natural moral law essay

A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies

Natural Law ethics

Introduction.

Natural law ethics is based on Aristotelian teleology; the idea that everything has a nature which directs it towards its good end goal. Aquinas Christianised this concept. The Christian God designed everything with a telos according to his omnibenevolent plan for creation.

Christian ethics is most associated with the commands and precepts found in the Bible. Aquinas’ contribution was to argue that telos is also a source of Christian moral principles. Human nature has the God given ability to reason which comes with the ability both to intuitively know primary moral precepts and to apply them to moral situations and actions. Following this ‘natural law’ is thus also an essential element of living a moral life.

There is biblical evidence for this view from St Paul in Romans chapter 2:

“when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law … They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them.” (Romans 2:14-15).

Gentiles are those who are not Jewish, nor part of the newly-emerging Christianity when St Paul was writing. The ‘law’ refers to the religious law of the Hebrew bible or old testament. Paul clearly indicates that human beings have another source of morality. Not exactly the law itself, but the ‘requirements of the law’. This is ‘written on their hearts’ and found in their conscience. Aquinas thinks all humans are born with God-given reason, which involves the innate ability to intuitively know the moral precepts of natural law.

The ancient Greek idea of telos refers to a thing’s behavioural inclination towards its good end due to its nature.

The nature of a thing determines the behaviours that are ‘natural’ to it. An acorn naturally grows into an oak tree, because of the way its inherent nature is constituted. Birds fly south in winter, because of their natural instincts.

Natural law ethics claims that human beings are also born with a God-designed nature, including the power of reason. Reason intuitively knows certain things to be good or bad, thereby inclining humans towards following God’s morality. So, humans have a telos, a natural inclination towards our good end

“the light of reason is placed by nature in every man, to guide him in his acts towards his end”. – Aquinas.

Animals and natural objects have their behaviour determined by their telos. Humans, however, have free will. We are capable of choosing whether to follow God’s moral law or not. If we do, we will be orientating ourselves towards our good end of glorifying God by following his moral law. This achieves eudaimonia (flourishing), another Aristotelian concept that inspired Aquinas.

Like Aristotle, Aquinas thought eudaimonia can be achieved at the societal as well as the individual level. God has designed the telos of human beings so that a harmony of their individual interests can be achieved if they follow the natural law.

A person or society which fails to orient itself towards the glory of God will not flourish, but degenerate. This doctrine energised much of the preoccupation of Catholics with the moral fabric of society and their opposition to changes they feared would lead to moral degeneration.

So, on the natural law view, ethics is about following the natural law within our nature.

The four tiers of law

The ultimate source of moral goodness and thus law is God’s omnibenevolent nature, which created and ordered the universe with a divine plan, known as the eternal law. However, that is beyond our understanding. We only have access to lesser laws that derive from the eternal law.

The eternal Law . God’s plan, built into the nature of everything which exists, according to his omnibenevolent nature.

The divine law – God’s revelation to humans in the Bible.

The natural law – The moral law God created in human nature, discoverable by human reason.

Human law – The laws humans make which should be based on the natural and divine law. Human law gains its authority by deriving from the natural and divine law which themselves ultimately derive authority from God’s nature.

“Participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law”. – Aquinas

The Primary Precepts & Synderesis

Reason is a power of the human soul. Synderesis is the habit or ability of reason to discover foundational ‘first principles’ of God’s natural moral law.

“the first practical principles … [belong to] a special natural habit … which we call “synderesis” … is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered.” – Aquinas

The first principle synderesis tells us is called the synderesis rule: that the good is what all things seek as their end/goal (telos). This means that human nature has an innate orientation to the good.

“This therefore is the principle of law: that good must be done and evil avoided. ” – Aquinas

Further to this, through synderesis we learn the primary precepts: worship God, live in an orderly society, reproduce, educate, protect and preserve human life and defend the innocent. These primary precepts are the articulation of the orientations in our nature toward the good; the natural inclinations of our God-designed human nature, put into the form of ethical principles by human reason. Simply having reason allows a being to intuitively know these precepts. We are all born with the ability to know them.

Secondary precepts & conscientia

“there belongs to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.” – Aquinas.

Conscientia is the ability of reason to apply he primary precepts to situations or types of actions. The judgement we then acquire is a secondary precept. E.g euthanasia: the primary precepts don’t say anything about euthanasia exactly, but we can use our reason to apply the primary precepts to euthanasia, and realise that it goes against the primary precept of protecting and preserving human life. Arguably it even disrupts the functioning of society too. Therefore, we can conclude the secondary precept that euthanasia is wrong.

