an essay on forgiveness

66 Forgiveness Essay: Examples, Titles, & Thesis Statement

A forgiveness essay is an exciting yet challenging task. In our article, you can find good forgiveness essay examples in literature, history, religion, and other spheres

📝 Writing a Forgiveness Theme Statement

🏆 best forgiveness essay examples, 🔍 simple forgiveness titles for essay, 💡 interesting forgiveness essay examples.

In your forgiveness essay, focus on different aspects of forgiveness. Some good forgiveness titles for the essay reveal themes of revenge, justice, and personal forgiveness. You can write an excellent reflective or argumentative essay on forgiveness – it is a versatile topic.

Regardless of your forgiveness essay’s specific topic and type, you should develop a strong thesis statement. Below we will provide recommendations on making a good forgiveness theme statement. This will help you come up with a solid base and arguments to prove your position.

Check these tips to make a powerful forgiveness thesis statemen:

• Determine the primary idea. What are you trying to prove? Can anything be forgiven, or are there cases when it’s not possible? Introduce your one main idea and the angle from which you will look at it. You can also include some facts or opinions about the acuteness of the topic.
• Work out your argumentation. It is crucial to have a firm structure in your forgiveness essay. You need to support the thesis statement with several arguments and evidence to demonstrate the consistency of your paper.
• Think of the opposing views. Every argument has a counterargument. When working on your forgiveness theme statement, always keep an opposite thesis statement in mind. Having considered counter positions, you gain additional arguments for your position.
• Don’t quote others in your thesis statement. A thesis statement is the first and foremost chance to introduce your point of view. Use your own strongest words to reach a reader. This is where they get the first impression about the whole work.

We also have lots of other tips on developing A+ thesis statements. Check our free thesis statement generator to discover more information and get a perfect forgiveness theme statement.

• Forgiveness and Reconciliation Critique Availability of literature; as stated in the literature though the area of forgiveness is new in the field of psychology, but there is enough literature to cover the study.
• Divine and Human Forgiveness in “Rime of the Ancient Mariner” By Samuel Taylor Coleridge After killing the albatross who was suppose to provide them with wind, all the people in the ship died but he managed to survive because he had asked God to forgive him all the sins […]
• Hamlet and Forgiveness: A Personal Reflection Some of the most prominent themes in the story are the ideas of mutual forgiveness, people’s motivation to be proactive and take risks, and their willingness to forgive and ask for forgiveness.
• Christ’s Atonement and the Concept of Forgiveness This study will connect the atonement of Jesus Christ and attitudes towards forgiveness through the revision of the current church, Love and God’s commandment to forgive.
• Service Recovery and Customer Forgiveness Studies suggest that after apologizing to customers plus taking responsibility for the problem, getting to the root of the problem is very important to prevent such occurrences in the future. Getting to the root of […]
• Racial Inequality Targeted Student Loan Forgiveness Programs The research into this topic seems highly significant as the reduction of racial inequality was one of the most debated topics in the U.S.for the last several decades.
• Forgiveness in the Christian Texts and the World Today The apostle calls upon the church’s people to stop the punishment of the wrongdoer and forgive, comfort, and affirm their love for him. It instructs Muslims to follow God and forgive others instead of following […]
• Philosophy of Forgiveness I believe that if anyone had gone through all the pain and horror that Simon had, and was asked to forgive Karl, the instinct, and most humane reaction at that moment would be to strongly […]
• The Effects of Forgiveness Therapy After gathering the relevant data, the researchers compared the recovery of the participants to their controls to determine the effects of forgiveness therapy.
• Self-Forgiveness: The Step Child of Forgiveness Research Other than the similarities and the differences, the two types of forgiveness relate to each other as self-forgiveness facilitates interpersonal forgiveness, this is through allowance of one to identify with one’s offender.
• The Amish Philosophy of Forgiveness It is important to note that the immediate forgiveness of the enemy does not mean that the Amish will let the perpetrators of crime go free.
• Review: “Interventions Studies on Forgiveness: A Meta-analysis” by Baskin T. and Enright R. In the church, members come to the pastor with a variety of social and psychological issues. The first step the pastor should undertake is to sympathise with the victims.
• Self-Forgiveness as the Path to Learning to Forgive the Others The key issues that the given research responds to or, at least, attempts to solve, are the definition of self-forgiveness, the relation between self-forgiveness and interpersonal forgiveness, and the means to differentiate between self-forgiveness and […]
• The Effects of Forgiveness Therapy on Depression, Anxiety and Posttraumatic Stress for Women After Spousal Emotional Abuse Enright forgiveness model applied in the study proved effective since it systematically addressed the forgiveness process identified the negative attributes caused by the abuse, and prepared the women for positive responses.
• Forgiveness & Reconciliation: The Differing Perspectives of Psychologists and Christian Theologians Based on the research design there is evidence of measures put in place to control against most of these biases which strengthens the study findings; this is the strength to the study.
• Forgiveness in Simon Wiesenthal’s Work The Sunflower Taking into account the major themes of the book The Sunflower, one is to make a conclusion that such response to atrocities as forgiveness is considered to be the key aspect of humanity.
• Forgiveness in Martin Luther’s Movement for Rights Blacks The bible teachings tell us that God exists in the holy trinity and the only way to forgive others is for us to be able to forgive our own transgressions.
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• The Spiritual Principle of Forgiveness in Wes Anderson’s Film The Royal Tenenbaums, Saint Augustine’s Confessions, and the Biblical Story of Adam and Eve
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• Love, Forgiveness, and Trust: Critical Values of the Modern Leader
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• The Kite Runner: Forgiveness, Loyalty, and the Quest for Redemption
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• Morals And Forgiveness In Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower
• The Emotional and Physical Benefits of the Act of Forgiveness
• The Monster’s Lack of Forgiveness in Frankenstein, a Book by Mary Shelley
• Conflict Management : Forgiveness And Reconciliation
• Man Alive: A True Story Of Violence, Forgiveness And Becoming
• The Renaissance Figure That Wonders the Lands in Hope of Bring Forgiveness in the Pardoner and His Tale
• The Impact of Acceptance, Tolerance, and Forgiveness in Frankenstein, a Novel by Mary Shelley
• Racism, Redemption, Forgiveness and Hope in Minor Miracle, a Poem by Marilyn Nelson
• Why Perspective in Forgiveness and Redemption is so Important
• The Themes Punishment vs. Forgiveness Present in the Scarlet Letter by Nathaniel Hawthorne
• The Dynamics of Corporate Debt forgiveness and Contract Renegotiation
• Throwing Stones-Resilience and Forgiveness in The Glass Castle
• The Importance of Granting Forgiveness to One’s Enemies in Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower: on Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness
• The Meaning and Significance for Christians Today of Forgiveness
• Penalties and Exclusion in the Rescheduling and Forgiveness of International Loans
• Gender Differences in the Relationship Between Empathy and Forgiveness
• Conflicts And Forgiveness In Family
• The Importance of Perspectives in Forgiveness and Redemption
• The Economic And Ethical Ambiguities Of African Debt Forgiveness
• Exploring the Themes of Forgiveness and Reconciliation in The Tempest by William Shakespeare
• Vengeance and Forgiveness in Shakespeare’s The Tempest
• The Effects of Forgiveness Therapy on Depression
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Short Essay on Forgiveness

The famous saying goes “To err is human, to forgive is divine”. What makes the power of forgiveness comparable to God? The very nature of humans is to get angry and feel resentful towards those who have hurt us or did some harm to us in any way.

We tend to remember the undesirable actions of others which impacted us and made us feel bad. Forgiveness is the act of overcoming the feeling of resentment or revenge for the person who has done wrong actions.

Forgiveness is a virtue but the way people perceive it is quite relative. Some people think that certain actions are forgivable while others are not. Some people think that forgiveness encourages the wrongdoer to perform ill deeds repeatedly. Forgiveness is subjective and the act of forgiveness can have many meanings. Acceptance of apology may be forgiveness for some, while helping the other who hurt you to get out of the habit of ill-treatment may be a way for others.

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We all make mistakes. So when we learn to forgive others, we can also seek forgiveness when we commit follies. Also if we are able to forgive others, we also learn to forgive ourselves in situations of self-guilt. Thus the virtue of forgiveness helps us come out of the feeling of self blame. If we fail to forgive ourselves in time, we often end up realizing that others had forgiven us long back, but we kept feeling bad about ourselves all this time.

Forgiveness helps us feel light and helps us get rid of hard feelings that occupy our mind and heart and eat away our peace of mind. Forgiveness is a way to self-fulfillment. People who can readily forgive others are much more responsible and satisfied inside than those who keep grudges against others and develop feelings of enmity. The feeling of anguish only results in arguments, fights, mistreatments and war in certain cases. Those who forgive help create positive energy on this planet.

Now, let us take the example of a terrorist who kills hundreds of innocent people in a terrorist attack. Does he deserve forgiveness? Such criminals kill common man in the name of religion and consider it a way to please or reach their God. Heinous Acts of this degree do not deserve mercy and forgiveness. Though there may be people who would still believe that forgiveness is humanity, yet to discourage and prevent any such future acts of terrorism, such people must be severely punished and not forgiven.

If the people who are close to you betray or hurt you, you find it most difficult to forgive them. Sometimes the extent to which your trust is breached determines the ease or difficulty in forgiving. But it is true that the more easily we forgive the other person, the less likely we shall suffocate ourselves keeping bad intentions for the wrongdoer. We need to feed it into our system to let go so that we do not stay annoyed and offended for long. Our grudges will only affect the relationship with the person and not hurt the other person in any way. The ability to forgive gives us a sense of freedom and makes us suffer less and feel lesser misery and pain.

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Essay on Forgiveness

Students are often asked to write an essay on Forgiveness in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Forgiveness

Understanding forgiveness.

Forgiveness is when we stop feeling anger towards someone who has done something wrong to us. It’s like letting go of a heavy burden.

The Power of Forgiveness

When we forgive, we feel lighter and happier. It helps us to move on and not dwell on past hurts.

Forgiveness and Relationships

Forgiveness strengthens our relationships. It helps us to understand and accept others, despite their mistakes.

Learning to Forgive

Forgiving is not easy, but it’s important. We can learn to forgive by understanding that everyone makes mistakes.

250 Words Essay on Forgiveness

Introduction.

Forgiveness, a virtue often preached yet seldom practiced, is the act of pardoning an offender. It is a complex psychological phenomenon that involves an intricate interplay between emotions, cognition, and actions.

The Significance of Forgiveness

The importance of forgiveness lies in its ability to release the negative emotions of anger, resentment, and the desire for retribution. This cathartic process promotes emotional well-being, reducing stress, and enhancing interpersonal relationships. It is a testament to human resilience and our capacity for empathy and compassion.

The Psychology of Forgiveness

From a psychological perspective, forgiveness is a conscious, deliberate decision to relinquish feelings of resentment or vengeance. This process involves a cognitive shift, a change in one’s attitude towards the offender, and a willingness to let go of negative emotions. It does not necessarily mean forgetting the offense or reconciling with the offender, but rather, it is about finding inner peace and moving on.

Forgiveness as a Social Construct

Sociologically, forgiveness is a social construct that helps maintain social harmony. It promotes reconciliation and prevents the perpetuation of a cycle of revenge and hostility. In this sense, forgiveness is an essential component of social cohesion and stability.

In conclusion, forgiveness is a powerful tool for personal growth and social harmony. It is a testament to human strength, resilience, and our capacity for empathy. The decision to forgive is a journey towards inner peace, one that requires courage, humility, and a profound understanding of the human condition.

500 Words Essay on Forgiveness

Forgiveness is a multifaceted concept, deeply embedded in human interactions and fundamental to the continuity of social relationships. It is a conscious decision to let go of resentment or vengeance towards an individual or group who has harmed us, regardless of whether they deserve our forgiveness.

The act of forgiveness is a psychological process that involves a change in emotion and attitude towards an offender. It is a voluntary and deliberate act that requires effort and emotional resilience. The process is often complex, involving feelings of hurt, anger, and betrayal. However, it also opens the door to healing, peace, and the possibility of reconciliation.

Psychologists suggest that forgiveness can be a transformative process that promotes mental health, reduces anxiety, and enhances our well-being. It is a coping strategy that allows us to deal with interpersonal conflicts and emotional injuries. By forgiving, we free ourselves from the chains of bitterness, enabling us to move forward without the burden of past hurts.

The Philosophy of Forgiveness

Philosophically, forgiveness is seen as a virtue, an act of grace and compassion. It is a moral decision to absolve another of their wrongdoings, not out of obligation, but out of understanding and empathy. This perspective emphasizes the ethical dimension of forgiveness, viewing it as a moral duty or obligation.

Forgiveness in Practice

Practicing forgiveness requires a high degree of emotional intelligence and maturity. It begins with acknowledging the hurt and allowing oneself to feel the pain. The next step is to empathize with the offender, trying to understand their perspective. This is followed by making a conscious decision to forgive, which often involves a verbal or mental declaration of forgiveness.

Forgiveness is a personal journey and there is no right or wrong way to go about it. It can be a slow and challenging process, but it also brings about personal growth and emotional liberation.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

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Greater Good Science Center • Magazine • In Action • In Education

Forgiveness Defined

What is forgiveness.

Psychologists generally define forgiveness as a conscious, deliberate decision to release feelings of resentment or vengeance toward a person or group who has harmed you, regardless of whether they actually deserve your forgiveness.

Just as important as defining what forgiveness is , though, is understanding what forgiveness is not . Experts who study or teach forgiveness make clear that when you forgive, you do not gloss over or deny the seriousness of an offense against you. Forgiveness does not mean forgetting, nor does it mean condoning or excusing offenses. Though forgiveness can help repair a damaged relationship, it doesn’t obligate you to reconcile with the person who harmed you, or release them from legal accountability.

Instead, forgiveness brings the forgiver peace of mind and frees him or her from corrosive anger. While there is some debate over whether true forgiveness requires positive feelings toward the offender, experts agree that it at least involves letting go of deeply held negative feelings. In that way, it empowers you to recognize the pain you suffered without letting that pain define you, enabling you to heal and move on with your life.

While early research focused on forgiveness of others by individuals, new areas of research are starting to examine the benefits of group forgiveness and self-forgiveness .

For More: Read forgiveness expert Fred Luskin’s essay, “ What Is Forgiveness? ,” and Jack Kornfield’s thoughts on what forgiveness means . Learn more about forgiveness research in this summary of key studies and recent white paper , and consider: Is anything unforgiveable?

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Why Practice It?

We often think of forgiveness as a kind, magnanimous act—an act of mercy or compassion extended to someone who wronged us. While that can be true, research over the past few decades has revealed enormous personal benefits to forgiveness as well. According to that research, here are some of the most compelling ways forgiveness is good for us, our relationships, and our communities.

• Forgiveness makes us happier : Research suggests not only that happy people are more likely to forgive but that forgiving others can make people feel happy , especially when they forgive someone to whom they feel close.
• Forgiveness protects our mental health : People who receive therapy designed to foster forgiveness experience greater improvements in depression, anxiety, and hope than those who don’t. Forgiveness may also play a role in preventing suicide .
• Forgiveness improves our health : When we dwell on grudges, our blood pressure and heart rate spike—signs of stress which damage the body; when we forgive, our stress levels drop, and people who are more forgiving are protected from the negative health effects of stress . Studies also suggest that holding grudges might compromise our immune system, making us less resistant to illness.
• Forgiveness sustains relationships : When our friends inevitably hurt or disappoint us, holding a grudge makes us less likely to sacrifice or cooperate with them, which undermines feelings of trust and commitment, driving us further apart. Studies suggest that forgiveness can stop this downward spiral and repair our relationship before it dissolves.
• Forgiveness is good for marriages (most of the time): Spouses who are more forgiving and less vindictive are better at resolving conflicts effectively in their marriage. A long-term study of newlyweds found that more forgiving spouses had stronger, more satisfying relationships . However, when more forgiving spouses were frequently mistreated by their husband or wife, they became less satisfied with their marriage.
• Forgiveness boosts kindness and connectedness : People who feel forgiving don’t only feel more positive toward someone who hurt them. They are also more likely to want to volunteer and donate money to charity, and they feel more connected to other people in general.
• Forgiveness can help heal the wounds of war: A research-based forgiveness training program in Rwanda , for instance, was linked to reduced trauma and more positive attitudes between the Hutus and Tutsis there. A study of people who learned forgiveness skills in war-torn Sierra Leone found that they reported feeling less depressed, more grateful, more satisfied with life, and less stressed afterward. Perhaps most famously, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is widely credited with encouraging forgiveness and reconciliation after the end of apartheid in that country. Archbishop Desmond Tutu , the commission’s chairman, has argued that forgiveness is the path to “true enduring peace.”
• Forgiveness is good for kids and teens: Kids who are more forgiving toward their friends have higher well-being. Forgiveness training can help adolescent girls who are bullies and bullied decrease their anger, aggression, and delinquency, while increasing their empathy and improving their grades.
• Forgiveness is good for workplaces : Employees who are more forgiving are also more productive and take fewer days off, partly thanks to reduced stress around their relationships.
• People who practice self-forgiveness tend to have better physical and mental health . Forgiving ourselves may also improve our relationships .

For More: Learn more about the benefits of forgiveness in researcher Everett Worthington’s article, “ The New Science of Forgiveness ,” and in Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s essay, “ Forgiveness + Reconciliation .”

How Do I Cultivate It?

According to Robert Enright , Fred Luskin , and other experts, forgiveness isn’t just for the deeply magnanimous among us; it’s both a choice and a trainable skill that almost anyone can learn. Fortunately, research suggests that the capacity for forgiveness is an intrinsic part of human nature . Here are some research-based strategies for tapping into that capacity, whether you’re trying to forgive others, forgive yourself, or seek forgiveness from someone else.

• View forgiveness as something for you, not a gift to someone else: In his Nine Steps to Forgiveness program, Fred Luskin emphasizes that forgiveness is best seen as something that will bring you peace, closure, and reduce your suffering—a point echoed by Jack Kornfield in this video.
• Articulate your emotions : If you want to forgive or be forgiven, be willing to express how you’re feeling to others and to yourself. Ruminating on negative feelings is both unhealthy and unproductive. As the GGSC’s Christine Carter argues, this is an important lesson to teach kids as well.
• Look for the silver lining: This can be a controversial tip, but research suggests that after someone hurts you, you can forgive more easily by reflecting on the personal benefits you may have gained through the transgression. Writing about those benefits might be especially helpful.
• Make an effective apology: If you’re seeking forgiveness from others, studies suggest that apologizing will help—but weak apologies might only make things worse. Researcher Aaron Lazare has studied apologies for years, concluding that an effective apology has four parts: It acknowledges the offense, offers an explanation for the offense, expresses remorse or shame, and involves a reparation of some kind.
• Cultivate empathy : When someone has been hurt, they’ll be more likely to forgive—and less likely to retaliate—if they can sense or imagine the distress or remorse felt by the person who hurt them. This might explain why apologies foster forgiveness.
• Practice mindfulness: Training in mindfulness can help college students become more forgiving, perhaps because awareness of painful feelings is part of the process of forgiveness. More mindful people are also more forgiving of betrayal .
• Humanize the Other through contact : Research in Northern Ireland found that people on both sides of the violence there were more likely to forgive if they came into contact with someone from the other side, perhaps because it reduced feelings of anger and encouraged them to see the other’s humanity.
• Don’t let yourself off too easy: Research suggests that forgiving yourself for mistakes can sometimes reduce your empathy for others and your motivation to make amends. For a more healthy way to forgive yourself, read these research-based steps , which include empathizing with your victim and honestly reflecting on what you did wrong, or follow this process recommended by Rick Hanson.
• Seek peace, not justice: In his forgiveness program , Robert Enright emphasizes that forgiveness is separate from justice. The people who hurt you may never get their just desserts, but that shouldn’t prevent you from moving on with your life.
• Understand that forgiveness is a process : True forgiveness doesn’t happen in an instant; instead, it takes time and energy to achieve, and might not come easily.
• Overcome barriers to forgiveness: Research reveals some common fears and concerns to address if we are resistant to forgiving.
• Foster a forgiving school: Build a school climate of care and fairness in order to facilitate forgiveness among teachers and staff.
• Raise forgiving kids : Parents can help kids learn forgiveness by modeling it themselves, and allowing kids to move through the process of forgiveness at their own pace.

For more: Check out Christine Carter’s tips for teaching forgiveness skills to children, adapted from Luskin’s nine steps. And she offers these tips for fostering forgiveness in families.

Leading forgiveness researchers have also developed their own evidence-based programs to foster forgiveness, including the following.

