corruption in government essay

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• Prime Minister's Office 10 Downing Street

Against Corruption: a collection of essays

Published 12 May 2016

© Crown copyright 2016

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This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays

1. Foreword by David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Corruption is the cancer at the heart of so many of our problems in the world today. It destroys jobs and holds back growth, costing the world economy billions of pounds every year. It traps the poorest in the most desperate poverty as corrupt governments around the world syphon off funds and prevent hard-working people from getting the revenues and benefits of growth that are rightfully theirs. It steals vital resources from our schools and hospitals as corrupt individuals and companies evade the taxes they owe. It can even undermine our security, as Sarah Chayes argues in her essay, if the perceived corruption of local governments makes people more susceptible to the poisonous ideology of extremists.

The longer I have been Prime Minister, and the more I have seen in this job, the more I believe that we cannot hope to solve the big global challenges of our time without making a major dent in the whole cycle of corruption. If we continue to hide from this problem, how will developing countries blessed with natural resources ever break out of the poverty trap? How will we stop people from risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean unless we enable them to build a better life back at home? In the end, we have to deal with corruption if we are to have any hope of a truly prosperous and secure future.

Furthermore, people actually want us to deal with this problem, every bit as much as they want us to tackle issues like poverty and migration. They want the law to be upheld and they want the corrupt to be punished, with justice and recompense for those who have suffered.

Yet while corruption is such a huge problem, the national and global efforts to deal with it are often weak. No country has a perfect record on these issues – and so there is a hesitation in raising them. For too long there has been something of an international taboo over stirring up concerns. For too long it has just been too easy for those in authority to ignore or pretend not to know what is going on. As David Walsh puts it in his essay: this “longing to indulge the irresponsibility of not knowing” has been the rock upon which corruption is built. I profoundly believe that this has to change – and it has to change in every country. Make no mistake, corruption affects us all, Britain included. From tax evasion and overseas territories who have been accused of hiding the proceeds of corruption, to an MPs’ expenses scandal that tore at the fabric of the world’s oldest democracy, we have our own problems and we are very much still dealing with them.

That is why I have made tackling corruption such a political priority. From the 2010 Bribery Act to becoming the first major country in the world to establish a public central registry of who really owns and controls companies, I am determined that we should do everything we can to demonstrate leadership on these issues and put our own house in order.

Through our chairmanship of the G8 and the Summit at Lough Erne, I put tax, trade and transparency on the global agenda and sought agreement on a global standard for the automatic exchange of information over who pays taxes where. While many said it would never happen, today 129 jurisdictions have committed to implementing the international standard for exchange of tax information on request and more than 95 jurisdictions have committed to implementing the new global common reporting standard on tax transparency by 2018.

Through our chairmanship of the United Nations High Level Panel, Britain secured the inclusion of tackling corruption at the heart of the new Sustainable Development Goals to eradicate absolute poverty from our world. On my watch, the UK has signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative – and we’re leading a global drive to get other countries on board and clean up a sector which has for too long been vulnerable to corruption. We are going further still. I am determined that the UK must not become a safe haven for corrupt money from around the world. We know that some high-value properties – particularly in London – are being bought by people overseas through anonymous shell companies, some of them with plundered or laundered cash. So we are consulting on ways to make property ownership by foreign companies much more transparent – and considering whether to insist that any non-UK company wishing to bid on a contract with the UK government should publically state who really owns it.

Yet all of these measures address only parts of the problem. As the Panama Papers show, corruption is a truly global challenge. Criminal networks operate across borders. And wealth that is plundered from the poorest countries can end up hidden away in the richest countries. So nations need to tackle this issue in partnership, developing a truly comprehensive, sustained and coherent international agenda to defeat the causes of corruption. That is why we are holding the Anti-Corruption Summit in London and why I have compiled this book. The essays in this book are not about trying to claim the moral high ground, nor about telling others what to do. Neither do they claim to be a comprehensive guide to tackling corruption. But they are an attempt to bring together some of the most pioneering thinkers on this issue to begin a frank and informed global debate over how to tackle what I believe is one of the most pernicious enemies of progress in our time.

While the essays cover a wide range of perspectives and experiences, there are a number of consistent themes. For a start, we can be clear about the scale and extent of the problem. José Ugaz tells us that every year one in four people around the world pay a bribe to access public services. While in Mexico, a family spends on average 14% of its income on bribes for basic services to which they are already entitled – including water, medicine and education.

Christine Lagarde sets out the indirect economic costs of corruption, including the way corruption can act like a tax on investment and stifle the creation of new business. She also highlights its impact on the poorest and its damaging effect on the moral fabric of our society.

Many of the essays bring home the sheer extent of corruption, reaching every country and affecting so many areas of life – from the desperate stories of the vulnerable paying bribes to get treatment for a sick child, to the world of sport which was for so long indulged with a special status that left some of its participants behaving as if they were exempt from the rules that everyone else was expected to follow.

Some of the essays are very clear about the definitions of corruption. Francis Fukuyama, in particular, analyses the origins of corruption, providing a strong historical and intellectual underpinning to the challenges we face. Running through the essays is the sense that not only do you need the right rules and enforcement but you need to change the underlying culture too. There is a clear message here. We cannot have one or the other; we need both. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key offers us his perspective when he uses a cricketing analogy to describe the national character of his country and its intolerance of “underarm deliveries”. He argues that you have to promote a culture which makes it close to impossible for the corrupt to prosper or escape detection. There is also a striking frankness and directness in the politicians who are writing about the history of corruption in their own countries.

President Ghani describes Afghanistan as, by any measure, “one of the most corrupt countries on earth”. In his essay on tackling corruption in Estonia, Mart Laar says that corruption was so ingrained that it had become a way of life. He writes: “we didn’t even understand that it wasn’t normal.” President Buhari uses that same concept to describe corruption in Nigeria as a “way of life” under “supposedly accountable democratic governments” and points to evidence suggesting that between $300 billion and

$400 billion of public funds have been lost to corruption since Nigeria’s independence in 1960.

But that frankness about the problem will only deliver real change if there is true political leadership. Without that leadership, many of the rules, institutions and mechanisms to address corruption will never actually bite. For years Nigeria had the laws and the anti-corruption agencies, but as President Buhari explains, there was “a complete lack of political will to strengthen these agencies and to faithfully enforce the laws.” These laws were ignored with impunity and procurements were made with a complete disregard for due process. He cites one example of a provision to allow courts to treat unexplained wealth as evidence of corruption. There is a similar provision in Singapore, the use of which is explored in the essay by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. But the difference is that in Nigeria’s case, neither the Code of Conduct Bureau nor the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission has ever invoked such provisions in their decades of existence.

Above all, when I read through the essays I feel both depressed and uplifted. Depressed because the scale of this problem is truly frightening and the human costs are so desperate. It is hard not to pause on Jim Yong Kim’s essay when he describes the situation in Sierra Leone where corruption stopped some mothers from immunising their infant children because nurses demanded rice in exchange for ‘free’ shots.

But I am also uplifted because there is a consistent theme that we can crack this and there are so many encouraging stories of measures that have already had an impact.

Angel Gurría tells us that between 1999 – the year the OECD convention tackling transnational bribery came into force – and 2014, 361 individuals and 126 companies were sanctioned for foreign bribery in 17 countries, with at least $5.4 billion imposed in combined monetary sanctions and 95 people put behind bars.

José Ugaz describes some of the ways that new technologies have already been employed to bring about real change. In Guatemala, a public campaign over a customs fraud scandal forced the resignation of the president and vice- president. In Brazil, 40 civil society organisations mobilised two million Brazilians to use online actions and events to successfully campaign for a new law that prevents candidates who have been convicted of corruption from standing for public office for at least eight years.

When El Salvador gave citizens the right to ask for information about public officials’ assets, 6,000 citizen requests helped to uncover cases where the wealth of public officials had grown by 300% during their time in office. In Venezuela, a new smart phone app is allowing ordinary citizens to report on instances of bribery and any irregularities during elections, with more than 400 complaints registered for follow-up in the most recent parliamentary elections.

Christine Lagarde also cites an example from Indonesia where the then Minister of Finance partnered with business to create ‘new rules of the game’. These meant that the government delivered a streamlined customs approval process in exchange for a commitment from business not to offer any bribes to officials.

Jim Yong Kim describes how publishing school funding allocations in local newspapers in Uganda transformed the proportion of funds that made it through to the schools, with one study concluding that the amount of funds diverted away by local officials correlated to the distance of a school from a town where there was a newspaper outlet.

All of these examples and more mean that the biggest message of this book is one of optimism. This battle can be won. Furthermore, there are clear lessons coming through that can help us to win it by shaping an international agenda to defeat and deter corruption.

First, corruption should be exposed so there is nowhere to hide. We need to end the use of secret shell companies, so that the corrupt no longer have an easy and anonymous way to hide their loot and move it across borders. We need to drive out the rogue lawyers, estate agents and accountants who facilitate or tolerate corruption in commerce and finance. We need to expose the theft or misuse of taxpayers’ money by opening up budgets and procurement so that people can see exactly how their money is used and they can demand that people are held to account when it is stolen. And we need a sustained effort in those areas which Paul Collier describes as the “pockets of high corruption”, including corruption-prone sectors such as the extractive and construction industries.

At the heart of all of this is international co-operation on transparency. In the UK we have adopted legislation to give the public unrestricted access to beneficial ownership information on UK companies through a public central registry so that people can see who really owns and controls companies. But as Paul Radu argues, tracking international flows of finance requires international co-operation. Well-structured, transparent and accessible databases could allow automated searches of ever-larger, global datasets that could feed real-time alerts to journalists in every country. His vision offers a network of investigative journalists that could help make transparency the natural enemy of international organised crime gangs and corrupt officials all over the world. Given the sheer quantity of data to get through, networks of civil society, activists and journalists – working with law enforcement – will be critical to holding people to account.

Second, we need to deal properly and comprehensively with the corruption we expose. That means bringing the perpetrators to justice, actively enforcing anti-corruption laws and working together across international borders to hunt down the corrupt, prosecute them and send them to jail. One cutting-edge idea to explore here comes from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. In Singapore, instead of prosecutors having to prove the guilt of the corrupt, they reverse the burden of proof so the accused have to show that they acquired their wealth legally. The Prevention of Corruption Act also provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction, so that the actions of Singaporeans overseas are treated in the same way as actions committed in Singapore, regardless of whether the corrupt acts had consequences in Singapore itself.

It will be a while yet before everyone is as bold and as far- reaching as Singapore. But what I believe we can all agree is that we should send a clear message to the corrupt that there will be no impunity and that we will restrict their ability to travel and do business as usual in our countries. That’s why we in the UK are looking closely at the potential of Unexplained Wealth Orders, and why I urge other countries to do the same.

Dealing with the corruption we expose also means taking responsibility to support those who have suffered from corruption. I believe that should include doing everything we can to track down looted money and create a trusted system to return it to its rightful owners. The looting of public wealth has been on such a scale in some countries, that returning it safely would make an enormous difference to their development prospects. It would also begin to address the sense of injustice that many in this book have so powerfully described.

Third, we need more than just clear rules that are properly enforced. As so many of the contributors have argued, we also need to make it much harder for corruption to thrive by driving out the underlying cultures that have allowed this cancer to fester for so long. This means tackling head on what John Githongo describes as the ‘pirate sector’ by creating a culture where the corrupt are (in Lesotho vernacular) “bobolu” and made to feel a social stigma that shames them for what they do.

It means challenging corrupt behaviours globally by embracing the vast possibilities that Paul Collier highlights around the twinning of different countries’ institutions and professions. From tax collection agencies, treasuries and civil services to professions such as accountancy and law, twinning can begin to build a newly shared culture of probity and honesty.

Changing the culture of corruption also means embracing the power of new technologies to deliver greater accountability for public money and public services. In India, for example, welfare smartcards are helping to prevent corrupt officials taking a cut of payments to the poor. Technologies like this can provide the information to enable government agencies, businesses, campaigning NGOs and individual citizens to come together in a comprehensive movement against corruption.

But all of this will only really work if political leaders have the courage to stand together, to speak up where previously there was silence, and to demand the strengthening and co- ordinating of international institutions that are needed to put fighting corruption at the top of the international agenda where it belongs. We cannot and must not fail this test of political leadership. As David Walsh writes: “No longer in the dark, we now have the opportunity for change. It would be a crime not to seize it.”

I intend to seize it, with the support of all the authors in this book and together with the widest possible coalition of leaders from politics, business and civil society.

Together we are against corruption. And together we can defeat it.

2. Francis Fukuyama: What is Corruption?

Corruption has in many ways become the defining issue of the 21st century, just as the 20th century was characterised by large ideological struggles between democracy, fascism and communism. Today a majority of the world’s nations accept the legitimacy of democracy and at least pretend to hold competitive elections. What really distinguishes political systems from one another is the degree to which the elites ruling them seek to use their power in the service of a broad public interest or simply to enrich themselves, their friends and their families. Countries from Russia and Venezuela to Afghanistan and Nigeria all hold elections that produce leaders with some degree of democratic legitimacy. What distinguishes them from Norway, Japan or Britain is not so much democracy as the quality of government which, in turn, is greatly affected by levels of corruption.

Corruption hurts life outcomes in a variety of ways. Economically, it diverts resources away from their most productive uses and acts like a regressive tax that supports the lifestyles of elites at the expense of everyone else. Corruption incentivises the best and the brightest to spend their time gaming the system, rather than innovating or creating new wealth. Politically, corruption undermines the legitimacy of political systems by giving elites alternative ways of holding onto power other than genuine democratic choice. It hurts the prospects of democracy when people perceive authoritarian governments to be performing better than corrupt democratic ones and undermines the reality of democratic choice.

However, the phenomenon labelled ‘corruption’ comprises a wide range of behaviours whose economic and political effects vary greatly. It is remarkable that, for all of the academic effort put into the study of corruption, there is still no broadly accepted vocabulary for distinguishing between its different forms. Before we can tackle corruption, we need some conceptual clarity as to what it is and how it relates to the broader problem of good government.

2.1 Corruption as a modern phenomenon

Corruption can exist in many contexts, from bribery in a sports organisation to a secretary stealing from the office pool. I am here going to focus on political corruption, which concerns the abuse of public office for private gain (see Johnston 2005, p. 11).

The first point to note is that corruption is a modern phenomenon. The very terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ did not always exist. In the European medieval era, virtually all regimes were what Max Weber labelled ‘patrimonial’ – that is, political authority was regarded as a species of private property which could be handed down to descendants as part of their patrimony. In dynastic times, a king could give away an entire province with all of its inhabitants to his son or daughter as a wedding present, since he regarded his domain as a private possession. Under these circumstances, it made no sense to talk about public corruption [footnote 1] .

The concept that rulers did not simply own their domains but were custodians of a broader public interest was one that emerged gradually in the 16th and 17th centuries. Theorists such as Hugo Grotius, Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes and Samuel von Pufendorf began to argue that a ruler could be legitimately sovereign not by right of ownership, but out of a kind of social contract by which he protected public interest – above all, the common interest in peace and security. The very notion that there was a potential conflict between public and private interest emerged with the rise of modern European states. In this respect, China beat Europe to the punch by nearly 1,800 years, having been one of the earliest civilisations to develop a concept of an impersonal state that was the guardian of a collective public interest.

Today no rulers dare assert publicly that they ‘own’ the territories over which they exercise authority; even traditional monarchs such as those in the Arab world claim to be serving a broader public interest. Hence we have the phenomenon that political scientists label ‘neo-patrimonialism’ – in which political leaders pretend to be modern servants of the common good in political systems with modern trappings like parliaments, ministers and bureaucracies. But the reality is that elites enter politics to extract rents or resources and enrich themselves and their families at the expense of everyone else.

A modern state which seeks to promote public welfare and treats its citizens impersonally is not just a recent phenomenon, but also one that is difficult to achieve and inherently fragile. The reason for this has to do with human nature. Human beings are social creatures, but their sociability takes the very specific forms of favouritism towards family and friends.

The demand that we treat people on an impersonal basis, or hire a stranger who is qualified rather than a relative or a friend, is not something that comes naturally to human beings. Modern political systems set up incentives and try to socialise people into different forms of behaviour. But because favouritism towards friends and family is a natural instinct, there is a constant danger of relapse – something I have elsewhere labelled ‘repatrimonialisation’ (Fukuyama 2011).

People who live in rich developed countries often look down on countries pervaded by systemic corruption as if they are somehow deviant cases. But the truth of the matter is that, up until a few centuries ago, there were virtually no modern uncorrupt states. Making the transition from a patrimonial or neo-patrimonial state to a modern impersonal one is a difficult and historically fraught process, much more difficult in most respects than making the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic one.

But if most countries throughout most of human history were patrimonial or neo-patrimonial, there were still large differences between them with regard to the quality of government. So we need to make some finer distinctions between types and levels of corruption.

2.2 Types of corruption

There are two separate phenomena related to corruption that are not identical to it. The first is the creation and extraction of rents, and the second is patronage or clientelism.

In economics, a rent is technically defined as the difference between the cost of keeping a good or service in production and its price. One of the most important sources of rents is scarcity: natural resource rents exist because the selling price of oil far exceeds the cost of pumping it out of the ground.

Rents can also be artificially generated by governments. Many of the most common forms of corruption revolve around a government’s ability to create artificial scarcities through licensing or regulation. Placing tariffs on imports restricts imports and generates rents for the government; one of the most widespread forms of corruption around the world lies in customs agencies, where the customs agent will take a bribe to reduce the duties charged or expedites the clearance process so that the importer will have their goods on time.

The ease with which governments can create rents through their taxation or regulatory powers has led many economists to denounce rents in general as distortions of efficient resource allocation by markets and to see rent creation and distribution as virtually synonymous with corruption. The ability of governments to generate rents means that many ambitious people will choose politics rather than entrepreneurship or the private sector as a route to wealth.

But while rents can be and are abused in the fashion described, they also have perfectly legitimate uses, which complicate any blanket denunciation. The most obvious type of a ‘good’ rent is a patent or copyright – by which the government gives the creator of an idea or creative work the exclusive right to any resulting revenues for some defined period of time. Economists Mushtaq Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (2000) point out that many Asian governments have promoted industrialisation by allowing favoured firms to generate excess profits, provided they were ploughed back into new investment. While this opened the door to considerable corruption and abuse, it also worked as a means of stimulating rapid growth at a rate possibly higher than market forces on their own would have produced.

All government regulatory functions create artificial scarcities and therefore rents. But while we can argue about the appropriate extent of regulation, few people would like to see these functions simply abandoned. The creation and distribution of rents by governments have a high degree of overlap with corruption, but are not simply the same phenomenon.

The second phenomenon that is often identified with corruption is that of patronage or clientelism. A patronage relationship is a reciprocal exchange of favours between two individuals of different status and power, usually involving favours given by the patron to the client in exchange for the client’s loyalty and political support. The favour given to the client must be a good that can be individually appropriated, such as a job in the post office, a Christmas turkey or a get-out-of-jail card for a relative, rather than a public good or policy that applies to a broad class of people (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Patronage is sometimes distinguished from clientelism by scale; patronage relationships are typically face-to-face ones between patrons and clients and exist in all regimes whether authoritarian or democratic, while clientelism involves larger-scale exchanges of favours between patrons and clients, often requiring a hierarchy of intermediaries (see Scott 1972). Clientelism thus exists primarily in democratic countries where large numbers of voters need to be mobilised (Piattoni 2001, pp. 4–7).

Clientelism is considered a bad thing and a deviation from good democratic practice in several respects. In a modern democracy, citizens are supposed to vote based on the politician’s promises of broad public policies or a ‘programmatic’ agenda. Such choices are supposed to reflect general views of what is good for the political community as a whole and not just what is good for one individual voter.

Of course, voters in advanced democracies cast their ballots according to their self-interest; programmes targeted at one group of citizens are nonetheless justified in terms of broad concepts of justice or the general good. Moreover, targeted programmes must apply impartially not to individuals but to broad classes of people. Targeted benefits to individuals are bad from the standpoint of social justice. In clientelistic systems, redistributive programmes that are supposed to help all poor people, for example, end up benefiting only those poor people who support a particular politician. This weakens support for effective universal policies and preserves existing social inequalities.

Nevertheless, there is reason to think that clientelism is actually an early form of democratic participation. In the United States and other countries, it was a way of mobilising poor voters and therefore encouraging them to participate in a democratic political system. It was suboptimal when compared to programmatic voting, yet provided a degree of accountability insofar as the politician still felt obligated to provide some benefits in return for political support. In that respect, clientelism is quite different from a more destructive form of corruption in which a politician simply steals from the public treasury for the benefit of his or her family, without any obligation to provide a public service in return. The problem with clientelism is that it usually does not remain confined to a mechanism for getting out the vote, but morphs into misappropriation.

A final conceptual distinction that needs to be made is between corruption and low state capacity.

‘Anti-corruption and good governance’ has become an often-repeated slogan in the development community and some people treat good governance and the absence of corruption as equivalents. Yet they are very different: a squeaky-clean bureaucracy can still be incompetent or ineffective in doing its job, while corrupt ones can provide good services [footnote 2] . Beyond low levels of corruption, good governance requires state capacity – that is, the human, material and organisational resources necessary for governments to carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently. It is linked to the skills and knowledge of public officials and whether they are given sufficient autonomy and authority to carry out their tasks.

Corruption, of course, tends to undermine state capacity (for example, by replacing qualified officials with political patronage appointees); conversely, highly professional bureaucracies tend to be less subject to bribery and theft. Low levels of corruption and high state capacity therefore tend to be correlated around the world. But getting to good governance is a much larger task than simply fighting corruption.

The distinction between corruption and low state capacity allows us to better understand differences between the effects of corruption in countries around the world. In the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2014, China ranks in the 47th percentile with respect to control of corruption, behind Ghana and just ahead of Romania (World Bank 2014). On the other hand, China has a great deal of state capacity. In the government effectiveness category, it is in the 66th percentile, while Romania is in the 55th and Ghana is in the 44th (World Bank 2014). This validates the common perception that the Chinese Government has a great deal of capacity to achieve the ends it sets, despite strong perceptions of pervasive corruption. The predictability and scale of corruption are also important; if a business owner expects to pay 10% of the transaction value in bribes, they can regard that as a kind of tax, which is less damaging to investment than a bribery level of 75% or one that varies arbitrarily from year to year.

2.3 Overcoming corruption

The first generation of anti-corruption measures taken in the mid-1990s by development finance institutions involved ambitious efforts to overhaul civil service systems along Weberian lines: incentivising officials by increasing wage dispersion and setting formal recruitment and promotion criteria. These measures had very little effect; the problem lay in the fact that corrupt governments were expected to police themselves and to implement bureaucratic systems developed over long periods in rich countries with very different histories. More recent efforts have focused on fighting corruption through transparency and accountability measures – that is, increasing the monitoring of agent behaviour and creating positive and negative incentives for better compliance with the institution’s goals. This has taken a variety of forms: cameras placed in classrooms to ensure that teachers show up for work; participatory budgeting where citizens are given a direct voice in budgeting decisions; and websites where citizens can report government officials taking bribes. Since governments cannot be trusted to police themselves, civil society has often been enlisted in a watchdog role and mobilised to demand accountability. Mechanisms like anti-corruption commissions and special prosecutors have, if given enough autonomy, also shown some success in countries such as Indonesia and Romania.

These later efforts, however, have also had uneven success (see, for example, Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Mauro 2002). In particular, transparency initiatives by themselves do not guarantee changes in government behaviour. For example, in countries where clientelism is organised along ethnic lines, co-ethnics are frequently tolerant of leaders who steal. Elsewhere, citizens may be outraged by news of corruption, but then have no clear way of holding individual politicians or bureaucrats accountable. In other cases, successes in punishing individual politicians are not sufficient to shift the normative framework in which virtually everyone in the political class expects to profit from office. Finally, anti-corruption campaigns may disrupt informal understandings and personal relationships that underpin investment and trade: without formal property rights and contract enforcement under a system of independent courts, the paradoxical short-term effect of prosecuting corrupt officials may be to deter new investment and thereby lower growth.

There is a single truth underlying the indifferent success of existing transparency and accountability measures to control corruption. The sources of corruption are deeply political. Without a political strategy for overcoming this problem, any given solution will fail. Corruption in its various forms – patronage, clientelism, rent-seeking and outright theft – all benefit existing stakeholders in the political system, who are generally very powerful players.

Lecturing them about good government or setting up formal systems designed to work in modern political systems will not affect their incentives and therefore will have little transformative effect. That is why transparency initiatives on their own often fail. Citizens may be outraged by news about corruption, but nothing will happen without collective-action mechanisms to bring about change. The mere existence of a democratic political system is no guarantee that citizens’ anger will be translated into action; they need leadership and a strategy for displacing entrenched stakeholders from power. Outside pressure in the form of loan conditionality, technical assistance or moral pressure is almost never sufficient to do the job. Anti- corruption commissions and special prosecutors who have had success in jailing corrupt officials have done so only because they receive strong grassroots political backing from citizens.

2.4 The American experience

The political nature of corruption and the necessarily political nature of the reform process can be illustrated by the experience of the United States in the 19th century (as I describe in Fukuyama 2014, chapters 9–11). American politics in that period was not too different from politics in contemporary developing democratic countries such as India, Brazil or Indonesia. Beginning in the 1820s, American states began extending the franchise to include all white males, vastly expanding the voter base and presenting politicians with the challenge of mobilising relatively poor and poorly educated voters. The solution, which appeared particularly after the 1828 presidential election that brought Andrew Jackson to power, was the creation of a vast clientelistic system. Elected politicians appointed their supporters to positions in the bureaucracy or rewarded them with individual payoffs like Christmas turkeys or bottles of bourbon. This system, known as the spoils or patronage system, characterised American government for the next century, from the highest federal offices down to local postmasters in every American town or city. As with other clientelistic systems, patronage led to astonishing levels of corruption, particularly in cities such as New York, Boston and Chicago where machine politicians ruled for generations.

This system began to change only in the 1880s as a consequence of economic development. New technologies like the railroads were transforming the country from a primarily agrarian society into an urban industrial one. There were increasing demands from business leaders and from a newly emerging civil society for a different, more modern form of government that would prioritise merit and knowledge over political connections. Following the assassination of the newly elected President James A. Garfield in 1881 by a would-be office seeker, Congress was embarrassed into passing the Pendleton Act. It established a US Civil Service Commission for the first time and the principle that public officials should be chosen on the basis of merit. Even so, expanding the number of classified (i.e. merit- based) officials met strong resistance and did not become widespread until after the First World War. Individual municipal political machines such as Tammany Hall in New York were not dismantled completely until the middle of the 20th century.

The American experience highlights a number of features of both corruption and the reform of corrupt systems. First, the incentives that led to the creation of the clientelistic system were deeply political. Politicians got into office via their ability to distribute patronage; they had no incentive to vote in favour of something like the Pendleton Act that would take away those privileges. The only reason it passed was a tragic exogenous event – the Garfield assassination – which mobilised public opinion in favour of a more modern governmental system.

Second, reform of the system was similarly political. The Progressive Era saw the emergence of a vast reform coalition made up of business leaders, urban reformers, farmers and ordinary citizens who were fed up with the existing patronage system. It required strong leadership from politicians like Theodore Roosevelt who was himself head of the US Civil Service Commission. It also required a clear reform agenda pointing towards modern government, formulated by intellectuals such as Frank Goodnow, Dorman Eaton and Woodrow Wilson. Finally, reform was helped along by economic development. Industrialisation in the US produced new social groups such as business leaders who needed efficient government services, a broad and better-educated middle class who could mobilise for reform, and a grassroots organisation of civil society groups.

2.5 Conclusions

The American experience is suggestive of how progress in the fight against corruption may be waged in contemporary societies suffering from it. Reform is always a political matter that will require formation of a broad coalition of groups opposed to an existing system of corrupt politicians. Grassroots activism in favour of reform may emerge spontaneously, but such sentiments will not be translated into real change until it receives good leadership and organisation. Reform also has a socio-economic basis: economic growth often produces new classes and groups that want a different, more modern politics.

America points to another feature of anti-corruption efforts. Control of corruption was very much bound up with efforts to increase state capacity. The period that saw the emergence of an industrial economy was also characterised by huge increases in levels of education – particularly higher education, which produced an entirely new class of professionals who worked for both private businesses and the government. One of the first government agencies to be modernised in the late 19th century was the US Department of Agriculture, which benefited from a generation of professional agronomists trained in the numerous land-grant universities that sprang up around the United States. The latter, in turn, were the product of the far-sighted Morrill Act of 1862 that sought to increase agricultural productivity (among other things) through higher education.

It would not have been possible to reform the old patronage-based bureaucracy without access to the human capital represented by this entire generation of university- educated officials. Every important reform effort undertaken to create modern state bureaucracies – in Germany, Britain, France, Japan and elsewhere – was accompanied by parallel efforts to modernise the higher education system in ways that would benefit public administration. Today development finance institutions focus on helping to provide universal primary and secondary education to poor countries and have largely given up on supporting elite education. The reasons for this are understandable, but do not correspond to the historical experience of state modernisation in countries that became rich in earlier eras.

These general observations about historical efforts to build modern uncorrupt administrations suggest that the process will be an extended one, characterised by prolonged political struggle. Fortunately, having a modern bureaucracy is not a sine qua non of economic development. No existing rich country had a squeaky-clean government in its early stages of economic growth – neither Britain, nor the United States in the 19th century, nor China today. Corruption and weak governance are obstacles to economic growth, but economic growth can happen also in poorly governed societies and will produce, over time, social conditions and resources that will make government reform more feasible. This is perhaps a pessimistic conclusion, given the fact that rentier states and kleptocratic governments are the source of international conflict and instability in today’s world. But it is also a realistic assessment derived from the historical record.

2.6 References

Eisenstadt, S. N. and Roniger, L. 1984. Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, F. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Fukuyama, F. 2014. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Johnston, M. 2005. Syndromes of Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khan, M. H. and Jomo, K. S. 2000. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kolstad, I. and Wiig, A. 2009. Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries? World Development, 37(3), pp. 521–32.

Mauro, P. 2002. The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. Working Paper No. 02/213.

Piattoni, S. 2001. Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scott, J. 1972. Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. World Bank. 2014. Worldwide Governance Indicators. Available online .

Francis Fukuyama is a Senior Fellow at Stanford University and Director of its Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. His book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 1992), has appeared in more than 20 foreign editions. More recently, he is the author of Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy (Profile Books 2014).

3. Paul Collier: How to change cultures of corruption

Corruption does not happen everywhere, it is concentrated in pockets: in particular industries, in particular societies and in particular times. Among industries, natural resource extraction and construction have long been seen as exceptionally prone to corruption. This is partly because projects in these sectors are idiosyncratic and difficult to scrutinise.

Some European countries such as Italy and Greece perform markedly worse than some African and Asian countries, according to Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2015). Places where grand corruption is perceived to be flourishing are rare, but Afghanistan and Angola are examples of these extreme conditions.

As to periods, Britain in the 18th century exemplified the behaviours that would now lead to a miserable ranking in corruption indices. More pertinently, there is good reason to think that, globally, there has been an upsurge in corruption in recent decades. Reversing this upsurge calls for concerted effort.

Alongside these pockets of high corruption, other industries, other societies and other times are virtually corruption-free. Denmark is currently seen as the least corrupt place in the world and many non-Western countries such as Botswana are also viewed as relatively untainted (Transparency International 2015). In most societies, corruption is not normal: it is therefore potentially avoidable everywhere.

Corruption is concentrated in pockets because it depends upon common expectations of behaviour. Where corruption is the norm, getting rid of it poses a co-ordination problem: if I expect those around me to continue to be corrupt, why should I change my behaviour? Because of this, pockets of corruption have proved to be highly persistent: the same industries and the same societies remain corrupt for many years.

Similarly, honesty is persistent. In the first TI survey conducted in 1995, Denmark was rated second globally. This persistence is not a matter of chance. Danes are born into an honest society and so inherit the expectation that they themselves will be trustworthy. Being trusted is a valuable asset: it makes many aspects of life much easier. In consequence, individual Danes have a strong incentive not to squander this valuable asset through behaving opportunistically. Because people have rationally chosen to protect their reputation for honesty, the entire society has stayed honest.

But change is possible. Until well into the 19th century, the British public sector was very corrupt. Positions were bought and sold and contracts were awarded in return for bribes. Crises such as military humiliation in the Crimean War helped to shock governments into change. Opportunities for corruption were curtailed: recruitment and promotion were opened to competitive examinations. A new purposive ethic was promoted and serving the nation became the pinnacle of social prestige and self-worth. By the late 19th century, the British Civil Service had become honest and competent. This transformation was largely fortuitous rather than the result of a properly thought-through strategy. But its success reveals the key components of how change can be brought about.

Societies do not have to wait for military humiliation and a moral revival: corruption can be tackled effectively.

In Britain, two key things – closing off the major opportunities for corruption and making working for the public good more prestigious and satisfying than abusing office for private gain – happened together. These two approaches are jointly critical in breaking cultures of corruption. Just as 19th-century Britain implemented both of them without international help, there is much that societies currently beset by corruption can do for themselves. However, the globalisation of business and social networks has created an important role for international action. Countries such as Britain can contribute to encouraging both internal and international initiatives. There is enormous scope for international actions that close off opportunities for corruption. Equally, there is much that can be done to make behaviours that promote the public good more prestigious and satisfying than those that sacrifice the public interest for private gain. This is because corruption, like honesty, tends to persist. Corrupt behaviour is self-reinforcing, and breaking out of it is not easy. A co-ordinated push for international action thus makes national initiatives more likely to succeed and more worthwhile to attempt. It can help those societies that are still struggling with the problems that Britain faced in the 19th century.

Britain has already done much to make global corruption more difficult. One contribution has been to ‘follow the money’. In recent decades, international lawyers and bankers created walls of secrecy that enabled corrupt officials to hide money away in ‘shell’ companies and offshore bank accounts. The Government has led the way in dismantling this labyrinth of deceit: the true ownership of British companies must now be revealed in a public register, and British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies are also taking action to improve company transparency. Britain has rapidly changed from being part of the problem to being a pioneer of the solution, but quite evidently following the money is subject to a weakest-link problem.

Corrupt money will hide wherever it can, so it is vital that all the major legal and financial centres close the loopholes. There is scope to extend transparency beyond bank deposits to other major assets such as property. There is also considerable scope for those governments that adopt effective measures for following the money to require all companies that wish to do business with them to comply with these standards, providing global reach for national efforts.

A second contribution has been to increase transparency in key sectors. In 2013, Britain and four other G7 countries signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), helping to bring daylight to a corrupt sector. In North America and Europe, what began as voluntary revenue transparency is now evolving into a legal requirement. Meanwhile the EITI is becoming the established international standard-setting entity for the sector, extending voluntarism beyond simple revenue reporting to matters such as contracts. There is now an equivalent voluntary initiative for the construction sector and it warrants similar co-ordinated propulsion.

A third contribution has been to increase accountability: the Bribery Act 2010 greatly tightened the legal liability of companies and their employees for bribing their way into contracts. Clamping down on bribery is a classic instance of the free-rider problem: no government wants its own companies to be disadvantaged. This is why the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been encouraging a co-ordinated international approach. The alternative to such co-operation is a race to the bottom that the businesses of no decently governed country can win.

There is, equally, plenty of scope for contributing to the complementary approach of making public good more prestigious and satisfying than the private gains generated by abuse of office. Take, for example, tax administration, which is fundamental to effective government.

In many poor countries, tax administration is an epicentre of corruption. As a specific example, consider the administration of Value-Added Tax (VAT), which is a means of revenue-raising encouraged globally by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because it is less distorting than most other taxes. But in several poor societies that followed IMF advice, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, VAT is actually reducing revenue rather than raising it. Even before VAT, many tax inspectors were corrupt, using their power to tax firms as a means of extorting money for themselves: ‘pay me or pay tax’ (Collier 2016). VAT has reduced revenue, because it expanded the options available to corrupt tax officials. It works by firms initially paying tax on their gross sales, but then getting a rebate on the inputs they have purchased, so that they end up only paying tax on the value they have added to those inputs. But in a country that introduces a VAT, a corrupt tax official can now sell a firm phoney tax receipts on inputs, in addition to the standard extortion racket. As a result, the rebate system ends up paying out more than the sales tax component of VAT is paying in. Clearly at the core of this phenomenon are norms of behaviour among tax officials, such that seizing opportunities for private gain is seen as both more prestigious and more satisfying than contributing to the public good of generating tax revenue and the public services it can finance.

How might Britain, and other countries in which VAT collection does not face such problems, help to change this perception?

Social prestige and personal satisfaction are largely set within peer groups: most people want to be respected by those they see as their peers and they find satisfaction in adhering to group norms. Hence a practical way of changing the behaviour of corrupt officials is to alter the group of people they regard as their peers. Currently, a corrupt tax official is likely to have two key networks in which they seek prestige: their extended family and fellow tax inspectors. Their family will honour them for helping relatives who lack opportunities to earn a large income: he or she becomes the patron of the family. Their fellow tax inspectors, subject to the same family pressures, may see corruption as reasonable. They may even regard honest behaviour as a threat to their own conduct and therefore disloyal.

A useful way of changing this state of affairs is to twin those tax administrations in which corruption is endemic with administrations in countries that are not corrupt. Twinning could involve regular secondments of staff in both directions and the potential for accreditation to international professional associations at various ranks. The purpose would not primarily be a transfer of technical skills, although that could clearly be a component, but rather a gradual transfer of attitudes and behaviours. The new network exposes the official to the potential of a new identity as a member of a prestigious international peer group of modern tax officials, working to global, not local, standards. It exposes the official to a new narrative circulating in the network: that tax officials are vital for the provision of core public services. And it exposes the official to a new norm of ‘good’ conduct. A ‘good’ tax inspector is no longer one who raises a lot of money for their family, but one who rigorously implements the tax code to make the rest of government feasible.

Exposure to these new attitudes creates a tension between the behaviour that would generate prestige and self-worth in the old networks and the behaviour that would generate prestige and self-worth in the new network. Creating this tension is not the end of the story, but it is an essential step. The other key step is to tackle the co-ordination problem: why should I change my behaviour, if nobody else is going to change theirs? Social psychologists have shown that successful co-ordination depends upon generating ‘common knowledge’ (Thomas et al. 2014). A new fact becomes ‘common’ if it is not only widely shared, but also crucially if everybody knows that everybody else knows it.

One way to create the common knowledge that yesterday’s behaviour is unlikely to persist tomorrow is to close an entire organisation and rehire those staff judged to have reasonable integrity into a new one under different management and higher standards. For example, many governments have closed corrupt tax departments within their ministries of finance and replaced them with independent revenue authorities, a change that has usually been reasonably successful. An analogous way for international twinning to overcome the co-ordination problem is for all the staff in an entire unit to be exposed to the international network at the same time. Each official in the unit would then realise that their colleagues were facing the same tension between old and new networks and hence the same choice.

There are already a few examples of institutional twinning. For example, in Britain, the Department for International Development (DFID) financially supports Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the British tax authority, to work with tax authorities in some low-income countries. Also, until a decade ago, governors of the Bank of England used to host an annual meeting for governors of African central banks. But the scope for twinning is vast, relative to what is, as yet, happening both in governments and in the wider society.

Around the world, governments have similar structures. For example, virtually all governments in low-income countries have a ministry of transport, a ministry of health and a ministry of finance. OECD governments have been liaising with these ministries for half a century, but the entities that are linked to them are their aid agencies not their counterpart ministries. Direct links with counterpart ministries have the potential for a very different form of relationship based on peer-group networks, rather than on money with conditions. Often ministries in low-income countries try to keep donor agencies ‘out of their hair’, whereas they would value direct links with their peers. An important example is the regulation of utilities such as electricity. Many governments of low-income countries are now establishing regulatory agencies, which is a vital step in attracting private finance for infrastructure. But the regulation of utilities faces intense pressures for corruption: the decisions of regulators affect both the profitability of companies and voter support for politicians. In the OECD, regulatory agencies have been operating for two or three decades. The OECD has also built peer group networks that have evolved peer standards of independence, transparency and impartiality. New regulatory agencies would benefit from becoming part of this distinctive culture.

Such specialised inter-government peer groups are indeed the core activity of the OECD. But membership of the OECD is confined to the governments of high-income countries. Admirably, the organisation is now trying to broaden its engagement with the governments of poor countries, for example, by the new initiative ‘Tax Inspectors Without Borders’ (OECD 2015). This is designed to embed tax inspectors for OECD governments in the tax authorities of poor countries on secondment for several months: not to train but to work on the job. An obvious extension would be to make this a two-way exchange of staff. The branding of ‘Tax Inspectors Without Borders’ neatly taps into the potential for such secondments to be glamorous: a survey of young French singles found that the ‘ideal spouse’ was a doctor with Médecins Sans Frontières!

More seriously, while the OECD initiative is excellent it is a drop in the ocean. The restricted membership of the OECD limits its scope to forge global links and there is no other international institution with the remit to build peer- group links across government departments between rich countries and poor ones. Perhaps this role should become a core function of national aid agencies such as DFID, but it would benefit from a co-ordinated kick-start by several heads of government.

Twinning has the potential to be extended well beyond government: part of the ‘big society’ can be direct links between the civil society organisations and their counterparts in poor countries. Again, historically such links have largely been confined to development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, which channel donations to needs. But an important part of tackling corruption is resetting the cultures of professions, including accountancy, law, medicine and teaching. For example, in many poor countries, it is socially acceptable for teachers not to show up for lessons. Twinning involving things like teacher exchanges between schools could help to shift these dysfunctional values. The global explosion of social media has made this far more feasible. The two approaches of closing off opportunities for corruption and reducing the prestige and satisfaction generated by corrupt behaviour reinforce each other. As the difficulties and risks of corrupt behaviour rise, fewer people will behave corruptly. This directly reduces the esteem from being corrupt because it is no longer so normal. Similarly, as more people start to get their esteem from being honest, those who remain corrupt are easier to spot and so find themselves running bigger risks.

National actions against corruption complement international actions. One major way of squeezing out corruption is to remove obvious sources of rent-seeking such as rationed access to foreign exchange and the award of government contracts through secret negotiation rather than open bidding. Competition within rule-based markets is an important part of the system of checks and balances that constrain public officials from the abuse of office. Another is to prosecute some prominent senior officials. For example, in Ghana, 20 judges were sacked in late 2015 for accepting bribes based on video evidence gathered by an investigative journalist (BBC News 2015). Being based on independent evidence, such sackings cannot be misinterpreted as government attempts to crush political opposition. Further, as high-profile events, they generate common knowledge among officials that all other officials are reflecting on whether they should change their behaviour.

Not all corruption is directly financial. Electoral corruption is highly damaging. New research finds that, under normal conditions, governments that deliver good economic performance enhance their prospects of retaining office, but that the discipline of accountability breaks down when elections are not free and fair (Collier and Hoeffler 2015). Twinning national electoral commissions with their international peers, along with twinning local and international election monitors, can help to raise standards of electoral conduct.

An international initiative against corruption provides an opportunity for national actions and international actions to cohere. As people recognise that the calculus of risks and rewards and the sources of prestige and satisfaction are changing both for themselves and their colleagues, previously entrenched patterns of behaviour could become unstable. Mass shifts in cultures of corruption do happen and it is possible to make them happen.

Paul Collier is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and one of the world’s leading and award-winning development experts. His latest book is Exodus: How Migration is Changing our World (Oxford University Press 2013).