Interior & exterior acts

A physical action itself is an exterior act because it occurs outside of our mind. Our intention; what we deliberately choose to do, is the interior act because it occurs inside our mind.

The point of natural law ethics is to figure out what fulfils the telos of our nature and act on that. By doing so, we glorify God. This cannot be done without intending to do it. A good exterior act without a good interior act does not glorify God because it is not done with the intention of fulfilling the God-given goal/telos of our nature.

The act of giving money to charity is an example of a good exterior act, but is only morally good when combined with the right kind of intention, which would be an interior act. If the intention was only to be thought of as a good person, which is not the right kind of intention, then the action is not truly morally good.

Whether telos exists

It is a strength of telos-based ethics that they are empirical, i.e., based on evidence. Aristotle observed that everything has a nature which inclines it towards a certain goal which he and Aquinas called its telos. It is a biological fact that certain behaviours cause an organism to flourish. Telos thus seems an empirically valid concept.

Weakness: Modern science’s rejection of final causation. Francis Bacon, called the father of empiricism, argued that only material and efficient causation were valid scientific concepts, not formal and final causation. The idea of telos is unscientific.

Aquinas and Aristotle claim every being has a unique essence which gives it a particular end/purpose. The issue is, modern science tells us that things are merely atoms moving in fields of force – i.e., material and efficient causation. The idea that entities have an ‘essence’ and thus a telos is unscientific. Physicist Sean Carroll concludes that purpose is not built into the “architecture” of the universe.

All supposed telos of a thing can be reduced to non-teleological concepts regarding its material structure and forces operating on it (material & efficient causation). There is no basis for grounding telos in God like Aquinas did, or as a required explanation of change like Aristotle did. For example, Aristotle would regard the telos of a seed as growing into a tree/bush. However, we now understand that change as resulting from the seed’s material structure which was itself caused by evolution, not anything like telos. Similarly, if there is anything in human nature which orients us towards certain behaviours, it is only because evolution programmed them into us because they happened to enable survival in our environment, not because of telos. So, Modern science can explain the world without telos. Telos is an unnecessary explanation.

Evaluation defending telos:

Polkinghorne, a modern Christian philosopher and physicist, argued that science is limited and cannot answer all questions. It can tell us the what but not the why . Science can tell us what the universe is like, but it cannot tell us why it is this way, nor why it exists. It cannot answer questions about purpose.

Polkinghorne’s argument is successful because science is limited. It cannot rule out something like a prime mover or God which could provide some kind of telos. If purpose existed, science would not be able to discover it. So, science cannot be used to dismiss the existence of purpose.

Evaluation critiquing telos:

Dawkins responds that it’s not valid to simply assume that there actually is a ‘why’. He makes an analogy: ‘what is the color of jealousy?’ That question is assuming that jealousy has a color. Similarly, just because we can ask why we and the universe exist, that doesn’t mean there actually is a purpose for it.

Dawkins’ argument is successful because it makes use of the burden of proof. Those who claim purpose exists have the burden of providing a reason to think it exists. There is no scientific basis for thinking anything other than material and efficient causation exists. Furthermore, scientists may one day actually explain ‘why’ the universe exists, but even if they don’t, that doesn’t justify a non-scientific explanation of purpose such as telos.

Universal human nature & moral dis/agreement

A strength of Natural law is that it is based on universal human nature. The primary precepts are found in the morality of all societies. For example, not killing for no reason and rules about stealing are universal. Valuing reproduction and education are also universal. Moral thinkers from different cultures came up with similar moral prescriptions such as the golden rule; to treat others as you would like to be treated, which can be found in ancient Chinese Philosophy, Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity. This suggests that moral views are influenced by a universal human moral nature. This is good evidence that we are all born with a moral orientation towards the good (telos), which is the foundation of Aquinas’ theory.

Weakness: If all humans were really born with the ability to know the primary precepts, we should expect to find more moral agreement than we do. In fact, we find vastly different moral beliefs. Furthermore, the disagreement is not random but tends to fall along cultural lines. This suggests that it is actually social conditioning which causes our moral views, not a supposed natural law in human nature. This has been argued by psychologists like Freud. Fletcher argues this shows there is not an innate God-given ability of reason to discover a natural law. He concludes that ethics must be based on faith, not reason (Fletcher’s positivism).