• Luskin’s Nine Steps to Forgiveness , which involve a mix of cognitive and meditative strategies, from articulating your grievance to shifting your expectations from life to revising the way you look at your past.
• Robert Enright’s Forgiveness Process Model , which consists of 20 steps divided into four phases : the Uncovering Phase , where one becomes aware of the true emotional stress he has suffered; the Decision Phase , where one commits to forgiving rather than continuing to focus exclusively on his suffering; the Work Phase , where one comes to accept—but not condone—the pain he has suffered, no matter how undeserved; and finally the Outcome/Deepening Phase , where one recognizes the relief and meaning he is gaining from forgiveness. Read Enright’s tips for moving through this process .
• Everett Worthington’s REACH method for forgiveness, which involves five steps: R ecall the hurt, E mpathize with the person who hurt you, offer an A ltruistic gift of forgiveness, C ommit to forgive (ideally publicly), and H old onto that forgiveness.

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Forgiveness: Letting go of grudges and bitterness

When someone you care about hurts you, you can hold on to anger and resentment — or embrace forgiveness and move forward.

Who hasn't been hurt by the actions or words of another? Perhaps a parent constantly criticized you growing up, a colleague sabotaged a project or your partner had an affair. Or maybe you've had a traumatic experience, such as being physically or emotionally abused by someone close to you. These wounds can leave lasting feelings of resentment, bitterness and anger — sometimes even hatred.

But if you hold on to that pain, you might be the one who pays most dearly. By embracing forgiveness, you also can embrace peace and hope. Consider how forgiveness can lead you down the path of physical, emotional and spiritual well-being.

What is forgiveness?

Forgiveness means different things to different people. But in general, it involves an intentional decision to let go of resentment and anger.

The act that hurt or offended you might always be with you. But working on forgiveness can lessen that act's grip on you. It can help free you from the control of the person who harmed you. Sometimes, forgiveness might even lead to feelings of understanding, empathy and compassion for the one who hurt you.

Forgiveness doesn't mean forgetting or excusing the harm done to you. It also doesn't necessarily mean making up with the person who caused the harm. Forgiveness brings a kind of peace that allows you to focus on yourself and helps you go on with life.

What are the benefits of forgiving someone?

Letting go of grudges and bitterness can make way for improved health and peace of mind. Forgiveness can lead to:

• Healthier relationships.
• Improved mental health.
• Less anxiety, stress and hostility.
• Fewer symptoms of depression.
• Lower blood pressure.
• A stronger immune system.
• Improved heart health.
• Improved self-esteem.

Why is it so easy to hold a grudge?

Being hurt by someone, particularly someone you love and trust, can cause anger, sadness and confusion. If you dwell on hurtful events or situations, grudges filled with resentment and hostility can take root. If you allow negative feelings to crowd out positive feelings, you might find yourself swallowed up by bitterness or a sense of injustice.

Some people are naturally more forgiving than others. But even if you tend to hold a grudge, almost anyone can learn to be more forgiving.

What are the effects of holding a grudge?

If you struggle with finding forgiveness, you might:

• Bring anger and bitterness into new relationships and experiences.
• Become so wrapped up in the wrong that you can't enjoy the present.
• Become depressed, irritable or anxious.
• Feel at odds with your spiritual beliefs.
• Lose valuable and enriching connections with others.

How do I move toward a state of forgiveness?

Forgiveness is a commitment to change. It takes practice. To move toward forgiveness, you might:

• Recognize the value of forgiveness and how it can improve your life.
• Identify what needs healing and who you want to forgive.
• Join a support group or see a counselor.
• Acknowledge your emotions about the harm done to you, recognize how those emotions affect your behavior, and work to release them.
• Choose to forgive the person who's offended you.
• Release the control and power that the offending person and situation have had in your life.

What happens if I can't forgive someone?

Forgiveness can be hard, especially if the person who hurt you doesn't admit wrongdoing. If you find yourself stuck:

• Practice empathy. Try seeing the situation from the other person's point of view.
• Ask yourself about the circumstances that may have led the other person to behave in such a way. Perhaps you would have reacted similarly if you faced the same situation.
• Reflect on times when others have forgiven you.
• Write in a journal, pray or use guided meditation. Or talk with a person you've found to be wise and compassionate, such as a spiritual leader, a mental health provider, or an impartial loved one or friend.
• Be aware that forgiveness is a process. Even small hurts may need to be revisited and forgiven again and again.

Does forgiveness guarantee reconciliation?

If the hurtful event involved someone whose relationship you value, forgiveness may lead to reconciliation. But that isn't always the case.

Reconciliation might be impossible if the offender has died or is unwilling to communicate with you. In other cases, reconciliation might not be appropriate. Still, forgiveness is possible — even if reconciliation isn't.

What if the person I'm forgiving doesn't change?

Getting another person to change isn't the point of forgiveness. It's about focusing on what you can control in the here and now. Think of forgiveness more about how it can change your life by bringing you peace, happiness, and emotional and spiritual healing. Forgiveness can take away the power the other person continues to have in your life.

What if I'm the one who needs forgiveness?

The first step is to honestly assess and acknowledge the wrongs you've done and how they have affected others. Avoid judging yourself too harshly.

If you're truly sorry for something you've said or done and want forgiveness, consider reaching out to those you've harmed. Speak of your sincere sorrow or regret. Ask for forgiveness without making excuses.

You can't force someone to forgive you. Others need to move to forgiveness in their own time. Remember, forgiveness is a process. Whatever happens, commit to treating others with compassion, empathy and respect.

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• Rakel D, ed. Forgiveness. In: Integrative Medicine. 4th ed. Elsevier; 2018. https://www.clinicalkey.com. Accessed Nov. 2, 2022.
• Forgiveness can improve mental and physical health. American Psychological Association. https://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/01/ce-corner.aspx. Accessed Nov. 2, 2022.
• Silva RS, et al. Forgiveness facilitation in palliative care: A scoping review. JBI Evidence Synthesis. 2020; doi:10.11124/JBISRIR-D-19-00286.
• Martinez-Diaz P, et al. Victim's perspective of forgiveness seeking behaviors after transgressions. Frontiers in Psychology. 2021; doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.656689.
• Domestic violence against men
• Domestic violence against women

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Speaking of Psychology: The power of forgiving those who’ve hurt you, with Robert Enright, PhD

Episode 247.

When someone hurts you, it can feel justifiable or even satisfying to nurse a grudge. But psychologists have found that forgiveness, when done right, can lead to better mental, emotional, and even physical health for the forgiver. Robert Enright, PhD, of the International Forgiveness Institute and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, discusses how you know if you’re ready to forgive, the difference between forgiveness and reconciliation, whether any harms are truly unforgivable, and how to forgive someone who isn’t sorry for what they’ve done.

About the expert: Robert Enright, PhD

Kim Mills: When someone hurts you, a friend or a former friend, a family member, a colleague, or a romantic partner, it can feel justifiable or even satisfying to nurse a grudge. After all, what do you have to gain from forgiving someone who's bullied you, betrayed you, or let you down? But psychologists who study forgiveness say that forgiving, when done right, can be therapeutic for the person who's been hurt. Research has found that it can lead to better mental, emotional, and even physical health.

So, when you want to forgive someone, where do you start? What steps do you take? How do you deal with the anger or grief that may be standing in the way of forgiveness? And, more broadly, can you forgive without forgetting? What's the difference between forgiveness and reconciliation? When someone has done something truly wrong, can you forgive them and seek justice at the same time? And, is it possible to forgive someone who isn't sorry for what they've done?

Welcome to Speaking of Psychology , the flagship podcast of the American Psychological Association that examines the links between psychological science and everyday life. I'm Kim Mills.

My guest today is Dr. Robert Enright, a professor in the department of educational psychology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He's a pioneer in the study of forgiveness, which he has been researching for nearly four decades. Dr. Enright has developed forgiveness-based interventions for children and adults who have suffered from bullying, abuse and other injustices. He's also brought forgiveness education programs to conflict areas such as Northern Ireland. He is interested in how forgiveness interventions and therapy can help people heal and improve their mental health and wellbeing. Dr. Enright is the author of more than 120 scientific articles and seven books, and has been awarded many honors, including a 2022 Gold Medal Award for impact in psychology from the American Psychological Association. 

Dr. Enright, thank you for joining me today.

Robert Enright: It's an honor to be with you, Kim. Thanks for asking me.

Mills: Let's start, as we often do in this podcast, with a definition. I'm going to ask you something that might seem obvious. What does the term forgiveness mean? You say people often misunderstand the term, so how do you define it?

Enright: I see it as a moral virtue, where you are being good to those who are not good to you, without excusing, without forgetting lest it happened again, without necessarily reconciling, as you had said in your introduction, and without throwing justice under the bus.

Mills: So, I mentioned in the introduction that your research and that of some of your colleagues, you've found that forgiveness can benefit people's health, their mental health and their wellbeing. Can you talk about that? What's the connection between forgiveness and wellbeing?

Enright: The key is that when we've been treated unjustly by others, a lot of times unhealthy anger sneaks into our heart and we're not even aware of that. And with that drip, drip, drip of the anger onto the heart, onto the emotions, day after day and even year after year, people start to become deeply angry or resentful. And then that can turn into anxiety and even depression and even low self-esteem, not liking yourself. And as you reach out, paradoxically, with goodness toward those who are not good to you, and it's your choice, it shouldn't be forced, that drip, drip, drip of the anger starts slowing down and in its place, you start having, as I say, that goodness toward the other. And that actually counteracts the toxic anger, reducing and even eliminating the effects of the trauma and that the anxiety and depression literally can leave and you get your life back.

Mills: Now, if you want to forgive someone, how do you do it—practically speaking? What are the steps that people should take?

Enright: Well, very briefly, it's good first to understand the effects of the injustice against you, seeing that it's quite negative and that you've been living with negative effects, like restlessness and too much anger and the like. And then you have to make a decision. How are you going to heal from that? And many people come to forgiveness when they've tried everything under the sun. And so they say, “Nothing's worked. I'll try forgiveness.” So, you make a decision, a free will decision without coercion from others. And then, what I say, hit the forgiveness gym to do the forgiveness work, to become forgivingly fit, you start thinking about the one who hurt you in new ways.

You see that they're more than the injustice against you. You see their personhood, is what you do. And when you do that and then you're ready to give this moral virtue-like quality, which is goodness to the other. That's when the healing starts to begin in the heart of the forgiver, which leads to finding new meaning and purpose in your own life, when you say, “Hey, I have a new way of dealing with trauma that I had never thought of before,” and it's there that you get a true psychological change that's transformative in a very positive way.

Mills: Now, it sounds like all of this is coming from within the person who is doing the forgiving. Does the person who is being forgiven have to play any kind of role in this?

Enright: I like your words “have to.” No. The other does not have to do anything, but it's helpful. If the other person is repentant, sorrowful, comes to you and genuinely apologizes without any nonsense, without using the apology as a way to gain power, that helps a lot, yes. But you can make this free will decision to go ahead and to try and be good to the other, try and expand your story of who this person is beyond just the injustice against you. And, it's your decision, your internal work. And you know why that's so important? Because then the other doesn't have that kind of power over you anymore. See, you're free to do this whenever you wish. Think about it. If your heart is damaged because of an injustice, and you need to forgive and you won't or you can't until three little words are uttered by the one who didn't like you, “I am sorry,” that's giving way too much power to the other.

Mills: But how do I know personally that I'm ready to forgive? I mean, I may feel like that's what I should do, but is it truly coming from within? We talk about heart here. Is it coming from my heart?

Enright: I think that's a great question. And, people tend to know when they are ready for a new chapter in their life. They know when they're ready to go on a diet. They know when they're ready to have a new friend. They know when they're ready to go to the physical gym to get physically fit. They have a motivation. They have a direction in their life. And so, a lot of times actually, people don't think they are ready, because they think what forgiveness is is caving into the other's nonsense. But, when they finally hear that that's not what it is, and you can stand firm, that what happened was unfair and it's still unfair, but I'm going to try and give this unexpected, shockingly new idea in psychotherapy of deliberately being good to the other, while watching my own back, then people know they're ready for this new chapter in their life, just like they might for a new diet.

Mills: Does the forgiver have to engage in some way with the person they're forgiving? Does that matter?

Enright: Well, it does matter, but it's not necessary. You see, if you can go to the other and say, “I am hurt. This isn't right what you've been doing. May we talk about it?” And the other's ready, wonderful, but the other might be deceased. And does that mean you cannot forgive someone who's deceased? Now you're trapped for the rest of your life. Think about that. But, you can. How can you be good to someone who's deceased? How about a kind word about that person to other family members? If it's a person in your family who's hurt you. Or donating a little money to charity in that person's name, so you're honoring that person's name. You see, that stops the drip, drip, drip of the anger in the heart.

So, it's really a unilateral idea, just as any moral virtue is. When you're trying to be fair or just to others, you don't wait for others to make certain moves before you, for example, stop at a stoplight when you're driving a car. That's your choice. I'm glad it's your choice, because with justice there are definite repercussions for not doing that. But with forgiveness, it's also your individual choice and you don't have to do it. That's what I like about it.

Mills: How can you forgive someone who isn't sorry for what they've done, or maybe even doesn't recognize what they did was hurtful?

Enright: It makes it harder, and you can actually then forgive the person for that offense. For the person to stubbornly insist that, “I have done nothing,” is another offense. And so you can go ahead, if you're ready, if you know what forgiveness is truly, and you're not being coerced into it by that person who says, “What's the matter with you?” And you want to do it, then you can go ahead on your own, regardless of what that other person does. That's how freeing forgiveness can be, with the consequence, “I am now freed from what this person has been doing to me.”

Mills: You mentioned a moment ago that forgiveness is a kind of moral virtue. But, what if someone doesn't want to forgive the person who hurt them, or isn't ready? Does that make that person less morally virtuous? That seems like you're putting the burden on the victim in a sense.

Enright: You are if you misunderstand forgiveness, because if we see forgiveness as absolutely necessary under all conditions or we’re morally weak, then yes, it would be putting the judgment actually on the victim. But, philosophers use the term, here's a big one for us, supererogatory. Forgiveness is a supererogatory moral virtue. There's a lot of syllables in there. And what they mean by that is, it's not one that must be done under all circumstances. It's similar to altruism. Do you have to give money to every single person you meet on the street who has a cup and is homeless? No. Are you going to be condemned if you give to two people and not 10? No. You'll be praised if you do it twice. It's the same thing with forgiveness. Supererogatory means it's up to you, in the context that's right for you, when you are ready.

Mills: Is there a difference between forgiving someone very close, like a family member you might see all the time, and forgiving someone you can easily avoid, like an old work colleague?

Enright: It actually depends on the severity of the injustice, as to whether forgiveness in a psychotherapeutic sense is worthwhile. Oftentimes, I find when looking at the issue of helping people to forgive, the deepest, most profound hurts that can last a lifetime oftentimes come from the family. Why? Because it's the family that's supposed to protect us. And, when those in the family now betray us, the hurt can be much deeper than if a boss fires us. Yet, at the same time, if that boss is very cruel to you, dumps you when you have a family to support and others are mocking you, that might be much worse than anything you've ever faced in the family, in which case, that one really might need some help, in an applied psychological sense. Both may need help, but in general, it's the family issues that cut us the most deeply.

Mills: And that brings me to the question of whether there's anything that is unforgivable. I mean, we can think of a lot transgressions—the Holocaust, murder. I mean, there are many bad things that we do to each other. Is anything truly, truly unforgivable?

Enright: For some people there are lines drawn in the sand and they won't go beyond that. And we should respect that. That is their choice to forgive people for certain offenses and not others. But, quite frankly, I have never seen any offense in the world that I probably couldn't point to at least one person who has forgiven. Let's take a look at the Holocaust, which you mentioned. Eva Mozes Kor, who passed away recently, broke my heart, because she passed away was with her twin sister Miriam in Auschwitz, the concentration camp in Poland. She made a decision to forgive—I'm going to put this in quotes. “Dr. Mengele.” He wasn't a doctor, he was a pretend doctor. But Miriam died, because of those experiments. Eva Mozes Kor decided on her own to forgive, to set herself free. Others who were with her in concentration camp thought it was, I'm quoting here, “improper.” And that's fine, because it would be improper for them, but not for her. So, we have to respect those who won't forgive, and respect those who will, because it's their free will decision to do so or not.

Mills: Now, people often think of forgiveness in a religious context. Many religions teach the value of forgiveness. Do you think, and have you found in your research, that religious people find it easier to forgive? Or, is forgiveness just as possible and as powerful in a secular context?

Enright: Our research has looked at people from all walks of life, Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, humanistic, atheistic, and we find that when people walk the pathway of forgiveness that's been worked out scientifically, and are willing to put the time in to become forgivingly fit, I've never seen a person fail miserably, especially depending on their demographics. Let's think about it for a moment realistically. Isn't it true that an atheist wants to be fair or just in the world, treating people with fairness, obeying the traffic rules? Absolutely, of course. And so, there's nothing in the rulebook of forgiveness that says you have to be a certain kind of believer to engage in it, just like the whole world engages in justice, regardless of culture. Because there are laws that might differ among different cultures, but they all have laws, and all people obey them or else. And that's just an example, the justice moral virtue, showing that we all on some level definitely try to engage in virtuous behavior.

Mills: Can it work the other way, though, where a religion says to you, “You must forgive, this is what we teach,” and you feel in your heart that you can't really forgive? Will that then weigh you down in the sense that you want to forgive, but you can't get there?

Enright: Yes, if you're misunderstanding your religion. Because, quite frankly, I have never seen a religion that demands that you get rid of your anger today. Okay? Usually, there are windows, usually there is compassion, usually there's patience. Honestly, I have studied these. I'm an egghead professor, remember. I study everything that's in English, whether it's Jewish or Buddhist or Christian or the materialist philosophies of the day, that demands that you start on the road of forgiveness today or watch out.

Mills: Now, you and your colleagues have developed forgiveness education programs for schools. What's the goal of those programs and how do they work?

Enright: The goal for children is to prepare them for adulthood. Isn't that what good education is always about? Why do we teach children to read? So, when they're in a grocery store as adults, they can read the mayonnaise jar to see how many calories there are. How about teaching them mathematics so they can balance a checkbook? Why don't we prepare children for the storms of injustice in adulthood that will visit them? I've never been able to figure that out. And so, what we're doing is we're preparing children for the storms of injustice that will hit them in adulthood, not by getting them into forgiveness therapy as children, but simply introducing them to what forgiveness is through stories. There are a lot of picture books out there for 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, 6-year-olds that show conflict and show how story characters work through that conflict, sometimes with more conflict, in other times was actually deliberately trying to get along by seeing the humanity in the other. Because, as Horton said, in Horton Hears A Who , “A person is what? A person is a person, no matter how small.” Oh, even if they hurt you? Right-oh.

And so, now we get the sense of children seeing what forgiveness is, so that on their own, when they mature more philosophically and rationally, they can make their own decisions whether to do this or not. Because I worked with a 35-year-old woman recently whose husband just abandoned her, and she has two children and has to get a new job. And she said to me, “I want to forgive, but I don't know how.” What if she knew how to forgive through forgiveness education, her life at 35 would be much better.

Mills: Now, are there any demographic differences and who is able to forgive? Are women more able to forgive, because of the socialization that we go through? I mean, there are stereotypes and I happen to be part Irish and part Italian, and we all supposedly hold grudges. Do you find things like that in your research?

Enright: I have not found gender differences in how people successfully go through our psychotherapeutic process when they've been traumatized. There is some research out there that suggests, and it's only some, because not all of it says this—women statistically sometimes are more open to forgiving. I have found when I give talks on forgiveness that if you did a headcount, there are more women in the audience. And I have more graduate students studying forgiveness with me who are women. So, I think it's an interesting point, Kim. Maybe there is something there. But, at the end of the day, when men and women are definitely motivated to forgive, both can forgive with equal accuracy.

Mills: Let's talk for a minute about the role of forgiveness in social and geopolitical issues, where I know you've done some work. How did you deal with, I mentioned in the intro Northern Ireland? How did you negotiate that forgiveness with those countries?

Enright: Okay. Usually we're asked in. See, I don't push myself into anywhere. Anne—so, in Northern Ireland—Gallagher, as with Eva Mozes Kor, she died and broke my heart. She had a peace movement in Northern Ireland. She had family members who were part of the difficulties there, what they called “the troubles.” And she said, “Come to Northern Ireland and help us understand forgiveness alongside the quest for justice.” And so I came, and she introduced me to school principals there. And at first, the school principals, rightly so, were skeptical of the idea of forgiveness, because they thought we were moving directly into political realm. The Irish Catholics versus British Protestants. No. No. No. We're interested in children in what they do when another child pushes the one down and skins the person's knee, or steals your orange at the lunch counter. And so, we're more interested in the person-to-person issues within their own community, you see, so that eventually as they develop their forgiveness muscle, as we say, and become more forgivingly fit, they might, if they so choose, start applying that in the political realm.