4. John Githongo: An African perspective on corruption

Sebolu is the Sotho word for a ‘spoilt thing’. It is a derogatory word used in Lesotho’s national language and vernacular to mean, among other things, corruption. Someone who is corrupt is described as being bobolu and people have deep disdain for such a person. [footnote 3]

In most of Africa though, there are few similar words of such powerful home-grown cultural resonance. Indeed, the word ‘corruption’ doesn’t exist in many indigenous African languages. It never has – it wasn’t needed. The idea of stealing communal goods was literally taboo. The concept of shuffling papers in a government office in a far-off capital, ‘making good’ and then coming home rich and wearing the ‘corrupt’ tag is, however, more obscure. Indeed, the local son or daughter ‘made good’ who demonstrates generosity back in the village is often lionised. Generosity of heart, even to strangers, but especially to relatives (no matter how distant), is a quality much admired by Africans generally.

East Africa’s lingua franca, Kiswahili, gives us ufisadi (meaning corruption) or mfisadi (corrupt one); terms cleverly engineered post-independence. Ufisadi brings to mind ‘hyena-like’ derived from the reputation of the hyena; fisi for being unscrupulous, greedy and ruthless. However, it does not have the same resonance for citizens of the region as sebolu does in Lesotho, which is one of the least corrupt African countries according to Transparency International’s (TI) annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2015).

That said, ‘perceptions of corruption’, or better put ‘perceptions of leaders involved in theft’, is one of the most resented attributes of officialdom to Africans at large. Recent research on the experiences and perceptions of Africans in 28 countries regarding corruption indicates that a majority (58%) felt that corruption had increased over the last 12 months. And in 18 of the 28 countries, the feeling was that their governments were doing badly in the fight against corruption. The report said that, despite these disappointing findings, the bright spots across the continent were in Botswana, Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Senegal. Citizens in these countries were some of the most positive in the region when discussing corruption (Transparency International and Afrobarometer 2015).

In environments where corruption is systemic but lacks cultural resonance, creating a climate where social sanction can be applied against corrupt practices has been challenging. People understand the terms ‘theft’ and ‘thief’, but corruption is a modern and ambiguous concept to many Africans. As a Nuer elder once told me, “My daughter cannot be married into a family of thieves.”

The task therefore is two-fold: we need to embed a clear legal framework to deter and punish corruption, and we need to actually change the culture, so that the concept of corruption is both understood and recognised as anathema. The war against graft (political corruption) has reached the point where the shame and social sanctions directed against this kind of theft and thief need to be given greater prominence in the arsenal used to fight corruption. This applies especially in developing countries where its consequences can be – and often are – deadly. In its culturally most compelling form, the social sanction is about ensuring, for example, that the thief is too embarrassed to go to church on Sunday because of the looks they’ll get.

As such, the whole approach to corruption needs to be re-examined: from local cultural assumptions and preconceptions to the legal conventions, constitutions, statutes and, especially, the prosecution-related instruments brought to bear on it at the national and global levels. Integral to this are the principles of legal authority and equality before the law. The equality component is essential: the rule of law must be seen to apply equally to all citizens without fear or favour, regardless of race, creed or class.

The following complementary but separate factors in a society are critical: culture, ethos, ethics and traditions, and legal processes and practices. Each derives its legitimacy from history and the traditional ways in which meaning is made. By their very nature, they are far more negotiable – existing as they do in a constant state of flux in a dynamic world. Our success depends on how effectively we bring and use them together in the fight against corruption. We do this cognisant of the fact that grand corruption, when compared to the drug trade, human trafficking, terrorism finance and other global evils, is the most easily rationalisable major felonious activity on the planet.

4.1 The global anti-corruption agenda

During the years 1993 to 2003, corruption was at the centre of the global development agenda. In 1993, Transparency International was founded. In the mid-to-late 1990s, corruption was adopted as a key development issue by the multilateral and bilateral development institutions. This culminated, in 2003, in the drafting and ratification by a host of countries of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (UNODC 2015).

The following decade saw the rise of the BRIC nations2 and rapid economic growth across much of the developing world, as well as globalisation and its associated technologies assisting the expansion of trade and commerce. At the same time, the struggle against Islamic extremism captured the attention of policy makers in the international community. Alongside it, unfortunately, has also come a rapid growth in the scale and complexity of corruption. So much so, that anti-corruption work needs to be returned urgently to the heart of the global development agenda. It needs to be part of the DNA of modern nation-states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and even religious organisations and how they interact on the global stage.

This urgency comes from the fact that graft has served to hollow out key governance institutions in some countries. This includes the defence and security sector and areas of social policy such as health and education, with dire consequences for the public services they are supposed to offer the poor, in particular.

The crippling impact of corruption on the delivery of these essential services has deepened economic inequalities, undermining faith in political processes, parties and politicians. In turn, this increases political volatility as politicians retreat to identity and personality politics with its complex web of non-negotiable irrationalities. It also feeds fundamentalism of all kinds – for example, ethnic, religious and sectarian.

4.2 BRIC nations – Brazil, Russia, India and China

The impunity that accompanies crony capitalism results in what I might call both a private sector and a ‘pirate’ sector, causing citizens – especially younger people who increasingly view elections as a pointless game of musical chairs among crooks – to begin to question capitalism in its current form and democracy itself. This also does serious damage to the independence, legitimacy and integrity of the service sector – in particular, banks, law firms and auditing firms – and deepens the challenges corruption poses.

4.3 The ‘pirate’ and private sectors

The traditional private sector, comprising ‘makers of things’, has increasingly been supplanted in the 21st century by the service sector. The growth of the latter has been buoyed by the dramatic expansion and sophistication of the internet and an increasing variety of communication platforms. This has energised traders, who remain vital to the ‘old economy’ where the world’s products are created, built, sold and moved. At the same time, however, we’ve seen a distinct ‘pirate’ sector gaining in influence, particularly over the last two decades.

By design, the ‘pirate’ sector is as virtual as possible, unencumbered by the traditional obligations and processes of rents, payrolls, medical schemes, pensions and so on. Although it can involve an individual or group of individuals, this sector forms itself into sophisticated entities. These can operate with the same ‘apparent’ legitimacy in multiple countries, even if it means they must use vexatious litigation – such as injunctions, court orders and delayed hearings – to allow them to act outside the law for the duration of their business in a country.

The ‘pirate’ sector often chooses to corporatise itself in offshore tax havens, using the skills of professionals, especially lawyers, bankers and auditors. As a result, it has become apparent that even seemingly reputable companies and professional firms sometimes contain ‘pirate units’. The units are able to move unhindered across borders and traverse the legal world like ghosts who disappear as quickly as these so-called ‘special purpose vehicles’ can be shut down.

Theirs is the euphemistic language of ‘commissions’; ‘conclusion’ and ‘success bonuses’; ‘consultancy’ fees; ‘facilitation payments’; ‘philanthropic’ contributions to the relations of ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPS); and the use of complex financial instruments to move resources around the world at the touch of a button. As I pointed out previously, businesses find corruption the easiest felonious activity to rationalise, especially in cross-cultural contexts. They are the entities that ‘get things done’ in a complex world. For them, relationships are tradable products that can be leveraged for a profit and not a social currency that helps make trade and commerce flow more smoothly within the law.

4.4 Renewing and reinvigorating international action

So how do we fight these piratical shadows? Corruption is defined as the abuse of vested authority for private gain. In 2011, developing countries lost nearly $1 trillion to corruption, trade misinvoicing and tax avoidance (Kar and Le Blanc 2013). Leading global advocacy organisations such as ONE have even made efforts to quantify the cost of graft in lives (McNair et al. 2014). Estimates show that the cost of corruption equals more than 5% of global gross domestic product (GDP) (OECD 2016).

As the recent FIFA scandal has demonstrated, unconstrained corruption also threatens valued cultural institutions and traditions that we all hold dear. At the same time, the complexity of the legal compliance environment – vis-à-vis anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and other illicit activities – that the genuine private sector has to contend with has increased exponentially. Indeed there is almost an unspoken ‘compliance paralysis’ as large numbers of lawyers, risk advisors and auditors apply expensive time to scrutinising transactions complicated by the web of demands that compliance has placed upon business.

As a result, the temptation for some businesses to rely on the ‘pirate’ sector and/or aggressively ignore or cover up compliance risks has risen. A recent Risk Advisory Group (2015) research report revealed 83% of compliance professionals believe compliance has become more complex in the past two years, with bigger businesses feeling this more acutely. The Risk Advisory Group CEO Bill Waite said, “Worryingly, compliance has become so elaborate that 78% of compliance professionals say that it now represents a risk in itself” (Cassin 2015).

This means we are at a critical juncture. It calls for a renewed global partnership against corruption to match, and even exceed, the concentrated and successful advocacy that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Corruption’s resurgence and complexity threatens not only global security and equitable development but also international trade and commerce, and people’s confidence in freedoms and systems of governance taken for granted since the Second World War.

For example, there has been a debate about creating an International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC). It’s proposed this could have the kind of powers granted to international weapons inspectors to target specific transactions and institutions that, when riddled with corruption, escape investigation and prosecution and cause citizens to lose confidence in public institutions and the rule of law and democracy.

The new push needs to identify, disrupt and delegitimise the global networks of corruption in money laundering; terrorism finance; drug, people and environmental trafficking; and other illicit activities.

This requires new global partnerships that target the information-era entities and domiciles that these networks rely on. They may be offshore tax havens or low-compliance jurisdictions where the ever-expanding raft of international regulations aimed at dealing with graft and illicit flows have limited currency. At the same time, the new regime should robustly incentivise self-reporting vis-à-vis corporate compliance, allowing for a ‘cleaning out of the stables’.

4.5 Culture, tradition and social sanction

To be fully effective, however, this reinvigoration of the rule of law must go hand in hand with action to create a cultural climate in which the corrupt – the thieves – are shamed for what they do.

Indeed, effecting change in the culture and traditions – which inform what is acceptable behaviour – is perhaps even more important in societies where legal institutions based on the Western model are nascent, or where their existence is being energetically contested, as it is in important parts of the developing world.

The release by WikiLeaks of US diplomatic cables in 2010 was a controversial episode of unofficial transparency and a powerful interrupter to the global status quo regarding corruption in relations between nation-states. It revealed the corrupt practices that ruling elites are capable of to the growing youth populations of regions such as the Middle East. The reverberations of this are still being felt.

Across Latin America and in the developed world, revelations of inappropriate, corrupt and unethical behaviour by leaders – in both the private and corporate sectors – have created a level of criticism from the public that is unprecedented in some countries. This is especially the case for the ‘millennial’ generation who appear to mistrust politicians and political parties the most.

Presidents have been forced to step down and others turned into lame ducks while still in office by dramatic mass expressions of discontent boosted by social media.

In this sense the change has already begun – untidily, noisily, chaotically and even bloodily – in many places. The outcome is uncertain. But, in the long term, it will be dramatically different from the status quo. This is, in part, because political leaders and ruling elites increasingly recognise the public’s lack of trust and confidence in them, especially that of their younger citizens. They also now appreciate that, in this networked world, a spotlight can be shone on corrupt and unethical relationships with the ‘pirate’ and private sectors.

In addition to institutions such as an International Anti- Corruption Court as a further step towards increasing transparency, strengthening enforcement and securing restitution, the tools of visa revocations, personalised financial sanctions and more harmonised extradition mechanisms could actually be cheaper and more effective in tackling corruption than prosecutions – which are always tortuous. However, for these measures to enjoy legitimacy around the world, they must be applied, and be seen to apply, with equal force across the different regions of both the developed and developing world.

To conclude, a successful international anti-corruption campaign requires co-operation on a global scale and specific legal measures that help transform attitudes towards corruption and the ability to prosecute the corrupt. Although it may take longer, embedding a culture of social sanction and censure for anyone found guilty of engaging in, facilitating or condoning corrupt activity, even to the extent that those holding office lose public trust, would support these measures.

They need to be seen as bobolu. They need to feel the social stigma when they attend family gatherings, visit the golf club or step into the supermarket – as much to set an example to others as to punish the individual, impressing on the whole community that corruption will not be tolerated.

John Githongo is the CEO of Inuka Kenya Ni Sisi Ltd, a non-governmental organisation focused on promoting good governance. Previously he served as Vice-President of Policy and Advocacy at World Vision International. John has been involved in anti-corruption research, advisory work and activism in Kenya, Africa and the wider international community for 19 years. This includes work in civil society, media, government and the private sector.

4.6 References

Cassin, R. L. 25 November 2015. Risk Advisory Group Report: Compliance is so complex, it’s now its own risk. FCPA Blog. Available online .

Kar, D. and Le Blanc, B. 2013. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002–2011. Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity. Available online .

McNair, D., Kraus, J., McKiernan K. and McKay, S. 2014. The Trillion Dollar Scandal Study. London: ONE.

OECD. January 2016. The CleanGovBiz Initiative. Available online .

The Risk Advisory Group. 2015. The Compliance Horizon Survey. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index – Lesotho. Available online .

Transparency International and Afrobarometer. 2015. People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 – Global Corruption Barometer. Berlin: Transparency International. Available online .

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015. Available online .

5. Paul Radu: Follow the money: how open data and investigative journalism can beat corruption

The early spring of 2015 saw thousands of angry people on the streets of Chisinau, capital of the tiny Republic of Moldova. While calling loudly for the resignation of the Government and the Parliament, they were shouting, “We want our billion back!” (Calugareanu and Schwartz 2015).

The demonstrators believed the politicians were to blame for the theft of almost $1 billion from Moldovan banks, which had left this poor country’s financial affairs in disarray.

Investigations are ongoing. But the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) research indicates that this $1 billion was the tip of the iceberg, in a country where many more billions of dollars in ‘black’ money appear to have flowed through a flawed banking system – with the help of corrupt politicians and organised crime as well as untrustworthy judges and law enforcement officers (Radu, Munteanu and Ostanin 2015).

We believe that the citizens of Moldova were victims of a transnational web of corruption, benefiting politicians and criminals who used complex multi-layered company structures to conceal both their identities and their activities. Regrettably, this story is not unique.

At the OCCRP, we have identified a number of cross- border money laundering schemes in Eastern Europe, serving criminal groups as diverse as Mexican drug cartels and Vietnamese and Russian organised crime gangs (OCCRP 2011).

The power of these crime groups stems primarily from their ability to operate with ease across national frontiers. They complete a detailed risk assessment at the country level and then choose the least vulnerable approach to conduct their illicit activities, whether in narcotics, refugee trafficking or the massive money laundering exercises that follow such crimes. The problem for national law enforcement is that, by definition, it cannot follow this type of crime easily or quickly across borders. Data exchanges between states and law enforcement agencies take time. Modern crime schemes are designed to have very short lives to avoid detection, lasting sometimes just months before the associated companies and bank accounts are wound up and replaced by new ones.

Yet alongside the advantages available for criminals of operating on this global scale, making it inherently harder to track them down, there are also disadvantages that the clever journalist or law enforcement official can exploit to expose them.

So how do we do this? How do we stop criminal gangs and the corrupt politicians they rely on – conducting business as usual? Firstly, I will argue, through data: more data means more transparency, provided the quality of information is there and supported by tools that allow proper analysis. Secondly, by journalists using advanced investigative techniques, including the emerging discipline of data journalism, to identify the patterns and practices inherent in corrupt activity.

Criminals can’t predict the future of open data Transparency is the natural enemy of international organised crime gangs and corrupt officials. Opaque systems allow them to thrive. And some of them go to great lengths to disguise their wrongdoing, using financial and company structures that span the world.

At OCCRP, we’ve found and exposed networks of companies based in New Zealand, with bank accounts in Riga, Latvia, that were transferring money to companies set up in the US state of Delaware, Cyprus or the United Kingdom. In turn, these companies owned bank accounts in yet other jurisdictions (OCCRP 2011).

Such criminal schemes are designed by creative and intelligent, if misguided, people. Some of them could have been the next Steve Jobs, but found crime more appealing. They often work for what we call the ‘criminal services industry’ – the lawyers, registration agents, business intelligence firms and other legitimate businesses that earn lucrative income from servicing the needs of criminal clients. But no matter how clever they are, they can’t predict the future; transparency rules change. For years, from the early 1990s, Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian and many other Eastern European mobsters and politicians were using Cyprus as a place to hide their activities behind labyrinthine corporate structures.

It reached the point where Cyprus, with a population of little more than one million, became one of the main investors in Eastern and Central Europe. Not all of these investors were criminal enterprises as many used Cyprus for tax optimisation purposes. But there is hardly a country in the region – from the former Yugoslavia to Russia and beyond – where Cyprus-based companies were not involved in huge, rigged privatisation scandals. [footnote 4]

In 2004, when Cyprus joined the European Union (EU) and started opening databases, including a registry of locally based companies, things began to change. Investigative reporters began combing through millions of records and, in many instances, came across the names of beneficial owners the real owners of the company – who thought they were sheltered from public scrutiny.

Politicians and criminals were caught off guard and exposed in press articles that led to arrests and resignations. Their past misdemeanours made future involvement in business problematic. However, they started fighting back almost immediately, substituting their names in company documents with those of professional proxies – usually Cypriot lawyers who would lend their name to just about anyone who wanted to conceal their identity.

In addition to this, the Cyprus registry is relatively expensive to use and searchable only by company name. This poses a serious problem for investigators, who often embark on an enquiry with only an individual’s name, be it a member of the local parliament or a controversial business owner. As a result, Cyprus still offers only partial transparency.

Yet even in countries with a stronger record, you can hit barriers. For example, New Zealand – ranked fourth in Transparency International’s (TI) anti-corruption index – has a well-organised register of companies that is free of charge and allows for name-based searches (Transparency International 2015). But, as with the UK’s Companies House database, it’s more difficult for investigative researchers to identify nominee shareholders and directors, especially in cases where they are proxies – not beneficial owners – acting for criminal groups and corrupt politicians.

And in the past few years, OCCRP investigations have revealed the involvement of an Auckland-based company (that was run by a nominee) in obscuring the ownership of companies across Eastern Europe. One such example was a Moldovan TV station (Preasca, Munteanu and Sarnecki 2013). Secretive media ownership is a huge problem across the region where, in many instances, the general public has no idea who is delivering the news. Once OCCRP exposed this non-transparent structure, its ownership was just moved to British companies that were again meant to obscure the identity of the real owners of the television station (Media Ownership Project 2015).

In a global economy, this isn’t just an issue for New Zealand. In 2016, the UK Government is implementing a new central registry of company beneficial ownership to enable researchers and other interested parties to access information on individuals with an interest in more than 25% of a company’s shares or voting rights, or who otherwise control the way it is run.

It matters because well-structured and accessible databases can be goldmines for investigators and members of the public. In 2008, British computer programmer Dan O’Huiginn reshaped the Panama registry of companies and built a simple interface that, for the first time, allowed name-based searches (Government of Panama 2015). This was the catalyst for investigative articles that exposed corrupt dictators, criminals and their close associates all over the world. This simple technical adjustment opened their activities up to public scrutiny, costing them untold millions of dollars. [footnote 5] :

The same principle applies to other official databases. For example, court records, government spending and tenders databases vary greatly in their organisation, accessibility and quality of data. In many jurisdictions, it takes investigators a lot of navigating, mining and shopping for data to find the evidence they are looking for. The opening up of company information and databases has to be accompanied by effective policies that ensure their accessibility, integrity, security and usefulness. Civic hacker collectives, journalists and civil society groups should be consulted to help determine the most useful access to data that also mitigates any privacy concerns. Governments requiring offshore companies operating in a country to identify their true beneficial ownership would also greatly reduce the space in which criminals can work and increase the costs they incur.

5.1 Fighting from within borders

Law enforcement must also jump on board the open data train and take advantage of advances in technology in order to keep pace with the criminals. Just like journalists, police officers and intelligence analysts need to master cross-border, multi-language, open-source intelligence to fight sophisticated serious crime. While it is true that data obtained in informal ways cannot always be used to build strong court cases, it can greatly shorten the time required for the investigative process.

Obtaining documents sequentially through official channels from other countries can take months or even years. Say, for example, that the police in the UK need information on a company based in Russia. They have to file requests and wait, sometimes for a year, only to find out that the Russian company is owned by a Cyprus limited firm. It might take another year to identify the next owner in a nested structure. Finally, the trail might end with bearer shares: where the owner of the stocks is not registered or is a proxy who doesn’t know the real owner (Funk 2014, p. 14).

Compare this with the adaptability of organised crime, which – albeit operating under no formal constraint – broke free from the nation-state mindset long ago. In the international space governed by weak international protocols and bilateral agreements, organised crime at present has no natural enemy. While criminals recognise no borders and are not bound by strict local rules, national and legal boundaries, a lack of resources continues to hamper law enforcement. Geopolitics can also deter cross-border collaborative initiatives between nation-states, which may find themselves at odds with their neighbours or dealing with governments that are themselves riddled with corruption.

There are, to be sure, examples of criminal networks being disbanded in a number of countries as a result of co- operation between law enforcement agencies. This did not necessarily prevent the mobsters from re-forming elsewhere outside those jurisdictions. Nevertheless, increased access to open data could help to boost cross-border co-operation and journalists can play an increasingly important role in it.

5.2 It takes a network to fight a network

Investigative reporting is – and can be even more – the natural enemy of criminal networks and, when practised collaboratively, it acts as an effective watchdog. It can change the status quo in innovative ways that are not immediately obvious.

Journalists and the public alike expect prosecutors to act after each journalistic exposé, with the desired result being arrests, convictions, repatriation of lost assets and other positive outcomes. Owing to limited human resources and a lack of skills, interest or even competence, this expectation is not always realised. However, regardless of law enforcement action or inaction, public exposure can adversely affect, and even stop, criminal businesses operating in other jurisdictions. Such exposure can also influence long-term changes in public attitudes, which can lead, in turn, to protests against, and even election defeats for, discredited parties or politicians.

With the stakes so high, it is essential that the journalism itself is rigorous, credible and transparent. Investigative articles must be linked to evidence, well- designed databases and ‘how we did it’ guidance, so that readers can recreate the investigative process if they want to. Governments, banks and financial institutions in general rely on open source information when deciding whether to give loans, enter business deals or accept money transactions. Effective data journalism can also help expose financial irregularity or illegality and prevent crime figures or oligarchs securing loans, opening accounts or making other transactions.

Using advanced investigative techniques, journalism can degrade international organised crime and corrupt networks even before they are firmly established within a jurisdiction. Corrupt politicians, officials and criminals view the proceeds of their illicit schemes as commodities to be repeatedly imported and exported and are always looking for new territories in which to generate profit.

When journalists work collaboratively across frontiers, sharing data, this practice can be identified and compromised. It takes a network to monitor a network.

International reporting groups such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ), OCCRP and others already co-operate on individual stories or sporadically share datasets. However, such is the scale of the problem and the ubiquity of organised crime that these efforts can seem to be only scratching the surface.

What journalists can do is share with colleagues in other countries details of the patterns of crime they have already detected in their own. This would enable wider cross-border investigations to determine whether the same criminal groups are setting up shop in other jurisdictions.

For example, a criminal group sets up Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) that are all owned by a set of companies with their headquarters on a particular street in Belize City, Belize. Replications of this simple pattern can be searched for in the company registries of other countries or in related datasets, potentially revealing the group’s activities in those territories too.

In future, with the proper resources, this kind of pattern recognition could be facilitated and automated through the development of specific algorithms. Crime groups will inevitably react by altering their activities to avoid detection. But, crucially, this will hamper their operations and cost them more in money and time.

Automated searches of ever-larger, global, transparent datasets can feed real-time alerts to journalists all over the world. The result could be that the public has earlier and reliable information about who the real corrupt beneficiaries of crimes are, such as the $1 billion bank theft that left the Republic of Moldova with an uncertain future.

To conclude, a key component to fighting future crime is increased cross-border co-operation between journalists and programmers, who need to employ and create new advanced investigative techniques on top of massive amounts of data. At the same time, activists and governments need to push for more transparency, quality and common standards in open data.

Paul Radu is the Executive Director of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (www.reportingproject.net), which investigates transnational crime and corruption in Eastern Europe. He is also a board member of the Global Investigative Journalism Network (http://gijn.org) and has received many international awards for his journalism.

5.3 References

Calugareanu, V. and Schwartz, R. 4 May 2015. Spring again in the Republic of Moldova – mass protest against corruption. Deutsche Welle. Available online .

Funk, T. M. 2014. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A Guide for Judges. US: Federal Judicial Center. Available online .

Government of Panama. January 2015. Panama Registry of Companies. Available online .

OCCRP. 22 November 2011. The Proxy Platform. The Reporting Project. Available online .

Media Ownership Project. January 2015. Media Ownership Project: Moldova. Available online .

Preasca, I., Munteanu, M. and Sarnecki, M. 26 March 2013. Taylor Network Back in Business. Rise Project. Available online .

Radu, P., Munteanu M. and Ostanin, I. 24 July 2015. Grand Theft Moldova. Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). Available online .

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index. Available online .

6. Sarah Chayes: Corruption and terrorism: the causal link

It’s February 2015 and I am in Kano, northern Nigeria. Not three months back, in the midst of Friday prayers, Boko Haram struck the Grand Mosque in the old fortress-like centre of town. The dead and the bloodied lay strewn in their hundreds across the public square.

I’m sitting with some lawyers – a prosecutor, the chairman of the state bar association and a court administrator – trying to work out the mechanics of corruption in the justice sector, in this most corrupt of countries. We’re talking details: how judges rarely demand bribes directly, their clerks collect the money; and how lawyers collude, blaming judicial corruption for the extra fees they pocket.

“Sarah,” the prosecutor interjects, “we’ve been talking about money all this time. But this isn’t just about money …”

“The saying goes,” he resumes awkwardly, “if you want to win your case, go to the judge with a beautiful girl.” [footnote 6]

I’m stopped cold. I imagine the girl. She may be 14 or 15. She returns home from school each day with her friends, the white veils of their school uniforms fluttering like matched plumage. I picture the glistening eyes of some overfed judge as he reaches for her. My stomach turns.

Abruptly another image comes to mind: the girl’s brother, a lanky young Nigerian man. Already disillusioned, he is pushed right over the edge. He would kill that judge if he could.

And Boko Haram, all around this town, would like nothing more than to help him do it. I could suddenly understand how it happens. I could see how the corruption perpetrated by officials of the then Nigerian administration – like that of many governments around the world – was itself helping to generate the terrorist threat.

The problem, I realised, is far more severe than white elephants or poor service delivery. Corruption entails a violation of a person’s basic humanity that can spur an enraged response.

It is these connections – between government corruption and terrorism or other violence – that this essay explores.

Corruption is one of those consensual topics. No one would argue it’s a good thing. International charities and multilateral organisations have worked hard to combat it, racking up impressive achievements in recent years. Anti- bribery laws, once unheard of, have spread well beyond their initial US–UK beachhead. Major arrests and asset seizures are increasingly common, as are citizen-led anti-corruption protests. Such protests have resulted in the resignation of senior officials or their ousting through the ballot box. That’s what happened in Nigeria, where a hard-nosed reformer – who has penned an essay in this volume – gained an upset victory in March 2015 elections over the administration those Kano legal practitioners were criticising.

And yet, when push comes to shove in bilateral relations, Western governments, businesses and charities are still most likely to prioritise other imperatives ahead of corruption. If an international aid agency or philanthropic organisation has set its sights on delivering health programming to rural villages, its government may be reticent to act against corruption in the host country for fear the precious permissions to operate will be cancelled. If the objective is a major extension of electrical power across a whole region or a trade foray into an emerging market, corruption may be seen as a ‘cost of doing business’. Corruption helps facilitate economic activity and growth, some maintain. Others cite culture: “It’s just the way people do things over there. Who are we to impose our norms?” These and other excuses are proffered to rationalise looking the other way or outright collusion.

Upon closer inspection, it thus appears that corruption is not so consensual after all. A remarkable number of Westerners actually argue in favour of it.

Of all the competing priorities, the one that most swiftly trumps anti-corruption is security. Co-operating with this or that corrupt leader is seen as critical, because he is our partner in the war against terrorism. His is the only military worth its salt in the region, troops that actually go on the attack against militants. He provides us with intelligence or bases or overflight rights. And so the kleptocratic practices of his network of cronies are overlooked. The way they have bent state functions, wired the whole economy to their own benefit, given free rein to low-level officials to rake in extorted bribes and blocked off every avenue of recourse – none of that matters, so long as they are ‘with us’ in the fight against terrorists.

This common framing is particularly ironic given the growing evidence that corruption is helping to drive many people into the folds of extremist movements and indeed lies at the root of many of today’s security crises (Chayes 2015; Sky 2015). The purported trade-off between security and corruption is a false dichotomy. Take southern Afghanistan, the former Taliban heartland, where I lived for nearly a decade. In the spring of 2009, a delegation of elders came to visit from Shah Wali Kot district, just north of Kandahar. This happened often. I was one of the only foreigners in Kandahar with no guards at my gate. When I asked why, with the Taliban killing people, the villagers don’t fight back, a man retorted, “How can they work with this Government? The Government doesn’t hear them. The Government doesn’t do anything for them. It’s just there to fill its pockets, nothing else. If the Government isn’t fixed, no matter how many soldiers the foreigners bring, the situation won’t improve.” [footnote 7]

A few days later in the border town of Spin Boldak, community leader Hajji Manan Khan concurred, “This Government … no one likes it. Ministers have huge palaces in Kabul, while the people have nothing. The foreigners should announce that the current Government is thieves. They should put the screws in them, call them on the carpet and demand accounts.” [footnote 8]

I heard this refrain again and again. Out of a hundred Taliban, elders would tell me, fewer than a quarter were ‘real’. The rest had taken up arms in disgust with the Government. This assessment was corroborated by interviews with Taliban detainees in international military custody. Explaining their motivations for joining the insurgency, they cited government corruption more often than any strictly religious rationale.

A similar picture emerges from Nigeria. When Boko Haram launched its first large-scale violent attacks in July 2009, police stations were the first targets. By all accounts, the Nigerian police is one of the most venal and abusive in the world (Human Rights Watch 2010). [footnote 9] And, during a November 2015 conversation in Maiduguri, where Boko Haram first emerged, local residents voiced a sentiment I had heard often: “People were very happy [with those first attacks]. Boko Haram was saying the truth about the violations by government agencies against the people. Finally they could stand up and challenge. They were claiming their rights.” [footnote 10]

Extremism isn’t the only form that backlash against corruption takes. Across the Arab world in 2011, populations took to the streets demanding an end to autocratic governments, the prosecution and imprisonment of corrupt officials, and the return of stolen assets. As the catastrophic situation in today’s Middle East demonstrates, revolutions rarely end peacefully. Some analysts see the expansion of extremism, from Daesh in Syria to a tenacious insurgency in Egypt, as a reaction to the failure of those initially non- violent efforts to break the grip of kleptocratic governing elites (Muasher 2015).

Ukraine seems as culturally and historically different from the Middle East as a country can be, yet its 2014 revolution was fuelled by similar motivations. While anti-Russian sentiment and a cultural affinity with Western Europe were important drivers of the Maidan protests, so was disgust at the corrupt Yanukovich Government. Photos of the deposed president’s pleasure palace went viral after his fall. The sequel to that revolution has been the first major East–West stand-off since the end of the Cold War, complete with the forcible annexation of territory and the displacement of more than a million people.

In these cases and others, corruption has helped generate some of today’s most dire security crises. The difficult question, especially regarding religious violence, is why? What is it about corruption that should drive people to such extremes?

Four elements of corruption in its current form help to provide an explanation: the humiliation inflicted on victims; their lack of recourse; the structure and sophistication of corrupt networks; and the truly colossal sums being stolen. Firstly, what we in the West often underestimate in thinking about corruption is the assault on victims’ human dignity that accompanies it. Recall the example of the judge’s ‘sextortion’, when the only way of gaining a hearing may be to allow a daughter or a sister to be violated.

Abuses of this nature can spark a burning need for retribution. In studies of violence ranging from Palestinian uprisings to gang shootings in the United States, insult or humiliation is found to be a key factor (Longo, Canetti and Hite-Rubin 2014; Black 2011). [footnote 11]

Given the obvious connections between religion and morality, the moral depravity underlying the abuse is frequently understood in religious terms. “Our leaders are bound by religious duty to do the right thing,” Kano’s then Bar Association Chairman Ibrahim Nassarawa told me, “so when they don’t, people hate them.” [footnote 12] At that point, a religious argument may be persuasive: “If our government were based on the Islamic system,” said Maiduguri residents, summarising Boko Haram’s preaching, “all these things wouldn’t be happening. We would have a fair and just society.” [footnote 13]

Secondly, with government perpetrating the crimes, there is no earthly hope of recourse. As Sardar Muhammad – who cultivates grapes and pomegranates west of Kandahar – put it in defining the word ‘corruption’, “If the district governor takes all the development budget and only gives the people a tiny bit, and I want to complain, and his gunmen keep me from complaining because they are his kept dogs, that’s corruption.” [footnote 14]

Deprived of any peaceful means of redress against an abusive government, even the founders of our own Western democracies rebelled. The 16th-century Dutch Revolt, the English Civil War and the American and French revolutions were all bloody affairs. Period documents from these milestones in democratic development indicate that in none of them did protagonists and ordinary citizens turn to violence gladly, but felt compelled to it after exhausting every other avenue and obtaining not the slightest concession (Robertson 2006). [footnote 15]

The unassailable impunity that Sardar Muhammad was lamenting derives from the third important feature of corruption as it currently exists in dozens of countries – how deeply it is embedded in state machinery. It’s not the work of a few venal officials, who might be rooted out or challenged in court. The kind of severe corruption that is common today is systemic. It is the practice of sophisticated networks armed with all the instruments of state function. They use those instruments to serve their aims – which largely boil down to personal enrichment. In many cases, these entities should not be thought of as governments at all, much less fragile or failing ones, but rather as savvy and successful criminal organisations.

Weaknesses in state function examined in this light may prove to be deliberate, especially in agencies with autonomous power. Judges or specialised prosecutors are underpaid. Armies are hollowed out to reduce the likelihood of a coup and because defence budgets and military assistance are juicy revenue streams. The results of this latter trend were on vivid display in 2014 as the cannibalised militaries of Iraq and Nigeria collapsed at the first sign of a challenge.

In other cases, apparently innocuous state agencies such as tax authorities or water departments are fashioned into bludgeons to force compliance. A Tunisian tax collector explained to me how, under the regime of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, certain people were accorded a tax holiday as long as they cut members of the ruling clique into their action. But “assessors would rarely make someone’s file go away completely. The permissiveness could always be revoked.” Taxes, he said, could be used “to punish someone who was too independent.” [footnote 16]

A trade union representative in Uzbekistan described a similar system to me in 2014: “There are so many taxes it is impossible to pay them all. So people make a connection in the tax office to pay less. But then you’ve broken the law and they know it, and you are afraid of the Government. The whole Government is set up that way, to make you do wrong, so then they have you on the hook.” [footnote 17]

These kleptocratic networks are horizontally integrated. They comprise government officials, businesses such as banks or construction companies, and so-called non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and implementers of aid – which may in fact be owned by relatives of government officials. But they also include outright criminals such as smugglers, drug-traffickers and even terrorists. Some within the government service in Algeria in the 1990s, and also officials in Pakistan today, are believed to have maintained operational links with extremists (Waldman 2010; Garçon 2003). [footnote 18]

For foreign governments, charities or businesses seeking to operate in such environments, this horizontal integration makes for particularly difficult navigating. The familiar distinctions between public and private sectors, licit and illicit actors, simply do not apply.

Finally, the amounts of money in play are truly obscene. Former FBI special agent Debra Laprevotte, who worked kleptocracy cases for years, says that the increase has been palpable: “For the longest time, we had a single billion-dollar case. Now there are at least five billion-dollar investigations underway.” [footnote 19]

According to two separate biannual surveys, ‘petty bribery’ in Afghanistan rakes in between £1.3 billion and £2.6 billion per year (UNODC 2012; Integrity Watch Afghanistan 2014).

This is in a country whose licit government revenue is barely estimated to top £1 billion (SIGAR 2015).

The development implications of such sums are obvious. Imagine if even a fraction were devoted to a country’s healthcare or water and sewage system, or to building a reliable and affordable public transport network in a burgeoning megacity, or to paying teachers a living wage. Imagine the impact on sustainable economic growth.

But when obtained through practices this corrupt, vast wealth in a sea of poverty also has a moral component – hence the easy link to religion. In the midst of the 16th- century Protestant revolt against the Habsburg ‘Divine Right’ monarchy, an anonymous Dutch pamphleteer complained, “They put robes of silk on their idols made of old wood, leaving us brethren of Christ naked and starving” (Arnade 2008, p. 99).

Then, as now, militant puritanical religion, imposed if necessary by force, was seen by some as the only remedy.

The picture painted here is a sobering one, particularly for governments, investors and humanitarian organisations that cannot avoid working in such countries. And especially when security concerns are so severe as to trump other considerations. Still, even in a world in which trade-offs are real and cannot simply be wished away, there are some important lessons to be considered.

Governments that ostensibly fight against terror may actually be generating more terrorism than they curb. The international community must do a better job of weighing up the pluses and minuses of partnering with acutely corrupt governments, and thus reinforcing them and facilitating their practices.

If alliances are too close, or pay too little attention to the corruption of host governments, the abused populations may come to associate the international community with the misdeeds of their own rulers. As 14th-century churchman William of Pagula admonished King Edward III, “He takes on the guilt of the perpetrator who neglects to fix what he can correct” (Nederman 2002, p. 82).

A more precise understanding of network structures and real dynamics of power must inform planning processes ahead of engagement. It is costly in human and other resources, not to mention politically uncomfortable, to draw up network diagrams – like the ones intelligence or police agencies regularly develop in their study of terrorists or criminals – that map members of ostensibly friendly governments and their cut-outs in business or the criminal world. But these costs should be weighed against the proven and often disastrous price of blind engagement in such complex environments.

A new, broader understanding of ‘corporate social responsibility’ is required. Across sectors, companies whose business models actually depend on servicing kleptocratic officials – such as some banks, lawyers, estate agents, registered agents, various extractive and other resource- based businesses, and international construction contractors – are contributing to significant security threats in their own countries.

It is in this light that they should consider their ‘corporate social responsibility’ – rather than as a synonym for donations to localised humanitarian work. Should their public-spiritedness remain wanting, then sanctions applied to them for colluding with illegal corrupt practices should be stiffened, commensurate with the harm they are doing.

Western citizens should begin pressurising such businesses. And above all, Western governments should cease viewing corrupt money flows, or good trade deals extracted from kleptocrats at the expense of their populations, as a necessary component of their nations’ economies.

6.1 References

Arnade, P. 2008. Beggars, Iconoclasts and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Black, D. 2011. Moral Time. New York: Oxford University Press, p.73.

Chayes, S. 2015. Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. New York: W.W. Norton.

Garçon, J. 15 November 2003. Les GIA sont une creation des services de securite algeriens. Liberation. Available online .

Human Rights Watch. 17 August 2010. Everyone’s in on the Game: corruption and human rights abuses by the Nigeria Police Force. Available online .

Integrity Watch. 28 May 2014. Afghanistan, National Corruption Survey. Available online .

Longo, M., Canetti, D. and Hite-Rubin N. 2014. A Checkpoint Effect? Evidence from a natural experiment on travel restrictions in the West Bank. American Journal of Political Science, 58(4), pp. 1006–1023.

Muasher, M. 2015. Thalatha Safarat Indhar Lam Yasma’ha Ahad. Alghad (Afkar wa Mawaqaf). Available online .

Nederman, C. ed. and trans. 2002. Political Thought in Early Fourteenth Century England: Treatises by Walter of Milemete, William of Pagula and William of Ockham. Of Pagula, W., The Mirror of Edward III. Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, p. 82.

Robertson, G. 2006. The Tyrannicide Brief: The Story of the Man Who Sent Charles I to the Scaffold. New York: Pantheon.

Sky, E. 2015. The Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq. London: Atlantic Books. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 5 March 2015. Letter to Generals Lloyd Austin, John Campbell and Todd Semonite. Available online .

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). December 2012. Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends. Vienna: UNODC. Available online .

Waldman, M. 2010. The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents. London School of Economics, Crisis States Working Group Paper, 2(18).

7. David Walsh: The irresponsibility of not knowing – corruption in sport

Being a sports writer was all I wanted.

Thirty-eight years, the only job I’ve ever had. Good times mostly. Not what I thought they would be. When I glance in the rear-view mirror, there is more cynicism, more corruption, more of sport’s dark side. It seems hard to believe now that the journey began with the expectation of standards higher than would ever be found in civilian life.

There is, of course, much to recall that was glorious, exciting and uplifting, sporting stuff that makes you think anything is possible. Hard to imagine that a boy who grew up on the potholed roads of Kenya could become a Tour de France champion, but that’s what Chris Froome did.

Or that a boy from Rosario in Argentina who was diagnosed with a growth hormone deficiency at age ten should become the greatest footballer we’ve ever seen. Well that’s Lionel Andres Messi’s story. How many winter evenings has he brightened? But even in the beautiful game, bad things were happening. Our obsession with football created a global popularity that would lead to extraordinary riches pouring into the game.

That money needed to be managed and those in control needed to be accountable. We are speaking of systems of good governance, but greed got a head start and governance never caught up. With great wealth comes power and that attracts the corruptible. Over the last 15 years, there has been the International Olympic Committee (IOC) scandal behind the awarding of the Winter Olympics to Salt Lake City in 2001, the FIFA scandal that simmered for more than ten years before boiling over in 2015 and, most recently, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) scandal involving high-up officials in the international federation.

Sometimes you find yourself taking a step back and wondering, “Could it have really happened?” Could custodians of the sport really have blackmailed an athlete in a €450,000-deal, covering up a doping violation so that the athlete could compete in the Olympics? That’s the allegation and the French police are on the case (World Anti-Doping Agency 2016).

I’d been a sports reporter for ten years when attending my first Olympics. That was Seoul 1988. A run along a busy promenade in South Korea’s capital city on the final Sunday of those Games remains a cherished memory. I never saw such an outpouring of national pride. Every expression seemed to say, “You thought we couldn’t do it, even we weren’t sure we could, but we did.”

Before those Games started, there had been student protests in Seoul and the world’s media highlighted the potential for the Olympics to be overshadowed by unrest. That never happened. The trouble came from inside the stadium, down there on the track or, more accurately, in the room where the Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson peed into what anti-doping personnel call ‘the collection vessel’.

The thing about watching something live is that it leaves a deeper, more lasting impression. Inside your living room, you see the story unfold. Inside the stadium, you feel it. It’s the difference between having your face painted and having your forehead tattooed. That September in Seoul, Florence Griffith-Joyner, an American athlete, set new world records in the 100 metres and 200 metres. They will stand for a long time yet, those records.

They called her ‘Flo-Jo’. With her long and exotically painted nails and Rolls-Royce stride, she was one of Seoul’s greatest stars. I saw her get the 200-metre record, decelerating in the home straight. It was a heart-sinking moment. There were allegations of doping, unproven. Florence Griffith-Joyner died at 38, far too soon (Walsh 2013).

Ben Johnson was a different story. He got caught. Can you imagine being awoken by a loud knock on your apartment door at 3.30 in the morning and being pleased about it? Doug Gillon, from The Glasgow Herald, stood there. “Johnson’s tested positive,” he said. The words landed like ice-cold water on a sleepy face. Other than tell our offices back home that we were up and on the case, I don’t know what we could have done to advance the story at that hour, but it was a watershed moment. Ben Johnson changed the landscape. Some of the things that had drawn us as kids to sport were being crushed by a will to win that recognised no boundaries.

How bad was it? How bad is it? It was bad. It’s gotten worse.

Part of that summer of ’88 was spent following the world’s greatest bike race, the Tour de France. A few days from the end, there was another drug controversy when Pedro Delgado, the Spanish-born race leader, provided a urine sample that contained the drug probenecid, used by athletes to mask their use of proscribed substances.