Evaluation defending Aquinas:

Aquinas’ claim is merely that human nature contains an orientation towards the good, it doesn’t involve a commitment to humans actually doing more good than evil, nor to incredibly evil acts or cultures occurring infrequently. Aquinas acknowledges that there are many reasons we might fail to do good despite having an orientation towards it. These include original sin, mistakes in conscientia, lacking virtue and a corrupt culture. So, the fact that there is a core set of moral views found cross-culturally shows his theory is correct.

Evaluation critiquing Aquinas:

Furthermore, cross-cultural morality might result merely from the basic requirement of a society to function. If anyone could kill or steal from anyone else for no reason whenever they wanted, it’s hard to see how a society could exist. That might create an existential pressure which influences the moral thinkers of a society, yielding prescriptions such as the golden rule. Cross-cultural ethics therefore has a practical reality as its basis, not God.

Alternatively, some of the cross-cultural similarities in moral codes might also have resulted from a biologically evolved moral sense rather than one designed by a God, which would mean they are not related to morality or telos at all.

Aquinas’ Natural theology vs Augustine & Karl Barth

A strength of Aquinas’ ethics is its basis in what seems like a realistic and balanced view of human nature as containing both good (reason & telos) but also bad (original sin). Natural law adds an engagement with autonomy to Christian ethics. Sola scriptura protestants like Calvin regard humans as mere passive receptacles for a set of biblical commands. However, Aquinas argues that God presumably gave humans reason so that they may use it.

Natural theology is the view that human reason is capable of knowing God, in this case God’s moral law. Aquinas defends this by first accepting that original sin destroyed original righteousness, meaning perfect rational self-control. However, it did not destroy our reason itself and its accompanying telos inclining us towards the good.

Only rational beings can sin. It makes no sense to say that animals could sin. Original sin made us sinners, but human nature was not reduced to the level of animals. We still have the ability to reason. Furthermore, Aquinas diverges from Augustine, claiming that concupiscence can sometimes be natural to humans, in those cases where our passions are governed by our reason. So, a comprehensive approach to Christian morality must include the use of reason to discover and act on the telos of our nature.

Weakness: Natural theology places a dangerous overreliance on human reason. Karl Barth was influenced by Augustine, who claimed that after the Fall our ability to reason become corrupted by original sin. Barth’s argument is that is therefore dangerous to rely on human reason to know anything of God, including God’s morality. “the finite has no capacity for the infinite” – Karl Barth. Our finite minds cannot grasp God’s infinite being. Whatever humans discover through reason is not divine, so to think it is divine is idolatry – believing earthly things are God. Idolatry can lead to worship of nations and even to movements like the Nazis. After the corruption of the fall, human reason cannot reach God or God’s morality. That is not our telos. Only faith in God’s revelation in the bible is valid.

Final judgement defending Aquinas: Barth’s argument fails because it does not address Aquinas’ point that our reason is not always corrupted and original sin has not destroyed our natural orientation towards the good. Original sin can at most diminish our inclination towards goodness by creating a habit of acting against it. Sometimes, with God’s grace, our reason can discover knowledge of God’s existence and natural moral law. So, natural moral law and natural theology is valid.

Arguably Aquinas has a balanced and realistic view, that our nature contains both good and bad and it is up to us to choose rightly.

Final judgement critiquing Aquinas: Barth still seems correct that being corrupted by original sin makes our reasoning about God’s existence and morality also corrupted. Even if there is a natural law, we are unable to discover it reliably. The bad in our nature unfortunately means we cannot rely on the good. Whatever a weak and misled conscience discovers is too unreliable.

Humanity’s belief that it has the ability to know anything of God is the same arrogance that led Adam and Eve to disobey God. Humanity believing that it has the power to figure out right and wrong is what led to the arrogant certainty of the Nazis in their own superiority. This arrogance of natural theology is evidence of a human inability to be humble enough to solely rely on faith.

Whether Religious & Natural law ethics is outdated

A strength of Natural law ethics is its availability to everyone because all humans are born with the ability to know and apply the primary precepts. Regarding those who do not belong to Abrahamic religion the Bible says: “Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature what the law requires … God’s law is written in their hearts, for their own conscience and thoughts either accuse them or tell them they are doing right” (Romans 2:14-15). So, it is possible to follow the natural law even if you are not Christian and/or have no access to the divine law (Bible).