And I had had the same thing with a school superintendent in the West Bank, where he said, “The anger we have within our community here in the Middle East is destroying within our own community, individuals, families and the local community. Could you help us reduce our anger level, by practicing forgiveness locally?” And we have done that. And so, the key is to not get involved in the political realm first, to get involved with the individual human heart, the family, and the local community and let's see where that develops. That is actually one of my big goals. My big dreams with this work I've been doing for 38 years, is to change the peace movement, where it brings forgiveness into the conversation, not just to usurp anything that's been done. But, dialogue by itself can appear very neat and tidy and respectful, but away from the peace table, if the hearts aren't right, hatred can continue. I want to see forgiveness as part of dialogue and as part of solutions alongside justice.

Mills: It sounds as if you're working a lot with the younger generations. And, I'm wondering if in some instances we're just going to have to wait for the next group of children, effectively, to become adults, in order to work through some of these issues? I mean, I think of the Middle East in particular, even what we're seeing between Russia and Ukraine right now.

Enright: That's right. I think that's extremely insightful, actually. And, that's correct. I think we need to bring two generations of children and adolescents through forgiveness, so they mature in that. They become, as I had said before, forgivingly fit, so that they can apply that alongside other issues that have been tried. Okay. How long is it going to take if we bring two generations through? Which is what? About 20 to 40 years? How long has the difficulties been going on in Northern Ireland? Hundreds of years. How long in the Middle East? Thousands. And so, is 40 years an exhausted amount of time where we should forget it? No. That's a blink of an eye. I think we should try this by having the humility to say, “Those who come after us might find a better way.”

Mills: So, you mentioned you've been at this for 38 years. What keeps you going? What are you working on now? What are the questions that you still need to answer?

Enright: Okay. What keeps me going is the passion for what we find. It has actually surprised me, the strength of the findings when people are gravely hurting psychologically, and are healed from, let's say, major depressive disorder. And that gives me a hope, and the hope keeps me going, that we can indeed create a better world, one heart at a time. And so, I would say on the table as my wishlist, more insight that forgiveness education is worthwhile for children and adolescents. And, here's a big one, community forgiveness. And we're actually starting to work on that in different war-torn communities, especially in Africa.

We've been approached by four different communities in different geographic areas of Africa. Coming to us, saying, “Can you help us? We have had civil wars.” I just had a meeting this past week with someone from an African community who told me one million people, Kim, one million people have died in this century from the civil wars. And he said, “We need to bring forgiveness into communities, into individual hearts, families and communities, and then community to community.” But see, both communities have to be astute enough and motivated enough to become well-versed in forgiveness. And then, what will happen? I want to find out.

Mills: Well, Dr. Enright, I want to thank you for joining me today. This is extremely important work that you're doing. Thank you so much.

Enright: Thank you so much for having me, Kim.

Mills: You can find previous episodes of Speaking of Psychology on our website at www.speakingofpsychology.org , or on Apple, Stitcher, YouTube, or wherever you get your favorite podcasts. And, if you like what you've heard, please leave us a review. If you have comments or ideas for future podcasts, you can email us at [email protected] . Speaking of Psychology is produced by Lea Winerman. Our sound editor is Chris Condayan. 

Thank you for listening. For the American Psychological Association, I'm Kim Mills.

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Episode 247: T he power of forgiving those who’ve hurt you, with Robert Enright, PhD

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• Robert Enright
• International Forgiveness Institute
• “ Forgiveness can improve mental and physical health ” ( Monitor on Psychology , January 2017)

Speaking of Psychology

Speaking of Psychology is an audio podcast series highlighting some of the latest, most important, and relevant psychological research being conducted today.

Produced by the American Psychological Association, these podcasts will help listeners apply the science of psychology to their everyday lives.

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Your host: Kim I. Mills

Kim I. Mills is senior director of strategic external communications and public affairs for the American Psychological Association, where she has worked since 2007. Mills led APA’s foray into social media and envisioned and launched APA’s award-winning podcast series Speaking of Psychology  in 2013. A former reporter and editor for The Associated Press, Mills has also written for publications including The Washington Post , Fast Company , American Journalism Review , Dallas Morning News , MSNBC.com and Harvard Business Review .

In her 30+-year career in communications, Mills has extensive media experience, including being interviewed by The New York Times , The Washington Post , The Wall Street Journal , and other top-tier print media. She has appeared on CNN, Good Morning America , Hannity and Colmes , CSPAN, and the BBC, to name a few of her broadcast engagements. Mills holds a bachelor’s degree in biology from Barnard College and a master’s in journalism from New York University.

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Essay on Forgiveness

Introduction

Have you ever held onto a grudge against someone who wronged you? Like when your sibling broke your favorite toy, but you eventually forgave them.

Forgiveness, a concept as old as humanity itself, holds profound significance in the human experience. The deliberate choice to let go of feelings of anger or retribution toward someone who has mistreated us forms the foundation of emotional healing and inner peace. In this essay, we delve into the transformative power of forgiveness, exploring its psychological, emotional, and even physical benefits. Through real-life examples and universal insights, we uncover how forgiveness transcends cultural and religious boundaries, offering a path to reconciliation, personal growth, and the restoration of human connections.

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Understanding Forgiveness

Forgiveness is a profound and complex concept that holds considerable sway in human relationships and emotional well-being. Fundamentally, forgiving someone means letting go of unpleasant feelings like rage, bitterness, and the need for vengeance against them. However, it is essential to understand that forgiveness does not imply condoning or excusing the harmful actions of others. Instead, it is a conscious and intentional decision to release oneself from the emotional burden of the offense.

• Release of Negative Emotions : Forgiveness entails acknowledging the pain caused by the offense while actively choosing to release the accompanying negative emotions. By relinquishing feelings of anger and resentment, individuals free themselves from the emotional turmoil that can otherwise consume them.
• Acceptance and Understanding : Central to forgiveness is accepting the reality of what has occurred. It involves accepting that the offense has happened and recognizing its impact on one’s life. Moreover, forgiveness often requires understanding the offender’s perspective, empathizing with their motivations or circumstances, and recognizing their humanity despite their actions.
• Emotional Healing and Liberation : Forgiveness is a transformative process that promotes emotional healing and liberation. Individuals experience a sense of inner peace and freedom by letting go of grudges and resentments. Forgiveness sets people free from the chains of the past and allows them to move on with their lives without being bound by negative feelings.
• A Path to Personal Growth : A practice of forgiving can result in significant personal development. It fosters resilience, compassion, and empathy , allowing individuals to cultivate healthier relationships and navigate future conflicts with greater maturity and understanding.
• The Power of Choice : Forgiveness is ultimately a choice—an active decision made by the individual. It is not always easy, and the process may be gradual and nonlinear. However, by choosing to forgive, individuals reclaim agency over their emotional well-being and refuse to allow the actions of others to dictate their inner state.
• Transcending Victimhood : Forgiveness enables individuals to transcend the role of the victim and reclaim their power. Forgiveness empowers individuals to rewrite their narratives rather than be defined by past hurts, embracing resilience and strength in adversity.

The Human Experience of Hurt

When someone hurts us, it’s like a punch to the gut, leaving us feeling angry, betrayed, or even broken. This hurt can come in many forms—words that cut deep, actions that leave scars, or betrayals that shatter trust. It’s the pain that weighs heavy on our hearts and refuses to let us forget. Holding onto this hurt can feel like carrying around a backpack full of bricks, dragging us down and making every step harder.

• Types of Hurt : Hurt comes in all shapes and sizes. It could be the sting of a friend’s betrayal, the pain of a loved one’s rejection, or the scars left by emotional abuse. Whatever the source, it leaves a mark on our hearts and minds.
• The Weight of Resentment : Holding onto hurt can feel like nursing a grudge. It’s comparable to expecting the other person to perish after consuming poison. But instead of hurting them, we end up hurting ourselves, letting bitterness and anger eat away from us.
• The Toll on Well-being : Carrying around all that hurt isn’t just emotionally draining-it also takes a toll on our mental and physical health. It can affect our immune systems and general health and cause stress, worry, and despair.
• Breaking the Cycle : It’s difficult to escape the vicious circle of pain and hatred. It means facing the pain head-on, acknowledging our hurt, and accepting that feeling angry or upset is okay. But it also means recognizing that holding onto that hurt isn’t doing us any favors.
• Choosing Healing : Forgiveness isn’t about excusing the other person’s actions or pretending that what they did was okay. It’s about letting go of the hurt and moving forward with our lives. It’s a way of taking back control and refusing to let past pain define our future.

The Act of Forgiveness

Forgiveness is not merely a passive response to wrongdoing but an active and intentional process that requires conscious effort and emotional maturity. It involves several key components and steps, each crucial to reconciliation and healing.

1. Choosing Forgiveness

• Conscious Decision : Forgiveness begins with deliberately letting go of resentment, bitterness, and the desire for retaliation. It’s a decision to release oneself from the emotional burden of holding onto anger and grudges.
• Empowerment : Choosing forgiveness empowers individuals to take control of their emotional well-being and refuse to allow past hurts to define their present and future. It’s an assertion of agency and autonomy over one’s own life.

2. Acceptance and Compassion

• Acknowledgment of Hurt : Forgiveness involves acknowledging the pain and suffering caused by the wrongdoing. It requires individuals to confront what has happened and understand their emotions.
• Compassion Towards the Offender : Central to forgiveness is cultivating compassion and empathy toward the person who has wronged us. This means recognizing their humanity, understanding their perspective, and acknowledging that everyone can make mistakes.

3. The Process of Letting Go

• Releasing Resentment : Forgiveness entails letting go of resentment, anger, and hostility towards the offender. It’s about freeing oneself from the emotional shackles of negativity and allowing space for healing and growth.
• Moving Forward : Forgiveness is not about forgetting or excusing the wrongdoing but about choosing to move forward with one’s life. It’s a commitment to not allowing past hurts to hinder personal progress and well-being.

4. Embracing Healing and Restoration

• Emotional Healing : Forgiveness promotes emotional healing and liberation from past pain. It allows individuals to experience inner peace, joy, and resilience in adversity.
• Restoration of Relationships : Sometimes, forgiveness can restore relationships and rebuild trust. It fosters open communication, mutual understanding, and a renewed individual connection.

5. Practice and Persistence

• Ongoing Process : Forgiveness is a journey rather than a destination. It requires ongoing practice, patience, and perseverance. Setbacks and challenges may occur along the way, but each step toward forgiveness brings individuals closer to healing and wholeness.
• Self-Reflection and Growth : Forgiveness practice provides individuals with an opportunity for self-reflection and personal growth. It enables them to cultivate empathy, resilience, and compassion, enriching their lives and relationships.

Overcoming Challenges in Forgiveness

Forgiveness is a noble pursuit, but it’s not always easy. Along the journey, individuals may encounter numerous challenges and obstacles that test their resolve and commitment to resisting resentment. However, by acknowledging these challenges and learning how to navigate them, they can unlock the transformative power of forgiveness and experience healing and inner peace.

• Facing the Pain : One of the biggest challenges in forgiveness is facing the pain caused by the offense. Although it’s normal to desire to repress or avoid unpleasant feelings, real healing can only start when we face them head-on. This calls for bravery, openness, and a readiness to recognize and communicate emotions.
• Letting Go of Anger and Bitterness : Anger and bitterness can act as barriers to forgiveness, trapping us in a cycle of negativity and resentment. Overcoming these emotions requires conscious effort and self-reflection. It involves recognizing the toll that holding onto anger takes on our well-being and choosing to release it, even when it feels difficult or uncomfortable.
• Dealing with Trust Issues : Betrayal and hurt can shatter trust, making forgiving and moving forward in a relationship challenging. Rebuilding trust takes time and patience, and it often involves setting boundaries and communicating openly with the person who hurt us. Forgiveness is allowing ourselves to trust again, even if carefully. It does not imply forgetting or endorsing the behavior.
• Navigating Reconciliation : In some cases, forgiveness may lead to reconciliation and the restoration of the relationship. However, this isn’t always possible or advisable, especially if the offense is severe or the other person hasn’t shown genuine remorse. Navigating the complexities of reconciliation requires discernment, self-awareness, and a commitment to prioritizing one’s well-being.
• Coping with Relapses : Forgiveness is a process, like any journey, with ups and downs. Sometimes, we feel like we’ve fully forgiven someone, only to have old feelings of anger and resentment resurface unexpectedly. Coping with these relapses requires self-compassion, patience, and a willingness to recommit to forgiveness.
• Finding Closure : Closure is essential to forgiveness but is not always easy to attain. Sometimes, closure comes from within, as we find peace and acceptance within ourselves. Other times, closure may involve external factors, such as receiving an apology or making amends with the person who hurt us. We must move forward and find healing regardless of how we achieve closure.

The Transformational Power of Forgiveness

Forgiveness is not merely letting go of resentment; it can potentially profoundly transform individuals and relationships. This transformational power stems from several key aspects of the forgiveness process, each contributing to healing, growth, and restoration.

1. Liberation from Emotional Bondage

• Release from Bitterness : Forgiveness liberates individuals from the heavy burden of bitterness and resentment that can weigh down the heart and soul. By letting go of negative emotions, individuals experience a newfound sense of lightness and freedom.
• Emotional Healing : Forgiveness promotes emotional healing by allowing individuals to process and release pent-up emotions such as anger, hurt, and sadness. It creates space for healing wounds and nurturing inner peace.

2. Cultivating Inner Peace and Serenity

• Inner Tranquility : Forgiveness fosters a sense of inner peace and tranquility by eliminating the internal turmoil caused by holding onto grudges and resentments. It enables individuals to experience greater emotional equilibrium and stability.
• Reduced Stress and Anxiety : Letting go of negative emotions through forgiveness can reduce stress and anxiety levels. By relinquishing the mental and emotional burden of past hurts, individuals experience a greater sense of calmness and relaxation.

3. Strengthening Relationships and Building Trust

• Restoration of Trust : Forgiveness has the power to repair damaged relationships and rebuild trust between individuals. It fosters open communication , honesty, and vulnerability, laying the foundation for renewed connection and intimacy.
• Deepening Empathy and Understanding : Individuals develop a deeper sense of empathy and understanding toward others through forgiveness. They become more attuned to the complexities of human nature and more compassionate in their interactions.

4. Empowerment and Personal Growth

• Self-Empowerment : Forgiveness empowers individuals to reclaim control over their lives and emotions. It turns the emphasis from victimization to empowerment, empowering people to take control of their own stories and overcome their circumstances.
• Personal Transformation : Forgiveness catalyzes personal growth and transformation by fostering resilience, compassion, and wisdom. It enables people to grow, learn from their experiences, and develop a stronger sense of authenticity and self-awareness.

5. Building a Foundation for a Better Future

• Breaking Generational Patterns : Forgiveness breaks the cycle of hurt and resentment, preventing the perpetuation of intergenerational trauma and conflict. It paves the way for a healthier and more harmonious future for oneself and future generations.
• Creating a Culture of Compassion : Forgiveness can ripple outward, creating a culture of compassion, empathy, and understanding. As individuals extend forgiveness to others, they inspire others to do the same, fostering a healing and reconciliation ripple effect in communities and societies.

Real-Life Examples

Forgiveness isn’t just a theoretical concept; it’s a lived experience, often demonstrated through the inspiring stories of individuals who have found the strength to forgive in the face of immense pain and adversity. Real-life examples of forgiveness are powerful testimonies of the transformative power of resisting resentment and embracing compassion. Here are some detailed descriptions of real-life examples of forgiveness:

• Nelson Mandela and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission : Nelson Mandela, the renowned pioneer of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a prime example of forgiveness’s efficacy. Rather than seeking vengeance against the perpetrators of apartheid, Mandela chose to pursue reconciliation and healing for the nation. The TRC gave victims and offenders a forum to discuss historical atrocities, tell their tales, and ask for forgiveness. Mandela’s commitment to forgiveness and reconciliation played a pivotal role in fostering national unity and healing the wounds of apartheid.
• Eva Kor and Forgiving the Nazis : Eva Kor, a Holocaust survivor and advocate for forgiveness, experienced unimaginable horrors during her time at Auschwitz concentration camp. Despite enduring unspeakable suffering at the hands of the Nazis, Kor made the remarkable decision to forgive her captors. In an act of profound courage and compassion, she publicly forgave the Nazis during a visit to Auschwitz, stating that forgiveness was her way of reclaiming power over her own life. Kor’s journey of forgiveness is a testament to the transformative power of letting go of hatred and embracing forgiveness, even in the most harrowing circumstances.
• Immaculée Ilibagiza and Forgiving the Rwandan Genocide : Immaculée Ilibagiza, a survivor of the Rwandan genocide, experienced unimaginable loss and trauma during the ethnic violence that swept through Rwanda in 1994. Despite witnessing the brutal murder of her family members and enduring unimaginable suffering, Ilibagiza found the strength to forgive those who had perpetrated the atrocities. Through prayer, meditation, and deep introspection, she could release the burden of hatred and resentment and embrace a path of forgiveness and reconciliation. Ilibagiza’s journey of forgiveness demonstrates the transformative power of forgiveness in healing deep-seated wounds and rebuilding communities torn apart by violence and conflict.
• The Amish Community’s Response to the Nickel Mines Shooting : In 2006, a tragic shooting occurred at an Amish schoolhouse in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, resulting in the deaths of five young girls and injuries to several others. Despite the devastation and grief caused by the senseless act of violence, the Amish community responded with an extraordinary display of forgiveness and compassion. Instead of seeking revenge or harboring bitterness, members of the Amish community extended forgiveness to the gunman and his family, offering support and compassion amid their pain. The community’s response to the tragedy exemplifies the transformative power of forgiveness in overcoming tragedy and fostering reconciliation.

Forgiveness as a Universal Human Experience

Forgiveness transcends cultural, religious, and geographical boundaries, making it a universal aspect of the human experience. Across cultures and throughout history, individuals and societies have grappled with the complexities of forgiveness, recognizing its profound impact on personal well-being, relationships, and social cohesion. Here’s how forgiveness manifests as a universal human experience:

• Inherent Human Imperfection : Forgiveness acknowledges human beings’ inherent fallibility. Everyone makes mistakes and experiences hurt and pain regardless of culture or background. Forgiveness recognizes that no one is immune to errors or immune to being harmed by others.
• The Need for Healing : Forgiveness arises from the universal need for healing and reconciliation, regardless of cultural context. When individuals experience harm or betrayal, the desire to find resolution and move past the pain is a fundamental aspect of the human condition.
• Cultural and Religious Perspectives : While the specific practices and rituals surrounding forgiveness may vary across cultures and religions, the underlying principles remain consistent. Virtually all major religions and ethical traditions emphasize the importance of forgiveness as a path to spiritual growth, inner peace, and social harmony.
• Human Capacity for Empathy : At its core, forgiveness requires empathy—the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. This capacity for empathy is a universal trait inherent in human nature, enabling individuals to recognize the humanity in themselves and others, even amid conflict and hurt.
• The Role of Social Bonds : Forgiveness deeply intertwines with the fabric of social relationships. Whether within families, communities, or larger societies, the ability to forgive strengthens social bonds, fosters trust, and promotes cooperation and collective well-being.
• Cross-Cultural Examples : Examples of forgiveness can be found in every corner of the globe, from the indigenous practice of restorative justice among Native American tribes to the concepts of “Ubuntu” in African cultures, emphasizing interconnectedness and mutual support. Similarly, historical examples such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and the forgiveness demonstrated by Holocaust survivors exemplify forgiveness as a universal human phenomenon.
• Shared Human Experience : Ultimately, forgiveness is a shared human experience that transcends individual differences and unites us in our common humanity. Regardless of culture, language, or background, the capacity to forgive—and to seek forgiveness—is an essential aspect of human existence.

Forgiveness is a beacon of hope in the human experience, offering healing, reconciliation, and the possibility of a brighter future. From the personal to the global level, forgiveness transcends boundaries, cultures, and religions, embodying the innate resilience and capacity for compassion within us all. As we embrace forgiveness, we free ourselves from the shackles of resentment and bitterness and sow the seeds of understanding, empathy, and peace.

Mahatma Gandhi famously said, “The weak can never forgive. Forgiveness is the attribute of the strong.”

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"The Meaning of Forgiveness"

Author:  King, Martin Luther, Jr.

Date:  January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1954 ?