A strange case for sure. Probenecid was banned by the International Olympic Committee, but wasn’t yet banned by the body that governed world cycling. Delgado, it was initially speculated, would be docked ten minutes but not thrown off the race. The Dutch rider, Steven Rooks, would then be the new leader and, with the race almost complete, the certain winner. [footnote 20]

I met Rooks before the start, on the morning after Delgado’s bad news.

“How do you feel about taking the yellow jersey?” “I don’t want it in these circumstances,” he said.

“But if he’s been cheating, and why would anyone use probenecid, you will be the deserving leader.”

“He has been the strongest rider in the race and deserves the victory.”

Rooks saw my righteousness for what it was. Innocence. What I believe he was telling me, in code, of course, was that athletes in the Tour de France do what they have to do, and no one is guiltier or more innocent than another. Strange how crushing that moment seemed. Over the years that followed, I became a different kind of sports writer – less gullible, even aggressively sceptical.

Something Albert Camus wrote strikes a chord: “Every act of rebellion expresses a nostalgia for innocence” (Camus 1956, p. 54). We want sport to be believable. In the world of our imagination, sport doesn’t just mirror life but offers something more principled, more idealistic, more inspiring than the world of business. Alas, the reality is far from that and there is a rebellion.

Folk are tired of the corruption. We want our innocence back. You can bet that when the news emerged that FIFA executive committee members were arrested on corruption charges, football fans around the world were silently cheering. At last. Same reaction from athletics fans when news that high-ranking members of the IAAF suffered the same fate.

Whether police investigations in both sports lead to charges doesn’t matter as much as knowing that men who once saw themselves as untouchable were mistaken.

With so much cheating on the field and so much corruption off it, you may think this is a bleak time for sport. On the contrary, this is what sport has needed: scrutiny, exposure of wrongdoing, punishment for those who have done wrong. No longer in the dark, we now have the opportunity for change. It would be a crime not to seize it.

From where did the malaise come? Do we blame the athlete because it is their body and what they put into it is ultimately their responsibility? Or the trusted coach who says that, without doping, victory is unattainable? Or the governing body that publicly says doping is a scourge, but privately accepts its existence as an irrepressible evil? From where does the corruption come?

What of the institutional corruption? Why did we get the IOC scandal, the FIFA scandal and the IAAF scandal? Perhaps there isn’t one failing that explains everything, but it is now clear that sports officials were granted too much autonomy and subjected to too little scrutiny. Members of the IOC and FIFA were treated like royalty and many of them embraced the world of privilege before abusing it. Now US federal officers and the Swiss and French police are pursuing cases of suspected fraud in sport, and they do so with fans worldwide urging them on.

Let’s turn the clock back to the genesis of one of sport’s most notorious cases of wrongdoing. It was July 1999. We were all at Le Puy du Fou, a theme park set among the trees and beauty of the Vendée in western France. It was the start of the Tour de France. The race began with a short individual race against the clock, each rider hurtling round a 4-mile circuit in pursuit of the first yellow jersey.

That race launched Lance Armstrong as an embryonic global icon. He won that short test by a staggering eight seconds and had done this after recovering from life-threatening testicular cancer. His domination of that year’s Tour was absolute and his performance seemed to many the most life-affirming story that sport had ever delivered.

Surviving cancer is one thing, but to follow recovery with victory in perhaps the toughest athletic challenge of all is quite another.

Armstrong cheated because he believed others were cheating and that it was the only way he could win. On both counts, he was almost certainly correct. But that merely explains his rationale – it cannot excuse it. A great number of his competitors in that race were not using drugs and so were put at an insurmountable disadvantage by those who did cheat.

The fact that Armstrong had been so seriously ill made it hard for people to believe that he would then use drugs that could be dangerous to his health. He never saw it like that. Many of the drugs used in restoring him to health, after he’d undergone four rounds of chemotherapy, were the same drugs that would give him greater endurance in the Tour de France. And they weren’t that dangerous.

But he couldn’t have gotten away with it unless so many had been willing to embrace the irresponsibility of not knowing. The truth is that the truth was there, an inch or so beneath the surface. “If a misdeed arises in the search for truth, it is better to exhume it rather than conceal the truth,” Saint Jerome wrote in the fifth century (cited in Ballester and Walsh 2004, p.1). That’s not bad advice.

In the surge of the feel-good factor that came with Armstrong’s first victory in the Tour de France, everyone had their reasons for clinging to the irresponsibility of not knowing and leaving the truth resting beneath the surface. His sponsors would sell bikes and clothing – and dreams – off the miracle of his comeback. Those entrusted with the duty to protect the sport, the world-governing cycling body (the Union Cycliste Internationale [UCI]) saw in him a saviour bearing the gifts of increased popularity and, of course, revenue.

As fans, we want our heroes to be angels on wheels, simon- pure, somehow immune to the uppers and downers of our own pill-popping society. In the maelstrom of Armstrong’s wondrous victory, we engaged in what the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge called ‘the willing suspension of disbelief’. All the reasons why this story had to be questioned were suppressed. Those who tried to protest were shouted down.

Let us try to explain how easy it would have been for the fraud of Armstrong to have been stopped before it had begun. The drug of choice in 1999 was erythropoietin (EPO), which promotes the production of red cells and allowed those using it an almost endless supply of oxygen. With it, a rider could fly up mountains. Angels on wheels indeed. At that time, there was no anti-doping test to identify it in urine. So EPO was a godsend for those who wished to cheat, and there were plenty.

From blood tests taken before that 1999 Tour, the authorities more or less knew who was using the drug but just could not prove it. They also knew that an EPO test was imminent. All they had to do was freeze the urine samples from ’99 and re-examine them when the EPO test was approved, which happened in 2000. It would have been simple and it would have exposed those who were cheating. But those who should have been protecting the sport were the same people who were promoting it, and Lance Armstrong was good for business.

It was not co-incidental that when Armstrong the Legend became Armstrong the Cheat, US federal investigators had gotten involved. The Feds have powers that allow them to dig deeper than journalists, and Armstrong’s former teammates quickly learned that while they could tell little white lies to journalists, they couldn’t lie under oath.

Only when the police got interested in the minutiae of football’s governing body, FIFA, and the athletics federation, IAAF, did we discover the extent of the corruption in both organisations. Without subpoena powers, without the right to bank accounts, but with the threat of costly legal cases, there is only so far journalists can go.

We came to know how rotten things were in the state of the Tour de France when French customs pulled over a team car on the Franco–Belge border at 6 am on a July morning in 1998. With FIFA, it was the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) arrest of US delegate Chuck Blazer that proved to be the turning point. Blazer spilt the beans and plenty of barons were in trouble. French police are now doing the same for the IAAF, showing the most powerful that they’re not as untouchable as they might have thought.

How did it get to this? Good people stayed quiet when they should have spoken up. Anyone who pushed for good governance in these organisations was putting themselves in an uncomfortable position. Few were prepared to do that. It was easier to look the other way, to travel on the gravy train and not pull the emergency cord. This longing to indulge the irresponsibility of not knowing has been the rock upon which the corruption was built.

Those who said nothing – they and their sports have paid a high price. Paul Simon wrote about this a long time ago in ‘The Sound of Silence’: “Fool, said I, you do not know. Silence, like a cancer grows” (Simon 1964).

How we have needed courageous people. Take the IOC and the privileges of its members. Forget the courtesy cars and five-star hotels, the access to the best tickets and the lavish banquets. Instead, consider the daily allowance. Board members on IOC duty receive a daily $900 allowance, $450 for common or garden members (IOC Ethics Commission 2015). It adds up when you spend maybe two and a half weeks at the Olympics, which even an IOC member wouldn’t dare to call hard work.

As much as there is an urge to say that these allowances are far too much, it is worth pointing out that, among the major sports bodies, the IOC is the only one that publicly discloses information such as per diem allowances to its members. This level of compensation does beg the question, ‘Who is serving whom?’ Is it the IOC members who serve the Olympics or the Olympics that serves its committee members?

There is a culture of entitlement that needs to end, because excessive privilege can often be the precursor to corruption: “If I am entitled to this, perhaps I can also get that.” Somewhere along the way, a lot of FIFA administrators came to see not much difference between privilege and wrongdoing – like one was the logical extension of the other.

Let me tell you about Vitaly Stepanov, the courageous whistle-blower who did so much to bring to light the doping secrets in Russian sport. He was recently asked to meet IAAF officials in a major city. To get there, he had to take a six-hour flight. IAAF booked the ticket and when it landed in Stepanov’s email, he realised it was a first-class flight (Walsh 2014).

Surprised and unimpressed to have found himself immediately drawn into this world of privilege, Stepanov rang his IAAF contact and said he had no wish to travel first- class. He considered the excessive cost could be far better spent on fighting the doping culture that he had exposed. Will sports officials ever get the message? (Walsh 2014).

For inspiration, they might care to turn their eyes to the example being set by Pope Francis, leader of the Catholic Church. When he turned up in Washington to meet President Obama, it was easy to pick out his car in the motorcade of more than 20 SUVs and police cars. He was inside the charcoal grey Fiat 500L, which was maybe a tiny step up, or down, from the Ford Focus he drives around the Vatican.

“I’m visible to people and I lead a normal life,” Pope Francis has said. “Public Mass in the morning, I eat in the refectory with everyone else, etc. All this is good for me and prevents me from being isolated. I’m trying to stay and act the same as I did in Buenos Aires because, if you change at my age, you just look ridiculous” (Pope Francis 2013, paraphrased).

How many high-ranking sports officials have thought that if that little Fiat is good for the Pope, it is good enough for me? How many believe they should have lives somewhat akin to the lives of fans upon whose loyalty their games are built? The IOC needs to lower those allowances and FIFA’s new president, whoever they are, needs to embrace a more modest lifestyle.

Transparency must become the norm and proper governance needs to be at the top of every agenda. For too long, good governance has been nothing but a PR sound bite. Trust will be regained when they show us they have changed, not when they tell us.

We need governments to lead as well, to say to sport’s wrongdoers that you are not part of some separate untouchable state. Do wrong and you will be held accountable. The Wild West is no more. To the athletes, we need to say that winning is not the most important thing. How you try to win is what matters.

Would you rather be top of the medal table with cheats or bottom with a group of totally honest athletes? Governments need to stop seeing the prowess of their athletes as a sign of national strength. For that too is another road leading to corruption. Better in my view for a government to understand that what truly matters is how many of its citizens are active.

We need to stop wearing our country’s success in sport like a badge of honour, for it matters not a whit whether we’re first or second in the medals table. It is Vitaly Stepanov, the Russian whistle-blower, to whom we should listen. He reminds us of what matters, and what doesn’t.

“Personally, I don’t like this whole idea of countries and nationalism and all of that. Things must be done that serve the planet not for the country. Same in sport, I don’t care that a Russian wins or an American wins. If the competition is fair, if the best one wins, that’s good. If a person is honest, talented, has a good coach and he is raised properly and he becomes an Olympic champion then he will be a hero. And it really will not matter what country he is from. Jesse Owens became a hero for the whole world.

“I went to the Olympic museum in Lausanne. There is a saying on a wall there from Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the Olympic movement. Let me just say it. ‘The important thing in life is not the triumph but the fight. The essential thing is not to have won but to have fought well.’ This is my view of what sport should be” (Walsh 2015).

7.1 References

Ballester, P. and Walsh, D. 2004. L.A. Confidentiel: Les Secrets de Lance Armstrong. France: La Martinière.

Camus, A. 1956. The Rebel: An Essay on a Man in Revolt. New York: First Vintage International, p. 54.

International Olympic Committee (IOC) Ethics Commission. 2015. Agenda 2020: Indemnity Policy. Switzerland: IOC. Available from: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Agenda2020/Ethics_ Commission_to_IOC_Members_IOC_Indemnity_Policy. pdf

Pope Francis. 2013. Letter to Father Enrique Rodriguez. Available online .

Simon, P. 1964. The Sound of Silence. New York: Columbia Records.

Walsh, D. 2013. Seven Deadly Sins: My Pursuit of Lance Armstrong. UK: Simon & Schuster.

Walsh, D. 14 December 2014. Russian doping whistleblower fears for his safety. The Sunday Times. Available from: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/sport/athletics/ article1495850.ece

Walsh, D. 29 November 2015. Husband and wife who brought down Russia. The Sunday Times. Available from: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/sport/athletics/ article1638611.ece

World Anti-Doping Agency. 2016. Independent Commission Report – Part 2. Available online .

8. President Muhammadu Buhari: My plan to fight corruption in Nigeria

In the run-up to the general elections in March 2015, I campaigned on the platform of addressing the challenges of security, the economy, power, infrastructure and fighting corruption. Of these, removing the cancer of corruption from the system is the key not only to restoring the moral health of the nation, but also to freeing our enormous resources for urgent socio-economic development.

Nigerians never cease to ask, for example, why it is that, at independence in 1960, Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was higher at $559 than that of Singapore’s at $476, but today Singapore’s GDP has grown to $55,182 and Nigeria’s has increased to just $3,005 (World Bank 2016).

For sure, there are many variables to explain this paradox of a city-state with a small population outperforming Nigeria so dramatically. But the most important single factor, to my mind, is our two countries’ contrasting leadership visions and attitudes to corruption. As Alan Greenspan (2007) has observed, “Corruption, embezzlement, fraud, these are all characteristics which exist everywhere. It is regrettably the way human nature functions, whether we like it or not. What successful economies do is to keep it to a minimum.” Unfortunately, successive Nigerian governments have simply been unable to contain the monster.

8.1 Corruption in Nigeria

Oil and gas are the second largest contributors to our GDP and account for more than 80% of our foreign exchange earnings. Yet this is the most corruption-ridden sector of our economy. By some industry estimates, 232,000 barrels of crude oil worth on average $6.7 billion per annum are lost by the Nigerian state to oil thieves (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010). This illicit trade thrives as a result of collaboration among politicians, security agencies, criminal gangs and even multinational oil company employees. As the Financial Times reported, the enormity of the problem is captured in satellite imageries showing the illicit oil trade “expanding exponentially between 2008 and 2013, at the same time as artisanal [illegal] refining was mushrooming across the Niger Delta on an industrial scale” (Wallis 2015).

The abuse and misuse of public office for private gain has been a constant feature of governance in Nigeria for the past 30 years. In the last two decades especially, corruption – with its corresponding devastating socio-economic consequences on national development and the well-being of our people – escalated rapidly and with even greater intensity. Our recent history has been one of predatory and rapacious political, military, public and private sector elites competing and alternating as the drivers of corruption. Paradoxically, corruption flourished and eventually became a way of life under the supposedly accountable democratic governments of the past 16 years during which, by one calculation, the nation earned more revenue than in all the previous 80 years combined.

Even as far back as the 1980s, procurement and contract costs in Nigeria were three times higher than those in East and North Africa, and four times higher than those in Asia. Studies suggest that public funds of between $300 billion and $400 billion have been lost to corruption since Nigeria became independent in 1960 (Ezekwesili 2012). According to the African Union’s high-level panel on illicit flows, Nigeria alone accounted for $217 billion of the African continent’s total $850 billion loss to illicit flows between 1970 and 2008 (UNECA 2015).

Despite anti-corruption agencies and laws introduced in recent years, there was a complete lack of political will to strengthen these agencies and to faithfully enforce the laws. As one commentator observed, across the entire spectrum of government, rules and regulations were ignored with impunity. Procurements were made with a total disregard for due process, inflated by billions of dollars and poorly executed, and payments were made for jobs not even done. No wonder then that Nigeria consistently scored below the African average in virtually all the categories considered by various transparency and good governance agencies: safety and the rule of law, ease of doing business, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunities and human development (Transparency International 2016).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016) has correctly identified that pervasive corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to governmental instability. Corruption erodes the moral fabric of society and violates the social and economic rights of citizens, particularly the poor and the vulnerable. Actually it creates poverty and hurts the poor disproportionately, because resources are diverted away from those who need government protection and services the most.

Indeed corrupt politicians, in collusion with electoral officials, have consistently distorted our electoral processes and perverted the rule of law, thereby undermining our democracy. Corrupt practices such as illegal duty and tax waivers lead to loss of revenue. Corruption drives away foreign direct investment with its consequential loss of opportunities for increased government revenue, job creation and skills acquisition. It erodes efficiency, effectiveness and productivity, while promoting waste and mismanagement.

The resultant inequality in society – with extreme mass poverty living side by side with islands of stupendous unearned riches – has led to frustration, hopelessness and despair, and laid the foundation for militancy and insurgency. Corruption in Nigeria has resulted in the decay of infrastructure, a lack of social services and the collapse of the institutions to fix them. The question then arises as to why and how Nigeria descended to become such a sorry example of a rich yet poor country.

8.2 How did this happen?

There are many predisposing factors to corruption in Nigeria. First, there is the distortion of values and the cultural context. In many communities, as indeed everywhere else in the world, material success is celebrated and emulated. In Nigeria, however, a further weakening of values occurred somewhere down the line, eroding the traditional mechanism of checks on the illegal, primitive and ostentatious accumulation and display of wealth. Dislocation of communities and urbanisation partly account for this.

Second, a strong culture of ethnicity and nepotism encourages corruption because it influences the irrational allocation of resources and the protection of culprits.

Third, there is a culture of elite exceptionalism whereby high public-office holders and the wealthy feel that, by virtue of their status, stature or position, they are exempted from the laws and rules regulating society.

Fourth, and most insidious, is the pervasive culture of impunity across the social strata, which is, in turn, fuelled by a legal system bedevilled by delays. The egregious culture of impunity has itself sabotaged and stultified the growth of the rule of law.

Finally, the single biggest contributor to corruption in Nigeria is the lack of political will among the leadership of the country in the past to tackle it. There are sufficient laws in the statute books, and robust rules, regulations and clearly set out procedures throughout the public service. But the institutions established to fight corruption either lacked the desire, the capacity and drive to tackle it or were deliberately subverted or circumvented.

8.3 Proposals to curb corruption in Nigeria

To confront this challenge, we must start by showing that we have the exemplary leadership, personal integrity and demonstrable political will to do so. Democratic governance based on individual liberties, human rights, a free press and the rule of law requires us to be fair and just in dealing with all cases of corruption. There must be transparency and a strict adherence to due process – however painstaking the effort and however slowly the wheel of justice turns under this setting. At the same time, we must be accountable and remain faithful to our oath of office whereby we swore to do justice to all manner of people without fear or favour. We must, like Caesar’s wife, be seen at all times to be beyond reproach in order to cast the first of any stones. Thus, though not required by law, my vice-president and I began my tenure by publicly declaring our assets, to be compared with our net worth on leaving office.

As I noted earlier, there exists a plethora of laws, rules and regulations to ensure good governance in Nigeria. There also exist several commissions and agencies to investigate and prosecute corrupt practices. We need not create any new ones unless absolutely necessary. We only need to strengthen, adequately fund and motivate the existing ones to do their jobs.

We shall also encourage independence of action and avoidance of self-censorship by anti-corruption agencies. No one will be presented as a ‘sacred cow’ beyond the reach of the law.

In the fight against corruption, citizen involvement and demand side activism are key components. Most of our people, especially those in the rural areas who are poor, ignorant and illiterate, do not make the link between corruption and their lack of access to healthcare, education and other facilities, even where they exist. They are too poor, too dependent and too powerless to demand accountability from their State or local governments. We shall therefore encourage the civil society, faith-based groups and community associations to challenge corruption within their communities. In this regard, we shall review our communication strategy towards a more open and transparent government by sharing information, encouraging citizen empowerment and supporting social actions to challenge corrupt practices by public officials at the federal state and local government levels.

In our model of democracy, there is a clear separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. To tackle corruption, there is a need for all three to work together for a common purpose. Towards this end, we are ready to engage with the Legislature and the Judiciary, state governments and all organs of government to ensure the necessary synergy towards effectively combating corruption.

Early in the life of this administration, I constituted a Presidential Advisory Committee on Anti-Corruption – made up of experts and persons of integrity – to oversee our anti-corruption effort, promote the reform agenda of the Government and co-ordinate the implementation plan for anti-corruption legislation and other interventions. Among other things, the Committee will also articulate and report on strategies towards repositioning and strengthening our agencies. These include the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), and the ways in which our criminal justice administration may be improved.

Given the transnational operations of criminals and the multi-jurisdictional effect of corruption, we will also intensify our collaboration with the international community. This includes international anti-corruption agencies and institutions such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other development partners. We also commit ourselves to compliance with the country’s international obligations under international treaties and conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Anti- Corruption (UNCAC) (UNODC 2015).

8.4 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission

Two anti-corruption institutions are key to Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts. These are the EFCC and the ICPC. We are aware that both are presently not working at maximum potential owing to a myriad of challenges, which include overlaps in mandate, gaps in operational legislation and funding, a human capital deficiency, leadership inadequacy and internal corruption.

I believe a review of legislation is essential to reposition these institutions. For example, currently the ICPC can only begin anti-corruption investigations in response to petitions from the public. We want to change that, revising the ICPC Act to increase the Commission’s powers to initiate investigations into cases of corruption (ICPC 2016).

This would include:

• Granting the ICPC the power to commence assets forfeiture proceedings, as is the case in the US, UK and South Africa. Illegally acquired properties may then be seized where the suspected owner is a fugitive, disclaims ownership or cannot be located despite diligent efforts.
• Streamlining the jurisdiction of the ICPC by reducing areas of overlap with the EFCC, thus giving each agency areas of primary jurisdictional responsibility.
• Giving the ICPC power to accept material assistance from international institutions and development partners, as well as to access funds from global anti-corruption agencies, which the present ICPC Act prohibits.

Similarly, as part of the EFCC legislative review, we will focus on:

• Empowering the Commission to presume that a person has illegally enriched themselves where such a person owns, possesses or controls an interest in any property that cannot be justified by present or past emoluments or circumstances.
• Streamlining the jurisdiction of the EFCC to reduce overlap with the ICPC mandate.
• Securing the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties where the suspected owner is a fugitive, disclaims ownership or cannot be located despite diligent efforts.
• Separating the agency for financial intelligence gathering from the EFCC. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, which operates as an arm of the EFCC, needs to be independent in order to enhance its operational autonomy.

We intend to work with the Legislature to implement all these necessary reforms. It’s also critical that these two agencies charged with fighting corruption and financial crimes collaborate closely with development partners for technical assistance, staff training and data sharing.

As international co-operation continues to reduce the number of havens for hiding the proceeds of crime, new havens are emerging. We need therefore to enhance the scope of our mutual legal assistance agreements to widen the net we cast to recover illicit funds and secure the forfeiture of unexplainable assets.

In this regard, the agencies will also need to be more proactive in leveraging the legislations of foreign jurisdictions such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (US Department of Justice 2015). Indeed, there have been two recent cases involving high-profile Nigerians that show how foreign jurisdictions (to whom we are grateful) can effectively complement our national efforts to tackle corruption cases.

Pursuant to action taken by the US under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Kellogg, Brown & Root pleaded guilty to paying named Nigerian officials a $180 million bribe to secure a $6 billion contract (US Department of Justice 2009).

In another notorious case, all numerous counts of corruption filed against a former governor of a state were dismissed by a court in Nigeria only for the same politician to be convicted in the UK – based on the same evidence!

These kinds of prosecution lapses in major corruption cases arise because of the slow nature of trials, especially of corruption cases, in our system. Typically, corruption trials involving high-profile public officers last an average of 8 to 10 years or, if they go to appeal, 15 years. In such a situation, prosecution and judicial fatigue set in.

It’s standard practice for senior defence lawyers to use legal technicalities such as preliminary objections to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, requesting stay of proceedings and appealing interlocutory or preliminary matters, or for courts to oblige the accused with injunctions (sometimes perpetual), restraining anti-corruption agencies from investigating, arresting or prosecuting the suspected persons!

However, with the passage of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015, which seeks to limit such abuses, we hope to see significant progress (Federal Ministry of Justice 2015). The ACJA contains several innovations with the potential to significantly improve criminal justice administration in Nigeria. For example, it states that an application for a stay of proceedings shall not be entertained, that all preliminary objections shall be considered along with the substantive issues and that a ruling shall be made thereon at the time of delivery of judgment.

8.5 The Code of Conduct Bureau

The CCB was created 36 years ago to ensure probity and accountability. This includes setting out a comprehensive code of conduct for public officers such as declaring their assets and liabilities, and those of members of their families, when they assume and subsequently leave public office. It has powers to apprehend offending public officers and arraign them before the CCT. Yet in spite of the glaring and widespread corruption by political appointees and other public servants, the Bureau has hardly used its powers and, where it has, only low-level public officers have been apprehended and brought before the CCT.

Lee Kuan Yew (2000), writing on corruption in his book, From Third World To First, The Singapore Story: 1965– 2000, stated that: “The most effective change we made in 1960 was to allow the courts to treat proof that an accused was living beyond his or her means or had property or income they could not explain as corroborating evidence of corruption.”

Nigeria has had a similar provision at paragraph 11(3) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, which provides that any property acquired by a public officer that is not fairly attributable to his income shall be deemed to have been acquired in breach of the Code (International Centre of Nigerian Law [ICNL] 1999). In its 36 years of existence, the CCB has never invoked this provision. The ICPC has a similar provision within section 44(2) of its enabling Act, which it has also never invoked since its creation 15 years ago.

The CCB is fundamentally hampered by the fact that there is no requirement for public officers’ asset declarations to be published. So to lead by example, my vice-president and I voluntarily submitted our assets declaration, hoping that other members of my Government would do the same.

But beyond this, the CCB simply lacks the capacity to verify the claims made in the thousands of assets forms submitted. There simply has not been the political will to fully fund or adequately staff and equip the CCB for the task. In co-operation with the National Assembly, we shall look for ways and means to make the required appropriation. We shall also seek co-operation and assistance from our development partners in the areas of computerisation of the operations of the CCB and Land Registries, with links to the operations of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Corporate Affairs Commission (our Companies Registry) to enhance and facilitate assets tracing. Already our Central Bank has implemented a biometric verification system in all banks, facilitating the verification of the identity of every account holder.

8.6 The Code of Conduct Tribunal

Like the CCB, the CCT was established more than three decades ago. Its purpose was to adjudicate on breaches of the Code of Conduct by public officers, which were referred to it by the CCB. In the absence of a functioning CCB, the CCT too has been doomed to failure, applying its powers to impose sanctions – such as removal from office, bans from holding public office and the forfeiture of corruptly acquired property – only to minor cases.

8.7 The Nigeria Police

The Nigeria Police, like the police everywhere, are primarily tasked with maintaining law and order. Its involvement with corruption cases and financial crimes is peripheral except in cases like theft. But the potential for compromised anti- corruption operatives remains a problem across our public sector. And the police are no exception. Indeed, Transparency International, citing the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, stated that 92% of respondents in Nigeria felt that the police were corrupt. We are aware of this general perception of the Nigeria Police and we shall take steps for its reform.

8.8 The Judiciary

The other institution that is critical to our ability to successfully combat corruption is the adjudicating agency or the Judiciary. Yet our Judiciary itself is perceived to be corrupt. As in other areas, it’s a difficult allegation to prove. From their pronouncements, it’s clear that the leadership of the Judiciary is aware of this general perception. It cannot be swept under the carpet, especially given the odious nature of many decisions from the Bench. These include granting perpetual injunctions, restraining the police and anti-corruption agencies from investigating, arresting or prosecuting high-profile politicians and the other examples I have already cited.

Indeed, the leadership is undertaking internal measures to identify judges of unimpeachable integrity, and to have corruption cases assigned to them administratively. They are similarly making efforts to cleanse the system by identifying compromised judges for disciplinary measures, including retirement. The discipline of judges, however, is the responsibility of the National Judicial Council established by the Constitution. There have been observations about the Council’s composition, the mode of appointment to it and how to make it broader-based in representation. These are matters for the Judiciary to consider.

Finally, we are undertaking administrative measures in the following areas to strengthen our anti-corruption crusade more generally:

Addressing poor remuneration in the public service

Alongside our wider reforms of the public sector, we need to look into appropriate remuneration for some categories of civil servants. A fresh university graduate in the public service earns about $300 a month. Unfortunately, inflationary pressures and increases in the cost of living make corrupt ways of supplementing legitimate income more attractive.

Again, Lee Kuan Yew (2000) said that one of the ways he dealt with corruption in the public service was to drastically increase the salaries of the accounting officers, putting them almost on a par with similar heads of private sector organisations. While this isn’t an immediate possibility for us, given our current economic circumstances, we do propose to finance some increases in critical functions related to public service wages, using part of the freed-up funds gained from recovered looted assets, reductions in waste and the plugging of leaks. However, there may also be need for a downward review of the emoluments, allowances and entitlements of certain public officers.

Reforming the oil sector

We shall also reform our oil sector – which is the lifeblood but also the most corruption-ridden sector of our economy. To that end, we will:

• Publish quarterly audits of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
• End the opacity in the swapping of crude oil for refined products, which has created avenues for corruption.
• Improve internal refining capacity with a view to ending, in 2016, the clearly unsustainable 1 trillion Naira (N) subsidy on imported petroleum products.
• Engender transparency in the purchase of all refined products by publishing purchases and reconciling the amounts against consumption figures.
• Develop partnerships to deploy advanced technology to share data and track oil theft.
• Increase the participation of Nigeria in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Improving financial management

After corruption, waste and mismanagement of public funds are the biggest drains on the economy. Even before the present economic downturn, reducing them had become imperative. For years, recurrent expenditure had been at 70 - 80% of the national budget with emoluments of senior public officers being the major expenditure heads.

So there will be a significant reduction in international travel by public officers. We will ensure that public officers travel only when absolutely necessary and, when they do, there will be a restriction placed on classes of travel.

In addition, the Federal Ministry of Finance has now established an Efficiency Unit to monitor all ministries, departments and agencies. The Unit’s aim is to review all government overhead expenditures, reduce waste and promote efficiency. We shall also vigorously enforce the Public Procurement Act to ensure that due process is followed in government procurements (Bureau of Public Procurement 2012).

Following decades of a lack of oversight over government revenues, receipts and income flow, we have recently reverted to constitutionalism and consolidated all government accounts into a Treasury Single Account maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria. As a result, we are now in a position to monitor all receipts, expenditures and block leakages, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of government revenues, receipts and payments.

We will run a leaner Government, reducing the number of ministries and reviewing the proliferation of parastatals and agencies. Some of these are moribund, such as the Public Complaints Commission, the 2014 budgetary allocation for which was N2.927 billion – all of it was spent on salaries.

Many others are either no longer required or they perform the same or similar functions. These include the National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion, with its 2014 budget allocation of N466 million to boost locally generated technology. In the same vein, the Nigeria Information Technology Development Agency had a 2014 budget allocation of N339.01 million to develop information technology.

Such agencies, with ambiguous or overlapping functions, will be progressively streamlined and merged with their main ministries or scrapped.

I will conclude by reiterating that the immediate and long- term benefits of curbing corruption in Nigeria are pretty obvious to us. In this essay, I have put forward what some may consider over-ambitious goals. I believe in the adage that the journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step. I have the will to take this first step. And with sustained effort, we shall reach our target of freeing-up sufficient funds to accelerate the development of critical infrastructure such as railways, roads and power; invest in health and education consistent with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; pursue our social programmes such as skills acquisition and poverty alleviation; and create an enabling environment for the diversification of our economy, with investments in agriculture, solid minerals, petrochemicals and allied industries.

These outcomes will encourage local and foreign direct investments, job creation, and reductions in poverty, crime and insecurity. As Sarah Chayes has observed, “Corruption has helped fuel most of the serious crises the world has witnessed in the past decade. It swells the ranks of terrorist movements, weakens local opposition to them, facilitates their activities and hollows out militaries tasked with combating them. It sparks angry protests that can turn into revolutions with unknown second and third order effects such as those in the Arab world in 2011” (Kirkpatrick 2015).

It is therefore in our national interest, and that of the international community, to fight corruption not only within national boundaries but also globally, through concerted international action.

8.9 References

Bureau of Public Procurement. 2012. Bureau of Public Procurement. Available online .

Ezekwesili, O. 28 August 2012. Corruption, National Development, the Bar and the Judiciary. Abula: 52nd Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Nigerian Bar Association.

Federal Ministry of Justice. 2015. Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. Available online .

Greenspan, A. 24 September 2007. Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi Klein. Democracy Now! Available [online] (http://www.democracynow.org/2007/9/24/alan_greenspan_ vs_naomi_klein_on).

Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). 2016. The Establishment Act. Available [online] (http://icpc.gov.ng/the-establishment-act/).

International Centre of Nigerian Law (ICNL). 1999. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Available online

Kar, D. and Cartwright-Smith, D. 2010. Illicit Financial Flows From Africa: Hidden Resource for Development. Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity. Available [online] (http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/ gfi_africareport_web.pdf).

Kirkpatrick, J. 30 September 2015. Interview – Sarah Chayes. E-International Relations. Available [online] (http://www.e-ir.info/2015/09/30/interview-sarah-chayes/).

Transparency International. 2013. Global Corruption Barometer. Available [online] (http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013).

Transparency International. 2016. Corruption by Country – Nigeria. Available [online] (https://www.transparency.org/country/#NGA).

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). February 2015. Track it. Stop it. Get it: Report of the High Level Pane on Illicit Finance Flows from Africa. Africa: UNECA. Available [online] (http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/ iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf).

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015. Available [online] (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories. html).

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2016. UNODC’s Action against Corruption and Economic Crime. Available online .

US Department of Justice. 11 February 2009. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine. Available online .

US Department of Justice. 23 September 2015. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Available [online] (http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt- practices-act).

Wallis, W. 26 May 2015. Nigeria: The big oil fix. Financial Times. Available [online] (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be2a72de-f30f-11e4-a979- 00144feab7de.html#axzz3yeg9x1Nz)

World Bank. 12 January 2016. GDP per Capita: Nigeria and Singapore (1960–2014). Available [online] (https://goo.gl/LNl6ez).

Yew, L. K. 2000. From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965–2000. UK: Harper Collins.

9. President Ashraf Ghani: Driving corruption out of procurement

9.1 introduction.

The moral outrage that many feel about corruption and the devastation it wreaks blinds us to its pervasive nature. But it is imperative we recognise that, in a number of countries, corruption is not an aberration within an otherwise well- functioning system of public governance. It is part and parcel of the system itself – reinforced by the fragmented nature of these countries’ governments, producing predictable, self- perpetuating costs for national development.

If we’re to tackle corruption effectively, we must identify and understand the systemic drivers that enable corrupt practices to thrive and reproduce. This essay argues that corruption is, at its core, a failure of individual and institutional accountability that allows officials to divert public resources from their intended uses.

But if the problem to solve in a country like Afghanistan is a lack of accountability, the actions needed to change it must overcome the fact that the government institutions, which are expected to carry out the reforms, are themselves highly fragmented. Reforms from outside the system can make some progress, but fragmentation means that these reforms will always be partial and temporary. In fragmented systems, only strong, national political leadership can tackle corruption at its roots. This is because only the top political leadership can look across the different arenas and ministries where corruption happens, in order to provide an effective agenda for reform. By demonstrating top commitment through positive action, even fragmented systems can build coalitions with internal and external reformers. But somebody must open the door.

9.2 Classifying accountability

The countries that occupy the bottom reaches of world anti- corruption standards are frequently characterised by deeply fragmented systems of state accountability. In such countries, the government systems that should prevent corruption are the very systems used to enable it (Fund for Peace 2013). This includes core operations such as procurement, financial management, recruitment, audit, legislation and justice.

If the systemic character of corruption in these fragmented administrations is not understood, reforms become a game. Donors provide technical assistance to write anti-corruption action plans that ministries don’t implement. Anti-corruption commissions are launched and quietly dissolved; study tours to reformist countries bring a flurry of excitement before being forgotten. None of these exercises make a serious dent in the fundamental problem of institutionalised corruption, because they assume that corruption can be tackled by suppressing its symptoms and they thus fail to address its structural drivers. Although some sections of the government may indeed be committed to reform, frequently they are kept there for appearances only, not to achieve any actual progress in the fight against corruption.

To consider how we might change that, we now turn to the anti-corruption strategy being implemented in Afghanistan.

9.3 Reforming corruption in fragmented accountability systems: the case of Afghanistan

By any measure, Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt countries on earth. Fifty years of near constant conflict have destroyed both social and institutional controls. The flood of money that poured into the country for reconstruction after the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001 further fragmented and reduced its systems of accountability.

When the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan took office in October 2014, we were united in our commitment to bring an end to corruption and the impunity that surrounded it. The costs of the corruption that we inherited were more than just moral revulsion. They had significant effects on national development. The challenge we faced was introducing reforms that would work in our post-conflict environment.

The departure of the international forces between 2012 and 2014 meant that the large volumes of financial support that accompanied the troops came to a sudden end. Government and donors agreed that the apparatus of corruption that had formed around the allocation of aid funding meant that, without reform, it would be impossible to switch into a private sector led growth strategy. Endless bribery would keep Afghanistan uncompetitive and poor.

As a country threatened by both internal violence and external attacks, establishing the government’s legitimacy is vital to maintain social order. But a history of state corruption has undermined the citizenry’s belief that government courts could credibly dispense justice; that government police would provide order; and that government agencies would represent the public’s interests fairly, rather than just hand out licences to rich bidders (Asia Foundation 2014).

9.4 Diagnosing where corruption happens

Just as long-distance travellers benefit from having a well-defined roadmap to reach their destination, our anti-corruption strategy began by mapping out the landscape of corruption in Afghanistan. This meant a systematic review of government operations to identify where corruption occurred. We found that state-sponsored corruption was everywhere. Particular areas of concern were:

Land grabbing Whereas in traditional Afghan society and under Islamic law, clear property rights provide strong social protections, land grabbing in Afghanistan had turned property into a source of discord, distrust and exclusion. As a result of land grabs, the private sector was denied access to property for investment, while the poor were driven into substandard and insecure housing.

Government appointments People widely believe that appointments to the government are secured through patronage and payment. The Ministry of Finance informed the Cabinet that national revenue could be doubled if civil servants were not paying back the costs of their appointments.

Banking The Kabul Bank became the emblem for the looting of public resources. Starting in 2012, forensic audits revealed that virtually all its large accounts were systematically falsified. Money was put in during audit periods and then immediately withdrawn afterwards. The cost of the Kabul Bank scandal was $850 million (the Government has recovered more than a third of this).

Customs Afghanistan has always relied on customs fees. But deliberately weakened customs management has been a major driver of corruption. Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office records approximately $1.1 billion in imports from Pakistan – but statistics from Pakistan report $2.32 billion in exports to Afghanistan (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2015). Nor does the bribery stop at the border. Studies of transport routes reveal that over a 100-mile stretch there can be as many as 12 posts, each demanding bribes.

Natural resource exploitation Afghanistan is developing the early symptoms of the resource curse, the syndrome whereby rich natural resources, which could in principle make a poor country well off, instead end up becoming a locus for corruption and the capture of that natural wealth by small elites. The worst manifestation is in mining, where corrupt licensing and procurement produce rapacious and destructive mining practices.

Smuggling and narcotics As with the drug trade everywhere, regional and global networks make the illicit economy a significant driver of corruption. More recently, violent and dangerous narcotics smugglers have expanded their field of activity to cover human trafficking and control over irregular migration from Afghanistan to Eurasia.

9.5 Corruption, procurement and reform

There is no quick fix to end this type of systemic corruption. However, we can see some ways forward if we look beneath the surface of where corruption happens to the processes by which government can abet or control corruption.

In Afghanistan, instead of being the systems for government accountability, procurement, financial management, recruitment, audit, legislation and the administration of justice have become the drivers that explain how corruption persists. Within a fragmented system like this, a reformist government can only turn its commitment to reform into practical action if it rebuilds those systems from the inside out.

To demonstrate how that can work in practice, the remainder of this paper will explore the Afghan Government’s efforts to reform the procurement process.

At its most basic, public procurement is how the government uses competition to get the public the best value at the lowest cost. Reforming how governments go about buying goods and services may not seem an especially exciting place to start systems reform, especially when compared with high-profile prosecutions or investigative reporting and publication. But procurement lies at the heart of what governments ‘do’. Global estimates suggest that government procurement can account for between 10% and 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) (SELA 2015). And when public procurement is infected by corruption, the effect on government performance and value to the taxpayer is catastrophic.

Procurement in Afghanistan has traditionally exhibited all the symptoms of a fragmented and corrupt system of government accountability. Forensic reviews repeatedly show a systematic rigging of competitive bidding, usually through the inclusion of non-existent companies to give the appearance of competition when there is in fact none. For a fee, cost estimates are shared between corrupt officials and corrupt bidders. Rules to block conflicts of interest are routinely subverted by companies owned by the relatives of high-ranking officials whose only ‘business’ is to provide access.

Not all corruption in procurement takes place behind the scenes. Threats of violence, kidnapping and bribery are used to force legitimate competitors to withdraw or alter their bids. Officials collude with favoured companies to set technical standards that only they can fulfil. Corrupt practices do not end at contract negotiations. Manipulating procurement so that low-quality goods are delivered rather than the higher-quality supplies that were procured and invoiced is a pervasive practice that leads to collapsed infrastructure, massive overcharging and poor-quality services. Procurement therefore provides an acid test of whether the new Government’s commitments to bring about systemic change will really be backed by political will and structural change.

The two key reforms in the first stage of the Afghan Government’s strategy are the formation of a National Procurement Council (NPC) to review all high-value contracts and the consolidation of construction contracts through two specialised agencies.

Centralising procurement was not the only route to reform open to us, but it enabled us to tackle the structural issues that allowed corruption to thrive. Reforming corruption ministry by ministry was not only far beyond the limited capacities of the Government, but it would also have left untouched the underlying incentives that drove this corruption in the first place. Only through sustained top- level oversight to create the accountability needed, combined with technical expertise, could we ever hope to change the bureaucratic culture.

9.6 Building the machinery of reform

To underscore the top-level commitment of the national leadership to bring corruption to an end, the NPC is chaired by me, the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s chief executive officer, the second vice- president and the ministers for finance, economy and justice also attend the weekly council meeting. Such high-levelparticipation is needed not just to send a symbolic message to the country at large, but also to present a unified front to the entrenched interests within the government itself that will resist reforms.

We are supported by an Office of Procurement staffed by Afghans who have been trained in professional procurement and who have the specialised expertise needed to understand the details of bids. Because such a large share of the Afghan budget is spent on security, the Government also gets technical support from the NATO military command to help review military contracts.

Public transparency is built into the process. Our weekly procurement review meetings include a representative of Integrity Watch (an international non-governmental organisation [NGO]), the US’s special oversight expenditure review body (SIGAR) and a rotating member of the Afghan Parliament’s Caucus on Integrity. Minutes of our meetings and all decisions are placed on an updated, publicly accessible website (Government of Afghanistan 2016), and our team provides regular briefings for journalists, donors and the Afghan media. Transparency has enabled us to begin to build trust in government.

The first major test of our work came in the security sector. Civil society and whistle-blowers had made serious allegations over a $400 million fuel contract awarded by the outgoing Government’s Ministry of Defence. In response to these allegations, the bid was reopened. A preliminary review found credible evidence of malfeasance. We suspended the contract and appointed a high-level commission of inquiry to review this and an additional nine major fuel contracts. The commission’s report revealed widespread subversion of the law. Unfortunately, a response was not going to be as simple as suspending the contract and starting over. Continuing the contract would have meant accepting the corruption. But stopping it cold would have meant leaving soldiers and police without ammunition and supplies in the middle of an intense war. This is a strong example of how corruption in procurement can have detrimental consequences for national security and the safety of our people. Given this dilemma, what were we to do?

