarchal families.” For further discussion of the issue, see the following; Allott , A. N. , “Legal personality in African Law,” (in) Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law , London , 1969 , 179 Google Scholar ; Woodman , Gordon , “The family as a corporation in Ghana and Nigerian Law,” 11 African Law Studies , 1 – 36 Google Scholar ; Danquah , J. B. , Akan Laws and Custom , London , 1928 , 200 Google Scholar ; Kludze , A. P. K. , Ewe Law of Property , London , 1973 , chapter 5 Google Scholar ; Ollennu , N. A. , Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana , London , 1962 , Chap. 2 Google Scholar ; Lloyd , P. C. , Yoruba Land Law , London , 1962 , 31 – 38 Google Scholar ; Oluyede , P. A. , Nigerian Law of Conveyancing , Ibadan , 1978 , 3 – 5 Google Scholar ; Nwabueze , , Nigerian Land Law , Enugu , 1982 , 32 Google Scholar .

8 Allott , A. N. , loc. cit. , 191 Google Scholar .

9 [ 1921 ] 2 A.C. 399 at 404 , per Lord Haldane. Google Scholar

10 Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill coined this phrase to refer to the persons who exercise administrative control over group-held property under the customary land law of Ghana. The phrase can conveniently be applied to similar persons performing similar functions under other systems of law in black African traditional societies. See his Ghana Land Law , London , 1964 , 49 Google Scholar .

11 This quotation from the Sunday Tribume , 9 02 , 1986 Google Scholar , underscores this fact. It reads: “Traditional rulers who had before the birth of the Decree been deemed custodians of land in their domain felt jilted, spited and trimmed by the Decree. During a courtesy call on ex-President Shehu Shagari on 9 09 1982 Google Scholar , six traditional rulers registered their opposition to the decree. … In a memorandum presented to the ex-President, the traditional rulers stated that ‘the traditional concept of land should be held in trust by the living for the dead as the unborn. Thus the trustees are variously the oba or the family or even at times, the individual.’ The traditional rulers noted that the Land Use Act was unnecessary as States of the Federation could legally and compulsorily acquire land for overriding public purposes with the payment of compensation.”

12 For this reason, although a definition proffered by Onwuamaegbu , M. O. in his Nigerian Land Law and Tenant , 1966 , 25 Google Scholar is alleged to be “a pointer to the route which the traveller or conveyance must take in his legal adventure of discovering the relation between the landlord and tenant in Nigeria,” we do not think that the proffered definition is helpful as the learned author would seem to suggest that the grantor is “a person who has a right of possession of land” rather than the person in whom the title is vested. Moreover, we object to the use of such terms as “landlord and tenant”, “overlord” etc, since their feudal connotations have an overshadowing effect on the customary law. See Oluyede's , P. A. quotation of the definition and comment in his book, Nigerian Law of Conveyancing , Ibadan , 1978 , 52 Google Scholar . See also Nwabueze , B. O. , op. cit. , 247 Google Scholar , where the learned author writes: “A customary tenancy creates in a real sense the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to it.” (Emphasis supplied.)

13 Kola tenancy is defined under the Kola Tenancies Law, cap.69, Laws of Eastern Nigeria,1963, as “a right to the use and occupation of land which is enjoyed by any native in virtue of a kola or other token payment made by such a native or any predecessor in title in virtue of a grant for which no payment in money or in kind was exacted.”

14 See Okuojenor v. Sagay [ 1958 ] W.R.L.R. 70 Google Scholar ; Ochoma v. Unosi [ 1960 ] 4 E.N.L.R. 107 Google Scholar and Eyamba v. Holmes ( 1924 ) 5 N.L.R. 83 Google Scholar .

15 [1979] 2 LRN 282. See the review of this case by Agbosu , L. K. in [ 1983 ] J.A.L., Vol. 27 No. 2 Google Scholar .

16 Sijuwade , J. , found evidence justifying the intervention of equity to grant relief against forfeiture and could have reversed the customary court's decision without reliance on the provisions of the Act. See his comments at p. 290 Google Scholar .