Genre:  Sermon

Topic:  Martin Luther King, Jr. - Career in Ministry Martin Luther King, Jr. - Education Martin Luther King, Jr. - Political and Social Views

“…His father saw him, and had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him.”  1

• There are sins of temperament—vindictiveness, stubborness, jealously, bad temper, malacious gossip. How much more prevalent they are; how much more harm they do.
• There are sins of social attitude
• There are the sins of neglect. It is not alone the things that we do, but the things we have left undone that haunt us—the letters we did not write, the words we did not speak, the opportunity we did not take. How often Jesus stressed this sin. What was wrong with that one talent man who buried his talent. What did he do? That was the trouble—he did nothing; he missed his chance. 2 So here they are—sins of passion, sins of temperment, sins of social attitude, sins of neglect. I suspect that every one here fits into one of these categories: So stay with us; you too need forgiveness
• Aeschylus’ Orestes 3
• The Scarlet—Arthur Dimmesdale 4
• Psychiatry—Most of the cases of metal derangement of a functional type are due to a sense of guilt.
• First of all it is a pardon. It is a fresh start, another chance, a new beginning.
• Second, forgiveness is a process of life and the Christian weapon of social redemption. Forgiveness is alway spoken of for others. Give Peter’s attempt to put it in legal and statistical terms. 5 Here then is the Christian weapon against social evil. We are to go outwith the spirt of forgiveness, heal the hurts, right the wrongs and change society with forgiveness. Of course we dont think this is practical. This is the solution of the race problem.

1.  Cf. Luke 15:20.

2.  Cf. Matthew 25:14–30.

3.  Aeschylus (525–456 BCE) was an Athenian dramatist whose works included the trilogy  Oresteia . The protagonist, Orestes, murdered his mother and her lover, but was eventually forgiven by the Areopagus thanks to the intervention of Athena, the goddess of wisdom.

4.  At the end of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s  Scarlet Letter  (1850), Reverend Arthur Dimmesdale revealed that he was the father of Hester Prynne’s illegitimate child and asked God to forgive them both.

5.  King may refer to Matthew 18:21–22: “Then came Peter to him, and said, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee, Until seven times; but, Until seventy times seven.”

Source:  CSKC-INP, Coretta Scott King Collection, In Private Hands, Sermon file, folder 16, "Meaning of Forgiveness" / "Questions Easter Answers."

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Reasons to be hardworking, forgiving, honest and trustworthy.

Being forgiving is a difficult trait to have especially if someone damaged one badly. The time when the person I trusted the most in the world, my best friend stole from my family and stabbed me in the back, it taught me that in order...

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Unforgiveness Steals Away Your Joy, Peace, and Happiness

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Analysis of the Article Intellectual Humility and Forgiveness of Religious Conflict

The article, “Intellectual Humility and Forgiveness of Religious Conflict.’, discusses a study regarding religious conflict. One of the authors begins by giving a detailed synopsis of what their experience was a undergraduate in religious studies. They often found themselves in conversations with people of other...

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Gratitude and the Act of Giving on Valentine's Day

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The Scarlet Letter: Hester Prynne Deserved and Earned Forgiveness

Have you ever made a terrible mistake and no matter how much you tried to fix it you can’t stop getting it from following you in life? In the novel The Scarlet Letter, by Nathainel Hawthrone the main character Hester Prynne knows how you feel....

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Enright's Four Stages of Forgiveness: Personal Account

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Ritualized Forgiveness and Confession in Christianity

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The Freeing Nature of Genuine Forgiveness

“I don’t like you, okay?” She shot back at Lance on the phone. “I don’t date men anymore. Men are a waste of precious time!” The words stung him. He told her good night and never called back again. Cara was angry and bitter. She...

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Best topics on Forgiveness

1. Reasons to Be Hardworking, Forgiving, Honest and Trustworthy

2. Unforgiveness Steals Away Your Joy, Peace, and Happiness

3. Analysis of the Article Intellectual Humility and Forgiveness of Religious Conflict

4. Gratitude and the Act of Giving on Valentine’s Day

5. The Scarlet Letter: Hester Prynne Deserved and Earned Forgiveness

6. Enright’s Four Stages of Forgiveness: Personal Account

7. Ritualized Forgiveness and Confession in Christianity

8. The Freeing Nature of Genuine Forgiveness

9. The People Who Shaped My Story

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The Ethics of Forgiveness: A Collection of Essays

Christel Fricke (ed.), The Ethics of Forgiveness: A Collection of Essays , Routledge, 2011, 212pp., $125.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780415885430.

Reviewed by Linda Radzik, Texas A&M University

Christel Fricke's rich collection of essays arose from a conference held in Oslo in 2008 on Charles L. Griswold's 2007 book Forgiveness . However, very little of the text is spent critiquing Griswold's work. Instead, Fricke's authors use Griswold's text as a map that points to areas worthy of further exploration. Like Griswold, most of these writers resist the temptation to develop simple, unified accounts of forgiveness and instead dedicate themselves to plotting the complexities of human interaction in the aftermath of wrongdoing. The examples the authors use along the way range from subtle, personal failings to large-scale atrocities. While most of the contributions are works in moral theory, the volume also represents other disciplinary approaches to issues of forgiveness, including literary criticism and linguistics. The result is a satisfyingly diverse range of perspectives on the nature, justification and limits of forgiveness.

Part I includes a pair of essays dedicated to the interpretation of particular, historical traditions of forgiveness. In "Forgiveness and Forbearance in Ancient China," Christoph Harbsmeier surveys the language of forgiveness in Chinese, arguing that, "for a Chinese person to forgive, is always to forgive 'in terms of' one of the concepts outlined" (21). Harbsmeier goes on to present twenty-nine different terms in ancient and modern Chinese related to "forgiveness." To me, their differences were not as remarkable as their similarity. All seemed to portray forgiveness as a matter of letting the wrongdoer off, in some way, from the possible consequences of wrongdoing. Shù , which Harbsmeier suggests as the best translation for 'forgiveness,' involves a general sort of empathetic forbearance.

So far, the virtue of shù will seem familiar enough to contemporary Westerners. But Harbsmeier emphasizes that it must be understood in a hierarchically structured culture, where, he tells us, "egalitarianism is not in any way envisaged or aspired to at any level, practical or psychological" (13). Shù is something one shows to people below oneself on the social scale. What one owes to people above oneself is, in contrast, zhong , "doing one's moral best" (22). When those above oneself commit wrongs, then, the question of forgiveness does not really arise. Instead the question for the underling is how to continue to do his duty to his superior in this new context. Harbsmeier's analysis helps explain, for example, why in China the question "whether they forgive or do not forgive Deng Xiaoping [for the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989] has become purely academic (i.e., quite irrelevant)" (14).

Ilaria E. Ramelli's contribution on forgiveness in Christian thought argues that what is almost invariably labeled as "the Christian view" is historically inaccurate. It is commonplace for contemporary writers on the ethics of forgiveness to assert that Christianity requires its followers to forgive wrongs unconditionally , that is, to forgive whether or not their abusers have met any conditions, such as apologizing, repenting or making amends. Ramelli painstakingly reviews an impressive range of ancient sources to show that, throughout the early history of Christianity, forgiveness was always predicated on repentance. Her argument is so convincing that I was left wondering how it has come to be that most contemporary writers -- and, I would add, all my students who self-identify as Christians -- have come to see a commitment to unconditional forgiveness as central to Christianity.

Part II on "Forgiveness and Selfhood" begins with Fricke's contribution, "What We Cannot Do to Each Other: On Forgiveness and Moral Vulnerability." Fricke provides an admirable description of the normative terrain of forgiveness and specifically the interconnections between moral and social norms. Fricke anchors her discussion of forgiveness in a social, relational understanding of the nature and consequences of moral wrongdoing. Wrongdoing damages the trust that normally marks relations among victims, wrongdoers and their communities; forgiveness is one way of repairing that damage.

Fricke goes on to emphasize that, as complex selves, we relate to one another, not just as moral agents, but also as friends, partners and neighbors. This leads her to distinguish between personal forgiveness, in which personal relationships such as friendships are repaired, and moral forgiveness, in which victims come to once again see their abusers as having intrinsic moral value as human beings. She argues plausibly that one may morally forgive a wrongdoer without personally forgiving. I was less convinced by her claim that "personal forgiveness always implies moral forgiveness" because "any close personal relationship includes mutual respect of moral value or dignity" (63). Might not someone who does not value humanity as such (say, a mafia hitman) value his personal relationships (with other mafiosos)? This combination of attitudes may not be able to be held in a fully, rationally consistent way, but it seems psychologically possible. The last portion of the essay poses the question of whether wrongdoers can deserve forgiveness and victims can be morally required to forgive in either of the two senses of forgiveness; however, Fricke provides no clear answers to those questions.

The next pair of articles pursues Griswold's claim that forgiveness requires a narration of the past, one which will both acknowledge its wrongful character yet allow for the forgiver to overcome her negative attitudes toward the wrongdoer. Garry L. Hagberg and Peter Goldie each ask how this might work in cases of self-forgiveness. Both worry whether "in self-forgiveness there is not the possibility of a narrative accounting from an appropriate distanced perspective" (Goldie, 83-4). In "Self-Forgiveness and the Narrative Sense of Self," Goldie suggests that such distancing is enabled by the wrongdoer's ability to think about herself in a way that is "essentially ironic" and involves seeing one's past, wrongdoing self as, in a sense, another person (87):

This opens up the epistemic and evaluative ironic gap that is at the heart of the notion of narrative: an epistemic gap because one now knows what one did not know then; and an evaluative gap because one can now take an evaluative stance which differs from the stance that one took then (87).

Hagberg, in "Forgiveness and the Constitution of Selfhood," rejects this dyadic view of the self as phenomenologically inaccurate. Instead, he believes that self-forgiveness is enabled by "one identity seeing bi-focally, not two persons gazing from a distance upon each other" (75). Hagberg draws on literary concepts to explain his view, comparing self-forgiveness to the experience of reading fiction, wherein "we simultaneously identify with a character in fiction but also stand apart from that narratively-entwined persona" (75). For Hagberg, this narrative process is not performed by a later self that is independently distinguishable from the wrongdoing self, but is instead what constitutes the new, forgivable self. Both Goldie's and Hagberg's essays provide satisfyingly complex examples of processes of self-forgiveness. Goldie's essay is also notable for its discussion of the odd case of self-pardoning, in which one regards one's own action as involuntary on the grounds that the circumstances overstrained one's nature without actually undermining one's freedom.

Part III includes six essays that address the limits of forgiveness, that is, a variety of possible restrictions on the possibility or permissibility of forgiveness. For example, almost all theorists of forgiveness claim that forgiveness is not possible where there is no wrong. But in "Forgiveness Without Blame," Espen Gamlund defends the position that forgiveness can occur even when harm-causing is not blameworthy but rather excused or justified. Cases of agent-regret (such as the regret felt by an unlucky driver who faultlessly kills a child), disagreements over culpability between the harmed and the harm-causer, and moral dilemmas all present disruptions to peace of mind and social relations that can be solved by the sorts of interactions and changes in view that we associate with forgiveness and self-forgiveness. While critics may insist that forgiveness requires culpability by definition, Gamlund's discussion will lead many readers to find such a stipulation unsatisfying.

A major debate in the literature on forgiveness is whether forgiveness is "conditional," meaning that forgiveness is only appropriate in cases where the wrongdoer has met some sort of requirement, such as repentance or moral improvement. Jerome Neu's essay, "On Loving Our Enemies," defends the conditional view. Drawing on work by Jeffrie Murphy, Neu argues that resentment is a morally appropriate reaction to being victimized that can be set aside only for a moral reason. Also working within a conditional framework, Arne Johan Vetlesen asks whether there are cases where no moral reason could justify forgiveness and where forgiveness is, therefore, wrong. In this rather unwieldy essay, Vetlesen emphasizes the relevance of the characteristics of the wrongful acts themselves, rather than the characteristics of the agents who perform the acts, claiming that "some acts are worse, morally speaking, than any individual agent" (161).

Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, in contrast to Neu and Vetlesen, defend the position that forgiveness is unconditional by addressing objections posed by Griswold and others. The authors argue that some critics of unconditional forgiveness conflate two senses in which forgiveness can be unconditional: "(1) forgiving no matter what condition the wrongdoer is in; and (2) forgiving no matter what the reason for doing so is" (102). While defending the view that "there is sufficient reason to forgive a wrongdoer whatever his state of mind" (97), Garrard and McNaughton go on to identify reasons for extending such unmerited forgiveness. While the points made in favor of unconditional forgiveness are perhaps not novel, the skill with which the issues are explained and defended makes this essay a good candidate for course syllabuses on forgiveness.

Geoffrey Scarre strays slightly from the theme of forgiveness to look at issues of apology. In "Apologising for Historic Injustices," Scarre dives into the controversy surrounding Australia's official apology to the "Stolen Generations," which addressed the century-long practice of removing aboriginal children from their parents' care, a practice that ended only in the late 1960s or early 1970s. In 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivered an official apology for this history, which was met with general approval from both the aboriginal and settler populations. Scarre argues that the apology was not appropriate because the people doing the apologizing did not have "ownership" of the wrongful deeds. While he defends the legitimacy of "insider-regret," a particular form of negative reactive attitude towards one's group's historical injustices, Scarre denies that this attitude can ground the practice of apology. Debates about the nature of collective responsibility are well established in the literature and are not much advanced by the arguments to be found here. However, Scarre's essay does provide opportunity for reflection on the nature and functions of apology. Scarre's clear and straightforward account of when an apology can be given and what functions it can perform is quite narrow and so leaves the reader reflecting on what a broader concept of apology might look like.

Finally, literary scholar Jakob Lothe provides a reading of W. G. Sebald's novel Austerlitz . Sebald was a writer who was born in Germany in 1944 but who lived most of his adult life in England. His fiction and non-fiction writings have become important to current discussions of how German identity has been shaped by the memory of World War II and the Holocaust. The narrator of the novel, who, like Sebald, is a German exile of the immediate postwar generation, develops an unusual friendship with a Jewish man who survived the Holocaust as a child and is now attempting to recover the story of his parents' lives and deaths in the camps. Lothe argues that Sebald's narrative techniques reveal that the main theme of the novel is forgiveness. This claim remains puzzling for much of the essay, but by the end it becomes clear that Lothe's theme is not 'what is involved in granting forgiveness,' but instead 'what it is like to feel the need to be forgiven for the injustices of previous generations.' As such, the essay is fruitfully paired with Scarre's contribution.

Griswold, C. L., Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration , Cambridge University Press, (2007).

Murphy, J. G. and J. Hampton (eds.), Forgiveness and Mercy , Cambridge University Pres, (1988).

Murphy, J. G., Getting Even , Oxford University Press, (2003).

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Forgiveness

To forgive is to respond in a particular way to someone who has treated someone badly or wrongly. Forgiveness is therefore a dyadic relation involving a wrongdoer and a wronged party, and is thought to be a way in which victims of wrongdoing alter both their and a wrongdoer’s status by, for instance, acknowledging yet moving past a moral transgression. Commonly, forgiveness is thought to involve the giving up of certain negative emotions towards the wrongdoer, the forbearance of negative reactions against the wrongdoer, and possibly the restoration of the relationship with the wrongdoer. Much philosophical discussion of forgiveness centers on three primary questions: (1) What is the nature of forgiveness—what must one do in order to forgive; (2) Who has standing to forgive—when is one in a position to forgive a wrongdoer; and (3) What are the norms governing forgiveness—when is forgiveness morally good, right, or praiseworthy?

1. Forgiveness as a Response to Wrongdoing

2.1 justification, 2.3 condonation, 2.4 pardon and mercy, 2.5 reconciliation, 3. the ends of forgiveness, 4. standing to forgive, 5.1 emotion accounts, 5.2 butlerian accounts, 5.3 punishment-forbearance accounts, 5.4 multiple-stage accounts, 5.5 performative accounts, 5.6 pluralist accounts, 6. self-forgiveness, 7. divine forgiveness, 8. political forgiveness, 9.1 forgiveness as a virtue, 9.2 norms governing instances of forgiveness, 9.3 skepticism about the morality of forgiveness, 10. the science of forgiveness, other internet resources, related entries.

An inevitable and unfortunate fact of life is that we are often mistreated by others. Forgiveness concerns one kind of response to those who wrong us. From the ancient Greeks to the present day, forgiveness has typically been regarded as a personal response to having been injured or wronged, or as a condition one seeks or hopes is bestowed upon one for having wronged someone else.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘forgivable’, the first entry under the general term ‘forgive’, as that which “may be forgiven, pardonable, excusable”, referring thereby to the quality of deserving to be forgiven. Notwithstanding the association with excusing conditions, forgiving is not, strictly speaking, equivalent to excusing. For wrongdoing that is excused entirely, there is nothing to forgive, since (as we shall see) agents who are fully excused are not blameworthy or culpable. Moreover, the application of the concept of forgiveness to non-moral behavior, as in the case of a forgivably poor musical performance by a pianist, shows that forgiveness is not always or necessarily a moral term. For this reason, there may be similar practices of forgiveness in non-moral arenas of normative appraisal (Haji 1998). However, we shall focus here on forgiveness as it pertains to moral appraisal and moral responsibility. Further, while most of our discussion will be focused on forgiveness for conduct, we note the possibility that one may also be forgiven for one’s character or the kind of person one is (Bell 2008).

2. Cognate Phenomena

Sometimes we do things that appear to be morally wrong. Suppose I see you, a total stranger, take a pear from a fruit stand and walk off with it. I reproach you for having stolen the pear into which you are now happily chomping. Yet you explain that you own that fruit stand and have not stolen anything. In giving this kind of explanation, you are offering a justification for your action—you are claiming that despite appearances to the contrary, your taking the pear was morally permissible. Offering justifications is commonplace in our moral lives. But justification and forgiveness ought to be distinguished. When conduct is justified, this implies that the conduct was not morally wrong. But when conduct is forgiven, there is no such implication. Indeed, in most cases (if not all), what we are forgiven for are the morally wrong things we do. This is why it can be offensive when someone says that she forgives you when you have done nothing wrong.

Sometimes we do things that are indeed morally bad or impermissible, but for which we are not morally blameworthy. In such cases, so-called excusing conditions render an otherwise blameworthy agent not blameworthy . Recall our pear-taker. Suppose that you take the pear, not from your own fruit stand, but from your neighbor’s. You have done something that you ought not to have done. Even so, there may be facts about you or the context of your action that make it the case that you are not morally responsible and blameworthy. When we draw attention to these facts—that is, when we offer an excuse for our action—we are not claiming that what we did was not morally wrong. Rather, we concede that what we did was morally wrong, but we provide putative reasons for thinking that we are not morally responsible and blameworthy for having done so.

When conduct is excused, this entails that the agent who so acted is not morally responsible and blameworthy for that conduct. But when one is forgiven for one’s conduct, this does not entail that the wrongdoer was not morally responsible and blameworthy for her conduct. It is often claimed that a necessary condition for forgiveness is that the wrongdoer is morally blameworthy for her conduct (see, e.g., Bash 2007: 5; Haber 1991: 33; Murphy 2003; Allais 2008; and Hieronymi 2001). Perhaps this is true (although see Gamlund 2011). But we need not insist, as a matter of conceptual necessity, that forgiveness requires that agents be morally blameworthy in order to show how forgiveness and excuse are distinct. For even if there are certain cases in which one can be forgiven for non-culpably having done wrong (say, in moral dilemma cases), this does not change the fact that forgiven agents can be morally responsible and blameworthy but that agents who are excused are not morally responsible and blameworthy.

There are many ways to respond to wrongdoers who are blameworthy for their conduct. One such way is to condone their conduct (Hughes 1995). “Broadly speaking, to condone”, writes Charles Griswold, “is to collaborate in the lack of censure of an action, and perhaps to enable further wrong-doing by the offender” (2007: 46). What is it to collaborate in the lack of censure of an action? Griswold makes two suggestions:

One may condone in the sense of accepting while not disapproving (by not holding the wrong-doing against its author), or in the sense of tolerating while disapproving (a sort of “look the other way” or “putting up with” strategy). (2007: 46–7)

We can call the first kind of condoning—the one that involves accepting and not disapproving of conduct—A-condonation. We can call the second kind of condonation—the kind that involves disapproving of but tolerating conduct—D-condonation. A brief discussion can help us to see how each differs from forgiveness.

According to Garrard and McNaughton, when

we condone an action, we say in effect that it wasn’t really such a bad thing to do […] Condoning an action amounts to saying (correctly or incorrectly) that the action wasn’t really wrong. (2010: 85)

Jean Hampton also seems to have something like A-condonation in mind:

I will define ‘condonation’ as the acceptance, without moral protest (either inward or outward), of an action which ought to warrant such protest, made possible, first, by ridding oneself of the judgement that the action is wrong, so that its performer cannot be a wrongdoer, and, second, by ridding oneself of any of attendant feelings (such as those which are involved in resentment) which signify one’s protest of the action. (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 40)

In order to forgive, however, the victim must represent the putative recipient of forgiveness as one who did something morally wrong (or bad or vicious).

D-condonation occurs when an agent disapproves of someone’s conduct, but tolerates it. Griswold characterizes it as a sort of “look the other way” or “putting up with” strategy (2007). The forgiver, by contrast, does not paper over wrongdoing—she is prepared to blame, but forgoes it.