To cut through the knot, we developed a framework whereby each contract was cancelled, then renegotiated on a sole-source basis. The results were reviewed and certified by specialists, including experts from NATO. The NPC then re-examined each case to confirm that the results met procedural and value-for-money standards, and the results were placed on its public website.

The same framework is now being applied to the Ministry of Interior. Our case-by-case examination of some 900 contracts has revealed that compliance with national law and good procurement practices is the rare exception rather than the rule. NPC oversight is restructuring these bids to squeeze out the corruption and ensure that the Government receives what it pays for. Our best estimates are that this system has saved the Government at least $350 million in its first year of operation.

Presidential hands-on management of the national procurement authority is meant to send the message to our people of the Government’s commitment to reform. But it is also a temporary measure, triggered by the need to restore credibility. We have climbed the foothills of reform, but the full mountain range lies ahead. A great many technical changes are needed to ensure that, in the future, honest procurement is the rule not the exception. Now that the political door has been opened to reform, internal and external reformers can embed a great many more changes across other government operations such as publishing contracts, benchmarking bids against known unit costs and reviewing procurement rules.

Better oversight and detailed reviews of processes can address corruption when and where it occurs, but it will not change the underlying structures that enable it. For that to happen, we must make the entire government system invulnerable to exploitation and manipulation. This is a significant challenge for us. Tackling the reform of large-scale procurement is technically complex. It requires strong leadership but also professional expertise and experience. Furthermore, the structure of aid partnerships in Afghanistan has meant that each ministry has built up its own project- financed wing for procurement and construction – another example of how fragmentation allows corruption to emerge.

Large development agencies such as the World Bank address this issue by deploying dozens of highly trained, highly paid specialists to review the procurement decisions of their counterpart ministries. Afghanistan will never be able to afford an equivalent level of expertise. We need an entirely different model of how procurement happens.

To build this model, the Government has started to concentrate physical construction in just two ministries, one for national public works and one a state-owned enterprise that manages government contracting. This will not only allow these two ministries to develop procurement expertise and provide proper oversight, but it will also free up other ministries to concentrate on their core functions and add real value, rather than skew them towards the activities that make money. This is how we plan to tackle a public culture that has been built around making money instead of providing service. For example, the education ministry can improve the quality of teachers and student learning instead of lobbying for more school construction. The health ministry can focus on reducing Afghanistan’s appalling maternal mortality rates rather than dreaming about building ever more clinics that lack trained staff and proper supplies.

9.7 Complementary reforms

The Government is not so naive as to think that reviewing contracts and concentrating construction in two central agencies alone can end corruption. Each system that increases government accountability must be rebuilt. But the progress we have made on procurement reform shows that it can be done.

What comes next? Even with improved planning, clearer rules and heightened oversight, corruption will keep occurring until the likelihood of punishment reaches a level that makes officials decide that it is no longer worth the risk.

Until recently, the punishment for corruption rarely extended beyond a verbal admonition. Fiduciary oversight was in any case largely left to the donor agencies. Our next task then is to make sure that punishments fit the crimes: reform must move to the courts, the judges, the police and the prosecutors.

Here we can frankly admit that progress is slower than we expected. The Government has not been able to move as quickly on justice sector reform as it would have liked. Justice reform is particularly difficult, because a balance must be struck between maintaining the independence of the judiciary and finding ways to reform what itself has become a core driver of institutionalised corruption.

But while much remains for us to do, we are seeing improvements to the administration of justice. Government’s actions are beginning to end the regime of impunity that protected high-level culprits. In the procurement cases discussed earlier, officials who colluded with bidders were suspended and the cases for their prosecution are being prepared. Personnel actions are similarly being used to transfer officials away from positions susceptible to bribery. Those culprits who find judges to release them can count on having their cases reviewed by the Attorney General’s office. But accelerating the pace of justice sector reform is clearly the Government’s next frontier.

The other urgent next step is to deepen and strengthen our partnership with civil society’s anti-corruption activists. Our experience shows that, to have any real chance of success fighting corruption in a post-conflict society, top- level engagement and strong accountability are needed to signal that the necessary local and national will to fight corruption exists. The more that Afghanistan’s people believe that the Government is taking reform seriously, the more the Government can count on whistle-blowers and an investigative media to end the atmosphere of impunity on which a culture of corruption thrives.

Over time, more and more ministry decisions and actions on budgets, contracts and expenditures will be made public and actively disseminated through traditional and modern media. Accepting citizen feedback and monitoring must become a core part of how the government conducts its business. As with procurement, top-level leadership is needed to crack open bureaucratic resistance, after which internal and external reformers can push forward a corruption reform programme of actions. But that first step remains critical.

9.8 Conclusions

This paper has argued an approach for how states can achieve transformational change in the fight against corruption, using procurement in Afghanistan as an example.

Firstly, it shows how top-level political commitment, an electoral mandate to end corruption and government actions can together enable a series of practical actions to bring about national level reform. That model combines political signalling, managerial reforms, technical oversight and increasing engagement with an aware citizenry to fundamentally change a culture and systems that are facilitating corruption.

Secondly, it details how successful high-level reform strategies need to begin with the understanding that corruption is not a phenomenon in and of itself, but the result of fragmented regimes that lack accountability. During the war in Afghanistan, responsibility for unprecedentedly large amounts of money fell to diverse control systems, none of which had the capacity or reach to compensate for the lack of state-managed oversight. Overcoming fragmentation could only begin from the top.

This is not the only route that countries can follow. But the Afghan Government’s procurement reforms offer many valuable lessons for how to bring an end to corruption in development. Procurement everywhere accounts for a very large share of government expenditure, but in post- conflict or post-disaster countries there will always be a sudden surge of new procurement into systems without the experience to manage it. Fragmentation is built into the reconstruction process. Properly managed reform, with high- level oversight, closes down opportunities for corruption and aligns procurement designs with the institutional capacities needed to control corruption.

Procurement is especially interesting, because it is an area where governments must have the political acumen and will to navigate the trade-offs that reform will entail. Governments cannot just stop procurement while they fix the system. As the Afghan case study shows, simply stopping the procurement of obviously flawed fuel contracts in the middle of a war would have meant losing the war. But, because the governance structures were in place to allow for a sufficiently senior level of decision making, an alternative arrangement could be developed.

Afghanistan has only just started implementing the fully fledged reform needed to root out corruption. It took decades to build up a system that systematised corruption at every level. It will be many years before the Government can claim success. But the strategy and roadmap for reform are clear, and the first round of hurdles has already been passed.

Government corruption has driven a three-decades-old conflict. Corruption has blocked Afghanistan from being self-reliant and free. And corruption has wasted a vast amount of precious resources that could otherwise have been spent reducing Afghanistan’s crushing levels of poverty. Afghanistan’s citizens voted for a Government that would have the courage and commitment to break the cycle of corruption. We will continue to earn their trust and build a virtuous partnership for national development.

9.9 References

Asia Foundation. 2014. A Survey of the Afghan People. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. Available online

Fund for Peace. 2013. Fragile States Index. Washington DC: FFP Publications. Available online

Government of Afghanistan. 2016. Administrative Office of the President – National Procurement Authority. Available online

Observatory of Economic Complexity. December 2015. Country profile: Afghanistan. Available online

SELA. 2015. Public Procurement as a Tool for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Caracas: SELA.

10. Prime Minister John Key: New Zealand: a culture of fair play

It says a lot about the New Zealand psyche that one of the most notorious acts in our sporting history involved an underarm cricket delivery.

New Zealand needed six from the last ball to tie a 1981 one-day match against Australia when Trevor Chappell strode to the crease and rolled the ball down the pitch.

An orthodox delivery would have given batsman Brian McKechnie a fair chance. The underarm version did not. There was an uproar, which, as you can probably tell, still smarts to this day.

The reaction might have been outsized, and I have no doubt Chappell is sick of hearing about it, but it was telling.

The ploy went against one of the most intrinsic aspects of our national character – a sense that we all deserve a fair crack and that we must do what is right.

It is ingrained in our psyche – we are a fundamentally honest people.

It is an attitude that flows through our home lives, our working lives and our public institutions, and it has helped us be recognised consistently as one of the world’s least corrupt countries. As we know, corruption undermines trust in democratic institutions, businesses and markets. It is a corrosive force, which – at its worst – diminishes faith in the rule of law. All of this impacts on economic and social development, distorting the playing field, making it harder for fair-minded people to prosper and for a country to support its most vulnerable.

New Zealand is uniquely placed to protect itself from corruption and to work with its neighbours to combat it in their countries. We are a multicultural, outward-looking trading nation of just 4.5 million people, a long way from the markets where we sell our goods and services, and reliant on the rule of law in the places we sell them to. In order to prosper, we have always needed not just to be good at what we do but also to be honest in how we do it.

10.1 Our constitutional arrangements

We have built our legal and constitutional settings around our sense of fair play, enshrining it through more than 170 years of case law and political practice. So, while it is based on the Westminster system, our unwritten constitution has evolved in a pragmatic way. We tend to fix things when they need fixing, ‘without necessarily relating them to any grand philosophical scheme’ (Constitution Arrangements Committee 2005). And there is a strong sense that it operates effectively because of our sense of fairness. A good example of that is our ongoing recognition of the historical injustices perpetrated on Māori by the Crown through land seizures, Treaty of Waitangi breaches and other injustices (Ministry of Justice 2016a).

The Treaty of Waitangi is a founding document of New Zealand. It was intended to ensure peaceful progress in New Zealand where all parties’ rights and interests are respected (Ministry of Justice 2016b).

But the Treaty was not always honoured by the Crown. Successive governments have endeavoured to acknowledge those injustices through the return of land and resources, and through the delivery of apologies on behalf of the Crown.

Today this process takes place largely with near-universal public and political support, because it is the right thing to do.

It is this same embedded sense of fair play that makes it difficult for corruption to take hold in New Zealand. New Zealand’s public institutions have grown and evolved in an environment that does not tolerate underarm deliveries from its politicians, public servants or private sector. As Prime Minister, I am particularly well aware of that. I am regularly held to account not just in Parliament and in the media, but by everyday New Zealanders who are never shy to tell me of any issue that they have with my Government’s performance. That is how it should be.

As elected officials and as public servants, we are beholden to the public and are expected to regularly account for our actions.

New Zealand’s highly professional public service is expected to act in accordance with the law, to be imbued with the spirit of service to the community and to give free and frank advice to ministers.

The public service is politically neutral. That neutrality means that the Government, Parliament and the public can trust advice given by officials. Merit-based appointments, made on the recommendation of the State Services Commissioner, help ensure that senior public servants do not owe their jobs and their loyalty to any politician or political party. This culture, which has been enshrined in law, ensures that even as governments and ministers change, a professional body of experts is always on hand to deliver on the agenda of the elected government.

10.2 Scrutiny of government action

As is often said, the best disinfectant is sunlight. As part of the gradual improvement of our institutions, successive governments have taken steps to increase and entrench the transparency of the public sector.

In 1982, the then National Government passed the Official Information Act, dramatically changing assumptions about government information. The law means that ministers and officials have to provide any official information requested unless there is a compelling reason not to (Ministry of Justice 2015a). While there is always a degree of tension about where the line should be drawn, the oversight of the Office of the Ombudsman ensures that openness is maintained. (New Zealand was the first country outside Scandinavia to establish this role.)

Recognising that there were significant weaknesses in the way information on the state of the government’s finances were reported, the then Labour Government passed the Public Finance Act in 1989. This requires government to operate transparently and provide regular public reporting of its accounts (Ministry of Justice 2015b). For the past 25 years, this legislation has ensured that governments present an accurate picture of the public finances and the fiscal consequences of their policies.

As Prime Minister, I have taken steps to ensure greater transparency by, for example, proactively publishing details of spending on ministerial credit cards. Ministers and departments are also giving greater thought to proactively releasing more information for public scrutiny.

New Zealand has a range of independent bodies set up to audit and deal with allegations of corruption and misconduct. The Independent Police Complaints Authority (IPCA), the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (JCC) and the Office of the Ombudsman all have broad powers to investigate and report on the conduct of public officials. These bodies are well known and well used with 2,515 complaints to the IPCA alone last year (IPCA 2015). This independent oversight helps maintain public trust in our institutions, with 78% of New Zealanders surveyed reporting that they have trust and confidence in the police (Gravitas 2015).

Serious and complex allegations of corruption in the public or private sector are investigated by a specialist group called the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). The Director of the SFO has complete independence when it comes to operational decisions, while the SFO and New Zealand Police work closely together in the fight against fraud and corruption, and ensure that specialist knowledge and expertise can be used and information shared.

The police and SFO are further enabled by legislation, which ensures that all of New Zealand’s bribery and corruption offences apply both domestically and extra- territorially (Ministry of Justice 2013). This means that the SFO can bring a case against New Zealand citizens, residents and companies for acts of bribery and corruption that occur wholly outside of New Zealand.

Another important aspect is a free and independent press. As Prime Minister, I front the media almost every day, sometimes several times, on issues of the day. Questions will range from the performance of my Executive and MPs, to New Zealand’s position on international affairs and domestic policy, to what I had for breakfast.

My Government is well aware of the importance of fronting up, and of the fact that our media and the public would expect nothing less. They demand accountability and answers.

The upshot is that I, along with other ministers, am forced to defend every decision and mistake we make and every dollar we choose to spend or save.

Colleagues and staff are aware of what is expected of me and I have no doubt that they have no interest in seeing the Prime Minister having to defend an issue that they have caused.

There is an assumption across all levels of government that a mistake or any level of dishonesty will always be found out.

While mistakes happen and will usually be forgiven by reasonable people, corruption and cover-ups are never tolerated.

10.3 New Zealand’s support for anti-corruption in the Pacific region

Given the clear benefits that a low-corruption environment can have on economic growth and quality of governance, fighting corruption has been a key plank of New Zealand’s international development policies. As the only country outside northern Europe to regularly feature at the top of Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), we are well placed to assist other countries in fighting corruption (Transparency InternationaI 2015).

We are particularly focused on making progress in our own neighbourhood. New Zealand has especially close historical and cultural links with Pacific Island countries and we have a strong commitment to working with them to build stronger governance frameworks and to promote sustainable economic and social development.

While auditing doesn’t sound like a glamorous nation- building activity, it is a critical part of ensuring that governments are spending public money responsibly and effectively. New Zealand is working with Pacific Island countries to ensure that they complete regular and timely financial audits of public accounts to help improve transparency and accountability. The number of audits completed in Pacific Island countries over the past five years has more than doubled (PASAI 2015).

Promoting the importance of accountability in the eyes of the public has led to growing awareness of the role of auditing in holding government institutions to account. More public office holders are being held to account for their misconduct and misuse of public funds (PASAI 2015).

A high standard of public accountability is a critical element in preventing a culture of corruption from developing or taking hold. As we know from our own experience, when the public won’t tolerate corruption and have an expectation that their officials will be held to account, those in positions of power are less likely to abuse it. So the higher the standard of probity and accountability that figures in authority are held to, the more likely we are to prevent corruption and to detect and prosecute it when it occurs.

10.4 Public financial management

Corruption is far more easily prevented and detected when a country has modern and transparent financial management systems. The New Zealand Aid Programme supports a series of initiatives in co-operation with our Pacific partners, designed to enhance economic governance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015a). That work is helping to strengthen border management systems and levels of accountability in a key area of revenue collection (Oceania Customs Organisation Secretariat 2016).

New Zealand also provides support to Samoa, Kiribati and the Cook Islands, linked to reforms including improvements to public finance systems, better public procurement, stronger and more independent audit, and greater accountability and oversight of state-owned enterprises. Further support has assisted Samoa and the Solomon Islands to reform and modernise their revenue systems (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015b).

Together with Australia, we have also provided joint funding for the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance to boost the effectiveness of Pacific Island Ombudsman offices. This has increased their ability to investigate complaints of maladministration by those in the public sector (Walter and Gordon 2013).

Pacific leaders also recognise the crucial role that civil society has to play in fighting corruption with advocacy, education and community-focused outreach. For close to a decade, the New Zealand Aid Programme has provided support to TI chapters in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Our support has focused on efforts to improve the culture of transparency through initiatives such as ethics training for law enforcement agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015a).

10.5 The justice system

Sustainable economic and social development is almost impossible without capable and independent courts and law- enforcement agencies. These give people confidence that the law is enforced fairly and free from political influence. Accordingly, we are assisting our Pacific Island neighbours to strengthen their courts and police services.

Five years ago, we began supporting the Pacific Judicial Development Programme (PJDP) with Australia. This is focused on strengthening the professional competence of Pacific Island judicial officers and the court systems they use (PJDP 2015).

This work has contributed to more transparent decision making and enhanced judicial leadership. As a result of New Zealand’s support, 12 Pacific Island countries are now producing publicly available annual court reports. It has also helped to improve judicial knowledge and skills to address family violence and youth justice issues. New Zealand provides ongoing mentoring for Pacific judges, and funding to attend judicial conferences and other training opportunities through the Judicial Pacific Participation Fund (JPPF) activity (JPPF 2016).

New Zealand also sends a number of its own judges on request to preside in courts across the Pacific – for instance, in Vanuatu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016).

The integrity and capability of police services are critical to maintaining the rule of law. The overwhelming majority of New Zealanders have tremendous respect for our police because we know they can be trusted to treat us fairly and in accordance with the law. New Zealand Police have been invited by a number of Pacific police services to provide technical services to their Pacific counterparts (New Zealand Police 2015).

New Zealand Police provide training and mentoring across the Pacific in prosecutions, community policing, human rights, ethics, leadership and road policing. These kinds of interventions build public trust in the police and add to a culture of service, which is the front line against corruption (New Zealand Police 2015).

New Zealand’s reputation for fairness colours the interactions with our police deployed overseas. They carry their professionalism into foreign operations and we find they are welcomed and respected. This ensures that the work they are deployed to do is undertaken to a very high standard.

10.6 Staying ahead of corruption

As a country with solid anti-corruption foundations and a long history of assisting our neighbours in building their own anti-corruption capacity, the most significant risk we face is complacency. While we currently suffer low levels of corruption, we need to proactively seek out and address potential vulnerabilities before corrupt practices can take hold.

With that in mind, in 2014, the Government moved to address a weakness in our companies’ registration laws. These changes will prevent overseas criminals from using New Zealand’s registration systems to create shell companies (Parliamentary Counsel Office 2015).

We also draw on the expertise of civil society and the private sector in the fight against corruption. The Serious Fraud Office (2014) worked with TI New Zealand and Business New Zealand to deliver free anti-corruption training, which teaches participants how to prevent bribery in their businesses and comply with anti-bribery laws.

Recognising the importance of sport in our culture and the huge scope for corrupt sporting practices, we passed a law in 2014 to specifically criminalise match-fixing (New Zealand Parliament 2014). The new law provides that manipulation of sporting activities with intent to influence a betting outcome is a criminal activity. Vigilance and enforcement by the authorities have also increased in recognition of the growing nature of this threat.

10.7 Conclusion

Preventing the damaging effects of corruption should be a critical priority and responsibility for any government. Politicians and public servants have to focus on building and maintaining strong, independent institutions to guard against corruption, as well as promoting a culture that makes it close to impossible for corrupt individuals to prosper or escape detection.

As a country, we take great pride in our track record. But we know we must remain committed to ensuring that corruption does not gain a foothold, and open to views on how to prevent it. As a small part of an increasingly connected international community, we must be open to sharing our successes and our failures in order to stamp out corruption for good.

10.8 References

Constitutional Arrangements Committee. 2005. Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional Arrangements: Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee. Wellington: New Zealand House of Representatives, p.12.

Gravitas Research and Strategy Ltd. 2015 (updated 2016). New Zealand Police Citizens’ Satisfaction Survey. New Zealand: Gravitas, p.4. Available online .

Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA). 2015. Annual Report 2014–2015. Wellington: IPCA, p.4. Available online .

Judicial Pacific Participation Fund. 2016. Welcome to the Judicial Pacific Participation Fund. Available [online] (http://jppf.org.nz/welcome/).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2015a. New Zealand Aid Programme Strategic Plan 2015–19. Available online .

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2015b. New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade – Annual Report 2014–15. Available online .

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2016. Aid Partnership with Vanuatu. Available [online] (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our- work-in-the-pacific/vanuatu/).

Ministry of Justice. 2013. Relevant Anti-corruption Legislation. Available [online] (http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global- publications/s/saying-no-to-bribery-and-corruption- 2013-a-guide-for-new-zealand-businesses/relevant-anti- corruption-legislation).

Ministry of Justice. 2015a. Official Information Act 1982. Available online .

Ministry of Justice. 2015b. Public Finance Act 1989. Available online .

Ministry of Justice. 2016a. Waitangi Tribunal. Available online .

Ministry of Justice. 2016b. The Treaty of Waitangi. Waitangi Tribunal. Available [online] (http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-tribunal/ treaty-of-waitangi).

New Zealand Parliament. 2014. Crimes (Match-fixing) Amendment Bill. Available online .

New Zealand Police. 2015. International Service Group. Available online .

Oceania Customs Organisation Secretariat. 2016. Oceania Customs Organisation Secretariat. Available [online] (http://www.ocosec.org/).

Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (PASAI). 2015. Annual Report for Year Ended 30 June 2015. Available online .

Pacific Judicial Development Programme (PJDP). 2015. The Programme. Available online .

Parliamentary Counsel Office. 2015. Companies Amendment Act 2014. Available [online] (http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0046/latest/ DLM4094913.html).

Serious Fraud Office. 10 June 2014. Helping New Zealand’s Fight Against Corruption. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Available online .

Walter, G. and Gordon, J. 2013. Independent Review of the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance. Available [online] (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our-approach-to-aid/evaluation-and-research/evaluation- reports-2013).

11. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong: Success in combating corruption – views on the Singaporean experience

Corruption is a scourge that can never be tolerated. Countries have tried all ways to combat it. They create anti-corruption agencies. They pass strong laws. They promulgate codes of conduct for public officials. Companies pledge to conduct business cleanly. Yet often corruption remains endemic, a cancer in the society. How then has Singapore achieved some measure of success in eradicating corruption? I put it down to four factors.

First, we inherited a clean and working system from the British colonial government. We had many compelling reasons to want to end colonial rule and to be masters of our own destiny. But to their credit, the British left Singapore with a working system and sound institutions – English laws, a working Civil Service, and an efficient and honest judiciary. Importantly, the Colonial Service officers upheld high standards. People like Sir William Goode, our last Governor and first Head of State, had a sense of duty and stewardship. After Singapore, Goode served as Governor of North Borneo, now the state of Sabah in Malaysia. He left an impression in North Borneo, as in Singapore. Even a generation later, the people of Sabah still remembered him fondly.

Second, when the British left, our pioneer leaders were determined to keep the system clean. The People’s Action Party (PAP) first came to power in 1959, when Singapore attained self-government. However, it was by no means a no- brainer for the PAP to fight to win the 1959 General Election.

The country faced a myriad of problems: poverty, poor public health, an acute housing shortage, a stagnant economy and an exploding population. Did the PAP want to inherit these overwhelming problems? Why not become a strong opposition party, and let another party govern and fail?

In the end, what decided the issue for Mr Lee Kuan Yew, our founding Prime Minister, and his team, was the overriding need to prevent the public service from going corrupt. One term of an incompetent, corrupt government and Humpty Dumpty could never be put together again. So the PAP fought to win and formed the Government. When they took their oath of office, Mr Lee and his PAP colleagues wore white shirts and white trousers. It symbolised their determination to keep the Government clean and incorruptible. That set the tone for Singapore ever since.

Third, with strong political will, we institutionalised a robust, comprehensive anti-corruption framework that spans laws, enforcement, the public service and public outreach. We enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), which puts the burden of proof on the accused to show that he or she acquired their wealth legally. Any unexplained wealth disproportionate to known sources of income is presumed to be from graft and can be confiscated.

The PCA provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction, so that the actions of Singaporean citizens overseas are treated the same as actions committed in Singapore, regardless of whether such corrupt acts have consequences for Singapore (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2016a).

Our anti-corruption agency, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), is well resourced and independent. It is empowered to investigate any person, even police officers and ministers, and conducts public outreach to raise public awareness and shape social norms (CPIB 2016b). We pay public servants fair and realistic wages benchmarked to private sector earnings and, in return, demand the highest standards of integrity and performance.

Fourth, we have over time developed a society and culture that eschews corruption. Singaporeans expect and demand a clean system. They do not condone giving or accepting ‘social lubricants’ to get things done. They readily report corrupt practices when they encounter them. Singaporeans trust that the law applies to all and that the Government will enforce the laws without fear or favour, even when it may be awkward or embarrassing. Businesses have confidence that, in Singapore, rules are transparent and fairly applied. The story is told of a businessman who visited Singapore from an Asian country used to different operating norms. He left puzzled and disturbed that he could not discover the going rate for bribes to officers at different levels of government. He concluded wrongly that the prices must be very high!

Singapore has achieved some success eradicating corruption, but we are under no illusions that we have permanently and completely solved the problem. Corruption is driven by human nature and greed. However strict the rules and tight the system, some individuals will sometimes still be tempted to transgress. When they do, we make sure they are caught and severely dealt with. Two years ago, we charged an Assistant Director from the CPIB itself with misappropriating (S)$1.7 million.

We keep our system clean not just for ourselves, but also to uphold our international reputation. Thus we deal strictly also with those who use financial institutions in Singapore to launder money or transact ill-gotten gains from corruption.

We are zealous in protecting the integrity of our financial centre and business hub.

There is a Chinese proverb: ‘If the top beam is askew, the bottom beams will be crooked.’ Keeping a system clean must start at the very top. A Singapore armed forces officer, on a course overseas, was once asked by his classmate how Singapore kept its system clean. He explained our arrangements and the central role of the CPIB. His classmate asked a follow-up question: but to whom does the CPIB report? The Singaporean ingenuously replied that the CPIB reported directly to the prime minister. This elicited further puzzlement. Much later the Singaporean understood why. The real question he was being asked was, who guards the guardian?

There is no formula to solve this ancient riddle, but we are determined to uphold the highest standards of integrity from the top level of the Government down. In 1996, rumours spread that Mr Lee Kuan Yew and I had received improper discounts on property purchases. The Prime Minister, then Mr Goh Chok Tong, ordered a full investigation, which found that there had been nothing improper. He brought the issue to Parliament, which held a full debate lasting three days (Parliament of Singapore 1996).

Both Mr Lee and I spoke. In his statement Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, “I take pride and satisfaction that the question of my two purchases and those of the Deputy Prime Minister, my son, has been subjected to, and not exempted from, scrutiny … It is most important that Singapore remain a place where no one is above scrutiny, that any question of integrity of a minister, however senior, that he has gained benefits either through influence or corrupt practices, be investigated” (National Archives of Singapore 1996).

Trust is slow to build, but fast to lose. We have spent more than 50 years building up confidence in Singapore. The integrity of the Government, the system and the men and women in charge has been key to Singapore’s success. We are determined that that integrity and reputation must never be undermined and will long remain a competitive edge and a source of pride for Singapore.

11.1 References

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). 2016a. Prevention of Corruption Act, Singapore. Available online .

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). 2016b. About CPIB. Available online .

National Archives of Singapore. 21 May 1996. Statement by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew Nassim Jade and Scotts 28. Available online .

Parliament of Singapore. 21–23 May 1996. Purchase of Properties by Senior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister BG Lee Hsien Loong (Statement by the Prime Minister). Available online .

12. Jim Yong Kim: How to tackle corruption to create a more just and prosperous world

Corruption poses an enormous obstacle to international development and the global goal of ending extreme poverty. [footnote 21] Using public power for private gain is also unjust. It denies resources to the poor, undermines the delivery of services to the vulnerable and weakens the social contract, leading to exclusion, instability and conflict. I am committed to fighting corruption, because it is the right thing to do and because it is critical to achieving the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity for the poorest 40%.

More than 50 years of development experience has taught us that we can achieve these targets through inclusive growth, investing in people’s health and education and insuring them against risks, such as unemployment or illness, which threaten to plunge them into poverty. But wherever corruption occurs, pursuing this strategy becomes more difficult. In the Philippines, for example, corruption prevented the construction of high-quality roads in some areas, making it harder for goods to get to market and harming growth, incomes and job creation (World Bank 2011; Procurement Watch 2009). In Sierra Leone, it stopped some mothers from immunising their infant children, because nurses demanded rice in exchange for ‘free’ shots (World Bank 2012). In India, many poor people received less financial support from workfare initiatives because officials pocketed the proceeds (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2014).

Some countries have experienced growing inequality and lost billions of dollars for public services because of corruption, undermining their very foundations. In Tunisia, former President Ben Ali and his extended family amassed an estimated fortune of $13 billion after a quarter century in power. This amounted to more than a quarter of Tunisian gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, the year he stepped down in response to mass protests. There were also 220 domestic companies – responsible for at least 21% of the country’s net private sector profits – connected to the family of the President, who had enacted regulations that gave them unfair economic advantages (Rijkers, Freund and Nucifora 2011).

During my tenure at the World Bank Group, I have seen that corruption affects countries regardless of development status and is often an international operation. According to some estimates, businesses and individuals pay between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion in bribes alone each year (Kaufmann 2015). This is about ten times the value of overseas development assistance or approximately 2% of global GDP. Both domestic firms and multinational corporations make payoffs to public officials in exchange for access to commercial opportunities.

The World Bank Group and others have dedicated substantial effort to understanding and monitoring corruption, and developing experience and knowledge of how to tackle the problem. In 1996, at our annual meetings, one of my predecessors, James D. Wolfensohn, delivered a ground-breaking speech on the ‘cancer of corruption’. He seized the opportunity to take on an obstacle to reducing poverty that we, and others, had largely failed to address (Wolfensohn 1996).

Since that time, the World Bank has taken a new approach. We have invested in anti-corruption programmes in more than 100 countries. In 2007, we adopted an organisation-wide governance and anti-corruption strategy, which we updated in 2012. Today our global practices for Governance, and Finance and Markets, as well as our independent integrity group, spearhead work to share with clients our knowledge and experience in fighting corruption, though all parts of the organisation take responsibility for fighting misconduct.

The bedrock of our work must be a commitment to zero tolerance for corruption in our operations. Last year, the World Bank Group committed grants and loans amounting to approximately $56 billion to support projects, programmes and policies critical to reducing poverty and inequality in developing countries. Close scrutiny of how these funds are spent and sanctions for their misuse are critical to ensuring that corruption does not undermine the intended outcome, whether it is raising farmers’ crop yields or improving students’ reading, writing and arithmetic skills.

Working with developing countries, we assess project and loan plans for corruption risk, closely supervise activities and build in monitoring mechanisms, including hotlines to report misconduct. When alleged wrongdoing takes place, our independent integrity group investigates and takes vigorous action if it confirms corruption. We have excluded firms and individuals that engaged in misconduct from receiving contracts that we financed and compelled the return of misused financial support and the cancellation of contracts associated with tainted transactions.

Last year, these efforts rooted out misconduct in connection with 61 projects worth more than $500 million (World Bank 2015). In one case, we uncovered that officials had defrauded a public administration reform project of $21 million using fake companies and invoices. Our investigation has led to the recovery of stolen funds and the Government’s prosecution of its officials. Even with these successes, we understand that fighting corruption requires constant vigilance and that misconduct takes many forms and adapts to new opportunities.

Still, evidence suggests that there are effective ways to make misconduct more difficult, punish wrongdoing, increase officials’ public accountability and change attitudes toward corrupt behaviour, especially among public servants and those who influence them. These actions, which I outline below, are helping countries make critical development strides, including building better roads, improving access to education and medicine, and providing the poor with sufficient support from social safety nets.

12.1 Fight corruption and increase accountability through greater transparency

Experience shows that providing citizens with access to information about government operations and public servants’ assets can be an effective way to prevent officials from abusing their power when avenues exist to make authorities answerable to the public. In 1997, the Ugandan Government found that schools did not receive 80% of their allocated funding because local officials diverted the support. Officials responded by publishing in local newspapers each school’s allocation, empowering administrators and parents to demand that these transfers reach their schools. By 2001, schools reported receiving 80% of these allocations. A subsequent study concluded that the amount of funds that local officials diverted correlated to the distance of a school from a major town where there was a newspaper outlet (Reinikka and Svensson 2011).

Making transparent the flow of royalties and other financial transactions between governments and corporations can also reduce corruption, especially in oil, gas and mining operations. There are 31 countries, including many in Sub-Saharan Africa, that disclose all payments and receipts from oil, gas and mining operations as part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). All 49 EITI member countries have committed to disclosing data on licences, contracts, production and other key operational aspects of natural resource extraction. The information that EITI distributes enables citizens and good government groups to monitor authorities’ relationships with extractive companies and hold officials accountable. In Nigeria, information that EITI published showed billions of dollars in underpayments by companies and their agents, sparking government efforts to recover missing funds to bolster public finances (EITI 2014).

Disclosing information in connection with EITI has correlated with reduced perceptions of corruption among businesses in several countries, including Peru, where indicators for abuses of public power dropped by 14%. Greater confidence in good governance makes companies more likely to undertake the long-term investments necessary for natural resource extraction, suggesting that transparency contributes to economic growth, job creation and higher incomes.

12.2 Use new technologies to increase scrutiny

Evidence suggests that new, inexpensive ways of verifying identities and executing payments using digital technology can reduce the impact of corruption on public service delivery to the poorest. In India, for example, some of its large social welfare programmes suffered from ineligible beneficiaries receiving payments and officials taking a cut of, or delaying, payments meant for the poor. To combat these problems, the government distributed smartcards based on the country’s biometric identification system to 19 million needy villagers in connection with the $5.5 billion National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. This substantially reduced the role of officials in the payment process, lessening the opportunities for misconduct. After two years, research showed that, when compared to other programme beneficiaries, smartcard recipients received 35% more money and obtained payments almost 30% faster (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2014).

Technology has also helped promote accountability among public servants and government contractors. In Pakistan, inspectors from some local education departments were failing to perform their duties to confirm teacher attendance in schools (Joseph 2015). Now they must take geo-tagged pictures of themselves on the job, which has proved to be an effective way to hold the inspectors accountable for countering instructor absenteeism. Rates of teacher attendance – above 93% in 2015 – have increased every year since the programme began and school-monitoring information is available to the public at http://open.punjab. gov.pk/schools .

In Mindanao, a conflict-riddled region of the Philippines, geo-spatial tracking and digital photography have contributed to timely construction of roads (Sta Ines 2014). Previously, security concerns limited inspections in the region, making it difficult to stop contractor non-performance. But now data and evidence of road construction in the Philippines is publicly available at www.openroads.gov.ph. Transportation infrastructure has improved, promoting the distribution of goods and economic activity.

12.3 Get citizens and companies involved

Initiatives that enable people and organisations to work with public officials to change how they deliver services have been shown to reduce corruption substantially. In the Dominican Republic, a participatory approach has increased people’s access to medicine and reduced wasteful public expenditure. Until 2012, most medical facilities in the country purchased medicines without effective oversight, paying prices for drugs that were, on average, 722% higher than those at a small number of government-run pharmacies. Patients were forced to absorb these high costs, because medicine buyers were receiving kickbacks from private suppliers (National Pharmaceuticals Management Unit 2013).

In 2010, public officials, citizen groups, the private sector and others formed the Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative. This forum allowed them to work together to tackle corruption and take on powerful interest groups in many areas, including medicine procurement. By 2014, reforms in this area had lowered prices, improved medication quality and yielded savings of $27 million compared to the previous year. Public spending on drugs was reduced by 64%.

Participatory governance also helped people in poor rural villages in Indonesia fight the high level of corruption under the Suharto Government that was a major factor in cutting off their communities from public services and economic opportunities. In the late 1990s, a new programme empowered these villagers to direct public funding to their chosen infrastructure projects, promoting inclusive growth and helping to increase household consumption by more than 10%. Community oversight and financial audits have been critical to the efficient expenditure of $3.6 billion on infrastructure, including the construction of 100,000 km of rural roads, 17,000 small bridges and 40,000 clean-water systems, and the building or rehabilitation of 43,000 schools and health clinics. Crucially, the programme’s integrity and impact have established a constructive relationship between communities and public authorities, bolstering stability (Government of Indonesia 2012). [footnote 22]

12.4 Take on corruption at the global level

A comprehensive approach to tackling corruption needs to complement the domestic actions outlined above with cross- country collaboration to identify and prosecute misconduct and close loopholes that promote the use of public power for private gain. At present, developed and developing countries are not co-operating sufficiently to end the international catalysts for misconduct, with harmful consequences for developing countries’ fiscal wellbeing and development.

International trade in merchandise has increased by more than 500% over the last 25 years. Trade as a share of world GDP has increased by half over this period, from 40% in 1990 to about 60% today. As economic activity has become more globalised, so has corruption. Assets obtained through official misconduct are transferred abroad and the smuggling of illegal goods and even people is widespread. New avenues for wrongdoing have expanded the number and kinds of participants involved in corruption, which now encompass counterfeiters, pirates and armed groups.

Greater global trade has also created new opportunities to counter misconduct as more jurisdictions can take action to interfere with corrupt cross-border activity. Under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), developed and developing countries that have signed the accord are obligated to work with other countries to prosecute misconduct and assist with the return of stolen assets (UNODC 2015).

Still, in countries afflicted by significant corruption, prosecutors are often unable to investigate and punish wrongdoing because of political interference or ineffectiveness. Countries with more independent and robust legal systems can help. Legislation such as the UK’s Bribery Act 2010, the US’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Brazil’s Clean Company Act give prosecutors the authority to pursue individuals or corporations who pay off foreign officials. In 2010, BAE Systems paid $400 million to the US Justice Department and £30 million to the UK Serious Fraud Office to settle bribery allegations arising out of the sale of equipment to Tanzania. The UK Department for International Development used some of these funds to refurbish classrooms in, and provide teaching materials to Tanzanian primary schools in co-ordination with national authorities (Gray, Hansen, Recica-Kirkbride and Mills 2014, p. 6).

Other countries’ punishment of the cross-border laundering of corruption’s proceeds is also important to making misconduct less lucrative. In 2014, for example, Teodoro Obiang, the son of Equatorial Guinea’s long-time leader, was forced to pay $30 million to settle US Government allegations that he had used money stolen from his country to buy a California mansion, a Ferrari and Michael Jackson memorabilia (US Justice Department 2014).

Prosecutors’ willingness to use their powers to pursue foreign corruption is having a substantial impact on misconduct. Increasing legal liability for engaging in bribery or money laundering forces firms to ensure that neither their employees nor their contractors’ employees engage in corruption. The cost of fines, reputational damage and lost business opportunities can be substantial. In 2008, Siemens AG agreed to pay $1.6 billion to the US Government and establish a $100 million anti-corruption fund at the World Bank Group to settle charges that it paid bribes to public officials in connection with its international business (World Bank 2009). Domestic firms that show they comply with anti-corruption requirements create a competitive advantage as trusted partners for global supply chains and are likely to see an increase in commercial opportunities. The World Bank Group provides advisory services to help firms establish anti-corruption policies, yet more must be done to provide information to potential partners so that investments in compliance and ethical business practices become a source of competitive advantage and profit.

Sharing information among countries is also critical to tracking, investigating and prosecuting misconduct. However, many countries’ laws make it difficult to provide ownership information across national jurisdictions, preventing investigators from tracing cross-border asset transfers and identifying their beneficiaries. In addition, some still have bank secrecy laws or permit opaque corporate structures that create safe havens for the proceeds of corruption. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, which is a partnership between the World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is working to remove these obstacles to investigation and prosecution by proposing law and policy changes, providing expert advice on bringing cases and fostering co-operation across jurisdictions.

International co-operation is also vital to reducing illicit international trade, a scourge in its own right and a source of bribes to customs officials. Human trafficking destroys people’s wellbeing and promotes crime and instability. Trade in products resulting from illegal logging, fishing and hunting often damages the environment and economic growth. In Kenya, for example, outlawed commerce in ivory and endangered species has significantly harmed the tourism sector (UNWTO 2015).

Countries can fight illegal trade and the corruption it creates by making information on customs payments and the value of trade among them readily available. Governments can also pass laws that force companies and countries to prove the legitimacy of their products now that technology enables the easy creation of a chain of custody for goods through the use of microchips and satellite tracking. Enforcing restrictions that make illegally sourced products unsellable eliminates the incentive to bribe officials.

Harmonising cross-border trade rules related to customs, taxation and other fiscal matters can also reduce the economic benefit of a variety of corrupt activities. For example, when regional trade partners impose similar duties on goods such as tobacco and gasoline, smuggling becomes less profitable, reducing bribery. When governments empower companies to extract their countries’ natural resources, some of these corporations exploit differences in how countries tax corporate profits to reduce their tax burden through practices such as abusive transfer pricing, which fraudulently shifts the location of profits to jurisdictions where tax rates are lower. Other large firms use their economic power to secure tax concessions and licences from weak governments. Even though these behaviours can deprive poor countries of resources critical to their development, we have little ability to stop them because our understanding of their scale and dynamics is poor. When political elites collude with firms to rig these government licences and regulations to their benefit, public officials also create a business climate that favours politically influential firms, stifling competition, slowing innovation and reducing economic growth.

The World Bank Group is working at multiple levels to make international trade less vulnerable to this kind of illegitimate activity. In co-operation with the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), we are helping governments crack down on abusive transfer pricing using a toolkit that enables authorities to evaluate companies’ tax reporting, especially in the extractives sector. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we have established an initiative to help developing countries strengthen their tax systems, which will help make collection more efficient and policies fairer, and improve authorities’ ability to detect tax evasion. Analysis suggests that, with balanced tax systems, many lower-income countries can increase revenues from 2% to 4% of GDP (IMF 2011). Our support to countries such as Colombia and Ghana has already increased revenues and reduced tax evasion.

12.5 Conclusion

Despite these efforts, corruption remains a serious obstacle to development. Corruption can inhibit inclusive growth and job creation, stand in the way of new mothers and infants living healthy lives and prevent the vulnerable from receiving the social assistance they need. Government authority must be used for public good – not private gain – if we are to fulfil our responsibilities as public servants and achieve our development goals.

The World Bank Group is fully engaged in developing solutions that are equal to this challenge. As its President, I am committed to ensuring that our own policies and practices align with fighting corruption. The organisation is sharing the best global knowledge of what does and does not work to stop misconduct, from transparency and incentives to collective action and partnerships. We are helping countries take on corruption at the international level so they set rules that make it easier to trace assets and share information across jurisdictions, identify and prosecute corruption wherever it takes place, and promote fair and honest global competition.

Still, the international community must do more across all of these areas. For example, we must produce comprehensive information about cross-border financial activities such as tax evasion, smuggling and trafficking in stolen goods and money laundering. Governments must evaluate the effectiveness of their anti-corruption efforts based on their work’s impact on contributors to economic growth and development, such as the quality of public services, social safety nets and the investment climate.

We must fight corruption in communities, countries and globally. I strongly support leaders’ efforts to take on entrenched interests that force the poor to pay bribes or waste public resources. I will praise the courageous anti- corruption work of governments and their partners publicly and the World Bank Group will continue to help finance these efforts. We are committed to supporting bold actions, because the use of public power for private gain is morally wrong and, as the evidence shows, prevents the poor from reaching their full potential. There can be no doubt: tackling corruption is critical to creating a more just and prosperous world.

12.6 References

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 2014. Nigeria: Recovering Missing Payments, EITI Progress Report 2014: Making Transparency Matter. Norway: EITI. Available online .

Government of Indonesia. 2012. PNPM Rural Impact Evaluation April 2012. Jakarta: PNPM Support Facility.