17 C.L.U.A., 143, H. C. Ikere-Ekiti, suit No. HCR/3A/80.

18 “ Isakole is money paid to a land owner by a farmer who was granted permission by the land owner to cultivate food or economic crops on the land for his consumption or benefit. The farmer pays an agreed sum or in lieu of cash, gives out a number of some weight of crops cultivated to the land owner annually.” Per S. F. Adeloye, J., ibid. , 144.

19 Ibid. , 145. (Emphasis supplied.)

20 Ibid. , 145–146.

21 C.L.U.A . 146, Suit No. HCJ/GA/81.

22 Ibid. , 150. (Emphasis supplied.)

23 C.L.U.A . 151, H.C., Suit No. HCL/43/80.

24 Ibid. , 152.

25 Ibid. , 155.

26 (Unreported) CA/L/42/84, dated 14/3/85. Reported and commented upon by Omotola , J. A. in ( 1985 ) 3 J.P.P.L. 4 Google Scholar .

27 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)

28 C.L.U.A., op.cit ., 165.

29 ( 1985 ) 3 J.P.P.L., 5 Google Scholar .

31 Apart from this type of tenancy, there are other types of tenancies of definite periods or for particular purposes which terminate as soon as the periods expire or the purposes are achieved. These, however, do not usually present the sort of problems that characterise tenancies of indefinite duration which are our main focus of attention at present.

32 Unreported.

33 Essays on the Land Use Act , 1978, Lagos , 1984 , 8 Google Scholar .

34 Among the leading experts on African Land Law are Allott , A. N. , Woodman , Gordon , Bentsi-Enchill , Kwamena , Elias , T. O. , Nwabuaze , B. O. , Kludze , A. P. K. , Asante , S. K. B. , Ollennu , A. , Obi , S. N. , Lloyd , P. C. , Olayede , P. A. , Ezejiofor , G. and others. Google Scholar

35 Oluyede , P. A. , op. cit. , 53 Google Scholar .

37 See Etim v. Eke ( 1947 ) 16 N.L.R. 43 Google Scholar ; Ochonma v. Unosi ( 1960 ) 4 E.N.L.R. 107 Google Scholar .

38 See Oniaiwo v. Fagbenro ( 1954 ) 21 N.L.R. 3 Google Scholar ; Ogbakumanwu v. Chiabolo ( 1950 ) 19 N.L.R. 107 Google Scholar ; Okuojeror v. Sagay ( 1958 ) W.R.L.R. 70 Google Scholar ; Uwani v. Akom ( 1928 ) 8 N.L.R. 19 Google Scholar ; Etim v. Eke ( 1941 ) 16 N.L.R. 43 Google Scholar .

39 Elias , T. O. , Nigerian Land Law , London , 1971 , 90 Google Scholar .

40 Op.cit. , at 290.

41 See his editorial note at p. 163 of his Case on the Land Use Act ( C.L.U.A .) (Emphasis supplied.) Google Scholar

42 See the doubts expressed by Professor Omotola in the Editor's Notes, ( 1985 ) 3 J.P.P.L., 5 Google Scholar .

43 Rodney , Walter , How Europe Underdeveloped Africa , London , 1972 , 50 – 51 Google Scholar . For further information concerning the socio-economic structures of African traditional societies, see Asamoa , Ansa , The Ewe of South-Eastern Ghana and Togo on the Eve of Colonialism , Accra , 1986 Google Scholar and Popov , Yuri , Political Economy and African Problems , Moscow , 1982 Google Scholar .

44 See Ezejiofor , G. , “ Agada & Okoiko v. Escdalw . Have the last words been said?” ( 1975 ) N.L.J. 9 , 171 Google Scholar .

45 ( 1930 ) 1 W.A.C.A. 63 at p. 66 Google Scholar .

46 Ollennu , N. A. , Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana , London , 1962 , 94 Google Scholar ; see also Sarbah , M. , Fanti Customary Law , 3rd ed. London , 1968 , 83 Google Scholar ; Bentsi-Enchill , Kwamena , Ghana Land Law , London , 1964 , 378 Google Scholar ; Elias , T. O. , Nigerian Land Law , London , 1971 , 154 Google Scholar ; Nwabueze , B. O. , Nigerian Land Law , Enugu , 1882 , 276 Google Scholar ; Kludze , A. P. K. , Ewe Law of Property , London , 1973 , 238 Google Scholar .