Two other considerations help distinguish condoning from forgiving. First, under typical circumstances, we can condone actions that are not wrongs against us (Haber 1991: 59–60). We cannot, however, at least in typical circumstances, forgive others for their wrongs against others. Second, while we forgive agents for their conduct (or perhaps their characters), when we condone, we condone the conduct (or the character). It is infelicitous to say, “I condone you for lying to me” whereas it makes perfect sense to say, “I forgive you for lying to me”.

The phrase “pardon me” frequently functions as an apology, which might precede an act of forgiveness, or be a plea or request for forgiveness, or some similar act of forbearance. And to pardon a wrongdoer often seems indistinguishable from forgiveness, perhaps especially in cases of minor wrong. However, the concept of pardon also refers to a familiar and important legal and political power quite unlike forgiveness. Black’s Law Dictionary defines this sense of pardon as “an act or an instance of officially nullifying punishment or other legal consequences of a crime”, ordinarily “granted by the chief executive of a government” (Garner 1999: 1137). In the United States, for example, the President has the authority to grant pardons for federal offenses, and state governors may pardon crimes against the state.

Although reasons for exercising the power of pardon often mimic those given for forgiving wrongdoers, one clear difference between pardon and forgiving is that the former is typically exercised by third-parties as opposed to the victims of wrong. As discussed below, standard philosophical views maintain that there are good reasons for thinking that, with one important exception, third-party forgiveness is impossible, inasmuch as forgiveness is the prerogative or right of the victim of wrong. Another difference is that a central idea in the legal and political concept of pardon is that of an offer that must be accepted in order to accomplish its partial or complete end, such as mitigation of a criminal punishment via commutation of a prison sentence (Bingham 2009). Although on some views forgiveness is also an offer, especially where reconciliation between a victim and wrongdoer is attempted (Tombs 2008), the main sense of forgiveness seems not to involve the idea of an offer at all, let alone an offer that must be accepted by the wrongdoer in order for forgiveness to occur and accomplish at least some of its ends, for example to discharge one’s duty to forgive others as commanded by God, or to move beyond a potentially paralyzing negative emotion.

Furthermore, acts of mercy in general are to be distinguished from acts of forgiveness (Murphy 1988; Murphy & Hampton 1988; Tosi & Warmke 2017). First, manifestations of mercy, but not forgiveness, are essentially overt. To extend or show mercy to someone who has acted badly is to engage in some overt behavior: a parent may lessen a guilty child’s punishment. Forgiveness, however, is not necessarily overt. It is possible to forgive privately; indeed philosophical discussions of forgiveness have focused predominantly on its private manifestations. Second, mercy is third-personal in a way that forgiveness is not. A boss may reprimand an employee for telling an inappropriate joke in the lunchroom even though termination would be justified and the boss herself is not personally offended by it. Here, a third-party shows mercy, and does so (we may presume) justifiably. But forgiveness, if it is ever third-personal, is not third-personal in this way. Barring exceptional circumstances, you cannot forgive me for the offense I caused to a co-worker—you simply lack the standing to forgive me for my offense to her . Mercy is not paradigmatically second-personal in this way. Third, mercy is often (if not always) connected to authority in a way that forgiveness is not. It is natural to think that in order for S to show mercy to P, S must be in some kind of position of authority over P. Interpersonal forgiveness, however, is tied to no such authority structures.

When we are wronged, this typically damages our relationship with the wrongdoer. Minor offenses might put strains on relationships that put burdens on both persons involved; serious offenses might lead the victim to terminate the relationship altogether. Further, when we blame others for their wrongs against us, we often do so at the cost of causing further relational damage. We might withhold expressions of good-will, or alter our behavior in ways that make clear that we no longer trust the other.

Although in many cases forgiveness will be accompanied by reconciliation, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for forgiveness. One reason for thinking that reconciliation is not necessary for forgiveness is that the offending party may be, for whatever reasons, unwilling to reconcile. But the fact that I am unwilling to restore our relationship does not, all by itself, make it impossible for you forgive me for the wrong I did to you. In other cases, reconciliation is practically impossible. Perhaps I have secretly moved to Fiji and you have no way to get in touch with me. You can forgive me whether or not you know I am in Fiji. In still other cases, restoring a relationship would be “morally unwise”, as Jean Hampton puts it (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 42–3, fn. 9). Doing so might expose one to additional psychological damage, for example. Neither does reconciliation appear to be sufficient for forgiveness. Relationships may be restored, at least to some degree, for purely pragmatic reasons.

Even if reconciliation is neither necessary nor sufficient for forgiveness, we can still recognize that reconciliation is, as Robert Roberts (1995) puts it, the “teleology of forgiveness”. All things being equal, reconciliation is the goal to which forgiveness points. Although there are reasons that sometimes make reconciliation impossible or unwise, forgiveness is oriented towards promoting pro-sociality and friendly relations (McCullough 2008: 114, 116). In some cases, this might mean that the end of forgiveness is to repair a relationship to its ex ante state. In some cases, however, only partial reconciliation may occur. In such cases, the nature of the restored relationship should be “appropriate to the situation of the parties after they have forgiven one another” (Bash 2007: 25).

Common conceptions of forgiveness make clear that its main purpose is the re-establishment or resumption of a relationship ruptured by wrongdoing. In keeping with the common conceptions of forgiveness, many contemporary philosophers argue that the resumption of relationships disrupted by wrongdoing often requires a moral reassessment of the wrongdoer by the victim, and that such a reassessment involves relinquishing resentment or some other form of morally inflected anger (Murphy & Hampton 1988; Murphy 2001), or behavior such as seeking revenge (Griswold 2007; Zaibert 2009; Govier 2002; Hughes 2016).

Maintaining or perpetuating personal relationships is one of the clearest and most important ends of forgiveness, though not the only important one. Forgiving those who wrong us often helps us move beyond strong negative emotions which, if allowed to fester, could harm us psychologically and physically. Forgiveness benefits wrongdoers, as well, by releasing them from the blame and hard feelings often directed toward them by those they wrong, or helping them transcend the guilt or remorse they suffer from having done wrong, thereby allowing them to move forward in their lives. These ends of forgiveness may be regarded as in general enabling in the sense that they show how forgiveness sometimes helps people move beyond the wrongs they endure or cause and the sometimes debilitating effects those wrongs have on wrongdoers and victims alike. For some, forgiveness has these forward-looking benefits because of the way it transfigures the past. Emmanuel Levinas claims that “forgiveness acts upon the past, somehow repeats the event, purifying it” ([1961] 1969: 283), a notion similar to Hannah Arendt’s view that forgiveness alters the ethical significance of a wrongdoer’s past by keeping it from having a permanent or fixed character (Arendt 1958).

It is standard to assume that not just anyone can forgive a wrongdoer for a certain wrong. One must have “standing”. If I lack standing, then forgiving is not on the table for me; I am not a candidate for forgiving. And so to doubt whether someone has standing to forgive is not to doubt whether someone succeeded in forgiving. Nor is it to doubt whether someone’s forgiveness was morally good, right or permissible. Rather, it is to doubt whether that person can forgive in the first place.

Who has standing to forgive? It might be thought that one has standing only if one is the victim of wrongdoing (in some sense of ‘victim’). Jeffrie Murphy expresses such a view when he says that

I do not have standing to resent or forgive you unless I have myself been the victim of your wrongdoing. I may forgive you for embezzling my funds; but it would be ludicrous for me, for example, to claim that I had decided to forgive Hitler for what he did to the Jews. I lack the proper standing for this. Thus, I may legitimately resent (and hence consider forgiving) only wrong done to me . (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 21, emphasis original)

On this view, only those who have been directly wronged have standing to forgive. Suppose Alfred lies to Betty. Betty is thereby directly wronged by Alfred. Though we will not attempt a full account of what it means to be directly wronged by someone, the general idea is that for Betty to be directly wronged by Alfred means that Alfred’s conduct itself constituted a wrong against Betty; he failed Betty, morally speaking. Betty therefore has direct standing to forgive.

Suppose, however, that Alfred lies to Betty and this results in Betty being very late in picking up her brother Todd. Alfred did not lie to Todd, but by lying to Betty, there is a straightforward sense in which this resulted in a wrong being done to Todd. Here, while we can say that Betty was directly wronged and so has direct standing to forgive, it is not true that Todd was directly wronged by Alfred. Rather, it was something Alfred did to Betty that led to Todd’s being wronged indirectly . And because it would be fitting for Todd to blame Alfred, and for Alfred to apologize to Todd, it is plausible to think that Todd also has standing to forgive Alfred. Call this indirect standing .

Though controversial, it may be possible to have standing to forgive while lacking either direct or indirect standing. Such standing is implicated in cases where one person forgives on behalf of someone else who has or would have had direct or indirect standing. Suppose Ted’s adult daughter Maria is assaulted and left unable to communicate for the rest of her life. Supposing that Maria has direct standing to forgive her assailant, if it is possible for Ted to forgive the assailant on behalf of Maria, he is able to do so in virtue of possessing what we may call proxy standing .

Finally, consider third-party standing . What is labeled “third-party” forgiveness in the forgiveness literature is often a source of confusion. Charles Griswold rightly points out that some kinds of cases of standing are misleadingly called “third-party”. For example, he asks us to imagine a case in which the murder of a loved one injures us, and the matter of whether to forgive presents itself to us in light of the loss we’ve sustained. “This sort of case”, he says, “is not a matter of third-party forgiveness” (2007: 117). The standing to forgive that would accrue to such a person, Griswold says, would be (to put it in our above terminology) of the direct or indirect variety, depending on how the case is fleshed out. Griswold’s own view of the matter is that third-party forgiveness involves

a situation in which the question of forgiveness arises in light of your indignation at the loss suffered by another person, thanks to someone else’s actions: here the matter concerns your forgiving their offender on their behalf for the harm done to them (not to you). (2007: 117)

Yet because Griswold has in mind an activity that involves forgiving “on behalf” of the victim, this kind of standing to forgive might be best thought of as proxy standing. Indeed, he argues that in order to engage in what he calls third-party forgiveness, the forgiver can only do so if she has “standing”, and one receives such standing only if one has an “identification with the victim” (119).

We identify as third-party standing what both Glen Pettigrove (2009) and Margaret Urban Walker (2013) have in mind in their recent discussions of third-party forgiveness. Such cases, Walker writes, involve

the scenario in which A forgives the offender B for something B did to the victim C , where A is not plausibly seen as a fellow victim, and where A forgives B on A ’s own behalf, not on behalf of C or anyone else who might be a victim of the wrong. (2013: 495)

Such a putative forgiver, she says, is one who “suffered no wrong” by the offender’s actions (2013: 496). This putative standing to forgive, therefore, is not reducible to any of the aforementioned varieties: the forgiver was not wronged by the offender (directly or indirectly), she does not forgive herself, and she does not forgive on behalf of anyone else.

5. Theories of Forgiveness

It is widely thought that forgiveness is fundamentally a matter of how one feels about another. Jeffrie Murphy, for example, claims that “[f]orgiveness is primarily a matter of how I feel about you (not how I treat you)” (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 21; cf. Hughes 1993: 108). Broadly speaking, emotion accounts of forgiveness claim that forgiveness is best understood as fundamentally a change in emotion. According to such views, were you to be wronged, your forgiving the wrongdoer fundamentally involves your overcoming (or abating, or eliminating, or forswearing) some relevant negative emotion (e.g., resentment, hatred, rancor) that you experience because you were wronged. For example, Kathleen Dean Moore writes, that “the attitude of forgiveness is characterized by the presence of good will and by the lack of personal resentment for the injury” (1989:184). Norvin Richards claims that to “forgive someone for having wronged one is to abandon all negative feelings based on the episode in question” (1988: 79). Stephen Darwall also appears to defend some kind of emotion account when he says that to “forgive is, roughly, to forbear or withdraw resentment” (2006: 72).

Among the various emotion accounts, however, there is significant disagreement on two main points: (1) about which specific emotions are implicated in forgiveness; and (2) about what must be done with those emotions in order to forgive. We survey emotion accounts by taking these two issues in turn.

One way to differentiate between the varieties of emotion accounts is according to the emotion or set of emotions that are thought to be relevant to forgiveness. A cursory survey of the forgiveness literature might give one the impression that there is widespread agreement about which emotion is crucially implicated in forgiveness. That emotion is resentment. The view that forgiveness crucially implicates resentment is usually taken to be “received orthodoxy” (Bash 2007: 161; cf. Kekes 2009: 490; Radzik 2009: 117; and Zaibert 2009: 38). But any impression of wholesale agreement would be mistaken for two reasons. First, some emotion theorists argue that overcoming resentment is neither necessary nor sufficient for forgiveness. Such emotion theorists hold that in forgiving there are other emotions that may or must be overcome. And second, even among those who hold that overcoming resentment is either necessary or sufficient for forgiveness, there is disagreement about what resentment is . Some think of resentment as a “hostile feeling” which aims at inflicting harm on the wrongdoer (Garrard & McNaughton 2002), while others think of it as a kind of “moral protest” (Hieronymi 2001), while still others think of resentment as the paradigmatic sort of “moral anger” (Hughes 1993). Whereas some describe resentment as a “vindictive passion” (Murphy 2003: 16) others claim that resentment “need not entail motivation to retaliate for the wrong” (Holmgren 2012: 31). In recent work, Jeffrey Blustein describes resentment as being a member of a class of attitudes that are “feelings of insult” (2014: 33; cf. Murphy & Hampton 1988: 44–5).

It is difficult to know what exactly these characterizations of resentment amount to, what kinds of relations hold between them, and perhaps most importantly, which view is correct. Indeed, this is one of the more troublesome aspects of the philosophical literature on forgiveness: while it is commonly thought that forgiveness crucially implicates resentment, there is no such consensus about what resentment is ( contra Holmgren 2012: 35). And as we have already noted, even though resentment is widely thought to be the central or paradigmatic emotion that forgiveness implicates, not all emotional accounts accept that view.

So here is a rough and ready way of categorizing the various emotion accounts as regards the set of relevant emotions that forgiveness implicates. Let minimal emotionalism be the view that in order to forgive, one must overcome a very narrow set of emotions: only “hostile retributive feelings”, attitudes whose aim is to see the offender suffer for what she has done (Garrard & McNaughton 2002: 44). Examples of such emotions include the feelings of malice, spite, or ill-will that might arise as a response to being wronged. The minimal emotionalist can allow that there are lots of negative emotions that one might experience upon being wronged (e.g., anger, sadness, disappointment, hurt), but they claim that forgiveness requires only that we overcome a small subset of them—those emotions that might be best described as vengeful or hostile.

Alternatively, let moderate emotionalism be the view that in order to forgive, one must overcome both hostile retributive feelings and what we may call moral anger . According to moderate emotionalism, overcoming hostile feelings is not enough for forgiveness. One may harbor moral anger towards a wrongdoer (so the view goes) without thereby wishing that she suffers for what she did. But both moral anger and hostile feelings must be given up in order to forgive. Paul Hughes defends something like moderate emotionalism. An attitude counts as moral anger according to Hughes if it is “partially constituted by the belief that you have been wrongfully harmed by another” (1993: 331). As Hughes notes, not all anger is moral; if you are angry because a bird drops a gift on your head, your anger is non-moral for it is not constituted by a belief that the bird has done you a wrong. But because resentment is, according to Hughes, a paradigm case of moral anger, it must be overcome in order for one to forgive. Charles Griswold also appears to have in mind a kind of moderate emotionalism:

Forswearing resentment does not require giving up every ‘negative’ feeling associated with the injurious event […] Forgiveness does however mean overcoming negative feelings that embody and perpetuate the key features of resentment, feelings that very often accompany resentment—such as contempt and scorn— insofar as they are modulations of the moral hatred in question. (2007: 41)

Although Griswold thinks of resentment as a kind of moral hatred, he does not think of resentment as involving a desire to inflict suffering on the wrongdoer, but rather as a desire to “exact a due measure of punishment” (2007: 26). In this respect his view differs from Garrard and McNaughton, who do target those emotions that involve desires to inflict suffering on the wrongdoer.

Finally, let expansive emotionalism be the view that in order to forgive a wrongdoer, the victim must overcome all negative emotions that the victim has towards the wrongdoer on account of the wrongdoing in question. Norvin Richards is commonly cited as a defender of what we are calling expansive emotionalism: “to forgive someone for having wronged one is to abandon all negative feelings based on the episode in question” (1988: 79). On Richards’ view, not only must one overcome emotions like malice and moral anger in order to forgive, one must also overcome emotions like sadness and disappointment (1988: 77–79). In recent work, Jeffrie Murphy has also endorsed a more expansive emotionalism. Although he once argued that forgiveness ought to be construed narrowly as the overcoming of resentment, Murphy has now, citing the influence of Richards and others, become more ecumenical, writing that we should

think of forgiveness as overcoming a variety of negative feelings that one might have toward a wrongdoer—resentment, yes, but also such feelings as anger, hatred, loathing, contempt, indifference, disappointment, or even sadness. (2003: 59; see also Holmgren 1993: 341 and Blustein 2014)

The set of emotions that victims might possess in response to being wronged by another agent therefore form a large and diverse landscape.

Emotion theorists claim that in order to forgive one must make certain alterations to one’s emotional life. But what kind of changes must occur? Writers on forgiveness often speak of the overcoming of resentment. In doing so we follow precedent (e.g., Murphy 2003: 16; Holmgren 1993: 341). But other writers have claimed that one is to “abandon” (Richards 1988: 184) or “forbear or withdraw” (Darwall 2006: 72) resentment. Still others claim that forgiveness involves “letting go” of (Griswold 2007: 40) or the “elimination of” (Lauritzen 1987: 142) resentment. Rarely is much more said about the machinery of these proposed changes to one’s emotional life (notable exceptions include Hughes 1993, Hieronymi 2001, and Blustein 2014). We therefore want to know what kinds of changes are at issue with respect to each of these claims, and what relations hold between them? Does, for example, overcoming resentment entail that one has totally eliminated it? There are at least two facts about the relevant notion of overcoming about which most emotion theorists seem to agree.

First, emotion theorists have been keen to clarify that it is not just any kind of elimination of resentment that is at issue. Were you accidentally to fall and hit your head on a rock, thereby causing your resentment to be eliminated, you would not have forgiven. Or if your resentment simply withered away over the years via a process outside of your control or ken, it is widely thought that you would not have forgiven (cf. Horsbrugh 1974: 271). Emotion theorists therefore usually require that the forgiver’s resentment be overcome for reasons (e.g., Murphy 2001: 561). What kinds of reasons? Sometimes the right kinds of reasons are claimed to be specifically moral reasons (Murphy 2003: 16; Griswold 2007: 40). Murphy suggests that the fact that the wrongdoer “repented or had a change of heart”, “meant well (his motives were good)”, or “he has suffered enough” are the right kinds of reasons (1988: 24). But here, we should be careful to distinguish between two different questions. One question is a conceptual one, concerning what kinds of motivating reasons make forgiveness possible at all . But another kind of question, a normative one, concerns what motivating reasons make forgiveness, on any given occasion, appropriate (or permissible or praiseworthy). If Murphy is right, then it appears that one cannot forgive because one wanted to win a bet. This raises questions as to how moralized our conception of forgiveness ought to be. Should our account of forgiveness require that in order to forgive, one must do so for (only) moral reasons? Or could one forgive for merely prudential reasons (Ingram 2013)? We will return to this issue below.

Second, it is widely thought that the kind of overcoming of resentment that is implicated in forgiveness involves what Marilyn McCord Adams describes as “agent effort” (1991: 284). Even when one eliminates resentment for (the right) reasons, it is possible to do so using the wrong kind of process . Forgiveness therefore must have the right kind of history. Suppose, for example, that one sought to forgive and that the miracle of modern medicine produced a pill that, if ingested, could immediately eliminate one’s resentment. It has seemed to many that taking the resentment-eliminating pill does not qualify as forgiving (even if one were to take the pill for the right kinds of reasons). Why? It’s hard to say exactly, but many philosophers think of forgiveness as a manifestation of a virtue, a disposition to act and feel in certain ways (Roberts 1995; Pettigrove 2012). On this view, forgiving acts are properly understood as being the kinds of things that must “go through” the agent in a certain sort of way, either by way of an agential “struggle” against resentment or a decision to give up or do without resentment (what is commonly described as “forswearing”).

Still, many questions remain. First, which processes of overcoming the relevant emotions are the right ones? Hieronymi (2001) argues that in paradigmatic cases, resentment is eliminated by revising a specific judgment that rationally supports it, namely the judgment that the wrongdoer’s past action stands as a present threat. For discussions of this judgment-based approach to how forgiveness overcomes resentment see Zaragoza (2012), Nelkin (2013), and Warmke (2015). Blustein (2014) argues that overcoming the relevant emotions should be understood as involving a certain kind of forgetting.