Gray, L., Hansen, K., Recica-Kirkbride, P. and Mills, L. 2014. Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery. Washington DC: The World Bank, OECD and UNODC, p. 6.

International Monetary Fund – Fiscal Affairs Department. 2011. Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund, pp. 1–85. Available online .

Joseph, M. S. 2015. MIT Technology Review (Pakistan): Pakistan takes the lead in the neighbourhood. Available online .

Kaufmann, D. 2015. Corruption Matters. Finance & Development. International Monetary Fund. September 2015, pp. 20–23. Available online .

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P. and Sukhtankar, S. 2014. Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Working Paper No. 19999, pp. 1–53. Available online .

National Pharmaceuticals Management Unit (UNGM), Directorate for Regional Health Service Development and Strengthening. 2013. Technical Report: Baseline Study of the Status of the Supply of Medicines and Medical Supplies in Specialized Health Care Centers in the Dominican Republic. Dominican Republic: UNGM.

Olken, B. 2007. Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), pp. 200–248.

Procurement Watch Inc (PWI). 2009. A Study of Anti- Corruption Initiatives in the Philippines’ Construction Sector. Pasig City: PWI. Available online .

Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. 2011. The Power of Information in Public Services: Evidence from Education in Uganda. Journal of Public Economics, (95), pp. 956–966.

Rijkers, B., Freund, C. and Nucifora, A. 2011. All in the Family: State Capture in Tunisia. Policy Research Working Paper 6810. World Bank, pp. 1–46. Available online .

Sta Ines, N. 2014. Geotagging in Isolated Areas, Philippines. In: S. Lippman, ed. Procurement for Complex Situations Challenge – Competition Winners. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 1–5.

United Nations – World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). 2015. Towards Measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching Tourism in Africa. Spain: UNWTO.

US Justice Department. 10 October 2014. Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea Agrees to Relinquish More Than $30 Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds. Available [online] (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-vice-president- equatorial-guinea-agrees-relinquish-more-30-million- assets-purchased).

Wolfensohn, J. D. 1 October 1996. Annual Meetings Address. [online]. Available online .

The World Bank. 2 July 2009. Siemens to pay $100m to fight corruption as part of WBG Settlement. Available [online] (https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/ corruption-cases/files/Siemens_World_Bank_Settlement_ WB_PR_Jul_2_2009.pdf).

The World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency. 2011. Curbing Fraud, Corruption, and Collusion in the Road Sector. Washington DC: World Bank. Available online .

The World Bank. 2012. Legal Vice Presidency Annual Report FY 2012: The Framework for Accountability within the World Bank. Report No. 75111. Washington DC: World Bank. Available online .

The World Bank. 2015. The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Update, Fiscal Year 2015. Washington DC: World Bank. Available online .

13. Christine Lagarde: Addressing corruption – openly

Traditionally, public officials have been somewhat nervous about discussing corruption openly. Over the past several years, however, I have been struck by the extent to which world leaders are now willing to talk candidly about this problem. It is not just that the economic costs have become self-evident. It is also because there is an increasing demand for change. In a recent global survey, corruption was regarded as the ‘topic most frequently discussed by the public’, ahead of poverty and unemployment (survey cited by Klitgaard 2015, p. 15). Given that both poverty and unemployment can be symptoms of chronic corruption, my view is that the priority given to this problem by the public is entirely justified.

In this essay, I would like to share the IMF’s perspective on the economic impact of corruption and our experience in helping countries design and implement strategies to address it.

I recognise that there are many possible definitions of corruption, both broad and narrow. For the purposes of this essay, which is focused on the public sector, corruption includes any abuse of public office – whether it arises from financial incentives or political interference.

I would like to make three main points.

First, while the direct economic costs of corruption are well known, the indirect costs may be even more substantial and debilitating, leading to low growth and greater income inequality. Corruption also has a broader corrosive impact on society. It undermines trust in government and erodes the ethical standards of private citizens.

Second, although corruption is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon, I do not accept the proposition – or the myth – that it is primarily a ‘cultural’ problem that will always take generations to address. There are examples of countries that have managed to make significant progress in addressing it in a relatively short time.

Third, experience demonstrates that a holistic, multi- faceted approach is needed – one that establishes appropriate incentives and the rule of law, promotes transparency and introduces economic reforms that reduce opportunities for illicit behaviour. Perhaps the most important ingredient for a successful anti-corruption approach is the development of strong institutions, centred on a professional civil service that is sufficiently independent from both private influence and political interference.

13.1 The economic and social costs

Corruption afflicts countries at all stages of development. Indeed, some developing countries score better on corruption indices than many advanced countries. While there are no recent studies that quantify the overall global scale of corruption, a sense of how big a problem it is can be gauged from an estimate of the amount paid in bribes every year. A recently updated estimate points to $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion (or around 2% of global gross domestic product [GDP]) in bribes paid annually in both developing and developed countries. [footnote 23] Given that bribes are just a subset of all of the possible forms of corruption, the overall cost of corruption – in terms both of tangible losses and of lost opportunities – is a very high amount.

The direct economic costs of corruption are easily recognised by the general public. Two very clear examples are bribes given in order to evade taxes or to bypass public tender procurement. The first example results in a direct loss of public revenues; the second may result in both higher public expenditure and lower-quality public investment.

Corruption has a pernicious effect on the economy. Pervasive corruption makes it harder to conduct sound fiscal policy. For example, in data covering a range of countries, we find that low tax compliance is positively associated with corruption. By delegitimising the tax system and its administration, corruption increases tax evasion: if the granting of a tax exemption is perceived to be the product of a bribe, it is not surprising that the public are far less willing to comply with the tax laws. [footnote 24]

Corruption also undermines certain types of public expenditure to the detriment of economic performance. For example, it is associated with lower outlays on education and skewed public investment, driven by the capacity to generate ‘commissions’ rather than by economic justification (Mauro 1998). [footnote 25] The distortion in public investment spending is particularly harmful given the importance of promoting efficient public investment as a means of reducing infrastructure gaps and promoting growth.

The indirect economic costs of corruption may be even more consequential. [footnote 26] Clearly, causation is difficult to establish and, in quantitative analysis, a significant effect of corruption on growth has not been found (Svensson 2005). Nevertheless, in comparative studies of national data, corruption is associated with a number of key indicators. Countries with low per capita income tend to have higher corruption and countries with higher corruption tend to have lower growth. Studies have identified different ways in which corruption could affect growth.

First, corruption tends to impede both foreign and domestic investment. The higher costs associated with corruption are a form of tax on investment that, in turn, translates into less investment in business research and development and product innovation. Moreover, by creating uncertainty as to how the regulatory framework will be applied, it increases the ‘country risk’ associated with a particular investment project. [footnote 27] More generally, corruption generates an unfavourable business climate in which the creation of new enterprises is stifled, reducing the economy’s dynamism. [footnote 28]

Second, corruption undercuts savings. The illegal use of public funds to acquire assets abroad shrinks the economy’s pool of savings that could otherwise be used for investment.

Finally, corruption can perpetuate inefficiency. Because an over-regulated economy provides opportunities for regulators to demand bribes, corruption creates a strong incentive to delay economic liberalisation and innovation.

The impact of corruption on social outcomes is also consequential. Social spending on education and health is typically lower in corrupt systems. This, in turn, leads to higher child and infant mortality rates, lower birth-weights, less access to education and higher school dropout rates (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2002).

These outcomes disproportionately affect the poor, since they rely more heavily on government services, which become more costly due to corruption. Moreover, corruption reduces the income-earning potential of the poor as they are less well-positioned to take advantage of it. For all these reasons, corruption exacerbates income inequality and poverty (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 2002).

Corruption also breeds public distrust in government. It undermines the state’s capacity to raise revenue and to perform its functions as a supplier of public goods and services, regulator of markets and agent for society’s redistributive goals. Where powerful business elites collude to control public institutions, corruption results in state capture and the ‘the privatisation of public policy’.

The fallouts are all too clear: higher inequality in political influence, deterioration of public values and, ultimately, a diminution in the overall quality of life. These non-economic costs create a vicious cycle of underperformance in the public sector that is harmful to the economy in the long term. The moral fabric of society is also put at risk. It is not just that bribery becomes part of one’s everyday life. In a society where success is more likely to depend on who you know rather than on personal merit, the incentives for young people to pursue higher education are undermined.

13.2 Strategies for addressing corruption

Given the potential impact of corruption on macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth, the IMF has been actively engaged in helping our members design and implement anti-corruption strategies. In 1997, the Fund adopted a policy on governance that provides guidance on the nature of its involvement in circumstances where issues of governance, including corruption, are judged to have a significant macroeconomic impact.

Since that time, we have gained considerable experience in helping members design and implement anti-corruption strategies. This is particularly important in the context of economic crises, where effective anti-corruption measures are critical to restore confidence. In some cases, the problem has been so severe that the Fund had no choice but to withhold support until a credible reform strategy was in place.

Clearly, any anti-corruption strategy must be tailored to the circumstances of the particular country. Yet we have found that success requires the existence of a number of mutually supporting features, which are briefly summarised here.

13.3 Creating the right incentives

As has been noted by one expert in this area, “Corruption is an economic crime, not a crime of passion. Givers and takers of bribes respond to incentives and punishments” (Klitgaard 2015, p. 37). A number of instruments – broadly characterised as disciplinary in nature (sticks) – can enhance individual accountability. Other instruments provide positive reinforcement (carrots). The Fund’s experience is that an effective anti-corruption approach needs both positive and deterrent measures.

Strengthening the rule of law is critical to increasing individual accountability. The Fund has taken an active role – including through its conditionality – to strengthen legal frameworks that are designed to increase such accountability. For example, Ukraine’s current Fund-supported programme provides for the enhancement of legislation in a number of areas, including, in particular, the law on corruption.

However, unless legislation is effectively enforced, it will not be credible in deterring corruption. Without effective law enforcement institutions – the police and other investigatory services, the public prosecutor’s office and, ultimately, the courts – even the most robust legal framework will be ineffective. So, the greatest challenge arises when corruption has permeated society to the point that these institutions themselves have become compromised. In these cases, it may be necessary to create specialised ‘bridging’ institutions in the hope that they can more effectively fight corruption, including in the traditional law enforcement institutions, while broader institutional reform is implemented. These ‘bridging’ institutions include independent anti-corruption commissions and specialised anti-corruption courts such as those currently being established in Ukraine and the earlier ones in Indonesia (IMF 2015b; IMF 2004).

In this context, the Fund has found that the establishment of Anti-Money Laundering Frameworks is central to the fight against corruption. Requiring banks to report on suspicious transactions provides a very effective means of deterring criminal activities. The fact that these laws generally require even closer scrutiny of transactions conducted by ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEP) makes them particularly relevant to an anti-corruption strategy.

Beyond the enforcement measures discussed above, an effective anti-corruption policy must also rely on transparency. Transparency shines a spotlight on government decisions and transactions, enabling citizens to monitor the actions of their governments which, in turn, deters corrupt behaviour. Publicising instances of corruption and the efforts taken to address them also serves as a disincentive to engage in corrupt activities and shores up public trust in government. For these reasons, the Fund has been actively engaged in promoting greater transparency in the overall economic and regulatory environment.

We have developed standards and codes of best practices in areas such as data dissemination, fiscal transparency and monetary and financial policies (IMF 1997). [footnote 29] Promoting transparency in the extractive industries is another area that the Fund has actively pursued in its technical assistance work. Under the aegis of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), a template is now available for reporting and monitoring government revenues from natural resources.

Transparency can only go so far. It needs accountability for it to become a powerful deterrent against corruption. It is critical that public officials and institutions be assigned with specific mandates and tasks upon which they are expected to deliver. Moreover, oversight mechanisms are needed to ensure that officials and institutions are delivering as expected. This is why the Fund has actively supported its members in strengthening those institutions that exercise oversight powers in the management of public funds and in enhancing the financial accountability of state-owned enterprises. It has also provided technical assistance to help members monitor the use of public resources and consolidate extra-budgetary funds into the budget.

Even well-meaning public officials will be tempted by corruption if they cannot earn a living wage. Research shows a correlation between increases in wages and improvements in a country’s ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2002). This is why Fund- supported programmes have sometimes included increases in public salaries as part of an anti-corruption approach (IMF 2006). That said, there are two critical considerations. First, the remuneration of the public sector needs to be transparent and meritocratic; otherwise, it will be perceived as merely an instrument of political patronage. Second, studies show that an increase in remuneration will have little effect unless accompanied by clear signals that public officials will lose their jobs if they are caught engaging in corrupt acts.

13.4 Economic liberalisation and effective regulation

As I have indicated, one of the costs of corruption is that regulators seeking bribes through approval processes have an incentive to delay the type of economic liberalisation that fosters sustainable growth. Wherever discretion is granted to an official regarding the approval of an economic activity, there is a risk that this discretion will be abused. Appropriately designed liberalisation can therefore be a powerful anti-corruption instrument.

As part of its core mandate, the Fund has been actively engaged in encouraging liberalisation of trade, price and financial systems. We have also advocated free and fair market-entry regulations, as well as good statistics and transparency. Importantly, where liberalisation involves privatisation, it is critical that safeguards – such as adequate and transparent procedures – are in place so that the sale of assets is not compromised by corruption.

Of course, experience demonstrates that regulation in a market economy is essential for both sustained growth and financial stability. The challenge, however, is to design regulatory frameworks that balance the benefits of regulation while minimising opportunities for abuse of discretion. [footnote 30] For this reason, in its core areas of expertise, the Fund has promoted the adoption of rules, procedures and criteria that are as targeted, clear, simple and transparent as possible. These areas include public expenditure management, tax policy and administration, banking and foreign exchange systems, and data management (IMF 1997).

13.5 The role of the private sector

When people complain about corruption, they sometimes forget – perhaps conveniently – that for every bribe taken by a public official, one is given by a member of the private sector. Clearly then, addressing the behaviour of the private sector needs to be a key component of any effective anti- corruption strategy. How can this be done?

In some cases, this means using enforcement measures. For example, in those countries where bribery is a common way of facilitating foreign investment, it is critical that the country of the foreign investor enforces laws that prohibit foreign corrupt practices. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions can be invoked in this effort (OECD 1997).

However, experience also shows that the private sector can become effective partners in combating corruption. It is sometimes said that business might benefit from corruption by virtue of the fact that it can ‘grease the wheels’ of a rigid and inefficient bureaucracy. I disagree with that proposition. Based on my own experience, investors actually seek out countries that can give them the assurance that, once an investment is made, they will not be blackmailed into providing bribes. Because corruption creates an enormous amount of unpredictability for businesses, anti-corruption strategies can be designed to solicit their support.

I find Indonesia’s experience of implementing that partnership particularly illuminating. At a recent seminar hosted by the IMF on the topic, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Indonesia’s former Minister of Finance (and currently Chief of Operations at the World Bank), described how she successfully partnered with businesses to provide a streamlined customs approval process in exchange for their commitment not to offer any bribes to officials – ‘new rules of the game’. [footnote 31]

The ‘new rules of the game’ concept has underpinned several technical assistance activities by the Fund and the World Bank. In reforming tax agencies in Bolivia, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Myanmar, Peru, Poland and Senegal, Large or Medium Taxpayers’ Offices (LTOs and MTOs) were established to deal with a select group of taxpayers under streamlined conditions.

Beyond the business community, civil society also has a role to play. Through the use of social media, civil society can become a powerful force in combating corruption. In addition to being a very effective means of monitoring government activities, social media can also greatly enhance the credibility of an anti-corruption campaign by linking new institutions that have a specific mandate in this area. [footnote 32]

13.6 Building values and institutions

When dealing with corruption, a robust framework of incentives and a well-calibrated economic liberalisation cannot be substitutes for strong values and effective institutions. Of course, developing values at a personal and institutional level may seem beyond the control of any government. It is clearly not something that can be legislated. Yet unless public officials take pride in their work – and their independence from both political and private influence – all other efforts will fail.

Building values among public officials requires sustained public education. Formal training can help but, ultimately, values are most effectively instilled through the education framework, societal pressure and – as I will discuss further below – the example of leaders. The key objective is to develop a cadre of public officials who are – and are perceived to be – independent from both private influence and political interference. This is the single most important feature of a strong institution. Indeed, it has been noted that one way to assess the strength of an institution is to assess the extent to which key employees are replaced at the time of elections.

There are other factors that lend support to effective operation, some of which – such as rules that establish transparency and clear accountability – have already been mentioned. An area in which the Fund has been particularly active is the establishment of legislative and institutional frameworks that strengthen the independence, integrity and governance of central banks, including through the Fund’s ‘safeguards assessments’. A recent example has been work in Tunisia in support of the Central Bank, which strengthened its independence, internal control mechanisms and powers. Of course, enhancing the overall technical competence of officials who work in these institutions is also critical. For this reason, the Fund has invested considerable resources in capacity-building in a broad range of areas, from public finance management to the strengthening of the financial intelligence units, that are responsible for applying anti- money laundering laws.

13.7 Political will

Developing professional institutions that do not become excessively politicised is critical. Yet the irony is that in circumstances where institutions have been completely compromised by corruption, active and sustained political will is essential. Powerful vested interests can only be effectively challenged when a country’s top leadership sends a clear signal that they are committed to do so.

In some cases, this may require wholesale dismissals within an agency that has a reputation for corrupt practices. Prosecuting the powerful ‘big fish’ – which is necessary in order to send a clear signal of commitment and change – can only be achieved if a country’s leaders visibly support the process. Moreover, political leaders play a unique role in setting an example of professional integrity. Lee Kuan Yew is a leader who was very effective in both signalling a zero- tolerance policy towards corruption and building competent institutions at a time when corruption was pervasive in Singapore.

13.8 Avoiding pitfalls

Although active and sustained political leadership is critical to the success of any anti-corruption campaign, it is important that reforms in this area are not hijacked to implement a political agenda. One way of assessing whether anti-corruption efforts are credible is to note whether enforcement is limited to the prosecution of political rivals, or instead also extends to the government’s political supporters.

In addition, care should be taken to ensure that an anti- corruption campaign does not create such fear that public officials are reluctant to perform their duties. For example, in circumstances where state-owned banks have extended a loan to a company that has become insolvent, it is often in the interest of the bank, the debtor and the economy more generally to restructure the loan (which might include principal write-downs) in a manner that enables the company to return to viability. Yet the Fund’s experience has been that, in some countries, the managers of state-owned banks are simply afraid to engage in such negotiations. They fear that, if they agree to any debt write-down, they will be prosecuted under the country’s corruption law for having wasted state assets – even though a restructuring might actually enhance the value of the bank’s claim relative to the alternative, the liquidation of the company.

Finally, although regulatory reform can promote simplicity and automaticity, there are certain functions, such as bank supervision, where discretion will always be essential. For these reasons, regulatory reform cannot be a substitute for the development of effective institutions.

13.9 Concluding observations

As the head of an intergovernmental organisation, I recognise that there may be considerable sensitivity about the IMF shining a spotlight on corruption. At the same time, the alternative – turning a blind eye to the problem – is not a viable option. As is recognised under its existing policies, it is not tenable for the IMF to assess a member’s economic prospects exclusively through the lens of monetary, fiscal or financial sector policies, when the problem of corruption is endemic and has a major impact on economic performance. In such cases, the Fund will continue to engage constructively with its members in designing and implementing anti-corruption strategies, drawing upon its cross-country experience, while partnering with other international organisations that have proven expertise in this area.

13.10 References

Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. 2002. Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? Economics of Governance, (3), pp. 23–45. Available online .

Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Tiongson, E. 2002. Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services. In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 245– 279. Available online .

IMF. 2 July 1997. The Role of the Fund in Governance Issues – Guidance Note. News Brief, No. 97/15. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2004. Legal, Judicial and Governance Reforms Indonesia. Indonesia: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 04/189. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2006. Islamic Republic of Mauritania: 2006 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2015a. Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization. Washington DC: IMF.

IMF. 12 March 2015b. Ukraine – Request for Extended Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 15/69. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2015c. Republic of Mozambique – Fiscal Transparency Evaluation. Country Report No. 15/32. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

Kaufmann, D. 2005. Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 81–98. Available online .

Klitgaard, R. 2015. Addressing Corruption Together. Paris: OECD. Available online .

Mauro, P. 1998. Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure. Journal of Public Economics, (69), pp. 263–279. Available online .

OECD. 1997. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. [online]. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available online .

Svensson, J. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), pp. 19–42. Available online .

Van Rijckeghem, C. and Weder, B. 2002. Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption and by How Much? In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 59–88. Available online .

14. Angel Gurría: How to battle 21st-century corruption

Over the last two decades, we have made great progress in taking the fight against corruption to the highest global and political levels. Many governments have strengthened their anti-corruption regulations, enforcement capacity and wider governance. Several high-profile corruption cases have seen justice served. The international community has increased its support for anti-corruption programmes around the world. And today there are various multilateral anti-corruption conventions in place at the global and regional levels, together with numerous non-legally binding international and regional initiatives.

The OECD, working closely with its partners, has been prominent in this fight: setting standards across a range of areas from foreign bribery to public sector integrity, as well as on related issues such as tax evasion and bid rigging. And these initiatives have made a difference.

Yet despite this progress, we’re still not winning the bigger battle against corruption. Recent scandals involving national leaders and major corporations, the ongoing investigations into the sports sector, and the growing threat of terrorism and its links to corruption, also remind us that we need to do more, much more.

At the OECD, we believe that corruption’s harmful effects on growth, equality and trust are too big to ignore, and make tackling corruption not only a moral imperative but also an economic, social and political necessity.

Corruption allows for the financing of wars; it helps to smuggle people, guns and drugs; it channels public and private funds into illicit activities; and it undermines collective action against climate change and poverty. Furthermore, because of increased global interconnectedness, the mechanisms and vehicles of corruption are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to trace.

In this essay, I argue that, to deal with corruption and the devastation it causes, the international community must build coherent systems that focus on all stages of the anti-corruption process from prevention to detection and enforcement and, at the same time, ensure effective implementation by both governments and corporations. And we must boost global collaboration by fully engaging all countries – in the developed and the developing world – in the fight against corruption.

14.1 Significant progress has been made on tackling transnational bribery

Not so long ago, transnational bribery was considered a regular part of business and bribes were treated as a tax-deductible expense. In 1999, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions entered into force. The Convention made it illegal for citizens and businesses of signatory countries to bribe foreign public officials while doing business abroad and our work continues to ensure it is fully effective (OECD 1997).

As such, the OECD Working Group on Bribery has established a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that governments stick to their commitments (OECD 2015a). The private sector and civil society play an integral role in the group’s activities, providing input to regular consultations and the on-site visits that form part of a country’s evaluation.

The Convention has helped governments to push the fight against bribery up the agenda. Many of the 41 countries that make up the OECD Working Group on Bribery (which comprises all OECD countries and seven non-OECD countries) have made radical changes to their laws and institutions to comply with the Convention. One of the most recent and successful examples is the UK Bribery Act 2010, which entered into force in 2011. Between 1999 and 2014, 361 individuals and 126 companies were sanctioned for foreign bribery in 17 countries (OECD 2014). At least $5.4 billion was imposed in combined monetary sanctions and 95 people put behind bars (OECD 2014). The 2014 OECD Foreign Bribery Report showed that, among the 427 foreign bribery cases concluded, almost two- thirds of cases occurred in just four sectors: extractive (19%); construction (15%); transportation and storage (15%); and information and communication (10%). In the majority of cases, bribes were paid to obtain public procurement contracts and, in around half of cases, management or CEOs were involved (OECD 2014). As of December 2014, there were 393 ongoing investigations into alleged acts of foreign bribery in 25 of the countries party to the Convention and, even as I write, new cases are being brought to light (OECD 2014).

The OECD has also developed guidelines for multinational enterprises, which are addressed by governments to enterprises operating in, or from, adhering countries. These provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a global context. Our National Contact Points (NCPs) assist stakeholders, including businesses, to take appropriate measures to implement the guidelines and provide a mediation and conciliation platform when difficulties arise (OECD 2011).

For example, two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Cameroon recently brought a case to the NCP in the United States, alleging that a company had not observed the guidelines on combating bribery. The US NCP offered mediation to help the parties involved achieve a mutually agreeable resolution. In June 2015, the company agreed to a request from the NGOs to investigate past cases of corruption and take action against any acts of corruption (US Department of State 2015).

Of course, the best way to combat corruption is to prevent it from happening altogether. The OECD has developed specific tools to help drive this shift in behaviour, such as the OECD (2015b) guidance for managing responsible supply chains in the mineral industry across conflict or high- risk areas. This provides, among other things, measures to mitigate the risk of bribery by companies and recommends indicators for measuring improvement.

In response, major industry associations have developed initiatives to implement these recommendations, with a specific focus on the gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum sectors. As a result, industry audit programmes designed to implement the due-diligence guidance now cover 90% of the refined gold, 95% of the smelted tantalum and 75–85% of the smelted tin produced every year (OECD 2015c). The Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have all integrated these initiatives into their legal systems (OECD 2015c).

In addition, the OECD adopted the 2010 Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance. This is the first and only intergovernmental guidance for the private sector on how to prevent and detect foreign bribery through effective internal control, ethics and compliance programmes (OECD 2010a). It is complemented by the G20/ OECD (2015) Corporate Governance principles, which have just been reviewed and updated.

14.2 Improvements to national integrity systems

The OECD’s progress on tackling transnational bribery has been matched by extensive work on wider integrity systems at a national level. These include codes of conduct, effective competition, business integrity, and measures to secure greater value for money in public spending.

For example, the OECD has been examining the impact of bid rigging, which raises prices, reduces quality and restricts supply in the government procurement process and is often combined with bribery of public officials or unlawful kickbacks. Three years ago, we adopted a recommendation designed to help governments eliminate this type of corruption from their procurement processes and boost competition, forming the basis for numerous sets of national guidelines and advocacy materials (OECD 2012). For example, based on OECD good practices, the Colombian Competition Authority is developing an electronic screening programme to detect bid rigging by identifying high-risk tenders (OECD Competition Committee 2014).

The OECD has also conducted several country-specific projects in co-operation with national competition authorities to reduce bid rigging and increase transparency, starting with the Mexican Social Security Institute – which secured cost savings of around $700 million per annum and dramatically decreased its risks of corruption (IMCO 2012).

As the recent FIFA corruption scandal shows, government agencies such as tax authorities are essential players in the fight to deter, detect and disrupt national and global corruption. That is why the OECD has supported work to strengthen the reach of tax administrations in this area, including our 2010 recommendation to improve information sharing and collaboration across government agencies to combat corruption, tax evasion and other serious economic crimes (OECD 2010b). This led to the establishment of the Oslo Dialogue, a global forum to develop and promote a whole-of-government approach to tackling tax crimes and other serious financial crimes and is supported by the capacity-building programmes delivered through the OECD’s International Academy for Tax Crime Investigation (OECD 2015d).

In addition, we’re working with our members to target projects and industries that have traditionally been most at risk of corruption – issuing recommendations and guidance related to ethics, managing conflicts of interest and increasing transparency in lobbying, and very importantly, public procurement (OECD 2015e).[^33] Building on this, we’re successfully helping governments to pre-emptively identify and limit the risks of corruption and mismanagement in major infrastructure projects – as we did with the Milan Expo 2015 and the construction of Mexico City’s new airport.

14.3 Progress in extending international collaboration

Our effectiveness in curbing corruption depends on our ability to join forces and co-ordinate actions globally. As a result, we have been raising awareness of all the aforementioned initiatives in other international circles, and we are working to integrate emerging economies and developing countries in our work.

[^33]These include the 1998 Ethics Recommendation, the 2003 Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest, the 2010 Recommendation on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and the recently updated Recommendation on Public Procurement.

In particular, the OECD has actively supported the G20 to make the top standards in the fight against corruption count on a global scale. Based on OECD work and standards, the G20 has made a number of commitments and adopted principles and guidance on topics such as foreign bribery and solicitation, public procurement, asset disclosure, whistle-blower protection and private sector transparency and integrity (OECD/G20 2015).

We have also made progress in our dialogue with China on anti-corruption and the promotion of responsible business conduct, which is particularly timely as they take over the presidency of the G20 in 2016. Other emerging economies, in particular India, are also showing increasing signs of interest in the standards developed by our organisation.

Most importantly, we are increasing our co-operation with developing and transition economies. We have regional anti-corruption programmes across Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America (OECD 2015f). In addition, working with the Open Government Partnership (OGP), we are helping developing and transition economies to implement and monitor the OGP standards.

14.4 There is still a long road ahead

So what next? At the OECD, we believe we need to focus on four major areas in the future.

a) Corruption is every country’s problem

Every major economy must be active against corruption. It is still the case that 24 out of the 41 parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have yet to issue a single sanction (OECD 2014). Everyone needs to step to the fore and contribute their share in tackling international corruption. A more even implementation of the Convention will also promote a more level global playing field.

And while the 41 countries make up approximately 66% of world exports, a number of significant economies have yet to join, including China, India and Indonesia. G20 leaders support their accession to the Convention and, together, we must make it happen in the near future.

As part of this, the OECD can and should play a bigger role in helping to strengthen anti-corruption practices across the world by integrating partner countries into its various initiatives. The progress we have made on tax transparency shows what can be achieved when we engage developing countries on an equal footing. Today there are 129 jurisdictions committed to implementing the international standard for exchange of tax information on request (OECD 2016). The new global common reporting standard on tax transparency agreed in 2014, which will be implemented by more than 95 jurisdictions by 2018, will ensure the automatic transmission of information about financial accounts held offshore by taxpayers (OECD 2016). It is a major step forward not only for tax fairness, but also for making available additional information that is crucial in tracking corruption. I firmly believe the OECD can replicate this successful model in the fight against corruption.

b) Implementation, implementation, implementation

As we have seen, many of the standards are in place. We must now focus on effective implementation. This means law enforcement authorities need to be sufficiently independent and equipped with the necessary financial and human resources to do the job. Professionals such as lawyers, accountants and auditors need to be much more aware of the risks they face when advising in business transactions, especially at the international level. Ratings agencies should include corruption risks in their analysis of companies. Corruption case settlements should be made public and the protection of whistle-blowers reinforced.

We also need to make an effort to embed integrity within the management of both public and private organisations, including in their general management, human resources, internal control and audit, and external audit systems. This would also improve the monitoring of progress and the effectiveness and coherence of integrity policies and practices. Further engagement with the private sector is imperative.

Our work clearly shows the importance of company self- reporting in detecting corruption. However, self-reporting is often not acknowledged or incentivised. We intend to undertake work to ensure good compliance is rewarded and self-reporting actively promoted, as well as to find innovative ways to protect companies from undue solicitation.

Finally, effective implementation will depend on how we are able to address corruption in organisations where corruption often occurs – such as state-owned enterprises, public/private partnerships and local governments – and sectors that need special attention, such as customs, health, education and law enforcement. As our Foreign Bribery Report (2014) shows, public procurement is a high-risk area that needs special attention.

c) Integrating and widening the integrity agenda

The effectiveness of our various tools and initiatives will also depend on how we are able to link them up, build synergies, provide consistency in our approaches and support co-ordination between institutions responsible for enhancing integrity and fighting corruption.

Such connections also need to be built by governments and the different stakeholders at the national level, strengthening the links between initiatives on foreign bribery and public sector integrity with those on tax evasion, bid rigging, money laundering and illicit financial flows.

The OECD is uniquely placed to assist countries in this respect. We’re ready to work on the necessary training and policy advice, as well as offering our expertise to specific situations, when required – as our successful work on large infrastructure projects with Italy and Mexico shows.

Beyond institutional solutions, we need to balance a rules-based compliance approach with greater attention to the political economy of corruption and to the values of public officials. This will require taking better account of the existence of vested interests when shaping policies by promoting transparency and integrity in political finance, elections and lobbying at various levels of government. Preventing public officials or policies from being swayed by powerful and narrow vested interests is crucial, if we are to strengthen trust in our governments.

d) The relationship between corruption and other global issues

Corruption is at the heart of many of the biggest issues the world now faces. As we know, the forced displacement of people due to conflict, persecution, violence and human rights violations is on the rise. The current refugee crisis has triggered a global discussion about migration and refugees. Corruption plays a significant role in this crisis in the wake of inadequate government services. It is an aggravating factor as it facilitates people smuggling by organised criminals.

Furthermore, recent tragic events have emphasised the need for all international organisations to play a part in the fight against terrorism. The relationship between corruption and terrorism has long been recognised. Evidence shows that corruption contributes to the financing of terrorism and creates inequalities that disenfranchise communities and promote the development and growth of terrorist groups.

This phenomenon is facilitated by the growing complexity of corruption in commodity trading and illicit trade, through crude oil swaps, trade mispricing and stolen resource trading. The OECD is looking to further explore these issues in order to best equip countries to fight these corrosive and dangerous practices.

We also know that corruption undermines the fight against climate change. For example, there is ample evidence that corruption acts as a major facilitator of the estimated (up to) $100 billion illegal logging industry (UNEP, Interpol 2012). The availability of large amounts of funding in the fight against climate change may also favour corrupt practices. But overall, this is an area that remains relatively unexplored. The OECD is well placed to undertake work in this area in the light of its expertise in environmental issues, trade (including analysis of illicit trade) and fighting corruption.

In 2015, we saw the emergence of major bribery scandals in sports. Apart from its economic importance, sport plays a major role in holding societies together and we cannot tolerate the ethical breaches that undermine its legitimacy. These scandals illustrate the limits of self-regulation. Global leadership is required in this area. The OECD’s knowledge and experience in lobbying, good public governance, public procurement and fighting corruption mean that the organisation is ready to play a key role on this topic.

Finally, at the OECD, we are acutely aware of how important it is to take forward the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (UN 2015). Addressing corruption is vital in order to successfully achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While corruption is explicitly mentioned only in Goal 16, it is clear that it cuts across all of the SDGs and will be a major hurdle to achieving them. Corruption has a significant impact on poverty, inequality, hunger, education, the availability of clean water and sanitation, economic growth, industry innovation and infrastructure. It thwarts resource mobilisation and allocation and diverts resources away from sustainable development and from efforts to eradicate poverty. International organisations, including the OECD, must work together to ensure the fight against corruption is made a priority in order to achieve the SDGs. The G20 could take a leading role in this respect.

We need to establish a common vision and a global agenda. The OECD stands ready to play its part and work hard to win the battle against the dark side of our economies by designing, promoting and implementing better anti- corruption policies for better lives.

14.5 References

G20/OECD. 2015. Principles of Corporate Governance. Available online .

Instituto Mexicano para la Competividad (IMCO). 2012. Evaluación del Acuerdo de Trabajo IMSS-OCDE-CFC. Available online .

OECD. 1997. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available online .

OECD. 2010a. Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance. Available online .

OECD. 14 October 2010b. Recommendation of the Council to Facilitate Co-operation between Tax and Other Law Enforcement Authorities to Combat Serious Crimes. Available online .

OECD. 2011. National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Available online .

OECD. 2012. Recommendation of the OECD Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement. Available online .

OECD. 2014. OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. 2015a. Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Available online .

OECD. 2015b. Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Available online .

OECD. 2015c. Implementing the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. Available online .

OECD. 2015d. Forum on Tax and Crime. Available online .

OECD. 2015e. Bribery and Corruption. Available online .

OECD. 2015f. Regional anti-corruption programmes. Available online .

OECD. 2016. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. Available online .

OECD Competition Committee. 2014. Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Colombia. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available online .

OECD and G20. 2015. Anti-corruption. Available online .

United Nations. 2015. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available online .

UNEP, Interpol. 2012. Green Carbon, Black Trade. Norway: UNEP, Interpol. Available online .

US Department of State. 28 July 2015. US NCP Final Statement CED/RELUFA on the Specific Instance between the Center for Environment and Development (CED) with Network to Fight against Hunger (RELUFA) and Herakles Farms’ affiliate SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC) in Cameroon. Available online .

15. Mart Laar: The cancer of the modern world – a European perspective

Corruption is a cancer. At first, it can look small and harmless. Before you know it, it has taken over your entire body. Likewise, the losses from corruption can start small, but in the end the damage is enormous.

The problem of corruption around the world is well known. Dictators, arms smugglers and warlords rely on corruption to fund violence against their own populations. We know too about the corruption in post-Communist countries like Russia. It’s not just the corruption in the economy; it’s the corruption of the legal and political systems that sustains it, which is so damaging in so many countries.

Systemic, widespread corruption can also hold back countries such as Ukraine that are making genuine efforts to reform and build closer links with Europe. It undermines the inspiring campaigns and aspirations of reformers – as seen in Moldova, for instance – and saps the confidence of potential European partners. In Ukraine and Moldova, it is no coincidence that public dissatisfaction and protest appear to be as much about corruption as they are about anything else. And the public are right: corruption siphons off much- needed investment and slows the growth and progress of Eastern European economies. So I believe that we need a plan for Europe that places anti-corruption right at the heart of the process.

I know about corruption. I’ve seen it with my own eyes. You can no more eradicate it than you can abolish human greed. But that doesn’t mean that there is no hope. Estonia was deeply corrupted, just as other former Communist countries were as they made the transition to independence. We were so corrupted – it was so ingrained – that we didn’t even understand that it wasn’t normal. It had become a way of life. So for us, progress depended on a fundamental realisation: we could only cut ourselves off from the old Communist heritage if we cut out the cancer of corruption.

This was easy to say, of course, but harder to implement. European institutions stressed from the start of the integration process the importance of fighting corruption, but sometimes this seemed to us to be just warm words. To our surprise, as our economy and trade relations grew, several Western companies allegedly offered generous bribes in many common business deals. To them, corruption in Eastern Europe was normal. So, while the West finances campaigns against corruption abroad, it would be significantly more effective if all countries also dealt with the criminal activity and the bribes originating at home.

In many countries, corruption isn’t actually a negative word. It is connected with friendship and taking care of family. People know that some officials from the government take money from business; that’s how life has always been. How do you begin to unpick that? In Estonia, we knew that if we wanted to break free, we didn’t have any choice – we had to end corruption. Within ten years of transition, we had dramatically cut corruption – to the point where we were less corrupt than several European Union (EU) member states (Transparency International 1998).

How did we do it? A huge part of the answer was the European Union. We received vital encouragement from the EU, including as part of the negotiations on enlargement. Most importantly, we received a very clear message right from the start that the door to the EU would be closed to countries with the usual scale of post-Communist corruption. At first, it was thought that the EU was not serious. But then the Slovakian Government, under Vladímir Mečiar, was ousted from negotiations on enlargement (European Commission 1997). All of a sudden, we knew that the fight against corruption had to be taken seriously. Transparency was important too. Clear data enables you to see very similar countries, like Latvia and Estonia, with very different levels of corruption (Transparency International 2015). So if you could cut it in one country, why not the other? With the help of the EU, independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were also created, which aided the fight against corruption.

The EU shared with us, along with the other countries hoping to join, all of the best practice and legislation for tackling corruption. This allowed us to take big steps forward very quickly. An important part of this was to regularly publish key officials’ income and its sources, supported by criminal punishments for corruption in the penal code. Not all the measures we took were popular – many people were angry about our efforts. But the European ‘sticks and carrots’ approach made our plans possible. We could privatise public assets, in the knowledge that they could only be sold for legal money moved through European banks that had rules against money laundering and fraud. Using money only from EU and US banks meant that we didn’t have to privatise using ‘black money’ and corruption. When you cut corruption out of banking and the wider economy, it is much harder for corruption to take root in politics.

Helping to tackle corruption in Eastern Europe has also, of course, provided tangible benefits for people in Western Europe. It has helped open up new markets for trade and investment – based on a level playing field and open competition – therefore boosting the prosperity and security of all EU member states, including the big economies of the West.

Many people, including leaders, have asked for the secrets of Estonia’s success in tackling corruption. Every country is different, but here are my suggestions:

One – don’t become corrupt yourself. How can your citizens take anti-corruption programmes seriously if they suspect their government is corrupt? So you need to make it clear from the start: mistakes can be pardoned; corruption cannot. There can be no yellow cards – just red ones.

Two – let the market do the job. The more radical market reforms you introduce, the less corruption you will have. Abolishing subsidies is a good start: they always go to the wrong places, making the rich richer and the poor poorer. Simplifying the tax system and cutting taxes helps too – as does the abolition of custom tariffs, in which the EU plays a key role.

Three – make government smaller. This is often underestimated in the transition to a market economy. You can’t move your country to the future with the old machinery. So you need to break up the old structures that provide opportunities for corruption. A good way to start is to cut the government by half and double the salaries of those who remain. And then cut the size again by another 20%. Your new public service must be non-partisan and independent. As you go forward, keep government lean. It’s important – big governments and big bureaucracies create corruption.

Four – make everything public. Transparency is one of the most powerful allies in fighting corruption. When information on public spending, government agencies’ work and use of governmental benefits and privileges is freely available, it starts to reduce corruption. Modern technology can help a lot here. Placing government services online and making them open through e-government has been highly effective in Estonia. It doesn’t just cut the misuse of government credit cards and make sure government procurement is clean, it also cuts down on time and paper – and lets trees grow.

Five – let freedom reign. Freedom takes the state official out of the daily situations and transactions where corruption can occur. If you need to have a separate government document every time a house is built or renovated, there is a chance for corruption. When decisions – or the speed of decisions – depend on the will of a state official rather than the law of the land, you will have corruption. Abolish them and you find that nothing bad happens.

These conclusions are really quite simple. More freedom means less corruption, less freedom means more corruption. It’s just the same in sport. If you take away the competition and fair play, you will lose the spirit of sport. That’s what corruption does to all of our efforts, our dreams and our desires – in corrupt societies, they are thwarted and the human spirit is poorer as a result. We showed in Estonia that it doesn’t have to be like this. Together we can change it – together we can do it!

15.1 References

European Commission. 15 July 1997. Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the European Union. Brussels: European Commission. Available online .

Transparency International. 1998. Corruption Perceptions Index 1998. Available online .

16. José Ugaz: People’s power: taking action to demand accountability

16.1 introduction.

Over the past quarter of a century, the face of corruption has changed. And so has the anti-corruption movement.

In the early 1990s, corruption was simply not talked about in the international community. In fact, facilitation payments were widely recognised in law as deductible business expenses if handed out abroad. Back then, the focus of the emerging anti-corruption movement was to get corruption on the agenda: raising awareness of its devastating effects and showing its disproportionate impact on the poor. It is the most vulnerable people in our societies who too often have to make the hard choice to pay bribes to get the essential services they need, such as treatment for a sick grandparent or an education for their child.

This focus shifted in the late 1990s to creating ways to both measure corruption and develop the tools to prevent it. Launched in 1995, Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) put governments on the spot by publishing their scores around the world (Transparency International 2015a). By 2003, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) – now ratified by 178 countries – outlined a solid framework of anti- corruption laws (UNODC 2015). This came six years after the OECD Convention Against Foreign Bribery and seven years after the ground-breaking Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OECD 1997; International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 2012). The G20 has had an Anti-Corruption Action Plan since 2010 and the fight against corruption is now at the heart of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 16, promoting peace and justice with targets for tackling corruption (Transparency International 2015b; UN 2015).

Today many countries have solid anti-corruption legislation. But laws don’t work if they are not properly enforced. Corruption remains rife. Countries get used to failing scores and billions of dollars of illicit financial flows and money laundering provide luxury lifestyles for the corrupt. So what’s next? Pressure from the public is key.

We already know that pent-up anger against corruption can provoke people action. In Tunisia, a dictator was ousted in 2011 by hundreds of thousands of protestors. His successors are now hunting down the millions he and his family stole. In Guatemala, months of peaceful protests in 2015 forced out both the president and the vice-president. They are now in jail facing corruption charges. Marches against corruption in Brazil, Chile and Indonesia have also led to substantive changes to laws.