47 Elias , T. O. , Nigerian Land Law, op. cit. , 154 Google Scholar . The learned author found examples from Alexander's , C. W. Memorandum on Native Tenure in the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria , ( 1910 ) Colonial Office Legal pamphlet Vol. I , Folio No. 26 Google Scholar , where the grand-children of pledgors' families finally paid their ancestors' debts on the family lands and so redeemed them from the pledgees' living descendants. See p. 155. Also see the 1882 case of Incroma v. Marmoon , Sar F. C.L., 157 Google Scholar , where Bailey, C.J., said: “No right of possession by a mortgagee could vest ownership of mortgaged land in such a mortgagee. No length of even adverse possession would entitle a mortgagee to oust the claim of the mortgagor, the mortgage debt having been satisfied.”

48 ( 1933 ) l W.A.C.A. 284 Google Scholar .

49 See also lktanyi v. Adighogu [ 1957 ] 2 W.N.L.R. 55 Google Scholar , where Mbanefo, J., as he then was, said a pledgor has the “right of redemption and it does not matter for how long the land had been pledged, for in native customary law, once a pledge always a pledge".

50 Kludze , A. P. K. , Ewe Law of Property , 239 Google Scholar .

51 Loc. cit .

52 [1965] CC, Para., 148. Similar difficulties were encountered in Agbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi where all the defence that the defendant could set up was possession which, in customary law, is consisted with either a sale or a pledge, see ( 1933 ) W.A.C.A. 284 at p. 285 Google Scholar . See also the discussion of the problem in Olowu v. Miller Bros ( Liverpool Ltd .) ( 1922 ) 3 N.L.R. 110 Google Scholar ; Nwabueze , , Nigerian Land Law, op. cit. , 273 – 274 Google Scholar ; Ollennu , , P.C.L.L.G., op tit. , 102 – 107 Google Scholar ; Kludze , A. P. K. , Ewe Law of Property , 239 – 242 Google Scholar ; Bentsi-Enchill , Kwamena , op. tit. , 383 – 386 Google Scholar .

53 Reported by Ollennu , , P.C.L.L.G ., 173 (W.A.C.A.) Google Scholar .

54 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)

55 Nwabueze , B. O. , Nigerian Land Law, op. tit. , 278 . Google Scholar

56 ( 1950 ) W.A.C.A. ( P.C.L.L.G . 173 ) Google Scholar .

57 ( 1933 ) 1 W.A.C.A. 155 Google Scholar .

58 [ 1957 ] 2 W.N.L.R. 55 Google Scholar .

59 1889 . Reported by Elias , , Nigerian Land Law, op. cit . 155 Google Scholar .

60 [ 1974 ] 3 S.C. 15 . Google Scholar

61 Kludze , A. P. K. , Ewe Law of Property , London , 1973 , 38 Google Scholar .

62 Elias , T. O. , Nigerian Land Law, op. cit. , 155 Google Scholar . It would appear that the learned Chief Justice over-simplified the issues. Within 30 years, the pledgee could only have made £360 based on the 12 annual profit. This means that he obtained £20 over and above the loan in 30 years. What the C.J. did not take into account was the labour expended by the pledgor to harvest, sell and distribute the fruit and to clear and maintain the farm. This is where an order for account becomes necessary if justice should be done. The important point, however, is that this case departed from the pristine customary law.

63 [ 1957 ] 2 W.N.L.R. 55 . Google Scholar .

64 ( 1950 ) W.A.C.A., ( P.C.L.L.G. , 173 ) Google Scholar .

65 Kludze , A. P. K. , Ewe Law of Property, op. cit. , 238 Google Scholar .

67 [ 1974 ] 3 S.C. 15 Google Scholar .

68 Ibid. , at 32.

69 Indeed, these cases provide good illustrations of the fact that the economic structure of society ultimately determines the character of the laws.

70 Ezejiofor , G. , “ Agada Okoiko v. Ozo Esedalue : Have the Last Words Been Said?” [ 1975 ] N.L.J. 9 , 171 at 177 Google Scholar .