Weakness: Secularists often argue that biblical morality (divine law) is primitive and barbarous, showing it comes from ancient human minds, not God. J. S. Mill calls the Old Testament “Barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people”. Freud similarly argued that religious morality reflected the “ignorant childhood days of the human race”. Aquinas’ Natural law ethics is criticised as outdated for the same reason. Medieval society was more chaotic. Strict absolutist ethical principles were needed to prevent society from falling apart. This could explain the primary precepts. For example, it was once useful to restrict sexual behaviour to marriage, because of how economically fatal single motherhood tended to be. It was useful to simply ban all killing, because killing was much more common. It was useful to require having lots of children, because most children died. The issue clearly is that all of these socio-economic conditions have changed. So, the primary precepts are no longer useful. Society can now afford to gradually relax the inflexibility of its rules without social order being threatened.

Conservative Catholics often argue that natural law is not outdated because it serves an important function without which society flourishes less. They argue that secular liberal western culture is ethically retrograde because of its abandonment of traditional moral principles like the primary precepts. This shows that we really do need to follow God’s natural law in order to flourish.

Marriages are fewer and less successful. Mental illness increases. Rates of etcetc

People are no longer united by an ethic of devoting our lives to something greater than ourselves. Self-interest and materialistic consumerism is all modern society has to offer by way of meaning and purpose.

“[excluding] God, religion and virtue from public life leads ultimately to a truncated vision of man and of society and thus to a ‘reductive vision of the person and his destiny’”. – Pope Benedict XVI.

Here, Benedict XVI references an encyclical called “Caritas in Veritate”, where he argued that while there is indeed religious fanaticism which runs against religious freedom, the promotion of atheism can deprive people of “spiritual and human resources”. The atheist worldview is that we are a “lost atom in a random universe”, in which case we can grow and evolve, but not really develop morally.

“ideological rejection of God and an atheism of indifference, oblivious to the Creator and at risk of becoming equally oblivious to human values, constitute some of the chief obstacles to development today. A humanism which excludes God is an inhuman humanism. Only a humanism open to the Absolute can guide us in the promotion and building of forms of social and civic life — structures, institutions, culture and ethos — without exposing us to the risk of becoming ensnared by the fashions of the moment.” – Pope Benedict XVI.

So, religious and natural law ethics is not outdated but is a vital societal anchor for morality, meaning and purpose.

Natural law ethics is outdated because Aquinas’ theory was actually a reaction to his socio-economic context and since that has changed, Natural law is no longer relevant.

Aquinas thought that he discovered the primary precepts through human reason, as God designed. However, it’s a simpler explanation that Aquinas was simply intuiting what was good for people in his socio-economic condition. The idea that the resulting principles actually came from God was only in his imagination.

The great strength of religion as a form of social organisation is also its greatest weakness. By telling people that its ethical precepts (such as the primary precepts or sanctity of life) come from God it creates a strong motivation to follow them. Yet, because those precepts are imagined to come from an eternal being, they become inflexible and painstakingly difficult to progress. This makes them increasingly outdated.

The double effect

A single action can have two effects, one in accordance with the primary precepts and one in violation of them. Aquinas claims that such actions can be justified the good effect is intended while the bad effect is “beside the intention”. This is because being a good person involves developing the kind of virtuous character which acts with the intention of following God’s natural law.

Aquinas illustrated this with killing in self-defence. There are two effects; the saving of a life and the killing of a life. Killing someone, which clearly violates the primary precept of preserving human life, can be justified so long as it is an effect which is a secondary effect beside the intention of an action whose other effect was intended and was in accordance with the primary precepts.

There are four generally accepted conditions in modern Catholicism for an action to be justified by the double effect:

The intentionality condition. The good effect must be intended and the bad effect must be ‘besides the intention’. Aquinas illustrated the double effect with the example of killing someone in self-defence. So long as you intended to save your own life, then it is morally permissible to kill someone in self-defence. The bad effect is ‘besides the intention’.

The proportionality condition. The good effect must be at least equivalent to the bad effect. Saving your life is equivalent to ending the life of the attacker. You can’t use more force than is necessary to save your life – there must be proportionality there too.

The means-end condition. The bad effect and the good effect must both be brought about immediately – at the same time. Otherwise, the person would be using a bad effect as a means to bring about a good effect – which is not permissible.

The double effect only applies to actions which have two effects – one good, one bad – where both effects are brought about immediately.