This shows how much can be achieved when people react to specific events, but the rejection of corruption needs to become more sustained. This essay explores the new tools that citizens can, and should, make use of to fight corruption both collectively and as individuals. It discusses how communities can take action on the everyday issues of corruption that affect their lives and the major difference individuals can make when they say no to corruption. It also looks at how we can and should act together against the phenomenon of grand corruption, something that our ever- more connected world is now making possible.

At TI, we define grand corruption as the abuse of high- level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society alike. Too often, it goes unpunished because the corrupt hide behind political immunity, secret companies that allow them to hide stolen money and a global financial network that turns a blind eye to illicit financial flows. Even here, citizen action can make a difference to unmask the corrupt. I strongly believe that it will be pressure from people around the world – coming together, using new technologies and speaking with a united bold voice to demand justice – that will start to hold the grand corrupt to account. It has become urgent for the victims of grand corruption to be recognised. Together, we can all help to stop the current trend.

16.2 The power of the masses

Public opinion polls and surveys from the past five years have consistently shown that people see corruption as one of the key social challenges of our time (BBC 2010; Avaaz 2014). When a United Nations online poll consistently featured corruption as a top priority for the next generation of Sustainable Development Goals, this was translated into Goal 16, which commits all governments to “provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions” (UN 2016; UN 2015, p. 2).

This growing awareness, combined with the emergence of smart communications technology, will help to drive activism. Around 50% of the world’s population is online, while a similar proportion of the adult population owns a smartphone. By 2020, this is expected to rise to 80% (The Economist 2015).

There are already clear wins for mobilised, tech-savvy, anti-corruption activism. In Brazil, for example, a new law took effect in 2010 called Ficha Limpa, or Clean Record, which prevents candidates who have been convicted of corruption, mismanagement of public funds or electoral violations from standing for public office for at least eight years. It came about because more than 40 civil society organisations were able to mobilise two million Brazilian citizens to use online actions, together with events, to campaign for the legislation (Salas 2010). This is especially important in a country where TI studies show that 81% and 72% of people respectively feel that political parties and the legislature are corrupt or extremely corrupt (Transparency International 2013a).

Thanks to this law, Brazilian courts barred 317 mayoral candidates – who had criminal records – from running for office in the 2012 municipal election. In the 2014 general election, this rose to 497 (Alves 2014). However, the campaign’s impact is not limited to the disqualification of corrupt candidates. Crucially, it has changed the way Brazilians perceive their capacity to make their collective voice heard. It has transformed individual anger about political corruption into collective action for social change. In our latest survey, 81% of Brazilians now believe that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption (Transparency International 2013a).

Use of social media helped ignite and organise the uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East. It allowed millions of people to share messages of civil resistance and collective activism. Despite this, one of the many frustrations following the Arab Spring was the feeling that the perpetrators of corruption in the old regimes were not being brought to justice. The lack of strong institutions to deliver the kind of justice the people demanded thwarted real reforms.

In Guatemala, a similar story of disaffected citizenry turned out differently, because three key factors came together: technology, people and an institutional pressure for accountability.

Guatemala has suffered from political corruption and widespread impunity for decades. The justice system was seen as weak and co-opted by powerful interests. Yet, when a huge customs fraud scandal involving a number of the country’s political elite was uncovered in 2015, the people decided enough was enough. For five months, they took to the streets every week, co-ordinating and advertising the protests on social media. Their numbers swelled. This, combined with pressure from emboldened national prosecutors who were working alongside international investigators from the UN, eventually forced the country’s president and vice- president to resign. They were arrested shortly afterwards. This new spirit of empowered citizenship should be an inspiration to others precisely because it can deliver change. It gives legitimacy to legal action in the spirit of democracy. It is the will of the people.

16.3 Communities taking action

Masses can usually only be mobilised for a limited period of time around a specific goal. Their successes are watershed moments for all involved, yet they signal the beginning rather than the end of a long process. Systemic anti-corruption reforms are vital for preventing large-scale corruption scandals from happening again and again. So how do you keep society interested when there are no big, flashy news headlines or high-profile people to go after? By showing it that engagement matters.

When we think of communities, we think of the basic services that people need: education, health, waste collection, public transport and roads. Often communities are one step removed from how these are funded. Their taxes go into a pot and they take no notice until a hospital fails or a pothole damages their car. But we can only know whether money is well spent if we have access to information about it. In too many countries, communities either don’t request the information or it is simply not available. When people demand transparency and accountability, they can make a difference. They need to participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect their daily lives.

This is what happened in a school just outside Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. Corruption in education is a significant challenge in Bangladesh and particularly affects the poor. Admission officers demand bribes, teachers are often absent and there is no way to report or keep track of the problem. One school decided to change the way things worked. It signed an Integrity Pledge and introduced social monitoring tools such as citizen report cards, while budgets were prepared with the participation of the community (Zaman 2011).

Within a year, the dropout rate fell from 30% to 7%, the collection of unauthorised payments stopped, scholarships were distributed transparently and 100% of students passed the annual final examination. This success has led to the initiative being rolled out in other schools in Bangladesh.

Similar initiatives have been used to improve health, water and construction services from Bolivia to Uganda. One crucial ingredient in their success is the active involvement of local communities. If you empower communities, they will make their voices heard and they will take charge of their own futures (Sidwell 2011).

The other crucial element is transparency. Having access to information is a precondition for making informed decisions and holding public officials and elected leaders to account. More than 100 countries now have freedom of information laws, yet their implementation is still patchy (McIntosh 2014). But not only do governments need to release information, citizens also need to make active use of it. This combination of information and activism can be a potent tool.

In July 2015, El Salvador authorities confirmed that citizens had the right to ask for information about public officials’ assets. This is important because, if you can track wealth over time, it can show whether officials are using their positions for illicit gain. In less than four months, Salvadoran citizens submitted close to 6,000 requests for information. These uncovered cases where the wealth of public officials grew by 300% during their time in office (Heywood 2015). Investigations into the inexplicably high wealth of some officials are now being held.

New technologies are facilitating this push for transparency. ‘Big data’ may be a buzzword, but its trickle- down effect can allow ordinary people to search and evaluate important information. There is no reason why local, regional and national governments cannot put their records online and create a platform for citizens to search data on public tenders, tax spending or any other part of the day-to-day running of communities.

Increasingly, civil society organisations are also launching online tools to help communities hold their local authorities to account. Through Fix My Street, people in Georgia can flag construction and infrastructure issues in their neighbourhood to the mayor’s office and track repairs (Transparency International 2013b). The online portal has triggered the fixing of hundreds of problems. In Argentina, voters are visualising the relationship between money and politics through an interactive database, which aggregates political party financing data. The site allows citizens to see where party funds are coming from and where they are going (Transparency International 2012). In Lithuania, manoSeimas (My Parliament) lets users find out how parliamentarians have been voting on policy issues (Transparency International 2016a).

The tools to hold elected officials to account are beginning to expand. It is up to people to start using them. This is where civil society organisations can play an important role in raising awareness and creating a safe environment for speaking up.

16.4 Individuals can make a difference

For too many people, the idea that a corrupt system can change is difficult to believe; they simply accept corruption as business as usual. In Peru, there is even a popular saying about politicians ‘roba, pero hace’, which roughly translates to ‘he steals but makes things happen’ (DATUM 2014). More than half of all Peruvians are willing to vote for corrupt politicians as long as they ‘do work’ (Ipsos Perú 2014). Sadly, every year, one in four people around the world pay a bribe to access public services (Hardoon and Heinrich 2013). In Cambodia, India and Kenya, this figure is even higher than one in two. In Mexico, a family spends on average 14% of its income on bribes for basic services they are entitled to, such as water, medicine and education (Transparencia Mexicana 2011).

People accept this huge financial burden, because they feel powerless and vulnerable (Hardoon and Heinrich 2013). They believe reporting corruption won’t make a difference and could put them or their family in danger. Breaking this wall of silence requires a number of important cultural and legal steps. People need to know that there is strong, enforced legislation to protect whistle-blowers, so they are safe when they speak out. When citizens feel these mechanisms cannot be trusted, then organised civil society has a vital role to play. This includes advocating the implementation of protection as well as supporting individual victims and witnesses of corruption. The results can be impressive.

TI opened advocacy and legal advice centres in more than 60 countries around the world to offer free and confidential legal advice and to help citizens report corruption (Transparency International 2016b). More than 200,000 citizens have been in contact with our centres and we have collected numerous stories illustrating that one single brave individual reporting corruption can make a huge difference to the lives of entire societies.

In the Czech Republic, a whistle-blower on environmental corruption helped to save the country more than €2 billion (Transparency International 2015c). In Nepal, money that was meant for women giving birth in remote regions but stolen by healthcare officials was returned and redistributed where it was needed most (Transparency International 2015d). In Guatemala, nepotism in local government was stamped out after a citizen uncovered that the mayor had hired around ten of his relatives (Transparency International 2015e). In March 2015, Transparencia Venezuela launched a smartphone app Dilo Aquí, which allows ordinary citizens to report instances of bribery and any irregularities during elections (Transparencia Venezuela 2015a). In the parliamentary elections in December 2015, more than 400 complaints of electoral abuse were registered via the app that were then channelled to the National Electoral Council and the Comptroller General for follow-up (Transparencia Venezuela 2015b).

The goal is to encourage, cajole, educate and empower more citizens to speak out and speak out safely. This affects us all. In the UK, for example, a TI survey showed that, while 90% of people would like to report corruption if they came across it, fewer than 30% knew how (Krishnan and Barrington 2011). Individuals everywhere need to take their responsibility as citizens seriously and speak up for their right to live in a society free of corruption. When they do that, governments and institutions have to listen and act.

16.5 The new challenge: bringing down grand corruption

Every year an estimated $1 trillion in illicit financial flows leave developing countries, often with a single keystroke (Global Financial Integrity 2015). The majority of these funds end up in developed countries. Be it in a property in London or a bank account in Switzerland, the effects on the local economies left behind are devastating. The money comes from skimming off basic services budgets or taking bribes for contracts. Such abuse of entrusted power for private gain has immediate consequences on people – victims are often left helpless.

We want to see behavioural and systemic change in the next ten years and we want victims to be recognised and taken into serious consideration. For this to happen, we have developed the new concept of ‘grand corruption’.

Unfortunately, examples of grand corruption are everywhere. The Chinaleaks documents showed how the country’s elite funnelled billions of dollars of corrupt money into so-called ‘safe havens’ such as the Bahamas using shell companies (Boehler 2014). The President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, and his son Teodoro are estimated to have allegedly siphoned off more than $300 million from state coffers to buy a luxury lifestyle in Paris and the United States, while the majority of the country’s population lives in poverty. Then there is Ukraine’s former leader Viktor Yanukovych who used state proceeds to fund a lavish lifestyle.

Think also of the billions of dollars’ worth of fines the big banks, including household names such as Barclays, HSBC, Citibank and BNP Paribas, have had to pay for institutionalised corruption like rigging exchange rates, mis-selling products and helping clients avoid anti-money laundering rules and evade taxes.

We witness human rights abuses in cases of grand corruption. There are victims. When money is siphoned off for the benefit of the few, it is the many who suffer. Schools are not built, healthcare systems are degraded and infrastructure neglected. It exacerbates poverty and exclusion. Grand corruption also damages democracy and good governance. When a state is captured, such as allegedly happened in Guatemala under President Otto Pérez Molina, then insecurity and instability are high. It is the citizens that pay the price.

Unfortunately, grand corruption often goes unpunished. In the case of corporations, too often it is the shareholders who pay the fines, not the individuals who commit the crimes.

To change this, we need help from citizens. They have to use all the tools for fighting corruption outlined above – technology, community actions and mass movements - to demand justice and unmask the corrupt both in the countries where the corrupt money is generated and, just as importantly, in the countries where it ends up.

Money laundering is not just a term used to describe Mafia-style organised crimes. It might be the way your neighbour bought their flat via a secret offshore company, or the cash payments used to purchase a luxury watch. Citizens living in countries on the receiving end of corrupt money need to be part of the fight against grand corruption too. And this is where awareness raising is still in its infancy. We as civil society are calling on governments to put mechanisms in place that prevent dirty cash from entering their countries. But because this type of corruption is not obvious to citizens of dirty money destinations – in fact it can actually add to economic growth – there is still limited will from citizens to pressure their leaders or take action themselves.

The G20 has taken up this cause at a high level. It remains for the countries themselves to introduce the legislation and enforce it. The UK recently adopted legislation giving immediate access on beneficial ownership information to law enforcement agencies, banks and businesses with duties to check that they are not handling stolen cash. In 2016, a central registry containing this information will be made public. It is time for more countries to follow suit and for citizens to campaign to ensure that they do.

More and more, journalists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – using new online search tools to follow money – are exposing cases of grand corruption and pressing for criminal investigations and indictments. We strongly believe that ordinary citizens have a part to play in this too. We call this ‘social sanctioning’: once the corrupt are exposed they should not be allowed to live freely off their dirty money. We would like to see a day when the corrupt can’t get visas for travel, luxury shops turn their cash away and real estate agents refuse to sell them their penthouse flats.

16.6 Conclusion

Without active citizens the fight against corruption cannot be won. People need to say no to corruption on every level. They need to speak out against extortion and denounce leaders and companies who are exposed as engaging in corruption. They need to take responsibility for their own actions and demand the same from their peers. Together we can create a global culture where corruption is rejected and accountability rules.

There are plenty of examples where this has happened.But the feeling of disempowerment is still too widespread. People need to turn the anger and helplessness they feel into active rejection of the status quo. Civil society organisations can help create awareness and mobilisation, but governments have to enforce laws that show the corrupt will be held to account.

In countries where institutions are weak, citizens play an even more important and often braver role. Those who speak out can be targets, but not everyone has to be on the front line. Take the example of the school in Bangladesh: it was parents and local organisers who asked the school to note who showed up to teach and to commit to not asking for admissions bribes. These small steps led to measurable improvements – the kids passed their exams.

Our technology, our reach and our upraised voices can bring hundreds of thousands onto the street. These things can also be used to simply draw attention to the inconsistencies between a local politician’s lifestyle and their publicly declared salary. It is the combination of our loud indignation and our quiet vigilance that will put an end to corruption, both grand and not so grand.

16.7 References

Alves, L. 16 September 2014. Ficha Limpa Law Forces Candidates to Withdraw. The Rio Times. Available online .

Avaaz. 2014. Where next for Avaaz in 2014? Setting the agenda. Available online .

BBC Press. 9 December 2010. Global poll: Corruption is world’s most talked about problem. Available online .

Boehler, P. 22 January 2014. ChinaLeaks: Exposé on Chinese elite’s offshore accounts comes at sensitive time. South China Morning Post – China Insider. Available online .

DATUM. 2014. Perú 21 – ELECCIONES 2016. Available online

Economist, The. 28 February 2015. Planet of the Phones. [online]. Available online .

Global Financial Integrity. 2015. Illicit Financial Flows. Available online .

Hardoon, D. and Heinrich, F. 2013. Global Corruption Barometer 2013: Report. Berlin: Transparency International. Available from: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report Heywood, M. 13 November 2015. When Transparency Rules. Transparency International blog. Available online .

International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities. 15 February 2012. Organization of American States (OAS). Available online .

Ipsos Perú. September 2014. Informe de Opinión Data – Perú, septiembre de 2014. Available online .

Krishnan, C. and Barrington, R. 2011. Corruption in the UK: Overview and Policy Recommendations. UK: Transparency International.

McIntosh, T. 19 September 2014. Paraguay is 100th nation to pass FOI law, but struggle for openness goes on. The Guardian. Available online .

OECD. 1997. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Available online .

Salas, A. 22 June 2010. Aiming for a clean record in Brazil. Available online .

Sidwell, M. 25 August 2011. Race to the top. Transparency International blog. Available online .

Transparencia Mexicana. 10 May 2011. Índice Nacional De Corrupción Y Buen Gobierno. Available online .

Transparencia Venezuela. 19 March 2015a. Transparencia Venezuela lanzó ‘Dilo aquí’, una aplicación para denunciar. El Universal. Available online .

Transparencia Venezuela. 6 December 2015b. Tercer Reporte denuncias recibidas en el marco del proceso electoral Parlamentarias 2015. Available online .

Transparency International. 2012. Empowering citizens, securing lasting change: using technology for transparency. Berlin: Transparency International. Available online

Transparency International. 2013a. Global Corruption Barometer – Brazil. Available online .

Transparency International. 2013b. Fix My Street. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015a. Corruption Perceptions Index – Overview. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015b. Our work on the G20. [online]. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015c. True Stories – Hidden Costs. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015d. True Stories – Birth Rights. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015e. True Stories – Family Affairs. Available online .

Transparency International. 2016a. ManoSeimas.lt. Available online

Transparency International. 2016b. Get involved – Report Corruption. Available online .

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015. Available [online]((https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories. html).

United Nations. 2015. Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies; Sustainable Development Goals. Available online .

United Nations. 2016. Segments & Priorities – MY Analytics. Available online .

Zaman, I. 2011. Realising the MDGs by 2015: Anti- corruption in Bangladesh. Berlin/Bangladesh: Transparency International. Available online .

An important exception to this was the republican tradition, which started in Greece and Rome, and was adopted by numerous city states in Italy, the Netherlands and elsewhere. The very term ‘republic’ comes from the Latin res publica, or ‘public thing,’ denoting that the political order was representative of a larger public good.  ↩

A classic case was the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand: a highly corrupt individual, but a very talented diplomat, who helped negotiate the settlement at the Congress of Vienna.  ↩

Interview with Ms Mpho Letima, Fellow, African Leadership Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 28 October 2015.  ↩

A search for the term ‘Cyprus’ on www.occrp.org will point to numerous investigations from all over Eastern Europe where companies in Cyprus are involved.  ↩

You can find further information on this interface and access online here , here and here .  ↩

Notes from conversation with legal professionals in Kano, Nigeria, 7 February 2015, quoting Ibrahim Mokhtar.  ↩

Notes from conversation with tribal elders from Shah Wali Kot District, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 24 May 2009; names withheld for security reasons.  ↩

Notes from trip to Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, 25 May 2009.  ↩

Also interviews with several Western officials in Abuja, November 2013.  ↩

Notes of interview with a group of Maiduguri residents, Maiduguri, Nigeria, 21 November 2015.  ↩

Longo, Canetti and Hite-Rubin reference the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, and the wider violent unrest on the West Bank.  ↩

Ibid., notes Kano, Nigeria.  ↩

Ibid., notes Maiduguri, Nigeria.  ↩

Notes of conversation with Sardar Muhammad, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 20 November 2010.  ↩

See also numerous Dutch petitions to King Phillip II of Spain 1550–1580.  ↩

Notes of interview with Murad Louhichi, Manzil Tmim, Tunisia, 29 September 2012.  ↩

Notes of interview with ‘Rustam’ (name changed for security reasons), Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 23 February 2014.  ↩

This is a view I encountered frequently when covering the Algerian civil war for National Public Radio in the late 1990s.  ↩

Conversation with Debra Laprevotte, 15 September 2015.  ↩

In the event, the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), the world cycling governing body, cleared Delgado. He was not docked ten minutes and went on to win the 1988 Tour de France.  ↩

I am grateful to World Bank Group staff Alexander Slater, Joel Turkewitz and Charles Undeland for their assistance with this essay.  ↩

See also Olken, B. 2007. Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), pp. 200– 248.  ↩

This 2015 estimate is an extrapolation by Daniel Kaufmann based on his work in Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption (2005).  ↩

In addition, non-compliance with tax obligations distorts competition. See IMF. 2015a. Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization. Washington DC: IMF.  ↩

See also, for example, Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. 2002. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 280–299. Military spending is, in addition, prone to corruption, because of secrecy and a lack of transparency (see Gupta, S., de Mello, L. and Sharan, R. 2002. Corruption and Military Spending. In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 300–332).  ↩

While the analysis of the association between corruption and growth remains controversial, a meta-analysis of 52 cross-country studies found that a one-unit increase in the perceived corruption index is associated with a nearly 1 percentage-point decrease in the growth rate of per capita GDP (see Ugur, M. and Dasgupta, N. 2011. Evidence on the Economic Growth Impacts of Corruption in Low-Income Countries and Beyond: A Systematic Review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London).  ↩

Over the past decade, risk-rating agencies have realised that their previous models, driven by economic variables alone, were unsatisfactory and have incorporated governance and corruption factors, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators.  ↩

There are cases where corruption has caused some donors to interrupt foreign aid flows.  ↩

For example, the Fiscal Transparency Evaluation conducted by the Fund in Mozambique (the first in Sub-Saharan Africa) identified a need for greater transparency in public procurement and state-owned enterprises (see IMF. 2015c. Republic of Mozambique – Fiscal Transparency Evaluation). In Tunisia, the Fund has supported the development of a more transparent budget law that would strengthen budget preparation and execution procedures and introduce performance-based budgeting.  ↩

Many countries are taking the positive step of automating public services, which not only allows for simplification and efficiency, but also eliminates the potential for abuse of discretion.  ↩

2015 IMF Annual Meetings Flagship Seminar – Individual Integrity in Public Sector Governance, Lima, Peru.  ↩

A good example is the ‘I paid a bribe’ website in India (www.ipaidabribe. com). For other examples in Bhutan, Pakistan and Kenya, see Strom, S. 2012. Websites shine light on petty bribery worldwide. New York Times. 6 March 2012. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/ business/web-sites-shine-light-on-petty-bribery-worldwide.html?_r=0).  ↩

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Public Policy on Corruption Essay

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Introduction

Corruption denotes improper utilization of public office for personal gains. Widespread corruption is a clear indication that a given government is malfunctioning. A public policy created in this context regards anti-corruption. It is important to endorse a public policy, which advocates that no individual or any public/private office should indulge in corrupt dealings of any form. In most cases, characteristics of corruption are practiced in markets or organizations.

A lot of studies carried out indicate that corruption does not only reduce economic growth but it also lowers investments. This indicates why the proposed public policy is necessary. Corruption leads to reduced private savings and also destroys political stability. Foreign investors have also shown little interest in countries showing high prevalence of corruption. Studies also indicate that the level of corruption in countries importing goods have a negative effect on the business structures (Kellow, 2007).

A number of scholars have greatly contributed toward the analysis of corruption. The major reasons why corruption exists are low pay and poor monitoring system. Despite, an anticorruption policy will be viable in this context. Consequently, to create reliable policies on corruption, the government and the public should cooperate in eliminating such vices. In addition, action should be taken against those who violate these laws.

Details of the policy based on the Rational Model

This policy is going to affect all shareholder and employees. In addition, it will be applied to all the directors and officers in every institution. Going against the policy will lead to a severe punishment and disciplinary measures. An individual found corrupt will not only be sucked from his or her job but will also be referred to the relevant authority for castigation. With regard to the rational model, implementing this theory will experience some challenges.

In addition, some of the policymakers will not completely contribute to its implementation when they realize that it may affect them later. For example, a corrupt politician will be against the enforcement of this policy. However, to obtain zero tolerance on corruption, the following policies are required.

Employees are not allowed to take or give bribes for their own personal gains. Conversely, it is also illegal for employees to make some donations in form of payment with an aim of gaining. They are also prohibited from facilitating payments. According to the proposed anticorruption policy, it is also illegal for them to give gifts to clients and government officials.

In addition, when carrying out company business, an employee is not allowed to provide any gifts and entertainments to influence the rationality of such individuals. Records on the other hand must also be properly kept, all expenses are required to be adequately documented and maintained for long (Mbaku, 2007).

Before doing any business with a third party, an employee should ensure that the involved official meet the record keeping standards with regard to expenses connected with government officials. A written approval is generally needed when a given threshold has been exceeded. Before making any contracts with an organization, the employee must make sure that he or she is aware of the company’s background.

In addition, the employee should also have some information on the reputation of the company and its business capability. However, such acts must also contain provisions on anti-corruption. Finally, to ensure that there is compliance, proper training with regard to policies on anti-corruption as well as their roles must be carried out to the employees. When it comes to implementing these policies, some policymakers will not fully contribute to it due to their selfish interests.

The rationale of the policy

The rationale of this policy is to eliminate corruption. Internationally, corruption is hardly accepted. Factually, the vice slows down growth and development within institutions. Conversely, the policy intends to create viable provisions meant to deal with various aspects of corruption. This will be applicable to both public and private sectors. It is crucial to agree that the atrocities created by corruption are numerous. Nonetheless, it is possible to curb this menace despite the looming challenges.

How the model will assist policymakers in decision-making and implementation processes

This model is going to ensure that there is no biasness when it comes to the establishment and implementation of the concerned policy. In addition, people with self-interests will also be accommodated (Sapru, 2010). Besides, this model will ensure that there is universality when it comes to the application of these policies. Every policymaker will equally contribute to putting these policies into practice. Consequently, full transparency will be observed.

Evaluating the Rational Model

Contextually, the model monitors adherence to virtues concerning anti-corruption policies. This concerns the formulation of credible public policies. Additionally, the model exhausts all provisions of the policy-making criteria. It recognizes every aspect of viable public policies. Rationally, the model identifies the provisions of self-interest and biasness that might occur during the formulation of the previously mentioned public policy (anti-corruption policy).

It is important to report any suspected violation of anti-corruption policy to the concerned authorities as required by the model (Nicholls, 2011). Precisely, this model provides credible structures helpful in establishing, implementing, and evaluating the concerned policy. Hence, this indicates the viability of this model in formulating functional public policies.

Kellow, A. J. (2007). Science and public policy: The virtuous corruption of virtual environmental science . Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Mbaku, J. (2007). Corruption in Africa: Causes, consequences, and cleanups . Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Nicholls, C. (2011). Corruption and misuse of public office . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sapru, R. (2010). Public policy: Art and craft of policy analysis . New Delhi: PHI Learning.

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The causes and effects of corruption, and how to combat corruption, are issues that have been very much on the national and international agendas of politicians and other policymakers in recent decades (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Heywood 2018). Moreover, various historically influential philosophers, notably Plato ( The Republic ), Aristotle ( The Politics ), Machiavelli ( The Prince and The Discourses ), Hobbes ( The Leviathan ) and Montesquieu ( The Spirit of the Laws ), have concerned themselves with political corruption in particular, albeit in somewhat general terms (Sparling 2019; Blau 2009). For these philosophers corruption consisted in large part in rulers governing in the service of their own individual or collective—or other factional—self-interest, rather than for the common good and in accordance with the law or, at least, in accordance with legally enshrined moral principles. They also emphasized the importance of virtues, where it was understood that the appropriate virtues for rulers might differ somewhat from the appropriate virtues for citizens. Indeed, Machiavelli, in particular, famously or, perhaps, infamously argued in The Prince that the rulers might need to cultivate dispositions, such as ruthlessness, that are inconsistent with common morality. [ 1 ] And Plato doubted that the majority of people were even capable of possessing the requisite moral and intellectual virtues required to play an important role in political institutions; hence his rejection in The Republic of democracy in favor of rule by philosopher-kings. Moreover, these historically important political philosophers were concerned about the corruption of the citizenry: the corrosion of the civic virtues. This theme of a corrupt citizenry, as opposed to a corrupt leadership or institution, has been notably absent in contemporary philosophical discussion of the corruption of political institutions until quite recently. However, recently the corruption of political institutions and of the citizenry as a consequence of the proliferation of disinformation, propaganda, conspiracy theories and hate speech on social media, in particular (Woolley and Howard 2019), has become an important phenomenon which philosophers have begun to address (Lynch 2017; Cocking and van den Hoven 2018; Miller and Bossomaier 2023: Ch. 4). Social media bots are used inter alia to automatically generate disinformation (as well as information), propagate ideologies (as well as non-ideologically based opinions), and function as fake accounts to inflate the followings of other accounts and to gain followers. The upshot is that the moral right of freedom to communicate has frequently not been exercised responsibly; moral obligations to seek and communicate truths rather than falsehoods have not been discharged, resulting in large-scale social, political and, in some cases, physical harm. One key set of ethical issues here pertains to an important form of institutional corruption: corruption of the democratic process. For instance, revelations concerning the data firm Cambridge Analytica’s illegitimate use of the data of millions of Facebook users to influence elections in the U.S. and elsewhere highlighted the ethical issues arising from the use of machine learning techniques for political purposes by malevolent foreign actors. The problem here is compounded by home-grown corruption of democratic institutions by people who wilfully undermine electoral and other institutional processes in the service of their own political and personal goals. For instance, Donald Trump consistently claimed, and continues to claim, that the 2020 U.S. presidential election which he demonstrably lost involved massive voter fraud. The problem has also been graphically illustrated in the U.S. by the rise of home-grown extremist political groups fed via social media on a diet of disinformation, conspiracy theories, hate speech, and propaganda; a process which led to the violent attack in January 2021 on the Capitol building which houses the U.S. Congress.

In the modern period, in addition to the corruption of political institutions, the corruption of other kinds of institutions, notably market-based institutions, has been recognised. For example, the World Bank (1997) some time back came around to the view that the health of economic institutions and progress in economic development is closely linked to corruption reduction. In this connection there have been numerous anti-corruption initiatives in multiple jurisdictions, albeit this is sometimes presented as politically motivated. Moreover, the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath have revealed financial corruption, including financial benchmark manipulation, and spurred regulators to consider various anti-corruption measures by way of response (Dobos, Pogge and Barry 2011). And in recent decades there have been ongoing efforts to analyze and devise means to combat corruption in in police organizations, in the professions, in the media, and even in universities and other research-focused institutions.

While contemporary philosophers, with some exceptions, have been slow to focus on corruption, the philosophical literature is increasing, especially in relation to political corruption (Thompson 1995; Dobel 2002; Warren 2006; Lessig 2011; Newhouse 2014; Philp and David-Barrett 2015; Miller 2017; Schmidtz 2018; Blau 2018; Philp 2018; Thompson 2018; Sparling 2019; Ceva & Ferretti 2021). For instance, until relatively recently the concept of corruption had not received much attention, and much of the conceptual work on corruption had consisted in little more than the presentation of brief definitions of corruption as a preliminary to extended accounts of the causes and effects of corruption and the ways to combat it. Moreover, most, but not all, of these definitions of corruption were unsatisfactory in fairly obvious ways. However, recently a number of more theoretically sophisticated definitions of corruption and related notions, such as bribery, have been provided by philosophers. Indeed, philosophers have also started to turn their minds to issues of anti-corruption, e.g., anti-corruption systems (often referred to as “integrity systems”), and in doing so theorizing the sources of corruption and the means to combat it.

1. Varieties of Corruption

2.1.1 personal corruption and institutional corruption, 2.1.2 institutional corrosion and structural corruption, 2.1.3 institutional actors and corruption, 2.2 causal theory of institutional corruption, 2.3.1 proceduralist theories of political corruption, 2.3.2 thompson: individual versus institutional corruption, 2.3.3 lessig’s dependence corruption, 2.3.4 ceva & ferretti: office accountability, 3. noble cause corruption, 4. integrity systems, 5. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Consider one of the most popular of the standard longstanding definitions, namely, “Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official for private gain”. [ 2 ] No doubt the abuse of public offices for private gain is paradigmatic of corruption. But when a bettor bribes a boxer to “throw” a fight this is corruption for private gain, but it need not involve any public office holder; the roles of boxer and bettor are usually not public offices.

One response to this is to distinguish public corruption from private corruption, and to argue that the above definition is a definition only of public corruption. But if ordinary citizens lie when they give testimony in court, this is corruption; it is corruption of the criminal justice system. However, it does not involve abuse of a public office by a public official. And when police fabricate evidence out of a misplaced sense of justice, this is corruption of a public office, but not for private gain.

In the light of the failure of such analytical-style definitions it is tempting to try to sidestep the problem of providing a theoretical account of the concept of corruption by simply identifying corruption with specific legal and/or moral offences. However, attempts to identify corruption with specific legal/moral offences are unlikely to succeed. Perhaps the most plausible candidate is bribery; bribery is regarded by some as the quintessential form of corruption (Noonan 1984; Pritchard 1998; Green 2006). But what of nepotism (Bellow 2003)? Surely it is also a paradigmatic form of corruption, and one that is conceptually distinct from bribery. The person who accepts a bribe is understood as being required to provide a benefit to the briber, otherwise it is not a bribe; but the person who is the beneficiary of an act of nepotism is not necessarily understood as being required to return the favor.

In fact, corruption is exemplified by a very wide and diverse array of phenomena of which bribery is only one kind, and nepotism another. Paradigm cases of corruption include the following. The commissioner of taxation channels public monies into his personal bank account, thereby corrupting the public financial system. A political party secures a majority vote by arranging for ballot boxes to be stuffed with false voting papers, thereby corrupting the electoral process. A police officer fabricates evidence in order to secure convictions, thereby corrupting the judicial process. A number of doctors close ranks and refuse to testify against a colleague who they know has been negligent in relation to an unsuccessful surgical operation leading to loss of life; institutional accountability procedures are thereby undermined. A sports trainer provides the athletes he trains with banned substances in order to enhance their performance, thereby subverting the institutional rules laid down to ensure fair competition (Walsh and Giulianotti 2006). It is self-evident that none of these corrupt actions are instances of bribery.

Further, it is far from obvious that the way forward at this point is simply to add a few additional offences to the initial “list” consisting of the single offence of bribery. Candidates for being added to the list of offences would include nepotism, police fabricating evidence, cheating in sport by using drugs, fraudulent use of travel funds by politicians, and so on. However, any such list needs to be justified by recourse to some principle or principles. Ultimately, naming a set of offences that might be regarded as instances of corruption does not obviate the need for a theoretical, or quasi-theoretical, account of the concept of corruption.

As it happens, there is at least one further salient strategy for demarcating the boundaries of corrupt acts. Implicit in much of the literature on corruption is the view that corruption is essentially a legal offence, and essentially a legal offence in the economic sphere. Accordingly, one could seek to identify corruption with economic crimes, such as bribery, fraud, and insider trading.

But many acts of corruption are not unlawful. Bribery, a paradigm of corruption, is a case in point. Prior to 1977 it was not unlawful for U.S. companies to offer bribes to secure foreign contracts; indeed, elsewhere such bribery was not unlawful until much later. [ 3 ] So corruption is not necessarily unlawful. This is because corruption is not at bottom simply a matter of law; rather it is fundamentally a matter of morality.

Secondly, corruption is not necessarily economic in character. An academic who plagiarizes the work of others is not committing an economic crime or misdemeanor; and she might be committing plagiarism simply in order to increase her academic status. There might not be any financial benefit sought or gained.

We can conclude that many of the historically influential definitions of corruption, as well as attempts to circumscribe corruption by listing paradigmatic offences, fail. They fail in large part because the class of corrupt actions comprises an extremely diverse array of types of moral and legal offences undertaken in a wide variety of institutional contexts including, but by no means restricted to, political and economic institutions.

However, in recent times progress has been made. Philosophers, at least, have identified corruption as fundamentally a moral, as opposed to legal, phenomenon. Acts can be corrupt even though they are, and even ought to be, legal. Moreover, it is evident that not all acts of immorality are acts of corruption; corruption is only one species of immorality.

An important distinction in this regard is the distinction between human rights violations and corruption (see the entry on human rights ). Genocide is a profound moral wrong; but it is not corruption. This is not to say that there is not an important relationship between human rights violations and corruption; on the contrary, there is often a close and mutually reinforcing nexus between them (Pearson 2001; Pogge 2002 [2008]; Wenar 2016; Sharman 2017). Consider the endemic corruption and large-scale human rights abuse that have taken place in authoritarian regimes, such as that of Mobutu in Zaire, Suharto in Indonesia and Marcos in the Philippines (Sharman 2017). And there is increasing empirical evidence of an admittedly sometimes complex, but sometimes not so complex, causal connection between corruption and the infringement of both negative rights (such as the right not to be tortured, suffer arbitrary loss of one’s freedom, or have one’s property stolen) and positive rights, e.g., subsistence rights (such as the right to a sufficient supply of clean water to enable life and health); there is evidence, that is, of a causal relation between corruption and poverty. Consider corrupt authoritarian leaders in developing countries who sell the country’s natural resources cheaply and retain the profits for themselves and their families and supporters (Pogge 2002 [2008]: Chapter 6; Wenar 2016). As Wenar has forcefully argued (Wenar 2016), in the first place this is theft of the property (natural resources) of the people of the countries in question (e.g., Equatorial Guinea) by their own rulers (e.g., Obiang) and, therefore, western countries and others who import these resources are buying stolen goods; and, in the second place, this theft maintains these human rights-violating rulers in power and ensures that their populations continue to suffer in conditions of abject poverty, disease etc.

Thus far, examples of different types of corrupt action have been presented, and corrupt actions have been distinguished from some other types of immoral action. However, the class of corrupt actions has not been adequately demarcated within the more general class of immoral actions. To do so, a definition of corrupt actions is needed.

An initial distinction here is between single one-off actions of corruption and a pattern of corrupt actions. The despoiling of the moral character of a role occupant, or the undermining of institutional processes and purposes, would typically require a pattern of actions—and not merely a single one-off action. So a single free hamburger provided to a police officer on one occasion usually does not corrupt, and is not therefore an act of corruption. Nevertheless, a series of such gifts to a number of police officers might corrupt. They might corrupt, for example, if the hamburger joint in question ended up with (in effect) exclusive, round the clock police protection, and if the owner intended that this be the case.

Note here the pivotal role of habits (Langford & Tupper 1994). We have just seen that the corruption of persons and institutions typically requires a pattern of corrupt actions. More specifically, corrupt actions are typically habitual. Yet, as noted by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics , one’s habits are in large part constitutive of one’s moral character; habits make the man (and the woman). The coward is someone who habitually takes flight in the face of danger; by contrast, the courageous person has a habit of standing his or her ground. Accordingly, morally bad habits —including corrupt actions—are extremely corrosive of moral character, and therefore of institutional roles and ultimately institutions. Naturally, so-called systemic corruption would typically involve not simply the habitual performance of a corrupt action by a single individual but the habitual performance of a corrupt action by many individuals in an institution or, conceivably, an entire society or polity. Moreover, this pattern of individuals engaged in the performance of habitual corrupt actions might have a self-sustaining structure that gives rise to a collective action problem, if the pattern is to be broken. Consider widespread bribery in relation to competitive tenders for government contracts. Bribes are paid by competing companies in order to try influence the outcome of the tender process. Any firm that chooses not to pay a bribe is not given serious consideration. Thus, not to engage in corruption is to seriously disadvantage one’s company. Even those who do not want to engage in bribery do so. This is a collective action problem (Olson 1965).

Notwithstanding the habitual nature of most corrupt actions there are some cases in which a single, one-off action would be sufficient to corrupt an instance of an institutional process. Consider a specific tender. Suppose that one bribe is offered and accepted, and the tendering process is thereby undermined. Suppose that this is the first and only time that the person offering the bribe and the person receiving the bribe are involved in bribery. Is this one-off bribe an instance of corruption? Surely it is, since it corrupted that particular instance of a tendering process.

Ontologically speaking, there are different kinds of entities that can be corrupted. These include human beings, words of a language, artefacts, such as computer discs, and so on. However, our concern in this entry is with the corruption of institutions since this is the main focus of the philosophical and, for that matter, the non-philosophical, literature. Of course, institutions are comprised in large part of institutional roles occupied by human beings. So our focus on institutional corruption brings with it a focus on the corruption of individual human beings. (I refer to the corruption of individual human beings as personal corruption.) However in the case of institutional corruption, the focus on the corruption of human beings (personal corruption) is on human beings qua institutional actors (and on those who interact with institutional role occupants qua institutional role occupants)(Miller 2017: 65).

The upshot of this is that there are three sets of distinctions in play here. Firstly, there is the distinction between institutional corruption and non-institutional corruption—the latter being the corruption of entities other than institutions, e.g., corruption of artefacts. Secondly, there is the distinction between personal and non-personal corruption—the former being the corruption of human beings as opposed to, for instance, institutional processes. Thirdly, with respect to personal corruption, there is the distinction between the corruption of persons qua institutional actors and non-institutional personal corruption. Non-institutional personal corruption is corruption of persons outside institutional settings. Personal corruption pertains to the moral character of persons, and consists in the despoiling of their moral character. If an action has a corrupting effect on a person’s character, it will typically be corrosive of one or more of a person’s virtues. These virtues might be virtues that attach to the person qua human being, e.g., the virtues of compassion and fairness in one’s dealings with other human beings. Corrosion of these virtues amounts to non-institutional personal corruption. Alternatively—or in some cases, additionally—these virtues might attach to persons qua occupants of specific institutional roles, e.g., impartiality in a judge or objectivity in a journalist. Corrosion of these virtues amounts to institutional personal corruption, i.e., corruption of a person qua institutional role occupant.

In order to provide an adequate account of institutional corruption we need a serviceable notion of an institution: the thing corrupted. For our purposes here it is assumed that an institution is an organization or structure of organizations that reproduces itself (e.g., by training and recruitment processes) and is comprised of a structure of institutional roles defined in terms of tasks (Harré 1979; Giddens 1984; Miller 2010). Accordingly, the class of institutions is quite diverse and includes political institutions, (e.g., legislatures), market-based institutions, (e.g., corporations), institutions of learning, (e.g., universities), security agencies, (e.g., police and military organizations), and so on. Importantly, as we noted above, the various different types of, and even motives for, institutional corruption vary greatly from one kind of institution to another.

Note that in theorizing institutional corruption the distinction between an entire society or polity, on the one hand, and its constituent institutions, on the other, needs to be kept in mind. A theory of democracy, for instance, might be a theory not only of democratic government in the narrow sense of the legislature and senior members of the executive, but also of the public administration as a whole, the judiciary, the security agencies (police and military), civil society and so on. Obviously, a theory of the corruption of democratic political institutions (in the narrow sense of the legislature and the senior members of the executive) might not be generalizable to other sorts of institution within a democracy, e.g., to security agencies or market-based institutions. Moreover, fundamental differences regarding the specific form that a democracy ought to take, e.g., between those of a republican persuasion (Pettit 1997; Sandel 2012) and libertarians (Nozick 1974; Friedman 1970), might morph into disputes about what counts as institutional corruption. For instance, on one view market-based institutions exist to serve the common good, while on another they exist only to serve the individual self-interest of the participants in them. Thus on the latter, but not the former, view market intervention by the government in the service of the common good might be regarded as a species of corruption. Further, a theory of the corruption of democracy, and certainly of the corruption of one species of democracy such as liberal democracy, is not necessarily adequate for the understanding of the corruption of many of institutions within a democracy and, in particular, those institutions, such as military and police institutions, hierarchical bureaucracies and market-based institutions, which are not inherently democratic either in structure or purpose, notwithstanding that they exist within the framework of a democratic political system, are shaped in various ways by that framework and, conversely, might be necessary for the maintenance of that framework.

2. Institutional Corruption

2.1 general features of institutional corruption.

Our concern here is only with institutional corruption. Nevertheless, it is plausible that corruption in general, including institutional corruption frequently, if not typically, involves the despoiling of the moral character of persons and in particular, in the case of institutional corruption, the despoiling of the moral character of institutional role occupants qua institutional role occupants. To this extent institutional corruption involves personal corruption and, thereby, connects institutional corruption to moral character. If the moral character of particular institutional role occupants, (e.g., police detectives), consists in large part of their possession of certain virtues definitive of the role in question (e.g., honesty, independence of mind, impartiality) then institutional corruption will frequently involve the displacement of those virtues in these role occupants by corresponding vices, (e.g., dishonesty, weak mindedness, bias); that is, institutional corruption will frequently involve institutional personal corruption.

As noted above, the relationship between institutional corruption and personal corruption is something that has been emphasized historically, e.g., by Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli. However, some recent theorists of structural corruption have tended to downplay this relationship. Lessig’s notion of dependence corruption (Lessig 2011), in particular, evidently decouples structural corruption from (institutional) personal corruption (see section 2.3.3 below).