71 The question as to whether or not the principle is one of English as well as customary law is a controversial one. The following cases suggest that the principle does not apply, they are: Oko v. Olotu ( 1953 ) 20 N.L.R. 125 Google Scholar ; Omolowun v. Olokude [ 1958 ] W.R.L.N.L.R. 130 Google Scholar ; Anan v. Bing ( 1947 ) 12 W.A.C.A. 177 Google Scholar ; Moore v. Jones ( 1926 ) 7 N.L.R. 84 Google Scholar ; Santeng v. Darkwa ( 1940 ) 6 W.A.C.A. 52 Google Scholar . In the following cases inferences can be made that the maxim applies: Ezeani v. Njidike [ 1961 ] N.M.L.R. 95 Google Scholar ; Oso v. Olqyioye [ 1966 ] N.M.L.R. 239 Google Scholar ; Francis v. Ibitqye ( 1936 ) 13 N.L.R. Google Scholar The problem is that the courts do not often declare in their judgements whether or not they are applying customary or common law. See also the definition of land under s. 3 of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 89, Laws of the Federation and s. 2 of the Property and Conveyancing Law, 1959.

72 Emphasis supplied.

73 Omotola , J. A. , ( 1985 ) 3 J.P.P.L., 5 Google Scholar .

74 See Section 29.

75 Emphasis supplied.

76 Omotola , , C.L.U.A. , 146 . Google Scholar

77 Ibid. , at 149.

78 See section 34(5) (b).

79 Marx , K. & Engels , F. , Selected Works , Vol. 1 , Moscow , 1962 , 77 Google Scholar .

80 For the authority for this proposition see Abgloe v. Sappor ( 1947 ) 12 W.A.C.A. 187 Google Scholar ; Ekpendu v. Erika [ 1959 ] 4 F.S.C. 79 Google Scholar ; Esan v. Faro ( 1947 12 W.A.C.A. 135 Google Scholar ; Lewis v. Bankole ( 1909 ) 1 N.L.R. 82 Google Scholar ; Mogaji v. NugA ( 1960 ) 5 F.S.C. 107 Google Scholar , Manko v. Bonso (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62 Google Scholar ; Cole v. Folami [ 1956 ] 1 F.S.C. 66 Google Scholar , Olowu v. Oshirmbi , [ 1958 ] L.L.R. 21 Google Scholar , and Quarm v. Yanka ( 1930 ) 1 W.A.C.A. 80 Google Scholar . Adedubu v. Makanjuda ( 1944 ) 10 W.A.C.A. 33 Google Scholar .

81 Omotola , J. A. , Essays on the Land Use Act , 1978 , Lagos , 1984. p. 8 Google Scholar . See the repetition of this statement in his article, “The Land Use Act, and Customary System of Tenure”, Report of a National Workshop , Lagos , 1980 , 36 Google Scholar .

82 Essays on the Land Use Act, op. cit. , 8 Google Scholar .

83 Ibid. , 9.

85 It is for the same reason that section 50(1) defines the word “holder” as a person entitled to a right of occupancy and includes any person to whom a right of occupany has been validly assigned or has validly passed on the death of a holder. …]

86 Essays on the Land Use Act, 1978, op. cit. , 9 Google Scholar .

87 Ibid. 10.

88 Emphasis supplied.

89 See for example, Professor Omotola's discussion of the issue in Essays on the Land Use Act, 1978, op. cit . 8 – 9 Google Scholar and Report on a National Workshop op. cit. , 36 – 37 Google Scholar .

90 Essay on the Land Use Act, 1978, op. cit. , 10 Google Scholar . Emphasis supplied. It is very difficult to understand what the learned professor means by saying that: “A disposition of family property must be in accordance with customary law and this law requires that it must enjoy the consent of the family as a whole which consent has not been taken to mean the consent of the head of die family and the principal members.” What the rules have been taken to mean we are not told.

91 C.L.U.A., 146 at 150–152. (Emphasis supplied.)

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• Volume 32, Issue 1
• L. K. Agbosu
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855300010202

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