Second: need the relevant emotions be eliminated completely or perhaps only moderated, and what are we to say if the relevant emotions return (perhaps unbidden, perhaps not) at some point in the future? One might, for example, hold that a forgiver must eliminate all traces of the relevant negative emotion(s). It is uncommon to find this view stated explicitly, but Haber has attributed to it to some philosophers (1991: 7). Others have claimed that what is needed is not the total and final elimination of resentment, but rather, some sort of moderation. Margaret Holmgren, for example, allows that resentment can reoccur:

By overcoming her negative feelings at the time she forgives, the victim does not necessarily eliminate these feelings without a trace. They may recur from time to time throughout her life. However, once she has determined that forgiveness is the appropriate attitude towards her offender and has overcome her negative feelings towards him, it will presumably be possible for her to conquer these feelings again if they do recur. Thus we can plausibly say that the victim has forgiven her offender when she first overcomes her resentment towards him. (1993: 341–2)

There is also a strand of discussion in the forgiveness literature that crucially implicates the forswearing of resentment (or some other attitude or behavior). P.F. Strawson claims:

[T]o ask to be forgiven is in part to acknowledge that the attitude displayed in our actions was such as might properly be resented and in part to repudiate that attitude for the future (or at least for the immediate future); and to forgive is to accept the repudiation and to forswear the resentment. (1962: 76)

The difference between overcoming and forswearing (or renouncing) some attitude is not usually made explicit. Sometimes the terms appear to be used interchangeably. Marilyn McCord Adams, however, distinguishes overcoming an attitude (which she suggests involves “agent effort”) from forswearing an attitude, which she describes as a “deliberate act” (1991: 284). The implication is that forswearing (as an act of renunciation) is something one does straightaway, whereas overcoming is not. One may forswear resentment by making a decision or making a commitment, but to decide to give up or commit to eliminate resentment does not imply that one has or will overcome it.

Bishop Joseph Butler is commonly cited as the progenitor of emotion accounts. In a way, this is not surprising, for his legacy in the philosophical literature on forgiveness rests on two of his Fifteen Sermons (1726): Sermon VIII (“Upon Resentment”) and Sermon IX (“Upon Forgiveness of Injuries”). Butler does indeed make clear that resentment and forgiveness are importantly related, and his interpreters have often attributed to him the view that forgiveness is the forswearing or overcoming of resentment (Murphy 1988: 15; Haber 1991: 16; Holmgren 1993: 341)

Ernesto Garcia (2011) has called this interpretation of Butler the “Renunciation Model”, according to which Butler holds: (1) that resentment is a “negative vindictive response that is incompatible with goodwill”; and (2) that forgiveness occurs “only insofar as we forswear or renounce our negative feelings of resentment towards our wrongdoers” (2011: 2). Garcia and others have convincingly argued, however, that Butler did not advocate the Renunciation Model, for he advocated neither of these two theses (Garcia 2011; Griswold 2007: 19–37, and Newberry 2001). This is not the place to explore Butler’s view in great detail. However, we can bring into relief enough of Butler’s account of forgiveness to show why he does not advocate the Renunciation Model.

Consider the claim that Butler held that resentment is a response to injury that is incompatible with good-will and therefore forgiveness. What Butler actually says, however, is that forgiveness is perfectly compatible with an attitude of resentment. Butler held that resentment helps us to deal with those who harm us: it motivates us to insulate ourselves from wrongdoers, and it motivates us to deter future wrongdoing via punishment. When resentment has these ends it serves the public good and is therefore compatible with the general obligation to good-will [IX.9]. Indeed, as Butler puts it, resentment is both “natural” [VIII. 11] and “innocent” [VIII.19]. Therefore, resentment as such is compatible with good-will.

Butler does say that resentment can be dangerous, but it is not resentment as such that is the problem. Rather, he claims that when resentment is allowed to become “excessive” it can easily lead an agent to pursue revenge, not as a means to producing some greater social good, but as a self-gratifying exercise that seeks “the misery of our fellow creatures” [IX.10]. But to let resentment carry one this far is to violate a general obligation to benevolence. To forgive, then, is simply to prevent resentment from having this effect on us. The divine command to benevolence is therefore just the command to “prevent [resentment] from having this effect, i.e. to forgive injuries, is the same as to love our enemies” [IX.13.]. Resentment itself is natural and innocent. It is only when it is indulged and allowed to bleed into revenge that a violation of goodwill occurs. But this is the work of forgiveness: to prevent resentment from leading us to seek revenge. Therefore, Butler does not think that forgiveness is the forswearing or overcoming of resentment.

What, then, is forgiveness according to Butler? Griswold claims that Butler’s forgiveness involves two aspects: (1) the forswearing of revenge ; and (2) a moderation of resentment to an appropriate level (2007: 36). Yet according to Ernesto Garcia, “Butlerian forgiveness simply amounts to being virtuously resentful by avoiding both excessive and deficient resentment against our wrongdoers” (2011: 17). On Garcia’s interpretation, Butlerian forgiveness seems to require no emotional change at all—one can be virtuously resentful without ever having been viciously resentful. It is unclear whether Griswold thinks that Butler would require emotional change. If all that is required is that resentment be kept in check, this could be done without it ever having been excessive. On the other hand, if the requirement is that one must go through the process of moderating one’s resentment, this would require some kind emotional change (although not one that would require eliminating it entirely or even trying to do so).

Other approaches to forgiveness claim that there is an important connection between forgiving and punishment. The Oxford English Dictionary includes “pardon” in its definition of ‘forgive’, and Hobbes drew a connection between forgiving and the facility to pardon in his sixth Law of Nature: “A sixth law of Nature is this, ‘that, upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that, repenting, desire it’” ([1651] 1969). Remarking on this law, Bernard Gert writes, “This virtue, which Hobbes calls having the facility to pardon, one can also call being forgiving” (2010: 98). In a similar vein, Leo Zaibert has recently argued that “forgiveness is deliberately to refuse to punish” (2009: 368). According to the psychologist Robert Enright and his colleagues, forgiveness involves “the casting off of deserved punishments” (Enright et al. 1992: 88). On these punishment-forbearance views of forgiveness, forgiving crucially implicates the forbearance of punishment.

According to these views, when one forgives one commits not to hold a past wrong against someone and (so the story goes) were one to punish, doing so would be to hold a past wrong against the wrongdoer. Punishment-forbearance accounts may come in a variety of flavors, depending on how one understands the logical relations between forgiving and forbearing punishment (see, e.g., Londey 1986: 4–5; Wolsterstorff 2009: 203; Bash 2015: 53; Russell 2016). One could hold that forbearing punishing is necessary for forgiveness, or sufficient, or both. Alternatively, one could make a normative claim about the relations between forgiveness and punishment: forgiving a wrongdoing makes future punishment for that wrong morally inappropriate (see, e.g., Swinburne 1989: 97).

Some reject these claims about the relationship between the forbearance of punishment, instead finding “no clash between punishment and forgiveness” (Mabbott 1939: 158; cf. Haber 1991, Murphy 2003: 101; O’Shaughnessy 1967). For further discussion of the relationship between punishment and forgiveness see Griswold (2007: 32–33), Pettigrove (2012: 117–121), Russell (2016), Tosi and Warmke (2017); and Warmke (2011, 2013).

In an insightful chapter on the relationship between forgiving and hatred, Jean Hampton argued that forgiveness is a two-stage process, the first of which “involves regaining one’s confidence in one’s own worth despite the immoral action challenging it”, which can be accomplished by

overcoming, in the sense of “giving up” or “repudiating”, emotions such as spite and malice, and “overcoming” in the sense of “transcending” resentment. (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 83)

A further stage is required, however, for even after the first stage, one might still hate the wrongdoer and hatred, according to Hampton, is incompatible with forgiveness. Therefore, at the second stage, the forgiver “reapproves” of the wrongdoer (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 83), deciding to see the “wrongdoer in a new, more favorable light” (84), “revising her judgement of the person himself” (85).

This does not mean that the forgiver comes to approve of the wrongdoer’s action or the character trait that precipitated it—that disapproval must remain in order for forgiveness not to collapse into condonation. Rather, by having a change of heart towards the wrongdoer himself, the forgiver frees herself from hatred and indignation, allowing herself to accept the wrongdoer as a decent person worthy of “renewed association” (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 83, 85). On Hampton’s account then, forgiveness requires both a change in emotion towards the wrongdoer, and an intentional alteration of one’s assessments about the wrongdoer as a person, which is why she holds that “forgiveness must be defined so that it involves more than simply effecting certain psychological changes for moral reasons” (1988: 37). Forgiving, therefore, is accomplished when one successfully goes through both stages. For more on Hampton’s account see Radzik (2011).

The views of forgiveness canvassed thus far have, by and large, focused on forgiveness as a private phenomenon, involving, for example, a change in emotion. But another strand of thinking attends to our social and linguistic practices related to forgiveness, most notably, our practice of saying “I forgive you” or some cognate expression. Joram Haber argued that the question “What is forgiveness?” is best answered, “in the context of what speakers mean when they employ the term” (1991: 53), even if there are other ways to forgive besides uttering “‘I forgive you’” (1991: 40). According to Haber, understanding forgiveness requires discovering what one does when one performs the linguistic act of expressing forgiveness, typically by way of the utterance, “I forgive you” (1991: 29).

To see what Haber and his followers have in mind, we need a bit of background. J.L. Austin (1975) called attention to two ways to understand what we do when we speak. In the first instance, we can think of an utterance simply as a locutionary act, which is simply the act of uttering a sentence with a certain sense and reference. But we do not typically utter sentences simply for the sake of uttering sentences. We also ask questions, make demands, warn of threats, persuade detractors, express our preferences, inter alia . Austin suggested that in addition to the performance of the act of uttering a sentence, we may also perform an act in uttering a sentence, what he called illocutionary acts . Consider the sentence “I would like a ham sandwich”. The locutionary act is the utterance of the sentence itself. The illocutionary act might be one of simply communicating a desire, or it might be one of (in a different context) ordering a sandwich at the deli counter.

One way to examine what a speaker does when one says “I forgive you” is therefore to ask what illocutionary acts one performs when one does so. Haber focuses on a class of illocutionary acts that Austin called behabitives,

which include the notion of reaction to other people’s behavior and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else’s past conduct or imminent conduct. (Austin 1975: 160)

Examples of locutions with behabitive force include statements like, “I applaud you” and “I commend you”, which serve to express or exhibit the speaker’s attitude about the conduct of the intended audience. Understood as a behabitive, “I forgive you” functions as an illocutionary act that communicates to the audience that the speaker possesses certain attitudes about her. Haber suggests that for S to say “I forgive you” to X regarding some act A of X ’s, S represents (among other things) that ( S ) has overcome his resentment for X ’s doing A , or is at least willing to try to overcome it (1991: 40). Building on Haber’s account, Glen Pettigrove argues that when a speaker says “I forgive you”, she reveals three facts about herself: (1) that the speaker believes that she has been wronged by the one to whom she speaks; (2) that the speaker has an absence of hostile reactive attitudes that might have arisen in response to the wrongdoing; and (3) that the speaker has some degree of positive regard for the one she addresses (2004a: 379).

Speech acts may also function as commissives , which have the illocutionary force of committing the speaker to an action or a course of conduct. One might say, “I promise to buy you a tangerine tomorrow”, or “I will never lie to you again”. In doing so, the speaker places herself under an obligation to do (or not do) what she says she will do (or not do). Pettigrove claims that in addition to functioning as a behabitive, “I forgive you” can also function as a commissive by committing the speaking to forswear hostile reactive attitudes and retaliation toward the wrongdoer and to treat her with an appropriate level of benevolence (2004a: 385).

Used as a declarative, utterances or expressions may have the effect of (to put it crudely) changing reality in various ways. An appropriate authority might, for example, say, “I christen this ship”, or “I hereby find you guilty”. By making such an utterance, one is actually able to make it so that a ship is christened or that one is found guilty. Understood as a declarative, the utterance “I forgive you” (or one of its cognates) makes it the case that one has been forgiven, thereby altering the operative norms governing the interaction between victim and wrongdoer (Warmke 2016a, 2016b). Much like one can declare a debt forgiven (or a criminal pardoned), one can declare that one has been forgiven by sincerely saying something like “I forgive you” (Swinburne 1989). Such a declaration could release a wrongdoer from certain kinds of personal obligations to the victim (such as further apology or restitution, remorse or penance) (Nelkin 2013). It might also function as a way for the victim to relinquish certain rights or permissions to continue blaming the wrongdoer (Warmke 2016b).

Three clarifications about performative accounts are in order. First, one need not think that performative forgiveness possesses only one kind of illocutionary force. Pettigrove (2004a, 2012), for example, argues that “I forgive you” can function as both a behabitive and commissive. Some hold that it can function as a behabitive, commissive, and declarative (Warmke 2016b). Second, defenders of performative accounts need not hold that acts of forgiveness qua performative, must always function in the same way, for it might be that even if “the language of forgiveness is quite often put to a performatory use, and it is not always put to the same performatory use” (Neblett 1974: 269; cf. Pettigrove 2012: 17–8). It may be that sometimes “I forgive you” functions only as a behabitive, and other times also as a commissive. Third, defenders of performative accounts need not think that only speech acts (e.g., utterances of “I forgive you”) can fulfill the performative functions of forgiving. Cognate communicative acts, gestures, and facial expressions may achieve the same result (Swinburne 1989: 85).

Some philosophers have argued that forgiveness is just too diverse and diffuse of a practice to be captured by a simple, singular theory. Nick Smith observes that our “notions of forgiveness seem to identify a loose constellation of interrelated meanings among various beliefs, judgments, emotions and actions” (2008: 134). Responding to the view that forgiveness is the same wherever it occurs, William Neblett writes that

if there is anything about forgiveness that is always the same, no matter the context, it is very little, and it is none of the various things that philosophers are prone to say that it is, that it must be (like the wiping away of all resentment and ill-will). (1974: 273, cf. 269)

Marilyn McCord Adams has suggested that forgiveness has two “modalities”, which she labels “performative forgiveness” and “forgiveness from the heart” (1991: 294). Forgiveness from the heart, she writes, “involves a process of letting go of one’s own point of view (regarding the situation, one’s self and/or the victim, and the offender)”, which will typically “involve many changes in feelings, attitudes, judgments and desires” (1991: 294–5, italics original). Performative forgiveness, on the other hand, “focuses on externals (material compensations or behavior) and the formal structures of relationships, not on inner attitudes or feelings” (1991: 294). Examples include “the public acceptance of apologies for small injuries” and cases in which a “civil suit could be pressed but is legally or officially waived”, either of which, she claims, may be accomplished absent any “commitment to change one’s attitudes or feelings” (1991: 294). The key thought to which Adams draws our attention is that the phenomena counting as forgiveness can be understood as possessing an interior dimension or an exterior dimension (and sometimes both) (cf. Zaibert 2009; Warmke & McKenna 2013). Adams’s forgiveness from the heart occurs in this interior dimension insofar as it involves those things that can be roughly described as psychological: judgments, beliefs, emotions, feelings, decisions and intentions are interior aspects of forgiveness. The exterior “performative” dimension involves those things that can be roughly described as bodily. The relevant kinds of bodily conduct might include things like utterances of “I forgive you”, gestures, friendly behaviors, or a written letter or email.

In the recent years, the topic of self-forgiveness has drawn considerable attention (see, e.g., Williston 2012; Milam 2015). Indeed, it does seem a commonplace that people claim to forgive themselves both for wrongs they commit against others, and for self-directed wrongs in the form of some sort of personal failure or shortcoming, such as violating a commitment to another person; or failing to adhere to a diet. Although there seems to be no logical reason to think self-forgiveness as overcoming various forms of self-directed moral reactive attitudes such as disappointment or disgust is fundamentally unlike interpersonal forgiveness, there are significant differences between the two. First, and notwithstanding the fact that people may be angry with themselves, experience self-directed loathing, and struggle to overcome such negative emotional attitudes, it is not clear that the idea of resenting oneself is coherent and, thus, whether forgiveness as overcoming self-referential resentment is possible, at least on certain accounts of forgiveness. This is because resentment in the sense at issue requires such cognitions as that the wrongdoer is a moral agent and the victim a moral subject whose rights are in some way violated by a wrongdoer. That one and the same person is involved simultaneously as agent and subject, wrongdoer and victim, in this drama is often thought incompatible with the idea that resentment is necessarily directed at other people (Arendt 1958).

Nancy Snow (1992) argues that self-forgiveness serves two important self-regarding purposes (though see Hughes 1994). First, it serves the purpose of restoring wrongdoers to full moral agency even in the absence of the victim’s forgiveness. This is similar to Holmgren’s claim (1998) that self-forgiving is a way of restoring or maintaining one’s intrinsic self-worth, which she argues is an extension of her analysis of interpersonal forgiveness. Zenon Szablowinski (2011) concurs, arguing that a failure to self-forgive may be detrimental to a wrongdoer’s moral and psychological well-being, and that such forgiveness is morally appropriate when a wrongdoer’s guilt, shame, or self-loathing reach significantly high levels. Second, it constitutes a second-best alternative to full interpersonal forgiveness, in the sense that when full interpersonal forgiveness is not forthcoming (and there can be many reasons for this), self-forgiving is nevertheless an important and sometimes morally appropriate response to having done wrong.

The topic of God’s relation to human wrongdoing is an important one in mainstream Western theological and philosophical discussions of forgiveness, but it is by no means clear what the relationship is supposed to be between God and forgiveness, and the connection between that and the possibility of forgiveness between persons. This is because there is some question whether the differences between divine and human forgiveness are so significant that any comparison between them is inapt. As one author puts the point,

The difference between the human and the divine should not be underestimated, and it is possible that it would not just be over optimistic but actually dangerous to expect people to model their behavior on God. (Tombs 2008: 592)

The concern expressed in this remark is that whereas God’s forgiveness is supposedly unilateral, unilateral human forgiveness may be irresponsible, as when a victim of wrongdoing forgives a wrongdoer irrespective of any signs of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer. Another writer argues that the gap between human and divine forgiveness is unbridgeable, for God’s forgiveness is grounded in “eschatological divine justice” not, as in human forgiveness, in an awareness of “sinful solidarity with humanity” (Williams 2008: 584–585).

If divine forgiveness is possible, what is its nature? Douglas Drabkin reports that “there is no other way that God can forgive us, as far as I can see, except through a change in emotion” (1993: 237). What kind of emotional changes might be at issue? For many, the obvious candidate will be resentment. And so on this view, when we do wrong, God has resentment towards us. To follow Jonathan Edwards, we are “sinners in the hands of an angry God”. God forgives us by eliminating that resentment (though see Minas 1975).

One need not think that God gives up resentment, however, to adopt an emotion theory of divine forgiveness. Douglas Drabkin has argued that there is a kind of emotional change that is natural to suppose that God experiences and that this change is a good candidate for divine forgiveness. On his view, God, like any loving parent, will “suffer on our account” when we do evil (235). “When we repent”, he says, “God feels our joy and ceases to suffer” (235). He concludes: “This, I am suggesting, is how God forgives us: by rejoicing in our repentance” (235). However, on those theological views according to which God is impassible (i.e., God is unable to suffer or have reactive emotions), these kinds of emotion views will be off the table (see, e.g., Gavrilyuk 2004).

Another approach to divine forgiveness says that God forgives by forbearing punishment. Some philosophical discussions of divine forgiveness have proceeded as if this view (or something very much like it) is the default position. For example, David Londey proceeds to answer this question by operating with a conception of forgiveness that crucially involves the remission of any “penalty or sanction”, including “moral censure” and “more tangible punishments” that a wrongdoer is due (1986: 5). In their respective replies to Londey defending the possibility of divine forgiveness, Andrew Brien and Dean Geuras each assume a punishment-forbearance view according to which forgiveness is the forbearing of any punishment one ought to inflict (Brien 1989: 35) and the remission of a deserved penalty (Geuras 1992: 65). Swinburne argues that God’s forgiveness is akin to the forgiveness of a kind of debt: when God forgives us, the guilt that our wrongdoing incurred is wiped away (1989). See also Bash (2015), Brien (1989), Mackintosh (1927), Minas (1975), and Scheiber (2001).

The power of pardon enjoyed by duly established political authorities may be at best a loose cognate of forgiveness, but this is not to say that all legal or political analogues to forgiveness are implausible (for discussion see MacLachlan 2012, cf. Norlock & Veltman 2009). P.E. Digeser (2001) has argued in favor of a conception of political forgiveness that breaks sharply with the standard philosophical accounts of forgiveness as involving the overcoming of resentment or other negative emotional states by victims of wrong. Instead, Digeser seeks to divest political forgiveness of any personal feelings whatsoever in favor of a performative account in which such overt behaviors as pardoning a criminal or waiving a debt signify forgiveness. Digeser claims that separating the action of forgiving from its underlying motive and from the constellation of feelings often thought to accompany interpersonal forgiveness better suits a conception of justice as one in which people get their due. On this performative conception, forgiveness consists in political actors or institutions opting not to get their due, for whatever reasons.