Personal corruption, i.e., the state of having been corrupt ed , is not the same thing as performing a corrupt action, i.e., being a corrupt or . Typically, corruptors are themselves corrupted, but this is not necessarily the case. Consider, for example, a parent who pays a one-off bribe to an immigration official in order to be reunited with her child. The parent is a corruptor by virtue of performing a corrupt action, but she is not necessarily corrupted by her, let us assume, morally justifiable action.

Does personal corruption imply moral responsibility for one’s corrupt character? This issue is important in its own right but it also has implications for our understanding of structural corruption. Certainly, many, if not most, of those who are corrupted are morally responsible for being so. After all, they do or should know what it is to be corrupt and they could have avoided becoming corrupt. Consider, for instance, kleptocrats, such as Mobuto and Marcos, who have looted billions of dollars from the public purse (Sharman 2017), or senior members of multi-national corporations who have been engaged in ongoing massive bribery in China and elsewhere (Pei 2016). These kleptocrats and corporate leaders are not only corruptors, they are themselves corrupt; moreover, they are morally responsible for being in their state of corruption.

However, there appear to be exceptions to the claim that personal corruption necessarily or always brings with it moral responsibility for one’s corrupt character, e.g., adolescents who have been raised in criminal families and, as a result, participate in the corrupt enterprises of these families. These individuals perform actions which are an expression of their corrupt characters and which also have a corrupting effect.

What of the moral responsibility of corruptors for their corrupt actions? It is plausible that many, if not most, corruptors are morally responsible for their corrupt actions (e.g., the legions of those rightly convicted of corruption in criminal courts—and therefore, presumably, morally responsible for their actions—in jurisdictions around the world), but there appear to be exceptions, e.g., those who are coerced into offering bribes.

One school of thought in the theory of social institutions that might well reject the view that corruptors are necessarily or even typically morally responsible (or, therefore, blameworthy) for their corrupt actions is structuralism (Lévi-Strauss 1962 [1966]) and especially structural Marxism (Althusser 1971). According to the latter view institutional structure and, in particular, economic class-based relations largely determine institutional structures and cultures, and regularities in the actions of institutional actors. On this anti-individualist conception neither institutional corrosion nor institutional corruption—supposing the two notions can be distinguished (see below)—are ultimately to be understood by recourse to the actions of morally responsible individual human agents. Strong forms of structuralism are inconsistent with most contemporary philosophical accounts of institutional corruption, not the least because these accounts typically assume that institutions have an inherently normative—rather than merely ideological—dimension. However there are echoes of weaker forms of structuralism in some of these accounts when it comes to the issue of the moral responsibility of human persons for institutional corruption. One influential contemporary theorist of corruption who apparently does not accept the view that corruptors are necessarily or always morally responsible (or, therefore, blameworthy) for their corrupt actions is Lessig (Lessig 2011) (see section 2.3.3 below).

The upshot of our discussion of (institutional) personal corruption and moral responsibility is as follows. We now have, at least notionally, a fourfold distinction in relation to corruptors: (1) corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt action and blameworthy; (2) corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt action but not blameworthy; (3) corruptors who are not morally responsible for having a corrupt character, but whose actions: (a) are expressive of their corrupt character, and; (b) have a corrupting effect; (4) corruptors who do not have a corrupt character and are neither morally responsible nor blameworthy for their corrupt actions, yet whose actions have a corrupting effect, e.g., by virtue of some form of structural dependency for which individual human persons are not morally responsible.

Naturally, in the case of institutional corruption typically greater institutional damage is being done than simply the despoiling of the moral character of the institutional role occupants. Specifically, institutional processes are being undermined, and/or institutional purposes subverted. A further point is that the undermining of institutional purposes or processes typically requires the actions of multiple agents; the single action of a single agent is typically not sufficient. The multiple actions of the multiple agents in question could be a joint action(s) or they could be individual actions taken in aggregate. A joint action is one in which two or more agents perform a contributory individual action in the service of a common or collective end (Miller 2010: Chapter 1) or, according to some theorists, joint intention (Bratman 2016: Chapter 1). For instance, motivated by financial gain, a group of traders within the banking sector might cooperate with one another in order to manipulate a financial benchmark rate, such as LIBOR (London Interbank Borrowing Rate) (Wheatley 2012).

However, arguably, the undermining of institutional processes and/or purposes is not a sufficient condition for institutional corruption. Acts of institutional damage that are not performed by a corruptor and also do not corrupt persons might be thought to be better characterized as acts of institutional corrosion . Consider, for example, funding decisions that gradually reduce public monies allocated to the court system in some large jurisdiction. As a consequence, magistrates might be progressively less well trained and there might be fewer and fewer of them to deal with the gradually increasing workload of cases. This may well lead to a diminution over decades in the quality of the adjudications of these magistrates, and so the judicial processes are to an extent undermined. However, given the size of the jurisdiction and the incremental nature of these changes, neither the magistrates, nor anyone else, might be aware of this process of judicial corrosion, or even able to become aware of it (given heavy workloads, absence of statistical information, etc.). At any rate, if we assume that neither the judges nor anyone else can do anything to address the problem then, while there has clearly been judicial corrosion, arguably there has not been judicial corruption. Why is such corrosion not also corruption?

For institutional corrosion to constitute corruption, it might be claimed (Miller 2017: Chapter 3), the institutional damage done needs to be avoidable; indeed, it might also be claimed that the relevant agents must be capable of being held morally responsible for the damage, at least in the generality of cases. So if the magistrates in our example were to become aware of the diminution in the quality of their adjudications, could cause additional resources to be provided and yet chose to do nothing, then arguably the process of corrosion might have become a process of corruption.

An important question that arises here is whether or not institutional corruption is relative to a teleological or purpose-driven conception of institutions and, relatedly, whether the purposes in question are to be understood normatively. Arguably, the institutional purposes of universities include the acquisition of new knowledge and its transmission to students; moreover, arguably, knowledge acquisition is a human good since it enables (indirectly), for instance, health needs to be met. However, it has been suggested that the purposes of political institutions, in particular, are too vague or contested to be definitive of them (Ceva & Ferretti 2017; Warren 2004). One response to this is to claim that governments are in large part meta-institutions with the responsibility to ensure that society’s other institutions realize their distinctive institutional purposes. On this view, an important purpose of governments is provided, in effect, by the purposes of other fundamental institutions. For instance, an important purpose of governments might be to ensure market-based institutions operate in a free, fair, efficient and effective manner (Miller 2017: 14.1).

Naturally, there are many different kinds of entities which might causally undermine institutions, including other collective entities. However, collectivist accounts of institutions go beyond the ascription of causal responsibility and, in some cases, ascribe moral responsibility. Firstly, such collectivist accounts of institutions ascribe intentions, beliefs and so on to organizations and other collective entities per se. Secondly, this ascription of mindedness to collective entities leaves the way open to ascribe moral agency to these entities (French 1979; List & Pettit 2011). On such collectivist accounts corruptors include collective entities; indeed, corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt actions. Thus Lockheed Corporation, on this view, was a moral agent (or, at least, an immoral agent) which corrupted the Japanese government (a second moral agent) by way of bribery. Other theorists, typically referred to as individualists, reject minded collective entities (Ludwig 2017; Miller 2010). Accordingly to individualists, only human agents are possessed of minds and moral agency. [ 4 ] Thus collective entities, such as organizations, do not have minds and are not per se moral agents. Accordingly, it is only human agents who culpably perform actions that undermine legitimate institutional processes or purposes.

An important related issue that arises at this point pertains to the human agents who perform acts of corruption. Are they necessarily institutional actors? It might be thought that this was not the case. Supposing a criminal bribes a public official in order to get a permit to own a gun. The criminal is not an institutional actor and yet he has performed an act of institutional corruption. However, in this example the public official has accepted the bribe and she is an institutional actor. So the example does not show that institutional corruption does not necessarily involve the participation of an institutional actor. What if the criminal offered the bribe but it was not accepted? While this may well be a crime and is certainly an attempt at institutional corruption, arguably, it is not an actual instance of an act of institutional corruption but rather a failed attempt. Moreover, it is presumably not an instance of institutional corruption because the institutional actor approached refused to participate in the attempted corrupt action. Let us pursue this issue further.

As we saw in section 1 , corruption, even if it involves the abuse of public office, is not necessarily pursued for private gain. However, according to many definitions of corruption institutional corruption necessarily involves abuse of public office. Moreover, our example of an attempted bribe to secure a gun permit involves a public official. However, we have canvassed arguments in section 1 that contra this view acts of corruption might be actions performed by persons who do not hold public office, e.g., price-fixing by market actors, a witness who gives false testimony in a law court. At this point in the argument we need to invoke a distinction between persons who hold a public office and persons who have an institutional role. CEOs of corporations do not hold public office but they do have an institutional role. Hence a CEO who embezzles his company’s money is engaged in corruption. Again, citizens are not necessarily holders of public offices, but they do have an institutional role qua citizens, e.g., as voters. Hence a voter who breaks into the electoral office and stuffs the ballot boxes with falsified voting papers in order to ensure the election of her favored candidate is engaged in corruption, notwithstanding the fact that she does not hold public office.

The causal theory of institutional corruption (Miller 2017) presupposes a normative teleological conception of institutions according to which institutions are defined not only as organizations or systems of organizations with a purpose(s), but organizations or systems of organizations the purpose(s) of which is a human good. The goods in question are either intrinsic or instrumental goods. For instance, universities are held to have as their purpose the discovery and transmission of knowledge, where knowledge is at the very least an instrumental good. (For criticisms see Thompson 2018 and Ceva & Ferretti 2021.)

If a serviceable definition of the concept of a corrupt action is to be found—and specifically, one that does not collapse into the more general notion of an immoral action—then attention needs to be focused on the moral effects that some actions have on persons and institutions. An action is corrupt only if it corrupts something or someone—so corruption is not only a moral concept, but also a causal or quasi-causal concept. That is, an action is corrupt by virtue of having a corrupting effect on a person’s moral character or on an institutional process or purpose. If an action has a corrupting effect on an institution, undermining institutional processes or purposes, then typically—but not necessarily—it has a corrupting effect also on persons qua role occupants in the affected institutions.

Accordingly, an action is corrupt only if it has the effect of undermining an institutional process or of subverting an institutional purpose or of despoiling the character of some role occupant qua role occupant. In light of the possibility that some acts of corruption have negligible effects, such as a small one-off bribe paid for a minor service, this defining feature needs to be qualified so as to include acts that are of a type or kind that tends to undermine institutional processes, purposes or persons ( qua institutional role occupants)—as well as individual or token acts that actually have the untoward effects in question. Thus qualified, the causal character of corruption provides the second main feature of the causal theory of institutional corruption, the first feature being the normative teleological conception of institutions. I note accounts predicated on these two assumptions have ancient origins, notably in Aristotle (Hindess 2001).

In keeping with the causal account, an infringement of a specific law or institutional rule does not in and of itself constitute an act of institutional corruption. In order to do so, any such infringement needs to have an institutionally undermining effect , or be of a kind that has a tendency to cause such an effect, e.g., to defeat the institutional purpose of the rule, to subvert the institutional process governed by the rule, or to contribute to the despoiling of the moral character of a role occupant qua role occupant. In short, we need to distinguish between the offence considered in itself and the institutional effect of committing that offence. Considered in itself the offence of, say, lying is an infringement of a law, rule, and/or a moral principle. However, the offence is only an act of institutional corruption if it has some institutionally undermining effect, or is of a kind that has such a tendency, e.g., it is performed in a courtroom setting and thereby subverts the judicial process.

A third feature of the causal theory of institutional corruption pertains to the agents who cause the corruption. As noted in section 2.1.3 , there are many different kinds of entities which might causally undermine institutions, including other collective entities. However, it is an assumption of the causal theory of corruption that only human agents are possessed of minds and moral agency. Accordingly, on the causal theory it is only human agents who culpably perform actions that undermine legitimate institutional processes or purposes.

A fourth and final feature of the causal theory also pertains to the agents who cause corruption. It is a further assumption of the causal theory that the human agents who perform acts of corruption (the corruptors) and/or the human agents who are corrupted (the corrupted) are necessarily institutional actors (see discussion above in section 2.1.3 ). More precisely, acts of institutional corruption necessarily involve a corruptor who performs the corrupt action qua occupant of an institutional role and/or someone who is corrupted qua occupant of an institutional role .

In light of the above discussion the following normative theory of corruption suggests itself: the causal theory of institutional corruption (Miller 2017: Chapter 3).

An act x (whether a single or joint action) performed by an agent (or set of agents) A is an act of institutional corruption if and only if:

• x has an effect, or is an instance of a kind of act that has a tendency to have an effect, of undermining, or contributing to the undermining of, some institutional process and/or purpose (understood as a collective good) of some institution, I , and/or an effect of contributing to the despoiling of the moral character of some role occupant of I , agent (or set of agents) B , qua role occupant of I ;
• A is a role occupant of I who used the opportunities afforded by their role to perform x , and in so doing A intended or foresaw the untoward effects in question, or should have foreseen them;
• B could have avoided the untoward effects, if B had chosen to do so. [ 5 ]

Note that (2) (a) tells us that A is a corruptor and is, therefore, either (straightforwardly) morally responsible for the corrupt action, or A is not morally responsible for A ’s corrupt character and the corrupt action is an expression of A ’s corrupt character.

Notice also that the causal theory being cast in general terms, i.e., the undermining of institutional purposes, processes and/or persons ( qua institutional role occupants), can accommodate a diversity of corruption in a wide range of institutions in different social, political and economic settings, past and present, and accommodate also a wide range of mechanisms or structures of corruption, including structural relations of dependency, collective action problems and so on.

A controversial feature of the causal account is that organizations that are entirely morally and legally illegitimate, such as criminal organizations, (e.g., the mafia), are not able to be corrupted (Lessig 2013b). For on the causal account the condition of corruption exists only relative to an uncorrupted condition, which is the condition of being a morally legitimate institution or sub-element thereof. Consider the uncorrupted judicial process. It consists of the presentation of objective evidence that has been gathered lawfully, of testimony in court being presented truthfully, of the rights of the accused being respected, and so on. This otherwise morally legitimate judicial process may be corrupted, if one or more of its constitutive actions are not performed in accordance with the process as it ought to be. Thus to present fabricated evidence, to lie under oath, and so on, are all corrupt actions. In relation to moral character, consider an honest accountant who begins to “doctor the books” under the twin pressures of a corrupt senior management and a desire to maintain a lifestyle that is only possible if he is funded by the very high salary he receives for doctoring the books. By engaging in such a practice he risks the erosion of his moral character; he is undermining his disposition to act honestly.

2.3 Theories of Political Corruption

Let us term theories of corruption which focus on the undermining of institutional procedures or processes, as opposed to institutional purposes, proceduralist theories of institutional corruption. Mark Warren has elaborated a proceduralist theory of the corruption of democracies, in particular; a theory which he terms “duplicitous exclusion” (Warren 2006). (Relatedly and more recently, Ceva & Ferretti speak of bending public rules in the service of “surreptitious agendas” as definitive of corruption (Ceva & Ferretti 2017: 6), although in a recent work they have shifted to a notion of corruption in terms of lack of accountability (Ceva & Ferretti 2018; Ceva & Ferretti 2021). See discussion below in 2.3.4.)

Democratic political institutions are characterized by equality (in some sense) with respect to these processes. Warren offers a particular account of democratic equality and derives his notion of corruption of democratic political institutions from this. According to Warren, democracies involve a norm of equal inclusion such that

every individual potentially affected by a collective decision should have an opportunity to affect the decision proportional to his or her stake in the outcome. (Warren 2004: 333)

Corruption of democracies occurs under two conditions: (1) this norm is violated and; (2) violators claim to be complying with the norm (Warren 2004: 337). Warren contrasts his theory of duplicitous exclusion with what he terms “office-based” accounts (Warren 2004:329–32).The latter might be serviceable for administrative agencies and roles but is, according to Warren, inadequate for democratic representatives attempting to “define the public interest” (Warren 2006: 10) and relying essentially on the political process, rather than pre-existing agreement on specific ends or purposes, to do so. This latter point is made in one way of another by other theorists of modern representative democracies, such as Thompson (2013) and Ceva & Ferretti (2017: 5), and is an objection to teleological accounts (such as the causal account— section 2.2 above).

Warren’s other necessary condition for the corruption of institutions, namely duplicity, resonates with the emphasis in the contemporary anti-corruption literature and, for that matter, in much public policy on transparency; transparency can reveal duplicity and thereby thwart corruptors. Moreover, the duplicity condition—and the related surreptitious agenda condition of Ceva & Ferretti—is reminiscent of Plato’s ring of Gyges (Plato Gorgias ); corruption is something done under a cloak of secrecy and typically involves deception to try to ensure the cloak is not removed. Unquestionably, corruption often flourishes under conditions of secrecy. Moreover, corruptors frequently seek to deceive by presenting themselves a committed to the standards that they are (secretly) violating. But contra Warren—and, for that matter, Ceva & Ferretti—corruption does not necessarily or always need to be hidden in order to flourish. Indeed, in polities and institutions suffering from the most serious and widespread forms of corruption at the hands of the very powerful, there is often little or no need for secrecy or deception in relation to the pursuit of corrupt practices; corruption is out in the open. Consider Colombia during the period of the drug lord, Pablo Escobar’s, “reign”; the period of the so-called “narcocracy”. His avowed and well-advertised policy was “silver or lead”, meaning that politicians, judges, journalists and so on either accepted a bribe or risked being killed (Bowden 2012). Against this it might be suggested that at least corruption in democracies always involves hiding one’s corrupt practices. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case either. As Plato pointed out long ago in The Republic , democracies can suffer a serious problem of corruption among the citizenry and when this happens all manner of corrupt practices on the part of leaders and others will not only be visible, they will be tolerated, and even celebrated.

Warren’s theory is evidently not generalizable to many other institutions, namely, those that are not centrally governed by democratic norms and, in particular, by his norm of equal inclusion. Consider, for instance, military institutions. Most important decisions made by military personal in wartime—as opposed to those made by their political masters, such as whether to go to war in the first place—are made in the context of a hierarchical structure; they are not collective decisions, if the notion of a collective decision is to be understood on a democratic model of decision-making, e.g., representative democracy. Moreover, with respect to, for instance, the decision to retreat or stand and fight a combatant does not and cannot reasonably expect to have “an opportunity to affect the decision proportional to her stake in the outcome”. The combatant’s personal stake might be very high; his life is at risk if he stands and fights and, therefore, he might prefer to retreat. However, military necessity in a just war might dictate that he and his comrades stand and fight and, therefore, they are ordered to do so by their superiors back at headquarters and, as virtuous combatants, they obey. I note that Machiavelli contrasts combatants possessed of the martial virtues with corruptible mercenaries who only fight for money and who desert when their lives are threatened (Machiavelli The Prince : Chapter 12).

Thompson’s groundbreaking and influential theory of institutional corruption takes as its starting point a distinction between what Thompson refers to as individual corruption and institutional corruption. When an official accepts a bribe in return for providing a service to the briber, this is individual corruption since the official is accepting a personal benefit or gain in exchange for promoting private interests (Thompson 2013: 6). Moreover, the following two conditions evidently obtain: (i) the official intends to provide the service (or, at least, intends to give the impression that he will provide the service) to the bribee; (ii) the official and the bribee intentionally create the link between the bribe and the service, i.e., it is a quid quo pro . By contrast, institutional corruption involves political benefits or gains, e.g., campaign contributions (that do not go into the political candidates’ own pockets but are actually spent on the campaigns) by public officials under conditions that tend to promote private interests (Thompson 2013: 6). The reference to a tendency entails that there is some kind of causal regularity in the link between acceptance of the political benefits and promotion of the private interests (including greater access to politicians than is available to others (Thompson 2018)). However, the officials in question do not intend that there be such a link between the political benefits they accept and their promotion of the private interests of the provider of the political benefits. Rather

the fact that an official acts under conditions that tend to create improper influence is sufficient to establish corruption, whatever the official’s motive. (Thompson 2013: 13)

I note that in the case of institutional corruption and, presumably, individual corruption (in so far as it involves the bribery of public or private officials) the actions in question must undermine some institutional process or purpose (and/or perhaps institutional role occupant qua role occupant). Thus Thompson says of institutional corruption:

It is not corrupt if the practice promotes (or at least does not damage) political competition, citizenship representation, or other core processes of the institution. But it is corrupt if it is of a type that tends to undermine such processes and thereby frustrate the primary purposes of the institution. (Thompson 2013: 7)

While Thompson has provided an important analysis of an important species of institutional corruption, his additional claim that officials who accept personal benefits in exchange for promoting private interests, i.e., a common form of bribery, is not a species of institutional corruption is open to question (and a point of difference with the causal theory). As mentioned in section 1 , this species of bribery of institutional actors utilizing their position—whether that position be one in the public sector or in the private sector—can be systemic and, therefore, extremely damaging to institutions. Consider the endemic bribery of police in India with its attendant undermining of the provision of impartial (Kurer 2005; Rothstein & Varraich 2017), obligatory (Kolstad 2012) and effective police services, not to mention of public trust in the police. Some police stations in part of India are little more than unlawful “tax” collection or, better, extortion agencies; local business people have to pay the local police if they are to guarantee effective police protection, truck drivers have to pay bribes to the police at transport checkpoints, if they are to transit expeditiously through congested areas, speeding tickets are avoided by those who pay bribes, and so on. Moreover, endemic bribery of this kind is endemic in many police forces and other public sector agencies throughout so-called developing countries, even if it is no longer present in most developed countries.

Thompson invokes the distinction between systemic and episodic services provided by a public official in support of his distinction between individual and institutional corruption. By “systemic” Thompson means that the service provided by the official

is provided through a persistent pattern of relationships, rather than in episodic or one-time interactions. (The particular relationships do not themselves have to be ongoing: a recurrent set of one-time interactions by the same politician with different recipients could create a similar pattern.) (Thompson 2013: 11)

However, as our above example of bribery of police in India makes clear, Thompson’s individual corruption can be, and often is, systemic in precisely this sense. In more recent work Thompson has drawn attention to mixed cases involving, for instance, both a personal and a political gain—the political gain not necessarily being a motive—and suggested that if the dominant gain is political rather than personal then it is institutional corruption or perhaps a mix of individual and institutional corruption (Thompson 2018). Fair enough. However, this does not remove the objection that systemic bribery (for instance) involving only personal gain (both as a motive and an outcome) are, nevertheless, cases of institutional corruption.

Thompson uses the case of Charles Keating to outline his theory (Thompson 1995 and 2013). Keating was a property developer who made generous contributions to the election campaigns of various U.S. politicians, notably five senators, and then at a couple of meetings called on a number of these to do him a favor in return. Specifically, Keating wanted the senators to get a regulatory authority to refrain from seizing the assets of a subsidiary of a company owned by Keating. The chair of the regulatory authority was replaced. However, two years later the assets of the company in question were seized and authorities filed a civil racketeering and fraud suit against Keating accusing him of diverting funds from the company to his family and to political campaigns. Thompson argues that the Keating case involved: (1) the provision or, at least, the appearance of the provision of an improper service on the part of legislators (the senators) to a constituent (Keating), i.e., interfering with the role of a regulator on his behalf; (2) a political gain in the form of campaign contributions (from Keating to the senators), and; (3) a link or, at least, the appearance of a link between (1) and (2), i.e., the tendency under these conditions for the service to be performed because of the political gain.

Accordingly, the case study involves at least the appearance of corrupt activity on the part of the senators. Moreover, Thompson claims that such an appearance might be sufficient for institutional corruption in that damage has been done to a political institution by virtue of a diminution in public trust in that institution. Thus the appearance of a conflict of interest undermines public trust which in turn damages the institution. The appearance of a conflict of interest arises when legislators use their office to provide a questionable “service” to a person upon whom they are, or have been, heavily reliant for campaign contributions. Evidently, on Thompson’s account of institutional (as opposed to individual) corruption it is not necessary that the legislators in these kinds of circumstance ought to know that their actions might well have the appearance of a conflict of interest, ought to know that they might have a resulting damaging effect, and ought to know, therefore, that they ought not to have performed those actions. Certainly, the senators in the Keating case ought to have known that they ought not to perform these actions. However, the more general point is that it is not clear that it would be a case of corruption, if it were not the case that the legislators in question ought to have known that they ought not to perform the institutionally damaging actions in question. On the causal account ( section 2.2 above), if legislators or other officials perform institutionally damaging actions that they could not reasonably be expected to know would be institutionally damaging then they have not engaged in corruption but rather incidental institutional damage (and perhaps corrosion if the actions are ongoing).

As outlined above, Thompson has made a detailed application of his theory to political institutions and, especially to campaign financing in the U.S.. However, he views the theory as generalizable to institutions other than political ones. It is generalizable, he argues, in so far as “public purposes” can be replaced by “institutional purposes” and “democratic process” with “legitimate institutional procedures” (Thompson 2013: 5). Certainly, if the theory is to be generalizable then it is necessary that these replacements be made. The question is whether making these replacements is sufficient. Moreover, the particular species of institutional corruption that he has identified and analyzed might exist in other institutions but do so alongside a wide range of other species to which his analysis does not apply—including, but not restricted to, what he refers to as individual corruption. Thompson has recently identified some other forms of institutional corruption to which he claims his theory applies (Thompson 2018). For instance, the close relationship that might obtain between corporations and their auditing firms. The salient such relationships are those consisting of auditing firms undertaking profitable financial consultancy work for the very corporations which they are auditing; hence the potential for the independent auditing process to be compromised. These relationships certainly have the potential for corruption. However, they do not appear to be paradigms of institutional corruption in Thompson’s sense since, arguably, undertaking such consultancy work is not prima facie an integral function of auditing firms qua auditors in the manner in which, for instance, securing campaign finance is integral to political parties competing in an election (to mention Thompson’s paradigmatic example of institutional corruption).

Newhouse has attempted to generalize Thompson’ theory, but in doing so also narrows it. Newhouse argues that Thompson’s theory is best understood in terms of breach of organizational fiduciary duties (Newhouse 2014). An important underlying reason for this, says Newhouse, is that Thompson’s (and, for that matter, Lessig’s) account of institutional corruption presuppose that institutions have an “obligatory purpose” (Newhouse 2014: 555) Fiduciary duties are, of course, obligatory. Moreover, they are widespread in both the public and private sector; hence the theory would be generalized. On the other hand, there are many institutional actors who do not have fiduciary duties. Thus if Newhouse is correct in thinking that Thompson’s theory of institutional corruption provides a model for breach of organizational fiduciary duty and only for breach of organizational fiduciary duty, the ambition to generalize Thompson’s theory will remain substantially unrealized.

Lawrence Lessig has argued that the U.S. democratic political process and, indeed, Congress itself, is institutionally corrupt and that the corruption in question is a species of what he calls “dependency corruption” (Lessig 2011 and 2013a). Lessig argues that although U.S. citizens as a whole vote in the election of, say, the U.S. President, nevertheless, the outcome is not wholly dependent on these citizens as it should be in a democracy or, at least, as is required by the U.S. Constitution. For the outcome is importantly dependent on a small group of “Funders” who bankroll particular candidates and without whose funding no candidate could hope to win office. Accordingly, there are really two elections. In the first election only the Funders get to “vote” since only they have sufficient funds to support a political candidate. Once these candidate have been “elected” then there is a second election, a general election, in which all the citizens get to vote. However, they can only vote on the list of candidates “pre-selected” by the Funders. Lessig’s account of the U.S. election is complicated, but not vitiated, by the existence of a minority of candidates, such as Bernie Sanders, who rely on funding consisting of small amounts of money from a very large number of Funders. It is further complicated but not necessarily vitiated by the rise of demagogues such as Donald Trump who, as mentioned above, can utilise social media and computational propaganda to have an electoral influence much greater than otherwise might have been the case (Woolley and Howard 2019).

On Lessig’s view there are two dependencies in play, namely, the dependency of the outcome of the election on the citizenry and the dependency of this outcome on the Funders. However, these two dependencies are inconsistent. Therefore, the question that now arises is which dependency is legitimate. Clearly, the dependency on the citizenry as a whole is legitimate since this is what the Constitution clearly intended. Since these funders are not representative of the U.S. citizenry the dependency on the Funders is illegitimate and a corruption of the democratic process in the U.S..

Lessig states that his notion of dependency corruption cuts across Thompson’s notions of individual and institutional corruption (Lessig 2013a: 14). Regarding the relation to Thompson’s notion of institutional corruption: On the one hand, dependence corruption involves a tendency, as does Thompson’s notion of institutional corruption (see above section 2.3.2 ). On the other hand, on Thompson’s theory, a politician, or set of politicians, can receive campaign contributions from Funders and further their private interests without being dependent on them. So in this respect Thompson’s notion of institutional corruption is wider than Lessig’s notion of dependence corruption. Regarding the relation to Thompson’s notion of individual corruption: A politician, or set of politicians, may come to depend on personal benefits from Funders. This is dependence corruption but on Thompson’s theory it is presumably individual corruption. (Although, perhaps, it might not be individual corruption in Thompson’s sense, if it involves a regularity and hence tendency).

Lessig offers a plausible analysis of the corruption of the U.S. electoral system by the Funders. Two related questions now arise. Is Lessig’s theory of dependence corruption correct? Is the notion of dependence corruption generalizable to institutions other than political institutions and, if so, to what extent?

The extent to which Lessig’s notion of dependence corruption is generalizable is ultimately an empirical question; it is a matter of seeking to apply it widely and waiting on the outcome (see, for instance, Light’s analysis of corruption in the pharmaceutical industry (Light, Lexchin, & Darrow 2013)). However, as mentioned above in the comparison of Lessig’s account with that of Thompson, Lessig does not see his dependence account as entirely generalizable.

Unlike the causal account of corruption (see section 2.2 above), Lessig’s notion of institutional corruption commits him only to normatively neutral institutional purposes (Lessig 2014; Lessig 2013b: 14) rather than to morally good or otherwise valuable institutional purposes. Accordingly, by Lessig’s lights, to say of a university that it has as a fundamental purpose to educate (to some objectively acceptable, minimum standard) is merely to say that this is a de facto fundamental purpose. Therefore, being market-based it could change its order of priorities; i.e., it would be perfectly entitled to prioritize profit over educational standards, just as, for instance, a retail store is perfectly entitled to prioritize profit over its standards of service to its customers.

According to Lessig, dependence corruption does not necessarily involve corrupt persons. As we have seen, Lessig’s favored example of dependence corruption is the dependency of the outcome of U.S. elections on a small group of large funders of those campaigning for political office rather than on the American people. Lessig suggests that those who engage in dependence corruption could be “good souls” (Lessig 2011: 17). Here we need to keep in mind distinctions between being evil and being corrupt, and between being corrupt and being morally responsible for one’s corruption. A corrupt person is not necessarily an evil person. After all, as we have seen, a corrupt person might only be corrupt qua institutional actor. Thus a corrupt police officer might be a good father and husband. Moreover, corruption admits of degrees. So a corrupt police officer might be a so-called grass-eater rather than a so-called meat-eater; their corrupt character might only manifest itself in relatively minor forms of corruption, e.g., minor bribe-taking, rather than in major forms of corruption, e.g., on-selling large quantities of heroin seized from drug dealers.

What of moral responsibility and corruption? Consider Lessig’s own favored example of dependence corruption. Surely, moral responsibility for corruption of the U.S. electoral system can be assigned to U.S. legislators, in particular, as well as the Funders who finance campaigns in the expectation (presumably) of favorable legislation if their candidates are elected. Lessig distinguishes between

responsibility for changing individual behavior within the system and responsibility for changing the system itself. (Lessig 2013a: 15)

According to Lessig

the sin of a Congressman within such a system is not that she raises campaign money. It is that she doesn’t work to change the corruption that this dependence upon a small set of funders produced. (Lessig 2013a: 15)

So apparently direct participation in the corruption of the electoral system by legislators and (?) Funders is not a sin. Lessig’s claim here might be that the corruptors of the U.S. electoral system are not engaged in sinful acts because they are not morally responsible for this wrongdoing. This claim is open to question. The actions of the legislators and Funders (and, for that matter, the lobbyists) that are constitutive of dependence corruption (offering and receiving (directly and indirectly) campaign funds) are avoidable and the legislators and Funders are, or ought to be, aware of the institutional damage being done by their combined actions. Moreover, in suggesting that the legislators have a moral responsibility to change the system, Lessig, in effect, concedes as much. How could they have a moral responsibility to change the system if they were not aware of it and their role in it?

What might be influencing Lessig at this point is the degree of the moral responsibility, specifically, full and partial responsibility. It is the combined effect of the many individual actions of a large number of legislators (and Funders and lobbyists) that does the institutional damage. Therefore, each only makes a small causal contribution and each, therefore, only has a small share in the moral responsibility for the outcome. Moreover, in relation to changing the system, there is a need for joint action; it is a joint moral responsibility involving shared partial individual responsibility. Thus legislators could, and know they could, jointly act to enact campaign finance reform to address the problem of dependency by, for example, restricting campaign contributions. Accordingly, the moral responsibility in play is a species of collective responsibility; specifically, joint moral responsibility (Miller 2010: Chapter 4).

Ceva & Ferretti understand political corruption widely to include not only the corruption of politicians but of public officials in general, including police officers, members of the professions, such as doctors and teachers, and others in the public sector. They define political corruption in terms of two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: “There must be a public official who (1) acts in her institutional capacity as an officeholder (office condition) (2) for the pursuit of an agenda whose rationale may not be vindicated as coherent with the terms of the mandate of her power of office (mandate condition)” (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: 19). The first condition, namely that political corruption involves a public official who acts in her institutional capacity, is familiar (see above). What of condition (2), the mandate condition?

The mandate condition concerns the motive or reason guiding the office holder’s action; the action is performed for the pursuit of an agenda with a rationale. So the officeholder’s action considered in itself might or might not be an exercise of a constitutive institutional right or duty of the office in question. But what is this rationale that would render the action corrupt? The rationale in question is one that “may not be vindicated as coherent with the terms of the mandate of her power of office”. The key notion here is that of coherence with the mandate of the powers of office. Here the powers of office are presumably simply the institutional rights and duties constitutive of an office, e.g., the right of legislators to vote on legislation, the duty not to take bribes. So, in summary, corruption involves the performance of an action(s) the motivating reason for which does not cohere with the mandate authorizing an office holder’s rights and duties qua office holder.

Ceva & Ferretti further argue that the relations between organizational roles generate a deontic dimension. For instance, they say: “Office accountability governs the institutional relations between office holders. As participants in these relations, officeholders are established with the authority to require that one another ‘gives an account’ of their actions” (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: 25). They provide the example of a physician: “By following this course of action, the physician is also in the position of justifying her conduct to her colleagues with reference to the terms of her power mandate, thus fulfilling office accountability. By her action, the physician is accountable not only to the other doctors…but also to the hospital staff” (Ceva & Ferretti 2021:26).

Ceva & Ferretti also address the question, What is wrong with corruption? In doing so they offer a distinctive theory. According to them political corruption is inherently wrong (as opposed to wrong by virtue of its consequences) because it is “a specific form of interactive injustice consisting in a violation of the duty of office accountability” (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: 122). Thus, it turns out that political corruption is inherently wrong because it is unjust. More specifically, political corruption involves an action by an institutional member which is unjust to his colleagues since each member owes it to every other member to do his duty.

A question might arise at this point in relation to the scope of the notion of an institution that Ceva & Ferretti’s employ in their account of political corruption (understood as corruption of public institutions). For instance, are those who are entitled to vote in a democracy themselves institutional role occupants of the institution of government? Are patients in a public hospital themselves role occupants of the hospital or students in a public school role occupants of the school? Ceva & Ferretti deploy an account of a public institution according to which the answer to these questions is in each case in the negative. For on their account of the corruption of public institutions there must be an officeholder possessed of a mandate who engages in corruption. But citizens, hospital patients and school students are not office holders with mandates. Indeed, citizens are the source of the mandate as, arguably (supposing there is a mandate), are patients and if not students, at least their parents (on the students’ behalf). One untoward consequence of this view is that evidently citizens, patients and students cannot themselves directly engage in acts of corruption (understood as corruption of public institutions) or, at least, if they can their actions would fall outside Ceva & Ferretti’s theory of institutional corruption.

At any rate, to return to the question of the wrongness of corruption, we saw above that on Ceva & Ferretti’s view this consists in corruption being a form of interactive injustice. Accordingly, interactive justice goes hand in glove with office accountability. On this view a teacher who fails students who do not provide her with sexual favors, and gives high marks to those who do, is performing corrupt actions by virtue of her unjust treatment of her teaching colleagues. Ceva & Ferretti argue that the normative source (relevant to the inherent wrongness of corrupt actions) of the principle of impartiality in the practice of the assessment by teachers of their students’ work lies in the role-based relations that the teacher has with her fellow teachers (and other school staff) (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: 98). So this teacher’s action is not corrupt by virtue of the injustice done to the students (although Ceva & Ferretti agree that it would be unfair to the students), but rather by virtue of the injustice done to the teacher’s colleagues. Contrary to Ceva & Ferretti it could reasonably be claimed that the primary form of institutional corruption involved here lies in the corruption of the teacher-student relationship (and its harmful consequences). More generally, Ceva & Ferretti’s theory of political corruption evidently privileges relationships between office holders at the expense of those whom they serve.

As we saw earlier, in the paradigm cases corrupt actions are a species of morally wrong, habitual, actions. What of the motive for corrupt actions? We saw above that there are many motives for corrupt actions, including desires for wealth, status, and power. However, there is apparently at least one motive that we might think ought not to be associated with corruption, namely, acting for the sake of the good. Here we need to be careful. For sometimes actions that are done for the sake of the good are, nevertheless, morally wrong actions. Indeed, some actions that are done out of a desire to achieve the good are corrupt actions, namely, acts of so-called noble cause corruption.

This is not the place to provide a detailed treatment of the phenomenon of noble cause corruption (Kleinig 2002; Miller 2016: Chapter 3). Rather let us simply note that even in cases of noble cause corruption—contra what the person who performs the action thinks—it may well be the case that the corrupt action morally ought not to be performed; or at least the corrupt action is pro tanto morally wrong, even if it is morally permissible all things considered. Accordingly, the person who performs it may well be deceiving him or herself, or be simply mistaken when they judge that the action morally ought to be performed. So their motive, i.e., to act for the sake of what is right, has a moral deficiency. They are only acting for the sake of what they believe is morally right, but in fact it is not morally right; their belief is a false belief. So we can conclude that corrupt actions are habitual actions that are at the very least pro tanto morally wrong and quite possibly morally wrong all things considered, and therefore in all probability not motivated by the true belief that they are morally right.

Here there are more complex excuses and justifications available for what might first appear to be an act of noble cause corruption. Perhaps a police officer did not know that some form of evidence was not admissible. The police officer’s false belief that an action is right (putting forward the evidence in a court of law) was rationally dependent on some false non-moral belief (that the evidence was admissible); and the police officer came to hold that non-moral belief as a result of a rational process (he was informed, or at least misinformed, that the evidence was admissible by a senior officer). This would incline us to say that the putative act of noble cause corruption was not really an act of corruption—although it might serve to undermine a morally legitimate institutional process—and therefore not an act of noble cause corruption. This intuition is consistent with the causal account of corruption in particular. The police officer in question did perform an action that undermined a legitimate criminal justice process. However, his action was not corrupt because he is not a corruptor. He did not intend to undermine the process, he did not foresee that the process would be undermined, and (let us assume) he could not reasonably have been expected to foresee that it would be undermined. Nor is his action the expression of a corrupt character.

Earlier, it was suggested that acts of noble cause corruption are pro tanto morally wrong and that this is typically contra what the actor believes. However, it is conceivable that some acts of noble cause corruption are morally justified all things considered. Perhaps the act of noble cause corruption while wrong in itself , nevertheless, was morally justified from an all things considered standpoint. If so, we might conclude that the action was not an act of corruption (and therefore not an act of noble cause corruption). Alternatively, we might conclude that it was an act of corruption, but one of those few acts of corruption that was justified in the circumstances. Perhaps both options are possibilities.

Suppose an undercover police officer offers a “bribe” to a corrupt judge for the purpose, supposedly, of getting the judge to pass a lenient sentence on a known mafia crime boss. The police officer is actually engaged in a so-called “sting” operation as part of an anti-corruption strategy. The judge accepts the bribe and is duly convicted of a criminal offence and jailed. (Let us also assume that the judge is already so corrupt that he will not be further corrupted by being offered the bribe.) The police officer offers the bribe for the purpose of achieving a moral good, i.e., convicting a corrupt official. However, we are disinclined to call this a case of corruption. Presumably the reason for this is that in this context the “bribe” does not have a corrupting effect; in particular, it does not succeed in undermining the judicial process of sentencing the crime boss. So this is a case in which a prima facie act of noble cause corruption turns out not be an act of corruption, and therefore not an act of noble cause corruption. A less straightforward case is the one where the action does have a corrupting effect. Consider two possibilities: (i) The sting is continued for a while (to catch other corrupt judges) and paid for (by bribes) verdicts are temporarily enforced during the sting; (ii) The process of considering and accepting the money offered by the disguised police officer further despoils the judge’s character but has no further effect on court proceedings (because the judge is arrested within minutes). In both cases, arguably, the officer conducting the sting operations committed an act of corruption.

What of morally justified acts of noble cause corruption. Suppose someone bribes an immigration official in order to ensure that his friend—who is ineligible to enter Australia—can in fact enter Australia, and thereby have access to life-saving hospital treatment. This act of bribery is evidently an act of institutional corruption; a legitimate institutional process has been subverted. However, the person acted for the sake of doing what he believed to be morally right; his action was an instance of noble cause corruption. Moreover, from an all things considered standpoint—and in particular, in the light of the strength of the moral obligations owed to close friends when their lives are at risk—his action may well be morally justified. Accordingly, his act of corruption may well not have a corrupting effect on himself. Plausibly, this explains any tendency we might have not to describe his action as an action of corruption. But from the fact that the person was not corrupted it does not follow that the act did not corrupt. Moreover, it does not even follow that some person or other was not corrupted. Clearly, in our example, the immigration official was corrupted and, therefore, the action was pro tanto morally wrong, even if the action was morally right all things considered.

In this section the following propositions have been advanced: (a) the phenomenon of noble cause corruption is a species of corruption, and it is seen to be so by the lights of the causal account of corruption in particular; (b) conceivably, some acts of noble cause corruption are morally justified all things considered; (c) instances of structural corruption favored by Lessig and/or Thompson are potentially cases of noble cause corruption, but this is not necessarily the case.

Thus far our concern has been with theorizing institutional corruption. Indeed, most of the philosophical work undertaken to date has consisted in such theorizing. However, there are some salient exceptions to this. For instance, Pogge has suggested undermining the international borrowing privileges of authoritarian governments who have removed democratic governments (Pogge 2002 [2008]: Chapter 10); Wenar (2016) argues for the enforcement of property rights (popular resource sovereignty) in relation to the resources curse; Lessig (Lessig 2011) has elaborated a raft of specific measures to reform the system of campaign contributions in the U.S.; Alexandra and Miller (2010) have outlined ways to utilize reputational devices in some sectors in which reputational loss hurts the “bottom line” (see also Brennan & Pettit 2005 for an account of the theoretical underpinnings of such practical reforms).