The nature of the act condition. The action must be either morally good, indifferent or neutral. Acts such as lying or killing an innocent person can never be justifiable. An attacker would not count as an innocent person.

Whether the double effect is unbiblical

A strength of the double effect is that it helps to resolve seemingly disparate biblical themes. Jesus’ commands were not merely about following certain rules, but also about having the right moral intention and virtue (E.g. sermon on the mount). The double effect provides important clarity to Christian ethics by showing the relation between the important moral elements of intention and following the moral law. Good intention is important, not to the degree of justifying pure violations of the law, but when involved in an action that has a good effect it can justify permitting a bad side effect.

Weakness: the double effect is unbiblical. Some theologians reject the double effect as unbiblical because God’s commandments are presented as absolute and not dependent on someone’s intention. For those theologians, the distinction between intended effects of actions and merely foreseen effects “beside” the intention has no morally relevant significance. It’s not that intention has no relevance in traditional Christian ethics. Most theologians accept that people are not immoral for consequences of their actions which they could not have foreseen which violate God’s commands. For example if you decide to drive your car at the time a drunk person happened to be out and you ran them over, that would not be considered your fault even through it was an effect of your action. However if you could foresee a bad consequence, the fact that it was a secondary effect beside the effect you did intend doesn’t justify it for theologians who take this view.

Evaluation defending Natural law:

This criticism is unsuccessful because Natural law is different to the Bible. The Bible might be inflexible, but that is the divine law. The natural law in our nature is more flexible because it is in the form of very general precepts which require application and the telos of the natural law is glorifying God, which requires that it be our intention to glorify God – thus showing how intention is relevant.

Evaluation criticising Natural law:

This weakness is successful because it shows natural law is trying to add flexibility to inflexible biblical law – e.g. thou shalt not kill. Self-defence, passive euthanasia, even perhaps abortion could be justified by the double effect. The natural and divine law do not cover separate areas but cross-over and therefore conflict on this point of inflexibility. Christians must choose the Bible over Natural law.

Proportionalism & the double effect

A strength of Natural law is its flexibility due to the doctrine of the double effect.

This has been used by modern Catholics to allow, for example, passive euthanasia, abortion to save the life of the mother (though this is complex and controversial in catholicism), and contraception to prevent the spread of AIDS.

Weakness: B. Hoose’s proportionalism

Hoose developed natural law into what he claimed was a more flexible and coherent form called proportionalism.

Proportionalists agree about following the primary precepts, but argue it is acceptable to go against them if you have a proportionate reason for doing so – i.e., if your action will bring about more good than bad.

The nature of the act condition is invalid because what matters is the proportion of value to disvalue produced by your action. The means-end condition is invalid because what matters is the ultimate value/disvalue proportion.

For proportionalists, the only valid condition in the double effect is proportionality and your intention must be to act with with a proportionate reason.

E.g., Hoose would agree with Fletcher’s example of killing a baby to save the lives of its family. It brings about more value than disvalue, so we have a proportionate reason for breaking the primary precepts in that case.

A resulting strength of proportionalism is it’s far greater flexibility.

Euthanasia, abortion, genetic engineering, anything natural law said to be wrong could in principle be right depending on whether there is a proportionate reason for doing them in a particular situation. There are no intrinsically evil actions. An action can be intrinsically in violation of the principles of natural law, but for proportionalism that doesn’t establish wrongness.

Hoose’s argument for the greater coherence of proportionalism.

Aquinas said it’s bad to go against the primary precepts, but it could overall be justified through the double effect in some cases.

Hoose objects that an overall good act cannot be composed of bad parts (e.g breaking the precepts). Moral evil is moral evil, it could never be a component of moral goodness.

Moral actions are composed of parts like intention and their dis/accordance with the precepts, but those parts cannot be called good or bad in themselves. Only the overall act can be good or bad. So, no part of an action can be morally bad, including what the action itself is and whether it breaks the precepts.

The ‘parts’ of an action are still good/evil, not in a moral sense but in a factual or physical sense, regarding their enabling or disabling of flourishing (eudaimonia).

Factual enabling of flourishing ‘Ontic goods’. These are physical or factual goods, such as health, life and knowledge (these all enable flourishing and are thus ontic goods). ‘Ontic evils’ are the deprivation of such goods. Whatever in an action enables flourishing is an ‘ontic good’, whatever disables it is an ‘ontic evil’.