Digeser claims to have created a serviceable political notion of forgiveness shorn of its usual psychological baggage. And surely, as noted earlier, there is a sense of forgiveness in which an action such as waiving a debt or an utterance such as “I forgive you” is sometimes all that forgiveness is about. To this extent and in this sense, debt forgiveness and political pardons may reasonably be regarded as political forms of forgiving, and Digeser identifies four forms such political forgiveness may take (2001: 9). First, political forgiveness takes a many-to-one form when a group forgives an individual. Suppose, for example, the American people could forgive former President Clinton for lying to a grand jury, or that a university community could forgive a dean who embezzled funds. Second, we can recognize one-to-many political forgiveness, whereby an individual forgives a group. One can imagine, for example, exonerated prisoners forgiving police forces or the justice system for wrongly arresting or convicting them (for even if no single member of the police or justice system wronged the exonerated prisoner, their joint action may have done so). Third, in many-to-many political forgiveness, groups or collectives enter into forgiveness relations with other groups or collectives. Examples may include the aforementioned cases of U.S.-Japan and Tutsi-Hutu relations. Finally, one-to-one political forgiveness involves individuals forgiving other individuals. President Gerald Ford, for example, famously issued an executive pardon to former President Richard Nixon after his resignation amidst charges that he broke the law.

The past thirty or so years have seen a rapid increase on the part of political leaders apologizing for and seeking reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of moral atrocities. The ostensible aim of such efforts has not only been to rectify past wrongs and give those who have been wronged their due, but to heal deep and sometimes longstanding wounds caused by such wrongs as well. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the mid 1990s is probably the best-known example of such attempts to achieve reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of intra-national collective wrongs (Tutu 1999). Other instances of political apology, aimed in part at effecting some form of forgiveness or reconciliation, include Australia’s “sorry book”, which records citizens’ remorse over a former government policy mandating the forced removal of aboriginal children from their natural parents in the name of cultural assimilation, President Clinton’s apology to African Americans and subsequent proposals by scholars and policy-makers of reparations for slavery, and Northern Ireland’s 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the peace process initiated thereby (Brooks 2004; Biggar 2008). Understanding forgiveness as roughly synonymous with reconciliation supports the notion that these collective endeavors are institutional forms of forgiveness (Radzik 2009).

9. The Ethics of Forgiveness

Within Western traditions, forgiveness has often been regarded as a “high” and “difficult” virtue (Scarre 2004), and its opposite, unwillingness to forgive, as a vice. Yet this poses an immediate problem of interpretation, namely, whether forgiveness is a “high” and “difficult” virtue in the sense that while it is morally laudable it is beyond duty (i.e., supererogatory). Since supererogatory actions are permissible, not obligatory, it follows that a failure to forgive, at least in circumstances where forgiving would be supererogatory, would not, contrary to the aforementioned view, be a vice. However, widespread and persistent disagreement within moral philosophy both about supererogation and the deontic nature of forgiveness have led to conflicting views on the relation between forgiveness and moral obligation (see, e.g., Gamlund 2010; Lauritzen 1987). Some thinkers have argued that forgiveness is a duty (Rashdall 1907) while others have maintained that, like a gift with no strings attached, forgiveness is utterly gratuitous (Heyd 1982). It might also be thought that, similar to the duty of charity in Kant’s moral system, forgiveness is properly regarded as an imperfect duty. Unlike perfect duties such as the obligation to justice or honesty, imperfect duties allow for agential discretion over when and with respect to whom to discharge the duty. In this way, forgiveness may be located in a system of moral duties that allows for no supererogatory deeds at all.

In contrast to duty-based approaches to forgiveness, virtue-based perspectives suggest that the overcoming or forswearing of angry reactive attitudes characteristic of forgiveness must be grounded in or expressive of relatively stable and durable dispositions or character traits (Roberts 1995; Sadler 2008; Radzik 2010). On such views, forgiveness is a virtue, or is at least closely aligned with one or more of the traditional virtues such as magnanimity or sympathy. Within ancient Greek thought the views of Plato and Aristotle on the relationship between anger and living virtuously are noteworthy, as is the Christian traditions’ understanding of forgiveness as love or compassion.

Although forgiveness is not identified as a distinct virtue in Plato’s work, the Platonic perspective on anger illuminates the general emotional landscape in which forgiveness has often been located and from which it derives much of its value. In his discussion on the nature of community and individual morality in Book IV of the Republic , Plato makes clear that demonstrations of anger are generally regarded as manifestations of intemperance, which is a vice, and since angry emotions are ever a threat to overwhelm reason and self-control they must be rationally controlled in the name of a harmonious ordering of the different parts of the soul, which is the essence of a morally good person ( Republic , 439–442). By contrast, Aristotle, in his discussion of virtues and vices relative to anger in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics , explains that “good temper” is the mean between the extremes of irascibility, an excess of anger, and inirascibility, or what he alternatively calls a “nameless” deficiency of anger, and that the good-tempered person “is not revengeful, but rather tends to forgive” (1126a1). Aristotle’s general perspective on morally appropriate anger is that the person of virtue is “angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought” (1125b32). In general, both Plato’s and Aristotle’s views suggest that anger controlled by or expressive of reason may be seen as manifesting virtue, whereas anger ungoverned by rationality is a vice.

A disposition to too readily forgive may be symptomatic of a lack of self-respect, or indicative of servility, ordinarily viewed as moral infirmities or vices (Novitz 1998). This recalls Aristotle’s idea that the person deficient in appropriate anger is “unlikely to defend himself” and “endure being insulted” and is for this reason a “fool” ( Nicomachean Ethics , 1126a5), Kant’s notion that a person who fails to become angry at injustices done to him lacks dignity and self-respect (Kant [c. 1770–1794] 1997, cf. Sussman 2005; Ware 2014), and Hume’s assertion that since anger and hatred are “inherent in our very frame and constitution” the lack of such feelings is sometimes evidence of “weakness and imbecility” ([1740] 1958: 605). That interpersonal forgiveness does not always serve morally laudable aims suggests that a general account of the criteria for justified and morally permissible or even obligatory forgiveness is needed to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate forgiving.

Several virtue-theoretic perspectives contrary both to early Greek notions that anger appropriately mediated by reason is a virtue, and from the Christian view that forgiveness as transcending anger in an act of love is a virtue, should be mentioned. First, Nietzsche’s conception of ressentiment as sublimated anger/envy directed at the noble man suggests that both dispositional and episodic anger may be manifestations of weakness or vice, not strength, self-respect, or virtue (Nietzsche [1887] 1967; cf. Griswold 2007; Blustein 2014). This is reminiscent of Plutarch’s view that anger is like a disease, and extreme or abiding anger such as rage or bitterness are unnatural dispositional states (Plutarch [c. 100 CE] 2000). We should add to these views the observation that the negative effects of being angrily obsessed by someone’s wrongdoing is not by itself a justification for blaming or forgiving him. Put differently, though it might be a bad thing to be angrily obsessed with having been wronged, it does not follow from this that a victim of wrong must forgive the wrongdoer. There are, after all, other ways of transcending or purging recalcitrant anger which might be more appropriate than would be forgiving.

Nietzsche’s view suggests the further idea that even episodic angry emotions may be a sign of moral infirmity, insofar as such emotions concede power to others by revealing one’s vulnerability to injury. But the truly noble or strong are thought to have, in some sense, no such vulnerabilities. Second, some recent popular views suggest that the uninhibited expression of anger and rage is a good thing, insofar as such venting is cathartic. But on consequentialist grounds alone it seems clear that controlling intense anger rather than its unfettered expression is closer to what a good life requires, for though anger may sometimes be enabling in motivating constructive solutions to personal or political problems, its indiscriminate expression is more likely to be disabling, both for those expressing it and for those around them. This last remark relates to a third disparaging view of angry reactive attitudes, that of the Stoic Seneca, who maintains that all forms of anger are inconsistent with the moral life because they dispose us to cruelty and vengeance, which passions encourage us to see other people as less than fully human ( De Ira , c. 50CE). On this view, the person of virtue is one who strives to extirpate anger in all its forms. These three perspectives seem to imply that since anger is never an appropriate emotion, forgiveness cannot be a virtue, at least in the sense of overcoming justified anger.

What is the connection between forgiveness and another virtue, that of justice? Forgiveness has long been regarded by some as in conflict with justice, if not incompatible with it. Seneca ( De Clementia , c. 55CE) claimed that

Pardon is given to a man who ought to be punished; but a wise man does nothing that he ought not to do, omits to do nothing which he ought to do; therefore he does not remit a punishment which he ought to exact.

Mercy, by contrast, is aligned with justice in the sense that “it declares that those who are let off did not deserve any different treatment” ( De Clementia ). Considering the specific circumstances of individual cases is a matter of mercy, “not of forgiveness”. Mercy, unlike pardon and forgiveness, is an exercise of equity, which is an application of justice in light of the unique circumstances of individual cases. By contrast, the prerogative of pardon associated with such political executives as Presidents, Prime Ministers, and other authorities may be viewed, according to Aristotle, as an exercise of equity in the sense that such duly established authorities are commonly thought to use that power as a way of mitigating the rigors of universal standards of justice in their application to particular cases the specifics of which appear to fall beyond the scope of the universal rule (Wolsterstorff 2009; Bingham 2009).

What about the morality of individual acts of forgiveness? Let us use “positive moral status” as an umbrella term to capture the status of an instance of forgiveness insofar as it is morally good, morally virtuous, morally permissible, morally praiseworthy, morally right, morally obligatory, or morally supererogatory. It is commonplace to think that in order for an act of forgiveness to have positive moral status, certain kinds of conditions must be met. Conditionalism is the view that in order for an act of forgiveness to have positive moral status, certain conditions must be met either by the victim or the wrongdoer (or both). For example, it might be thought that in order for forgiveness to have positive moral status, the victim must forgive for certain kinds of good reasons. If the victim does not forgive for those good kinds of reasons, then she does something morally impermissible (or bad, or blameworthy, etc.) by forgiving. We can call such conditions victim-dependent . Alternatively, it might be thought that in order for forgiveness to have positive moral status, the wrongdoer must, say, apologize to the victim. This is a kind of wrongdoer-dependent condition. If the wrongdoer does not apologize to the victim, then the victim does something morally impermissible (or bad, or blameworthy, etc.) by forgiving.

Notice, however, that this claim is to be distinguished from the view according to which, absent a wrongdoer’s apology, the victim’s “forgiveness” is not actually forgiveness at all, but instead condonation or exculpation. On this latter sort of view, the conditions for positive moral status for an act of forgiveness are built into the very constitutive conditions for forgiveness itself. We can call a view of forgiveness that builds the conditions for positive moral status into the conditions for forgiveness itself a “thick” conception of forgiveness. On this view, forgiveness is, as such, always morally good, morally permissible, or otherwise possesses some other such positive moral status. (This is consistent with an act of forgiveness being all things considered wrong if, say, forgiving in some case would cause the death of innocent millions.) In contrast, a “thin” conception of forgiveness is one that allows that an instance of forgiveness can lack positive moral status. Of course, both thick and thin conceptions of forgiveness can require (or not require) that either (or both) victim-dependent and wrongdoer-dependent conditions were first met. And so here, we will set aside this thick/thin controversy and focus on the conditions for morally positive forgiveness as such.

It is widely thought that in order for an act of forgiveness to have positive moral status, the victim must meet certain conditions. The most commonly cited kind of victim-dependent condition has to do with the victim’s motivating reasons for forgiving. Only some kinds of motivating reasons make forgiveness morally positive. For example, Joram Haber has argued that for an act of forgiveness to be “appropriate” (such that were we to forgive we would not risk “moral reproval”), the victim must forgive for a reason that “preserves self-respect” and that the “only reason that would serve this function is that the wrongdoer has repented the wrong she has done” (1991: 90). For Haber, then, it seems that unless the wrongdoer repents and the victim forgives her (at least in part) for this reason, then that forgiveness is morally inappropriate. Haber therefore has two conditions, one wrongdoer-dependent (to repent for the wrong done), and one victim-dependent (to forgive at least in part because the wrongdoer repented). Jeffrie Murphy articulates a similar view, claiming that

acceptable grounds for forgiveness must be compatible with self-respect, respect for others as moral agents, and respect for the rules of morality and the moral order. (Murphy & Hampton 1988: 24)

Examples of the kinds of moral reasons that Murphy has in mind include: that the wrongdoer repented or had a change of heart, that she has suffered enough, and that she has undergone humiliation, such as “the apology ritual” (24).

There may be other kinds of conditions that a victim must meet in order to effect morally positive forgiveness. Charles Griswold writes that in the “paradigmatic scene”, where forgiveness is “at its best” as the manifestation of virtue (2007: 38), in addition to forswearing revenge, moderating resentment, and committing to give up any lingering resentment, the victim must also: (1) revise her view of the wrongdoer as someone who is reducible to the person who did the wrong; (2) give up any presumption of decisive moral superiority and recognize the shared humanity of both parties; and (3) address the wrongdoer and declare that forgiveness is granted (2007: 54–8).

It is more controversial whether morally positive forgiveness requires wrongdoer-dependent conditions. One of the foremost defenders of such conditions is Charles Griswold, who argues that in the “paradigmatic scene”, there are numerous wrongdoer-dependent conditions on forgiveness. Namely, the wrongdoer must: (1) acknowledge that she was responsible for the wrong in question; (2) repudiate the deeds and disavow the thought that she would do them again; (3) experience and express regret at having caused the particular wrong; (4) commit, by deeds and words, to being the sort of person who doesn’t do wrong; (5) show that she understands, from the victim’s perspective, the damage done by the wrongdoing; and (6) offer some sort of narrative to explain why she did wrong (2007: 47–51).

As noted above, Haber claims that repentance is necessary for morally positive forgiveness, as does Wilson (1988). Swinburne claims that, least in the case of “serious hurt”, “it is both bad and ineffective” to forgive when no atonement has been made (where atonement includes some combination of reparation, repentance, apology, and penance) (1989: 84, 86). Although he remains non-committal about the necessity of wrongdoer-dependent conditions, Jeffrie Murphy thinks that “it is not unreasonable to make forgiveness contingent on sincere repentance” (2003: 36).

Why think that a wrongdoer must apologize, repent, or have a change of heart in order for forgiveness to have positive moral status? Two general reasons have been given. First, it is thought that in the absence of apology and repentance, forgiving constitutes a failure to take the wrongdoing seriously enough. If we give up our resentment or discontinue blame while the wrongdoer continues to “stand by” their mistreatment of us, we are in effect condoning the wrongdoing (see, e.g., Kolnai 1973: 95–6). A second kind of reason is that forgiving in the absence of apology and repentance reveals a lack of self-respect. Forgiving the unapologetic will usually, if not always, mean that the victim will “underestimate their own worth and fail to take their projects and entitlements seriously enough” (Novitz 1998: 299; cf. Murphy 1982: 505; Griswold 2007: 64–5). In reply, Pettigrove (2004b, 2012: ch. 6) and Garrard and McNaughton (2011) take on both the condonation and the self-respect arguments, concluding that neither shows that forgiving unrepentant or unapologetic wrongdoers necessarily puts one at moral risk. For discussion of three other objections to the rejection of wrongdoer-dependent conditions—that it has bad consequences, that it is arbitrary, and that absent repentance resentment is still warranted—see Garrard and McNaughton (2011).

Eve Garrard and David McNaughton originally coined the term “unconditional forgiveness” to refer to morally positive forgiveness that doesn’t depend on the actions or attitudes of the wrongdoer (2002). The term itself may be misleading for the kind of conditions on morally positive forgiveness they rejected are what we are calling the wrongdoer-dependent conditions: they argued that an act of forgiveness need not be lacking in positive moral status just because the wrongdoer did not repent, apologize, or make restitution. They did not mean to claim that all acts of forgiveness as such have positive moral status, and so have recently clarified their position, defending what they call “conditional unconditional forgiveness” (2011; cf. Hoffman 2009). Their view is unconditional insofar as morally positive forgiveness does not require that the wrongdoer repent, apologize, or make restitution. However, a victim’s forgiveness may still be “defectively facile” if she fails to grasp the moral significance of the offense and so overcomes her hostile feelings too “smoothly and easily” (Garrard & McNaughton 2011: 105). Her reasons for forgiving may be bad ones and she may display her forgiveness in an illegitimate manner. The illegitimacy of such forgiveness, however, has nothing to do with the wrongdoer’s actions or state of mind.

Margaret Holmgren articulates a similar view, arguing that once a victim completes a certain kind of process,

forgiveness is always appropriate and desirable from a moral point of view, regardless of whether the wrongdoer repents and regardless of what [the wrongdoer] has done or suffered. (1993: 341)

Absent this process, however, the victim forgives prematurely, and her forgiveness may therefore be incompatible with her own self-respect and therefore inappropriate (1993: 341, 342). Notice that for Holmgren, whether one’s forgiveness is self-respecting depends wholly on whether the victim herself goes through a certain kind of process. On her view, forgiveness that is compatible with self-respect does not depend on the actions or attitudes of the wrongdoer. What kind of process is required? Holmgren identifies six general elements of this process: the victim must (1) recover her self-esteem; (2) come to fully appreciate the nature of the wrongdoing and why it was wrong; (3) acknowledge as basic and legitimate her feelings of anger and grief as a result of being wronged; (4) not withhold something she needs to say or express to the wrongdoer about her beliefs and feelings; (5) reassess the nature of her relationship with the wrongdoer; and (6) determine whether she wants to seek restitution from the wrongdoer (1993: 343–4).

All of the views canvassed thus far allow that, at least in some circumstances, forgiveness has positive moral status. But some philosophers have expressed skepticism about the morality of forgiveness as such. For example, some “perfectionist” views of morality might see forgiveness, not as having intrinsic moral value, but as having only instrumental or remedial value. A perfectionist view might hold that whatever attitudes or actions we overcome or forbear in forgiveness were not morally good in the first place: to feel resentment, for example, admits of moral error. And so if one is in a position to forgive, this would reveal only that something morally sub-par had already occurred in how a victim responded to being wronged. Forgiveness might be thought then as just the mechanism by which we expunge those already morally mistaken reactions. Griswold argues that something like this perfectionist scheme can be found in the ancients from Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans (2007: 2–14). And though his views on what we now call forgiveness are complicated, Nietzsche might be understood as “seeing forgiveness as part of a moral system that must be rejected in toto ” (Griswold 2007: 15; cf. Blustein 2014: 23–30).

Modern-day skeptics about moral responsibility and blameworthiness might also be committed to a remedial view of the moral status of forgiveness (see, e.g., Pereboom 2014). If no one is morally responsible and blameworthy for what they do, then morally reactive attitudes like resentment will likely be inappropriate for both epistemic and moral reasons. But if forgiving requires that one hold a wrongdoer morally responsible and blameworthy for what they have done, they are making a kind of moral mistake. Forgiving—understood as giving up one’s morally reactive attitudes or blaming behaviors—might be what is required to reverse that mistake, but the need to forgive itself is evidence that something has already gone wrong as regards one’s reactions to being wronged. According to Martha Nussbaum (2016), another modern critic of forgiveness, not only does forgiveness respond to an already normatively problematic attitude (i.e., resentment), it also takes on in its “transactional” form a kind of morally suspect down-ranking: the victim demands apology and humility from the wrongdoer thereby bringing her low until the victim is ready to move on from her anger.

One contemporary critic of the positive moral status of forgiveness is John Kekes (2009), who argues that the “standard view” ( viz . that forgiveness is always or at least sometimes morally good) is “seriously flawed”. The reason is simple: “when blaming wrongdoers is reasonable, there is no reason to forgive them; and when blaming them is unreasonable, there is nothing to forgive” (2009: 488; cf. Kolnai 1973; Zaibert 2009; Hallich 2013). On Kekes’ view, whether blame is reasonable depends on (1) whether the blamer’s belief about having suffered undeserved, unjustified, and non-trivial harm is true; (2) whether the emotion such harm elicits is appropriate; (3) whether the motive (for blaming) is commensurate with the harm; and (4) whether the (blaming) action, if there is one, remains within the limits set by the blamer’s relevant belief, emotion, judgment, and motive (2009: 501). And so if someone has done nothing blameworthy, then “neither blame nor forgiveness is appropriate” (2009: 501). On the other hand, if someone has done something blameworthy, then “blame [of the right kind and degree] is appropriate and forgiveness is not” (2009: 501). Either way, to forgive would be to do something morally inappropriate.