However, at a more general level there is an apparent need on the part of philosophers to conceptualize the notion of an anti-corruption system or, more broadly, an integrity system for institutions (Klitgaard 1988; Pope 1997; Anechiarico & Jacobs 1998; Klitgaard et al. 2000; Preston & Sampford 2002; Baker 2005; Miller 2017). An integrity system is an institutional arrangement the purpose of which is to promote ethical attitudes and behavior and, crucially, to prevent or, at least, reduce institutional corruption. For instance, an integrity system for a police organization might consist of a set of laws and regulations, an internal affairs department comprised of corruption investigators, an external oversight body, professional reporting mechanisms, an enforceable code of ethics, a complaints and discipline process, and so on. The contribution of philosophers to integrity systems has been threefold. Firstly, they have offered synoptic or “birds-eye” views of the architecture of such systems and in so doing determined whether they are fit for normative institutional purpose. Naturally, this work presupposes theories of the normative institutional purposes of the institutions in question (Lessig 2011; Thompson 1995). Secondly, they have addressed a variety of ethical issues that have arisen in the design and implementation of integrity systems and their various institutional components. Consider, for instance, the range of ethical issues that arise in relation to anti-corruption systems for police organizations, e.g., entrapment, privacy/surveillance (Miller 2016). Thirdly, they have identified the underlying causal and/or rational basis of the corruption and, in light of this, designed appropriate anti-corruption measures. (Pogge 2002 [2008]: Chapter 6; Lessig 2011); van den Hoven, Miller, & Pogge 2017). An important set of structural problems facilitating corruption are collective action problems, e.g., regulatory arbitrage in the global financial system and tax havens (Obermayer & Obermaier 2016; Rothstein & Varraich 2017). One kind of solution proposed is that of an enforceable cooperative scheme at the international level (Eatwell & Taylor 2000).

Integrity systems can be thought of as being either predominantly reactive or predominantly preventive, albeit the distinction is somewhat artificial since there is always a need for both reactive elements, e.g., investigations of corrupt actions, and preventive elements, e.g., ethics training and transparency mechanisms. Reactive systems are fundamentally linear. They frame laws and regulation that set out a series of offences, wait for transgressions, investigate, adjudicate and take punitive measures. In many areas, including institutional corruption, resources are limited and, thus, ethically informed decisions have to be made in relation to the prioritization of corrupt activity to be investigated and to what extent. This ethical problem is to be distinguished from the problem of under-resourcing motivated by a desire to hamstring anti-corruption initiatives. Moreover, both problems are to be distinguished from the debate between those who favor increased laws and regulations to combat, for instance, financial corruption, and those who argue for a decrease in such laws and regulations since they unnecessarily increase the cost of doing business.

Preventive institutional mechanisms for combating corruption can be divided into four categories. Mechanisms designed to reduce the motivation to engage in corruption, e.g., ethics education programs; mechanisms to reduce the capacity of those motivated to engage in corruption, e.g., legislation to downsize oligopolies to prevent cartels (Rose-Ackerman 1999), exploitation of the lack of trust between corruptors (Lambsdorff 2007), democratization and the separation of powers (“power corrupts” (Acton 1887 [1948: 364]) to reign in powerful, corrupt governments (Johnston 2014); mechanisms to eliminate or reduce the opportunity to engage in corruption, e.g., conflict of interest provisions; mechanisms to expose corrupt behavior, e.g., oversight bodies, media organizations (Pope 1997; Spence et al. 2011).

It is self-evident that there is need for both reactive and preventive elements if an integrity system is to be adequate. This point obtains whether or not the integrity system in question pertains to a single organization, an industry, an occupational group, or an entire society. However, the reactive and preventive elements need to cohere in an overall holistic integrity system (Miller 2017). A further point often overlooked is that if an integrity system is to be effective it presupposes a framework of accepted social norms in the sense of socially accepted moral principles. Social norms provide the standards which determine what counts as corruption. Moreover, in so doing they determine whether or not such behavior will be tolerated or not. Revealing corruption has very little effect if the wider community to whom the corruption is revealed are tolerant or otherwise accepting of it.

Corruption is a highly diverse phenomenon, including bribery, nepotism, false testimony, cheating, abuse of authority and so on. Moreover, corruption takes different forms across the spectrum of institutions giving rise to political corruption, financial corruption, police corruption, academic corruption and so on. The causal theory of corruption is a sustained attempt to provide an account which accommodates this diversity. In doing so it emphasizes the causal as well as the normative dimension of institutional corruption. The most influential contemporary philosophical theories of political corruption are those of Dennis Thompson and Lawrence Lessig. Moreover, Lessig’s notion of dependence corruptions looks to be generalizable to a degree to institutions other than political institutions. Likewise the mechanism that lies at the heart of Thompson’s theory may be generalizable to a degree to institutions other than political institutions. However, as they stand, neither of these theories provides a general or comprehensive theory of institutional corruption (and Lessig’s theory, at least, is not intended to do so). The wide diversity of corrupt actions implies that there may well need to be a correspondingly wide and diverse range of specific anti-corruption measures to combat corruption in its different forms, and indeed in its possibly very different contexts. Recent decades have seen the rise of whole systems of anti-corruptions mechanisms encased in what are referred to as integrity systems. Here we can distinguish reactive from preventive elements of an integrity or anti-corruption system and, arguably, an effective integrity system should integrate reactive and preventive elements in an overall holistic system.

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Corruption is a Global Problem for Development. To Fight It, We All Have a Role to Play

Oped published in French in La Tribune Afrique, June 13, 2023.

Oped by Ousmane Diagana, World Bank Vice President for Western and Central Africa and Mouhamadou Diagne, World Bank Vice President for Integrity.

Every day, we hear about the onslaught of crises facing the world—from climate change to conflict, inflation and debt, and the ongoing recovery from a years-long pandemic. Add to them the prospect of slow economic growth , and our efforts to overcome these challenges seem rife with obstacles. For developing countries, many with limited and already stretched resources, the confluence of crises will be especially difficult to navigate.

But if we are to achieve success over the challenges of our time, there is one scourge we cannot fail to confront: corruption.

The unfortunate truth is that corruption persists in all countries. It manifests in many ways—from petty bribes and kickbacks to grand theft of public resources. With advances in technology, corruption has increasingly become a transnational challenge without respect for borders, as money can now move more easily in and out of countries to hide illicit gains.

Corruption is also a fundamental problem for development.

Corruption harms the poor and vulnerable the most, increasing costs and reducing access to basic services, such as health, education, social programs, and even justice. It exacerbates inequality and reduces private sector investment to the detriment of markets, job opportunities, and economies. Corruption can also undermine a country’s response to emergencies, leading to unnecessary suffering and, at worst, death. Over time, corruption can undermine the trust and confidence that citizens have for their leaders and institutions, creating social friction and in some contexts increasing the risk of fragility, conflict, and violence.

To prevent these negative impacts, we must confront corruption with determined and deliberate action. For the World Bank Group, fighting corruption in development has been a long-standing commitment in our operational work. This commitment is reflected in our support for countries in building transparent, inclusive, and accountable institutions , but also through initiatives that go beyond developing countries to also include financial centers, take on the politics of corruption more openly than before, and harness new technologies to understand, address, and prevent corruption.  

Indeed, across western and central Africa in particular, it is one of the World Bank Group’s strategic priorities to emphasize issues of good governance, accountability, and transparency among our partner countries, with the aim of reducing corruption. We recognize that transparency in public affairs and the accountability of high-level officials are fundamental to the trust of citizens in their government and the effective delivery of public services. Working to rebuild and bolster trust between citizens and the state is critical today, especially in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence that make up half of the countries in this region alone.

Across Africa, World Bank Group support is helping countries face these challenges. Recent investments in the Republic of Congo , Ghana , and Morocco , for example, will support institutional governance reforms to improve the performance and transparency of service delivery. In Kenya, our support will further fiscal management reforms for greater transparency in public procurement , thereby reducing opportunities for corruption. Strengthening citizen-state engagement is key: In Burkina Faso, for example, a World Bank-funded project helped the national government improve citizen engagement and public sector accountability through the development of a digital tool to monitor the performance of municipal service delivery. 

The World Bank Group’s commitment to fighting corruption is also reflected in robust mechanisms across the institution that enhance the integrity of our operations. Our independent Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) works to detect, deter, and prevent fraud and corruption involving World Bank Group funds. Over two decades of INT’s work, the World Bank has sanctioned more than 1,100 firms and individuals, often imposing debarments that make them ineligible to participate in the projects and operations we finance. In addition, we have enforced more than 640 cross-debarments from other multilateral development banks, standing with our MDB partners to help keep corruption out of development projects everywhere. Nevertheless, we must remain vigilant to the risks of fraud and corruption that remain.

The World Bank Group also leverages its position as global convener to support anticorruption actors at all levels and from around the world. That is why we are pleased to have organized the next edition of the World Bank Group’s International Corruption Hunters Alliance (ICHA) to take place in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on June 14-16, 2023.

The ICHA forum is an opportunity for front-line practitioners committed to fighting corruption as well as policy makers and representatives from the private sector and civil society, to come together to share knowledge, experience, and insights for confronting corruption. For the first time since its inception in 2010, we are hosting the ICHA forum in an African country. This reflects the reality that the negative impacts of corruption can be more devastating for developing countries, who face unique challenges and have fewer resources to overcome them. Yet, it also acknowledges that there is a wealth of anticorruption strengths, skills, and expertise from these countries that we must draw upon.

Together, we can affirm that through our collective action, we can advance the fight against corruption even in an era of crises.  

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The problem of corruption and corruption of power

Thinking beyond politics.

By Prof. Victor Andres Manhit

Transparency International (TI) has been fighting corruption for 27 years in over 100 countries. Here in the Philippines, I remember their prominent voices such as Randy David, Solita Monsod, Attorney Lilia de Lima, and Judge Dolores Español — all passionate advocates for transparency and accountability, issues that are still very relevant in our society.

Accordingly, TI defines corruption as “the abuse of power for private gain.” By this, corruption has deprived countless citizens around the globe of much-needed public services and benefits of development.

Under the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), corruption indicators pertain to “bribery; the diversion of public funds; the effective prosecution of corruption cases; adequate legal frameworks, access to information; and legal protections to whistleblowers, journalists and investigators.”

But what has corruption caused us?

In September 2018, the United Nations (UN), citing World Economic Forum (WEF) data, expressed that global corruption eats up 5% of the world’s gross domestic product; in November, the World Financial Review stated that Philippines had lost $10 BILLION annually due to illicit financial flows; in December, the UN and the WEF disclosed that $3.6 TRILLION had been lost due to bribes and stolen money; and in December 2019, the WEF published that “corruption, bribery, theft and tax evasion, and other illicit financial flows cost developing countries $1.26 TRILLION a year.”

In the Philippines, an estimated P1.4 TRILLION has been lost to corruption in the years 2017 (P670 BILLION) and 2018 (P752 BILLION), Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos said, where around 20% of the annual government appropriation goes to corruption. Also, according to a study by Carandang and Balboa-Cahig (2020), “some of the more notable typologies and their accompanying corruption cases in the Philippine context are as follows: non-Compliance with the Government Procurement Reform, technical malversation, political dynasty, ghost project, income and asset misdeclaration, red tape, influencing a subordinate to defy order and protocol, bribery, connivance of government officials with drug lords.”

Further, the wide-ranging impact of corruption could result in a myriad of outcomes. In April 2020, the Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Center (GIACC) said that corruption may cause

“inadequate infrastructure, dangerous infrastructure, displacement of people, damage to the environment, reduced spending in infrastructure, reduced public expenditure, and reduced foreign investment.”

The said CPI indicators and data culled to substantiate them, and the gargantuan multi-level impact of corruption represent a formidable platform in instigating institutional reforms to achieve bureaucratic coherence and improve the development capacity of the state. With a multi-stakeholder roadmap against corruption, the plans and investments for economic recovery and development in the new normal will not be for naught. In turn, succeeding economic growths could be dispersed effectively.

Specifically, combating corruption in our country instantly augments the chance of helping the following: the 1.3 million people who have perceived themselves as poor in 2019 (self-rated poverty) and the families suffering from hunger (20.9%) during the pandemic, according to an SWS survey; the 16.7% of the population in poverty (Philippine Statistics Authority); and the additional 1.5 million Filipinos pushed into poverty by the pandemic (Philippine Institute for Development Studies).

But the problem of corruption could dangerously be translated into corruption of power. This happens if political opportunism becomes a trend. Rather than harmonize national unity in a pandemic-ravaged country, division and confusion among the population or a particular sector is instead espoused. In turn, false promises and hopes could frustrate the holistic approach being forged by a wide-range of social actors attuned to the long-standing battle against corruption.

More so, corruption of power could be exacerbated whenever the law is weaponized and used to benefit a new or selected few. Empirically, two examples could be cited. First if more than half of Filipinos agree that “It is dangerous to print or broadcast anything critical of the administration, even if it is the truth,” (SWS, July 3-6, 2020 survey), then what we have now is a terrified citizenry.

Second, the latest political charade in “handling” the country’s elite is not really about dismantling the oligarchy as pronounced. What’s happening is a mere changing of the old guards; the overt creation and empowerment of a new oligarchy, the “Dutertegarchs,” as William Pesek has pointedly raised.

To address corruption, political-institutional and economic reforms beg to be independently and holistically crafted and implemented.

Victor Andres “Dindo” C. Manhit is the President of Stratbase ADR Institute.

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H ead to any of the most disadvantaged places in America and ask local leaders what is holding their community back, and invariably you will hear a story about the local poor. They don’t want to work, don’t behave like they should, and have become dependent on government welfare programs. This story is centuries old. Indeed, the narrative of the shiftless poor inhabits a perpetual space in the nation’s collective consciousness.

These days, though, the biggest story about welfare cheats isn’t about the poor making off with a few dollars in undeserved aid. Any such fraud is dwarfed by the actions of Nancy New, a nonprofit leader in Mississippi, and John Davis, director of the state’s welfare agency, who, from 2017 to 2020, scammed a government program meant to help impoverished children in Mississippi, the nation’s poorest state, to the tune of nearly $80 million. It’s the largest public corruption scandal in the state’s history.

Rather than alleviating poverty through cash aid, child care, or job training, New and Davis used New’s nonprofit Mississippi Community Education Center to line their own pockets and those of a number of celebrity athletes, among other dubious schemes. Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Anna Wolfe uncovered the scheme, but the whole thing might not have made national headlines but for the involvement of Super Bowl champion quarterback Brett Favre . Favre was paid $1.1 million by New’s nonprofit for speaking events that, according to Mississippi state auditor Shad White, did not happen. Another $5 million went to build a volleyball stadium at Favre’s alma mater, the University of Southern Mississippi, with the justification that the funds would be used to host events for underserved youth. To date only one such event has occurred.

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While the Mississippi story is particularly shocking, our five years of research in America’s most disadvantaged places has shown that government corruption is disturbingly common. We saw firsthand how members of the local elite exploited the community’s meager resources—even aid meant to help the most vulnerable—through corruption of all kinds, a pattern enduring across generations. Through hundreds of interviews with local leaders and ordinary citizens alike in our nation’s most disadvantaged places—clustered in central Appalachia, South Texas, and the historic Cotton Belt—we learned that many people assume that the poor are eager to take advantage of the dole unless proven otherwise, a guilty-until-proven-innocent framework. Yet the same people who are eager to blame the poor will often discount a case like New’s, dismissing her as just one “bad apple.”

Take Crystal City, Texas, which has a poverty rate of close to 30%, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. A major obstacle to bringing new jobs to town that might drive that poverty rate down is that the city is still reeling from 2016, when the mayor, the city manager, and three current or former members of Crystal City’s city council were convicted in a conspiracy and bribery scheme. Yet another council member had already gone down on human trafficking charges, leaving only one member of the city council to run the town. The broader region has seen an economic boom from fracking in recent years, bringing in new hotels and restaurants along with new jobs. Yet Crystal City has missed out on this surge completely. Residents we spoke to complained that local government was largely non-functional when it should have been vying for a piece of the pie.

Read More: America Looks at Poverty All Wrong

In Clay County, Kentucky, which has a poverty rate of nearly 36%, The City of Manchester’s long-serving mayor Daugh White and several of his cronies pleaded guilty to racketeering and conspiracy charges in 2007 for pursuing kickbacks from companies bidding on city contracts. Just before White’s demise, a set of reformers decided to take him on. But in their efforts to unseat White and his coalition, the reformers employed an age-old eastern Kentucky tactic—vote buying. After a federal RICO investigation, they also found themselves in the clink.

Our government must find new ways to get resources to where they are most needed. Since at least the New Deal, there has been an expectation that aid from the government will flow not directly to the needy, but to local governments, who will distribute resources for the betterment of their community. While we met many honest and well-meaning local officials through our research, this approach is a recipe for corruption because all too often the officials responsible for delivering this aid to the poor are self-dealing people. A federally administered expanded Child Tax Credit, such as the one briefly implemented by the Biden administration during the Covid-19 pandemic, is one way to get aid directly to poor families while circumventing the open pockets of local elites. Targeted funding to local governments should be made in full recognition that especially in these places, the investments are at risk of not getting to where they are most needed. Government agencies must build in safeguards to avoid graft.

A broader problem in getting resources to the places of greatest need is that for decades, the government has invested in places through policies by soliciting proposals from the communities themselves. While this may sound like a good thing, rarely is the process driven by experts in regional development. Instead, local elites—with their own self-interest—typically control the undertaking. Expertise, not cronyism, is needed to determine which strategies are most likely to lead to meaningful gains.

In many of America’s most disadvantaged regions, corruption has exerted a chokehold that has kept local communities from thriving. In the words of John Kerry, civic corruption is “an opportunity destroyer because it discourages honest and accountable investment; it makes businesses more expensive to operate; it drives up the cost of public services for local taxpayers”—a toxic alchemy. Deeply disadvantaged communities cannot thrive until more people scrutinize the actions of the local elites who run them.

Correction: This article originally said Nancy New's nonprofit was called Mississippi First. It is called the Mississippi Community Education Center.

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How to Stop Corruption Essay: Guide & Topics [+4 Samples]

Corruption is an abuse of power that was entrusted to a person or group of people for personal gain. It can appear in various settings and affect different social classes, leading to unemployment and other economic issues. This is why writing an essay on corruption can become a challenge.

One “how to stop corruption” essay will require plenty of time and effort, as the topic is too broad. That’s why our experts have prepared this guide. It can help you with research and make the overall writing process easier. Besides, you will find free essays on corruption with outlines.

• ✍️ How to Write an Essay
• 💰 Essay Examples
• 🤑 How to Stop Corruption Essay
• 💲 Topics for Essay

✍️ How to Write an Essay on Corruption

Before writing on the issue, you have to understand a few things. First , corruption can take different forms, such as:

• Bribery – receiving money or other valuable items in exchange for using power or influence in an illegal way.
• Graft – using power or authority for personal goals.
• Extortion – threats or violence for the person’s advantage.
• Kickback – paying commission to a bribe-taker for some service.
• Cronyism – assigning unqualified friends or relatives to job positions.
• Embezzlement – stealing the government’s money.

Second , you should carefully think about the effects of corruption on the country. It seriously undermines democracy and the good name of political institutions. Its economic, political, and social impact is hard to estimate.

Let’s focus on writing about corruption. What are the features of your future paper? What elements should you include in your writing?

Below, we will show you the general essay on corruption sample and explain each part’s importance:

You already chose the paper topic. What’s next? Create an outline for your future writing. You’re better to compose a plan for your paper so that it won’t suffer from logic errors and discrepancies. Besides, you may be required to add your outline to your paper and compose a corruption essay with headings.

At this step, you sketch out the skeleton:

• what to write in the introduction;
• what points to discuss in the body section;
• what to put into the conclusion.

Take the notes during your research to use them later. They will help you to put your arguments in a logical order and show what points you can use in the essay.

For a long-form essay, we suggest you divide it into parts. Title each one and use headings to facilitate the reading process.

🔴 Introduction

The next step is to develop a corruption essay’s introduction. Here, you should give your readers a preview of what’s coming and state your position.

• Start with a catchy hook.
• Give a brief description of the problem context.
• Provide a thesis statement.

You can always update and change it when finishing the paper.

🔴 Body Paragraphs

In the body section, you will provide the central points and supporting evidence. When discussing the effects of this problem in your corruption essay, do not forget to include statistics and other significant data.

Every paragraph should include a topic sentence, explanation, and supporting evidence. To make them fit together, use analysis and critical thinking.

Use interesting facts and compelling arguments to earn your audience’s attention. It may drift while reading an essay about corruption, so don’t let it happen.

🔴 Quotations

Quotes are the essential elements of any paper. They support your claims and add credibility to your writing. Such items are exceptionally crucial for an essay on corruption as the issue can be controversial, so you may want to back up your arguments.

• You may incorporate direct quotes in your text. In this case, remember to use quotation marks and mark the page number for yourself. Don’t exceed the 30 words limit. Add the information about the source in the reference list.
• You may decide to use a whole paragraph from your source as supporting evidence. Then, quote indirectly—paraphrase, summarize, or synthesize the argument of interest. You still have to add relevant information to your reference list, though.

Check your professor’s guidelines regarding the preferred citation style.

🔴 Conclusion

In your corruption essay conclusion, you should restate the thesis and summarize your findings. You can also provide recommendations for future research on the topic. Keep it clear and short—it can be one paragraph long.

Don’t forget your references!

Include a list of all sources you used to write this paper. Read the citation guideline of your institution to do it correctly. By the way, some citation tools allow creating a reference list in pdf or Word formats.

💰 Corruption Essay Examples

If you strive to write a good how to stop a corruption essay, you should check a few relevant examples. They will show you the power of a proper outline and headings. Besides, you’ll see how to formulate your arguments and cite sources.

✔️ Essay on Corruption: 250 Words

If you were assigned a short paper of 250 words and have no idea where to start, you can check the example written by our academic experts. As you can see below, it is written in easy words. You can use simple English to explain to your readers the “black money” phenomenon.

Another point you should keep in mind when checking our short essay on corruption is that the structure remains the same. Despite the low word count, it has an introductory paragraph with a thesis statement, body section, and a conclusion.

Now, take a look at our corruption essay sample and inspire!

✔️ Essay on Corruption: 500 Words

Cause and effect essay is among the most common paper types for students. In case you’re composing this kind of paper, you should research the reasons for corruption. You can investigate factors that led to this phenomenon in a particular country.

Use the data from the official sources, for example, Transparency International . There is plenty of evidence for your thesis statement on corruption and points you will include in the body section. Also, you can use headlines to separate one cause from another. Doing so will help your readers to browse through the text easily.

Check our essay on corruption below to see how our experts utilize headlines.

🤑 How to Stop Corruption: Essay Prompts

Corruption is a complex issue that undermines the foundations of justice, fairness, and equality. If you want to address this problem, you can write a “How to Stop Corruption” essay using any of the following topic ideas.

The writing prompts below will provide valuable insights into this destructive phenomenon. Use them to analyze the root causes critically and propose effective solutions.

How to Prevent Corruption Essay Prompt

In this essay, you can discuss various strategies and measures to tackle corruption in society. Explore the impact of corruption on social, political, and economic systems and review possible solutions. Your paper can also highlight the importance of ethical leadership and transparent governance in curbing corruption.

Here are some more ideas to include:

• The role of education and public awareness in preventing corruption. In this essay, you can explain the importance of teaching ethical values and raising awareness about the adverse effects of corruption. It would be great to illustrate your essay with examples of successful anti-corruption campaigns and programs.
• How to implement strong anti-corruption laws and regulations. Your essay could discuss the steps governments should take in this regard, such as creating comprehensive legislation and independent anti-corruption agencies. Also, clarify how international cooperation can help combat corruption.
• Ways of promoting transparency in government and business operations. Do you agree that open data policies, whistleblower protection laws, independent oversight agencies, and transparent financial reporting are effective methods of ensuring transparency? What other strategies can you propose? Answer the questions in your essay.

How to Stop Corruption as a Student Essay Prompt

An essay on how to stop corruption as a student can focus on the role of young people in preventing corruption in their communities and society at large. Describe what students can do to raise awareness, promote ethical behavior, and advocate for transparency and accountability. The essay can also explore how instilling values of integrity and honesty among young people can help combat corruption.

Here’s what else you can talk about:

• How to encourage ethical behavior and integrity among students. Explain why it’s essential for teachers to be models of ethical behavior and create a culture of honesty and accountability in schools. Besides, discuss the role of parents and community members in reinforcing students’ moral values.
• Importance of participating in anti-corruption initiatives and campaigns from a young age. Your paper could study how participation in anti-corruption initiatives fosters young people’s sense of civic responsibility. Can youth engagement promote transparency and accountability?
• Ways of promoting accountability within educational institutions. What methods of fostering accountability are the most effective? Your essay might evaluate the efficacy of promoting direct communication, establishing a clear code of conduct, creating effective oversight mechanisms, holding all members of the educational process responsible for their actions, and other methods.

How to Stop Corruption in India Essay Prompt

In this essay, you can discuss the pervasive nature of corruption in various sectors of Indian society and its detrimental effects on the country’s development. Explore strategies and measures that can be implemented to address and prevent corruption, as well as the role of government, civil society, and citizens in combating this issue.

Your essay may also include the following:

• Analysis of the causes and consequences of corruption in India. You may discuss the bureaucratic red tape, weak enforcement mechanisms, and other causes. How do they affect the country’s development?
• Examination of the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption laws and measures. What are the existing anti-corruption laws and measures in India? Are they effective? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
• Discussion of potential solutions and reforms to curb corruption. Propose practical solutions and reforms that can potentially stop corruption. Also, explain the importance of political will and international cooperation to implement reforms effectively.

Government Corruption Essay Prompt

A government corruption essay can discuss the prevalence of corruption within government institutions and its impact on the state’s functioning. You can explore various forms of corruption, such as bribery, embezzlement, and nepotism. Additionally, discuss their effects on public services, economic development, and social justice.

Here are some more ideas you can cover in your essay:

• The causes and manifestations of government corruption. Analyze political patronage, weak accountability systems, and other factors that stimulate corruption. Additionally, include real-life examples that showcase the manifestations of government corruption in your essay.
• The impact of corruption on public trust and governance. Corruption undermines people’s trust and increases social inequalities. In your paper, we suggest evaluating its long-term impact on countries’ development and social cohesion.
• Strategies and reforms to combat government corruption. Here, you can present and examine the best strategies and reforms to fight corruption in government. Also, consider the role of international organizations and media in advocating for anti-corruption initiatives.

How to Stop Police Corruption Essay Prompt

In this essay, you can explore strategies and reforms to address corruption within law enforcement agencies. Start by investigating the root causes of police corruption and its impact on public safety and trust. Then, propose effective measures to combat it.

Here’s what else you can discuss in your essay:

• The factors contributing to police corruption, such as lack of accountability and oversight. Your paper could research various factors that cause police corruption. Is it possible to mitigate their effect?
• The consequences of police corruption for community relations and public safety. Police corruption has a disastrous effect on public safety and community trust. Your essay can use real-life examples to show how corruption practices in law enforcement undermine their legitimacy and fuel social unrest.
• Potential solutions, such as improved training, transparency, and accountability measures. Can these measures solve the police corruption issue? What other strategies can be implemented to combat the problem? Consider these questions in your essay.

💲 40 Best Topics for Corruption Essay

Another key to a successful essay on corruption is choosing an intriguing topic. There are plenty of ideas to use in your paper. And here are some topic suggestions for your writing:

• What is corruption? An essay should tell the readers about the essentials of this phenomenon. Elaborate on the factors that impact its growth or reduce.
• How to fight corruption ? Your essay can provide ideas on how to reduce the effects of this problem. If you write an argumentative paper, state your arguments, and give supporting evidence. For example, you can research the countries with the lowest corruption index and how they fight with it.
• I say “no” to corruption . This can be an excellent topic for your narrative essay. Describe a situation from your life when you’re faced with this type of wrongdoing.
• Corruption in our country. An essay can be dedicated, for example, to corruption in India or Pakistan. Learn more about its causes and how different countries fight with it.
• Graft and corruption. We already mentioned the definition of graft. Explore various examples of grafts, e.g., using the personal influence of politicians to pressure public service journalists. Provide your vision of the causes of corruption. The essay should include strong evidence.
• Corruption in society. Investigate how the tolerance to “black money” crimes impact economics in developing countries.
• How can we stop corruption ? In your essay, provide suggestions on how society can prevent this problem. What efficient ways can you propose?
• The reasons that lead to the corruption of the police. Assess how bribery impacts the crime rate. You can use a case of Al Capone as supporting evidence.
• Literature and corruption. Choose a literary masterpiece and analyze how the author addresses the theme of crime. You can check a sample paper on Pushkin’s “ The Queen of Spades ”
• How does power affect politicians ? In your essay on corruption and its causes, provide your observations on ideas about why people who hold power allow the grafts.
• Systemic corruption in China. China has one of the strictest laws on this issue. However, crime still exists. Research this topic and provide your observations on the reasons.
• The success of Asian Tigers . Explore how the four countries reduced corruption crime rates. What is the secret of their success? What can we learn from them?
• Lee Kuan Yew and his fight against corruption. Research how Singapore’s legislation influenced the elimination of this crime.
• Corruption in education. Examine the types in higher education institutions. Why does corruption occur?
• Gifts and bribes . You may choose to analyze the ethical side of gifts in business. Can it be a bribe? In what cases?
• Cronyism and nepotism in business. Examine these forms of corruption as a part of Chinese culture.
• Kickbacks and bribery. How do these two terms are related, and what are the ways to prevent them?
• Corporate fraud. Examine the bribery, payoffs, and kickbacks as a phenomenon in the business world. Point out the similarities and differences.
• Anti-bribery compliance in corporations. Explore how transnational companies fight with the misuse of funds by contractors from developing countries.
• The ethical side of payoffs. How can payoffs harm someone’s reputation? Provide your point of view of why this type of corporate fraud is unethical.
• The reasons for corruption of public officials.
• Role of auditors in the fight against fraud and corruption.
• The outcomes of corruption in public administration .
• How to eliminate corruption in the field of criminal justice.
• Is there a connection between corruption and drug abuse ?
• The harm corruption does to the economic development of countries.
• The role of anti-bribery laws in fighting financial crimes.
• Populist party brawl against corruption and graft.
• An example of incorrigible corruption in business: Enron scandal .
• The effective ways to prevent corruption.
• The catastrophic consequences of corruption in healthcare.
• How regular auditing can prevent embezzlement and financial manipulation.
• Correlation between poverty and corruption .
• Unethical behavior and corruption in football business.
• Corruption in oil business: British Petroleum case.
• Are corruption and bribery socially acceptable in Central Asian states?
• What measures should a company take to prevent bribery among its employees?
• Ways to eliminate and prevent cases of police corruption.  
• Gift-giving traditions and corruption in the world’s culture.
• Breaking business obligations: embezzlement and fraud.

These invaluable tips will help you to get through any kind of essay. You are welcome to use these ideas and writing tips whenever you need to write this type of academic paper. Share the guide with those who may need it for their essay on corruption.

This might be interesting for you:

• Canadian Identity Essay: Essay Topics and Writing Guide
• Nationalism Essay: An Ultimate Guide and Topics
• Human Trafficking Essay for College: Topics and Examples
• Murder Essay: Top 3 Killing Ideas to Complete your Essay

🔗 References

• Public Corruption: FBI, U.S. Department of Justice
• Anti-Corruption and Transparency: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
• United Nations Convention against Corruption: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
• Corruption Essay: Cram
• How to Construct an Essay: Josh May
• Essay Writing: University College Birmingham
• Structuring the Essay: Research & Learning Online
• Insights from U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre: Medium
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Essay on the political functions of corruption, additional details.

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Essay on Corruption for Students and Children

500+ words essay on corruption.

Essay on Corruption – Corruption refers to a form of criminal activity or dishonesty. It refers to an evil act by an individual or a group. Most noteworthy, this act compromises the rights and privileges of others. Furthermore, Corruption primarily includes activities like bribery or embezzlement. However, Corruption can take place in many ways. Most probably, people in positions of authority are susceptible to Corruption. Corruption certainly reflects greedy and selfish behavior.

Methods of Corruption

First of all, Bribery is the most common method of Corruption. Bribery involves the improper use of favours and gifts in exchange for personal gain. Furthermore, the types of favours are diverse. Above all, the favours include money, gifts, company shares, sexual favours, employment , entertainment, and political benefits. Also, personal gain can be – giving preferential treatment and overlooking crime.

Embezzlement refers to the act of withholding assets for the purpose of theft. Furthermore, it takes place by one or more individuals who were entrusted with these assets. Above all, embezzlement is a type of financial fraud.

The graft is a global form of Corruption. Most noteworthy, it refers to the illegal use of a politician’s authority for personal gain. Furthermore, a popular way for the graft is misdirecting public funds for the benefit of politicians .

Extortion is another major method of Corruption. It means to obtain property, money or services illegally. Above all, this obtainment takes place by coercing individuals or organizations. Hence, Extortion is quite similar to blackmail.

Favouritism and nepotism is quite an old form of Corruption still in usage. This refers to a person favouring one’s own relatives and friends to jobs. This is certainly a very unfair practice. This is because many deserving candidates fail to get jobs.

Abuse of discretion is another method of Corruption. Here, a person misuses one’s power and authority. An example can be a judge unjustly dismissing a criminal’s case.

Finally, influence peddling is the last method here. This refers to illegally using one’s influence with the government or other authorized individuals. Furthermore, it takes place in order to obtain preferential treatment or favour.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Ways of Stopping Corruption

One important way of preventing Corruption is to give a better salary in a government job. Many government employees receive pretty low salaries. Therefore, they resort to bribery to meet their expenses. So, government employees should receive higher salaries. Consequently, high salaries would reduce their motivation and resolve to engage in bribery.

Tough laws are very important for stopping Corruption. Above all, strict punishments need to be meted out to guilty individuals. Furthermore, there should be an efficient and quick implementation of strict laws.

Applying cameras in workplaces is an excellent way to prevent corruption. Above all, many individuals would refrain from indulging in Corruption due to fear of being caught. Furthermore, these individuals would have otherwise engaged in Corruption.

The government must make sure to keep inflation low. Due to the rise in prices, many people feel their incomes to be too low. Consequently, this increases Corruption among the masses. Businessmen raise prices to sell their stock of goods at higher prices. Furthermore, the politician supports them due to the benefits they receive.

To sum it up, Corruption is a great evil of society. This evil should be quickly eliminated from society. Corruption is the poison that has penetrated the minds of many individuals these days. Hopefully, with consistent political and social efforts, we can get rid of Corruption.

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Here are 10 ways to fight corruption

Robert hunja.

4. It’s not 1999: Use the power of technology to build dynamic and continuous exchanges between key stakeholders: government, citizens, business, civil society groups, media, academia etc.   5. Deliver the goods: Invest in institutions and policy – sustainable improvement in how a government delivers services is only possible if the people in these institutions endorse sensible rules and practices that allow for change while making the best use of tested traditions and legacies – imported models often do not work.   6. Get incentives right: Align anti-corruption measures with market, behavioral, and social forces. Adopting integrity standards is a smart business decision, especially for companies interested in doing business with the World Bank Group and other development partners.   7. Sanctions matter:  Punishing corruption is a vital component of any effective anti-corruption effort.   8. Act globally and locally:  Keep citizens engaged on corruption at local, national, international and global levels – in line with the scale and scope of corruption. Make use of the architecture that has been developed and the platforms that exist for engagement.   9. Build capacity for those who need it most: Countries that  suffer from chronic fragility, conflict and violence– are often the ones that have the fewest internal resources to combat corruption. Identify ways to leverage international resources to support and sustain good governance.   10. Learn by doing: Any good  strategy must be continually monitored  and evaluated to make sure it can be easily adapted as  situations on the ground change. What are other ways we could fight corruption? Tell us in the comments. 

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Corruption of Government Essay

Corruption of government is a pressing issue that has plagued societies throughout history. It is a phenomenon that occurs when individuals in positions of power abuse their authority for personal gain, disregarding the well-being and interests of the people they are meant to serve. This essay will explore the causes and consequences of government corruption, as well as potential solutions to combat this pervasive problem.

One of the main causes of government corruption is the lack of transparency and accountability. When those in power are not held responsible for their actions, it creates an environment conducive to corruption. In addition, the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals increases the likelihood of corruption, as it allows for unchecked decision-making and the manipulation of resources for personal gain.

The consequences of government corruption are far-reaching and detrimental to society. First and foremost, it undermines the trust and confidence that citizens have in their government. This erodes the social fabric and weakens the democratic institutions that are crucial for a functioning society. Furthermore, corruption leads to the misallocation of resources, hindering economic development and exacerbating social inequalities. It also perpetuates a culture of impunity, where corrupt officials are rarely held accountable for their actions, further perpetuating the cycle of corruption.

To combat government corruption, a multi-faceted approach is necessary. Firstly, promoting transparency and accountability is crucial. This can be achieved through the implementation of robust anti-corruption measures, such as the establishment of independent oversight institutions, strengthening of legal frameworks, and encouraging citizen participation in decision-making processes. Additionally, promoting a culture of integrity and ethical behavior within government institutions is essential. This can be done through comprehensive ethics training for public officials, as well as the enforcement of strict penalties for corrupt practices.

Furthermore, international cooperation is vital in the fight against government corruption. Countries should work together to share best practices and collaborate on anti-corruption initiatives. This includes supporting international organizations, such as the United Nations and World Bank, in their efforts to combat corruption globally.

In conclusion, government corruption is a complex and pervasive issue that requires concerted efforts to address. By promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity within government institutions, as well as fostering international cooperation, we can work towards a more just and equitable society. It is crucial that citizens remain vigilant and hold their governments accountable to ensure a brighter future for all.

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Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History

Federalist nos. 61-70.

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Table of Contents

Federalist no. 61.

The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

From the New York Packet Tuesday, February 26, 1788.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable, objection to the plan. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.

If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that view would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The constitution of New York makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the choice of the members of the federal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the constitution of this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.

If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in the State constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the representatives of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or other sinister motives, than the representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of people, with the advantage of local governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.

Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the federal House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations.

Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year.

It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for the national government at the same epochs.

Federalist No. 62

For the Independent Journal .

Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison

HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate.

The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.

Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?

A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.

Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions.

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.

Federalist No. 63

The Senate Continued

A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?

Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now laboring.

I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party, and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation, which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of representation; which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and REPRESENTING the people in their EXECUTIVE capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE; and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE capacity, since they were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually ELECTED BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered as the REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction between these and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY, from any share in the LATTER, and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the administration of the FORMER. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people, and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union.

But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate there instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the senate for life, continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole of its original portion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body, we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves.

Federalist No. 64

The Powers of the Senate

From the New York Packet Friday, March 7, 1788.

Author: John Jay

IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.

The second section gives power to the President, "BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."

The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. The convention appears to have been attentive to both these points: they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to the State legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors.

As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the President and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged.

Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information will be preserved.

There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position will see and confess that it is well provided for by making concurrence of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws.

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.

They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the other.

But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are contrived and urged.

Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given by our governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our legislature. All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the people may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected.

Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of government.

However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties?

As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a national form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention, and the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and, having no private interests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter.

As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations.

With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased. Every consideration that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments.

Federalist No. 65

The Powers of the Senate Continued

THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.

A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.

What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the legislative body. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the convention. In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment, and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?

Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?

Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.

These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature, will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the same persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future, office. It may be said, that the intervention of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his guilt?

Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the court of impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the convention; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I forbear to remark upon the additional pretext for clamor against the judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.

Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in favor of, such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a court formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State governments to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different, which could rationally be proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them. The second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men.

But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined, or some other that might be devised, should be thought preferable to the plan in this respect, reported by the convention, it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found? Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his INFALLIBLE criterion for the FALLIBLE criterion of his more CONCEITED NEIGHBOR? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious.

Federalist No. 66

Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered

From the New York Packet Tuesday, March 11, 1788.

A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter.

The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and well established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon the acts of the legislative body, is admitted, by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that the powers relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the executive. The division of them between the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.

It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire, without exception, the constitution of this State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, not only a court of impeachments, but the highest judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much more culpable must be the constitution of New York? 1

A SECOND objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?

If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the Government.

But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elections of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate though contingent power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they had participated. The principle of this objection would condemn a practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not always correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the representatives of the nation to become its accusers.

If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments.

It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to APPOINT. There will, of course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy.

A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they have been guilty?

This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.

The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this particular. The convention might with propriety have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: but they could not, with more or with equal propriety, have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law, a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any government. How, in fact, could a majority in the House of Representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident, than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with impunity, more than two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.

So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence or to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace.

• In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of impeachments. Back to text

Federalist No. 67

The Executive Department

THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our attention.

There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment.

Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States; not merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny, of that detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses, giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.

Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure or, it might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances which have been so insidiously, as well as industriously, propagated.

In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to treat with seriousness, the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual though unjustifiable licenses of party artifice, that even in a disposition the most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition.

In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate.

This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party 1 ; and who, upon this false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the fact, and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage he has offered to the dictates of truth and to the rules of fair dealing.

The second clause of the second section of the second article empowers the President of the United States "to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other OFFICERS of United States whose appointments are NOT in the Constitution OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, and WHICH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW." Immediately after this clause follows another in these words: "The President shall have power to fill up ?? VACANCIES that may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by granting commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT SESSION." It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight attention to the connection of the clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the deduction is not even colorable.

The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a mode for appointing such officers, "whose appointments are NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and which SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW"; of course it cannot extend to the appointments of senators, whose appointments are OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution 2 , and who are ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION, and will not require a future establishment by law. This position will hardly be contested.

The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other, which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other, for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate JOINTLY, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen IN THEIR RECESS, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, SINGLY, to make temporary appointments "during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session." Secondly. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which precedes, the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the "officers" described in the preceding one; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate. Thirdly. The time within which the power is to operate, "during the recess of the Senate," and the duration of the appointments, "to the end of the next session" of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the State legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the national Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments; and would have extended the duration in office of the temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of the State, in whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the national Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent appointments would, of course, have governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary appointments; and as the national Senate is the body, whose situation is alone contemplated in the clause upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the President. But lastly, the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article, not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides, that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF for six years"; and the latter directs, that, "if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or otherwise, DURING THE RECESS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE LEGISLATURE, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to fill casual vacancies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition, that the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility, must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy.

I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people. Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed government, whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America.

• See CATO, No. V. Back to text
• Article I, section 3, clause I. Back to text

Federalist No. 68

The Mode of Electing the President

From the New York Packet Friday, March 14, 1788.

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. 1 I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: "For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best," yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.

The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.

• Vide FEDERAL FARMER. Back to text

Federalist No. 69

The Real Character of the Executive

I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it.

The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York.

That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.

The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have copied.

The President is to be the ``commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT; to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement between them WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of the United States." In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most material points of difference are these: First. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. 1 The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly. The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of treason is limited ``to levying war upon the United States, and adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"; and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds. Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national legislature in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important purposes.

The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist 2 of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utmost plentitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative.

The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.

The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote in the appointment. If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made; in the government of New York, if the council should be divided, the governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination. 3 If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the national Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.

The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.

• A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY, has asserted that the king of Great Britain owes his prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is immemorial, and was only disputed, ``contrary to all reason and precedent," as Blackstone vol. i., page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the statute the 13th of Charles II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same. Back to text
• Vide Blackstone's ``Commentaries," vol i., p. 257. Back to text
• Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned. And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion. Back to text

Federalist No. 70

The Executive Department Further Considered

From the New York Packet Tuesday, March 18, 1788.

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. 1 Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.

Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

``I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.'' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be ``deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that ``the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE' 2 ; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is attainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number 3 , were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

• New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him. Back to text
• De Lolme. Back to text
• Ten. Back to text
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