Kekes’ argument relies on at least two crucial assumptions. First, it assumes that forgiveness requires giving up the judgment that one has been the victim of undeserved, unjustified and non-trivial harm, a judgment that is “at the core of blame” (2009: 498, contrast Pettigrove 2012: 6–7, fn. 12). If an account of forgiveness had no such requirement, however, then forgiveness would not be inappropriate simply because it required one to adopt a false belief about the past. Second, the argument assumes that when a wrongdoer is blameworthy, then either blame or forgiveness is appropriate, but not both. Yet if one can forgive while still judging truly that the wrongdoer did wrong, then it may be appropriate either to continue to blame or to instead forgive. Blameworthiness may provide reasons that merely justify blame, even if forgiveness is also justified (Warmke & McKenna 2013).

For much of the history of modern psychology, the topic of forgiveness was largely ignored. Piaget (1932) discussed the capacity of forgiveness so far as it is related to the development of moral judgment. Litwinski (1945) produced a study on the kind of affective structure that would provide one with a capacity to forgive. Emerson (1964) was the first to explore the association of forgiveness with mental health, and Heider (1958) proposed an early working definition of forgiveness (as the forgoing of vengeful behavior). Rokeach (1973) promoted forgiveness as a valuable form of conduct, but didn’t say much about its nature. Discussions of forgiveness as it relates to Prisoner’s Dilemma situations and tit-for-tat strategies were not uncommon (e.g., Gahagan & Tedeschi 1968)—the idea being that forgiveness could be likened to a cooperative move following a competitive move.

In the recent decades, forgiveness has enjoyed a significant increase in empirical attention (McCullough, et al. 2000: 6, 7). Important early work during this time included papers by Boon and Sulsky (1997), Darby and Schlenker (1982), and Weiner, et al. (1991). Yet even after decades of sustained empirical enquiry, psychologists remain divided about how forgiveness ought to be defined. The “major issue characterizing this new science of forgiveness”, Everett Worthington writes, “has been how forgiveness ought to be defined” (2005: 3).

Some psychologists forward interpersonal models of forgiveness. According to these approaches, forgiveness is an activity involving communication (perhaps verbal, perhaps not) between agents. Reconciliation-based models of forgiveness developed out of research in evolutionary psychology and evolutionary ethics (Sapolsky & Share 2004; de Waal & Pokorny 2005; Axelrod 1980a,b). According to these views, forgiveness evolved as a mechanism for affirming mutual cooperation between agents after an act of defection.

Others have sought to define forgiveness by way of intrapersonal models. According to these models, forgiveness occurs within one’s skin, as it were. DiBlasio’s (1998) decision-based model views forgiveness “as an act of the will, a choice to let go or hold onto” resentment, bitterness and the need for vengeance (1998: 76). McCullough and various colleagues have posited a motivational model that understands forgiveness as a process involving a decrease in motivations to avoid or seek revenge, and an increase in benevolent and conciliatory motivations (e.g., McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang 2003). Cognitive models conceive of forgiveness as a reframing of the narrative about the transgression, the transgressor and the forgiver (e.g., Gordon, Baucom, & Snyder 2000; Thompson, et al. 2005). One forgives by changing one’s assumptions, beliefs, standards, or perceptions about the wrongdoer and the wrongdoing. Emotion-based models see forgiveness as being accomplished by the replacement of negative, unforgiving emotions (e.g., anger, hatred) with positive, other-oriented emotions (e.g., empathy) (Worthington 2003; Malcolm & Greenberg 2000).

Still others have suggested mixed models , according to which forgiveness has both interpersonal and intrapersonal modes or aspects. Baumeister, Exline, and Sommer (1998) suggest that when one feels forgiving towards an offender but does not communicate as much, one has silently forgiven . Alternatively, when one does not feel forgiving but tells the offender that she is forgiving her, she accomplishes hollow forgiveness . When one both feels forgiving and tells the offender so, she has accomplished full forgiveness . Enright and Fitzgibbons (2000) have argued that in order to forgive, cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes must be made.

As it should be clear, there is significant disagreement about the nature of forgiveness in the psychological sciences, leading one prominent psychologist of forgiveness to write that “no consensual definition of forgiveness exists” (McCullough, et al. 2000: 7).

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• Sadler, Gregory, 2008, “Forgiveness, Anger, and Virtue in an Aristotelian Perspective”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association , 82: 229–247. doi:10.5840/acpaproc20088217
• Sapolsky, Robert M. & Lisa J Share, 2004, “A Pacific Culture Among Wild Baboons: Its Emergence and Transmissions”, PLoS Biology , 2: 534–541. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0020106
• Scarre, Geoffrey, 2004, After Evil: Responding to Wrongdoing , Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
• Scheiber, Karin, 2001, “May God Forgive?” in Forgiveness and Truth: Explorations in Contemporary Theology , Alistair McFadyen & Marcel Sarot (eds.), T&T Clark: Edinburgh, pp. 173–180.
• Seneca, [c.55 CE] 1998a, De Clementia , ( On Mercy ). in Seneca 1998c: 356–449
• –––, [c.50 CE] 1998b, De Ira , ( On Anger ). in Seneca 1998c: 106–355.
• –––, 1998c, Moral Essays , Vol. 1, C.P. Gould (ed.), Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Smith, Nick, 2008, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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• Strawson, P.F., 1962, “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy , 48: 1–25. Reprinted in 2003, Free Will (second edition), Gary Watson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72–93.
• Sussman, David, 2005, “Kantian Forgiveness”, Kant-Studien , 96(1): 85–107. doi:10.1515/kant.2005.96.1.85
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• Szablowinski, Zenon, 2011, “Self-Forgiveness and Forgiveness”, Heythrop Journal , 53(4): 678–689. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00611.x
• Thompson, Yamhure Thompson, C.R. Snyder, Lesa Hoffman, Scott T. Michael, Heather N. Rasmussen, Laura S. Billings, Laura Heinze, Jason E. Neufeld, Hal S. Shorey, Jessica C. Roberts, & Danae E. Roberts, 2005, “Dispositional Forgiveness of Self, Others, and Situations,” Journal of Personality , 73(2): 313–359. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00311.x
• Tombs, David, 2008, “The Offer of Forgiveness”, Journal of Religious Ethics , 36(4): 587–593. doi:0.1111/j.1467-9795.2008.00363_2.x
• Tosi, Justin & Brandon Warmke, 2017, “Punishment and Forgiveness”, Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics , Jonathan Jacobs and Jonathan Jackson (eds.): 203–216.
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• –––, 2015, “Articulate Forgiveness and Normative Constraints”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 45(4): 490–514. doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1101305
• –––, 2016a, “The Economic Model of Forgiveness”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 97(4): 570–589. doi:10.1111/papq.12055
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• Warmke, Brandon & Michael McKenna, 2013, “Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation”, in Haji & Caouette 2013: 189–212.
• Weiner, Bernard, Sandra Graham, Orli Peter, & Mary Zmuidinas, 1991, “Public Confession and Forgiveness”, Journal of Personality , 59(2): 281–312. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1991.tb00777.x
• Williams, Stephen N., 2008, “Forgiveness, Compassion, and Northern Ireland: A Response to Nigel Biggar”, Journal of Religious Ethics , 36(4): 581–586. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9795.2008.00363_1.x
• Williston, Byron, 2012, “The Importance of Self-Forgiveness”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 49(1): 67–80.
• Wilson, John, 1988, “Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance”, Philosophy , 63(246): 534–535. doi:10.1017/S0031819100043850
• Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 2009, “Jesus and Forgiveness”, In Jesus and Philosophy: New Essays , Paul K. Moser (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–23.
• Worthington, Jr., Everett, 2003, Forgiving and Reconciling: Bridges to Wholeness and Hope , Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.
• ––– (ed.), 2005, Handbook of Forgiveness , New York: Routledge.
• Zaibert, Leo, 2009, “The Paradox of Forgiveness”, Journal of Moral Philosophy , 6(3): 365–393. doi:10.1163/174552409X433436
• Zaragoza, Kevin, 2012, “Forgiveness and Standing”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 84(3): 604–621. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00361.x

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Forgiveness , The John Templeton Foundation.
• The Forgiveness Project .
• Philosophy Bites Program on Forgiveness , interview with Lucy Allais (UC-San Diego).
• Philosophy Bites Program on Derrida and Forgiveness , interview with Robert Rowland Smith.
• Chronological bibliography of philosophical work on forgiveness , maintained by Brandon Warmke (Bowling Green State University).

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Reflections: THE NECESSITY OF FORGIVENESS

 january 2007.

One of the persistent problems that everyone encounters in life is being offended by other people. The “other people” in question include strangers, co-workers, friends, and family. While many of these offenses are relatively minor irritants, others are deep, painful, and have a major impact on us. Regardless of the magnitude, in every case of offense, we are confronted with a critical issue: will we forgive the offender?

C.S. Lewis gives us helpful insight on forgiving others:

As regards my own sins it is a safe bet (though not a certainty) that the excuses are not really so good as I think; as regards other men’s sins against me it is a safe bet (though not a certainty) that the excuses are better than I think. One must therefore begin by attending to everything which may show that the other man was not so much to blame as we thought. But even if he is absolutely fully to blame we still have to forgive him; and even if ninety-nine percent of his apparent guilt can be explained away by really good excuses, the problem of forgiveness begins with the one percent of guilt which is left over. To excuse what can really produce good excuses is not Christian charity; it is only fairness. To be Christian means to forgive the inexcusable, because God has forgiven the inexcusable in you. This is hard. It is perhaps not so hard to forgive a single great injury. But to forgive the incessant provocations of daily life—to keep on forgiving the bossy mother-in-law, the bullying husband, the nagging wife, the selfish daughter, the deceitful son—how can we do it? Only, I think, by remembering where we stand, by meaning our words when we say in our prayers each night “forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those that trespass against us.” We are offered forgiveness on no other terms. To refuse it is to refuse God’s mercy for ourselves. There is no hint of exceptions and God means what He says. 1

In comparison to sins like adultery, murder, theft, etc., unforgiveness might seem relatively minor. But Christ does not see it that way. Of all the serious sins he could have possibly mentioned in the Lord ’s Prayer, Jesus focused only on forgiveness (Matthew 6:12, 14-15). He knew that offenses come to each of us regularly, and that we are prone to rationalize and justify our unforgiveness of the offender. He also knew that when we do so, we erect a barrier of sin between us and God which blocks our own forgiveness, as well as our prayers and fellowship with him, and leads to backsliding. Unforgiveness is a spiritual abscess that poisons the soul, the only remedy for which is forgiveness, no matter how difficult.

Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors…. For if you forgive men when they sin against you, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But if you do not forgive men their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins. MATTHEW 6:12, 14-15 (NIV)

1  C.S. Lewis,  The Weight of Glory  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 135-136.

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Home — Essay Samples — Life — Forgiveness — Explaining Why It Is Important to Forgive

Explaining Why It is Important to Forgive

• Categories: Forgiveness Interpersonal Communication

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Published: Sep 16, 2023

Words: 637 | Page: 1 | 4 min read

Table of contents

1. emotional healing, 2. strengthening relationships, 3. personal growth and empowerment, 4. breaking the cycle of hurt, 5. physical health benefits.

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Here’s How to Truly Earn Someone’s Forgiveness After You’ve Hurt Them

No matter how thoughtful and empathetic you try to be, you’ve probably hurt or offended someone you really care about. Maybe you accidentally let a private detail about your best friend’s health struggle slip during a group hang, or you snooped through your partner’s phone , completely shaking their trust. After messing up, it’s natural to want to make things right—but what’s the best way to actually earn that all-important “it’s okay”?

The reality is, “you can't make someone forgive you,” Elizabeth Earnshaw, LMFT , author of I Want This to Work , tells SELF. Even if you fall all over yourself apologizing and take accountability for your actions, “forgiveness comes from the other person,” Earnshaw says—and there are plenty of reasons why someone might not be ready to let bygones be bygones. They may need time to process what happened or perhaps they’re not convinced your “sorry” is genuine.

While you can’t force forgiveness, you can take meaningful steps to earn it. According to the experts we spoke with, these are some of the best ways to redeem yourself—and get whoever you offended to move past your slipup.

1. Don’t view apologizing as a sign of weakness.

If you struggle to admit when you did something wrong, that makes a lot of sense. Acknowledging that you were a shitty friend or significant other, for instance, can bring up uncomfortable emotions many of us would prefer to avoid—such as guilt, shame, or embarrassment.

However, if you see owning up to your mistakes as a blow to your ego, this mindset will only hold you back and prevent you from being a better pal, partner, and overall person, Nelly Seo, PsyD , a psychologist at Therapists of New York, tells SELF. Instead, try to reframe the act of taking responsibility as an opportunity for growth.

“It requires emotional strength and a lot of self-awareness to trade in your pride and admit you messed up,” Dr. Seo says. And ultimately, this perspective shift can make it easier to be more honest, remorseful, and vulnerable—without the defensiveness or blame-shifting that might ruin your chances of returning to your loved one’s good graces.

2. Be specific about what you’re sorry for.

A declaration of sorrow isn’t always enough. “A good apology includes a clear understanding of what exactly you did to hurt the person and shows some sense of remorse,” Earnshaw says.

If you were super late to a close friend’s birthday party, a brief “sorry again for last night” text the next morning doesn’t convey that you truly get their disappointment. Instead, express your regret and validate their feelings with something like, “I’m so sorry I wasn’t on time. I know this party meant a lot to you and it’s been planned for months, and I completely get why you’re mad at me.” Or, “I should have told you sooner that I was running late, and I feel horrible about letting you down.”

Basically, don’t just admit you did something wrong; admit you did something wrong to them . The more personal and detailed you are, the more it shows you’ve carefully reflected on the situation—which Earnshaw says will make your apology more meaningful (and more likely to be taken seriously).

3. Explain why you did what you did without making excuses.

Especially if you didn’t mean to hurt their feelings, it’s easy to slip into defense mode and start justifying your shitty actions. It wasn’t my fault I was late—work was crazy! I didn’t mean to say [insert insensitive comment]—I was just drunk!

To be fair, adding context for why you did what you did can help clear things up. But sometimes it can also come across like you’re deflecting responsibility, Dr. Seo warns. (Think about it: Are you truly taking accountability if your priority is to explain away your bad behavior?) That’s why, when you’re giving reasons for what happened, it’s important not to let them overshadow how your actions affected the other person.

With the example above, if you missed part of your pal’s big day due to a last-second work obligation, it’s okay to mention that—just don’t use it as an excuse to sidestep how disappointed they felt. Or say, after a few cocktails, you joked about how bad your body looks in front of a sibling who’s struggled with disordered eating : You can add that you weren’t in the best state of mind—while also addressing how deeply inconsiderate your comment was. “The point is to acknowledge how your mistake hurt them, rather than assuming your explanation alone can make everything okay and absolve you of responsibility,” Dr. Seo says.

4. Describe what you’ll do to prevent this from happening again—and actually follow through.

Words alone can only do so much. If you’re talking the talk but aren’t taking real steps to fix the issue, your apology (no matter how heartfelt) won’t carry much weight—which is why it’s helpful to outline how you intend to change. (In other words, what will you do from this point on? How will you prevent similar slipups from happening again?)

Instead of just promising your partner that you’ll stop snapping at them whenever family-related stress gets to you, come prepared with a few concrete steps you’ll take (like requesting 15 minutes of alone time to cool off, for example). Or, to make sure you never forget a friend’s important moments (like birthdays or big doctor’s appointments) again, commit to adding those events to your calendar—and set reminders to notify you too. That way “you’re showing the other person you’re serious about not hurting them again,” Earnshaw says, which is a solid step toward rebuilding trust and gaining their forgiveness.

5. If they need space, let them know you’re ready to give it.

“You shouldn’t expect to be forgiven,” Earnshaw says. (Remember: Apologizing is your part, but accepting it is theirs.) Not only can it be annoying and overwhelming, but “putting pressure on someone might send a message that you only apologized to get what you wanted (forgiveness) rather than to genuinely right your wrong,” she adds.

Of course, it’s natural to want to check in and see where they’re at. A better idea than bugging them for updates, though, is simply asking if they need space, Dr. Seo says. You could also say something like, “I know I've been apologizing a lot, so I’ll give you some time to process everything. I don’t want you to think I'm abandoning you; I just want to respect your needs.” By stepping back, you’re letting them work through their pain at their own pace, which they’ll probably appreciate more than a flood of “I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I’m sorry.”

6. Know that there’s a chance they won’t forgive you—and try to accept it.

Even if you do everything “right” and follow all of the advice above to a T, it’s possible that the person you hurt won’t ever forgive you—or even if they do, they may not want you back in their life. As heartbreaking as that outcome can be, though, you owe it to yourself to not let it jumpstart a never-ending cycle of self-blame and regret.

“No one is perfect, and we’re all bound to make mistakes that sometimes have big consequences,” Dr. Seo says. “What’s important is finding a way to accept that and, when you’re emotionally ready, focus on what you can learn from this experience.” Maybe that looks like reflecting on what it means to be a more reliable, trustworthy friend for your existing connections, or adopting healthier ways to manage your anger . As long as you’re committed to growing from your missteps, both therapists agree you’re on the path to doing better in the future—and forgiving yourself .

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Forgiveness

There’s no such thing as “forgive and forget”, forgetting a wrong done can be detrimental to your relationships..

Posted August 21, 2024 | Reviewed by Davia Sills

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The often-cited phrase “forgive and forget” is both common and problematic. It’s frequently used to persuade or pressure people into forgiving those who have wronged them.

However, the idea that forgetting is equivalent to forgiveness is misguided. Forgetting is an unrealistic expectation, and in many cases, it’s healthier—and safer—to remember offenses rather than trying to erase them from your memory .

Forgetting is not forgiveness.

Forgiveness does not erase the memory of the offense; rather, it involves an awareness of the harm that has been done. Forgiveness requires memory, not its absence.

If you forget an offense, you are not actually forgiving—you’re simply forgetting. For instance, if you overhear a close friend gossiping about you but then forget about it, you haven’t forgiven them; you’ve just forgotten.

Genuine forgiveness requires retaining some memory of the offense, including associated thoughts, emotions, or physical sensations. In my research for my book You Don’t Need to Forgive: Trauma Recovery on Your Own Terms , I found that no definitions of forgiveness included forgetting as a necessary component. In fact, many researchers argue that remembering the offense is essential for forgiveness to occur.

The notion of “forgive and forget” is misleading, implying that forgiveness should involve erasing the memory of the harm. In reality, remembering the offense does not equate to holding onto resentment or seeking revenge ; it simply means you recall what happened. While forgetting might sometimes follow forgiveness, it is not guaranteed. Forgiving someone does not mean you must lose your memory of the offense.

Forgetting can be a byproduct of forgiveness, but not always. When you forgive, you may forget about the offense—or you may not. The process of forgiving does not mean that you do not have the right to retain your memory of the offense in the future. The phrase forgive and forget causes confusion, as this implies that one who forgives will have no memory or should have no memory of the harm.

Forgetting is not and never was a required outcome of forgiveness. Remembering offenses does not mean that you are holding onto resentment or revenge; it simply means that you remember.

There is no wiping the slate clean.

The notion of “forgive and forget” suggests that forgiveness allows us to wipe the slate clean and restart our relationship from scratch. This expectation is unrealistic because relationships don’t offer a clean slate. Instead, relationships are dynamic, continuously evolving, and changing. Forgiveness doesn’t erase past events or reset a relationship; rather, it enables the development of a new phase in the relationship, one that is inherently altered by the experience.

A relationship cannot revert to its original state, nor can it truly begin anew. Forgiveness helps repair the damage caused by an offense, but the relationship will inevitably be different. For example, if a friend gossiped about you, you might need to establish new boundaries —such as requesting that they refrain from discussing you with others. This adjustment reflects the new dynamics in the relationship and helps rebuild trust and safety rather than attempting to return to the previous state or achieving an unrealistic clean slate.

Memory supports relationships.

Memory strengthens relationships rather than undermines them. For instance, if you forgive a friend who has gossiped about you, and you later discover that they’re gossiping again, your memory of the past offense helps you recognize a troubling pattern. This awareness is crucial for addressing and repairing ongoing issues in the relationship. Memory enables you to identify and respond to recurring problems and to decide whether you need to set new boundaries or even end the relationship.

The idea of “forgive and forget” is unrealistic and can be detrimental to maintaining safe and healthy relationships. A more practical approach is “forgive, but don’t forget,” which acknowledges that you can forgive while still retaining the memory of the harm. An even more nuanced perspective might be “forgive or don’t, but don’t forget,” recognizing that forgiveness isn’t always necessary or appropriate, and that memory plays a key role in supporting and managing relationships.

Amanda Ann Gregory, LCPC, is a Chicago-based trauma psychotherapist, national speaker, and author.

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