To decide whether the action is overall morally good however, we need to judge whether the action produced more ontic good compared to ontic evil. If it does, we have a proportionate reason for doing it, even if it goes against the primary precepts.

Aquinas would say killing the baby in Fletcher’s example is just morally evil – but Hoose is saying no, it’s only an ontic evil – which must be measured against the ontic good caused by the action (saving the whole family). If there’s a proportionate reason for doing it, then it is a morally good act to kill the baby.

“An act is either morally right or morally wrong. It cannot be both. If we talk of morally evil (meaning morally wrong) elements in an act that is morally right and is performed by a morally good person, we confuse the whole issue.” – B. Hoose.

Evaluation defending Natural law

John Paul II defends Natural law ethics, arguing that proportionalism is not a valid development because it misunderstands the objective/intention required for ethical action.

“Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man’s true good and thus express the voluntary ordering of the person towards his ultimate end” – John Paul II

Under natural law, we intentionally act on the moral law discovered in our nature by reason (primary precepts). God designed us to intuitively know these moral laws – so our telos/purpose is to follow them. The goal of natural law is to follow the primary precepts. John Paul II is correct that Proportionalism misdirects our goal/intention towards the balance of ontic goods over evils produced by our action. God has designed us to follow the primary precepts – so that is our ethical purpose. Hoose misdirects us away from that.

“The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas.” – John Paul II.

Evaluation criticising Natural law

Defenders of traditional Natural law like John Paul II assume that our ultimate end is simply to follow the precepts of natural law in a ridged deontological way.

Calculating the ontic goods over evils of our actions could actually be part of our ultimate end.

Even Aquinas accepted that his list of primary precepts was not final but could be added to. The project of understanding the telos of our nature is ongoing. Developments like those of proportionalism cannot be dismissed simply because they differ with the traditional approach.

Whether proportionalism is better suited to our fallen world

A strength of the double effect is that it is pragmatic.

It fits with the reality of moral decision making. Sometimes actions can have two effects and a method is required that makes sense of how to judge them. Aquinas’ self-defence illustration is intuitive.

Proportionalism has the strength of being better suited to moral decision making in our imperfect world.

The Fall destabilised creation, including the moral order. God designed the natural law to perfectly fit following it with human flourishing. In a post-lapsarian world, the presence of ontic evil around acts that follow the natural law sometimes mean they prevent flourishing. Taking a deontological approach to natural law doesn’t make sense.

Ontic goods and evils are defined in relation to whatever enables or disables flourishing. Flourishing is part of our telos. So arguably following proportionalism would successfully orientate us towards our telos.

Weakness: John Paul II argues that although consequences matter, proportionalism takes that too far when it claims that there are no intrinsically evil actions.

It can never enable achievement of our telos to do such acts. Consequences certainly matter, but they can never make an intrinsically evil act acceptable. Such acts disorder us; they can never rightly order us towards our end, even if done with the intention of bringing about a greater balance of ontic goods over ontic evils. It is better to avoid them and bear the consequences, even if it means suffering and dying. JP2 reminds us that early Christians were prepared to be martyred for their faith.

Only intentionally following of the natural law within our nature aims us at our telos of glorifying God. Consequences matter to some degree, but not to the point of justifying intrinsically evil acts.

“Christian ethics, which pays particular attention to the moral object, does not refuse to consider the inner ‘teleology’ of acting, inasmuch as it is directed to promoting the true good of the person; but it recognizes that it is really pursued only when the essential elements of human nature are respected. The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end … If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it … an intention is good when it has as its aim the true good of the person in view of his ultimate end. But acts whose object is ‘not capable of being ordered’ to God and ‘unworthy of the human person’ are always and in every case in conflict with that good.” – John Paul II.

Evaluation defending proportionalism

John Paul II’s reference to the Christian Martyrs is a self-serving illustration. It’s easy for most people to make sense of sacrificing oneself rather than break the natural law. However, what about cases where if we don’t break the natural law, we will be letting others suffer and die? Euthanasia is a clear example.

Evaluation criticising proportionalism

This is the ultimate argument against all forms of religious consequentialism. They misunderstand the purpose of morality. We are not here on earth to achieve happiness, but to follow God’s moral law. If suffering results from following God’s law due to living in a fallen world, that doesn’t invalidate God’s law. Aristotle and Aquinas both explained that flourishing is not happiness, but cultivating the virtues which rationally order us in our actions towards our end. As JP2’s example of the martyrs shows, if it is virtuous to suffer and die then that is what we should do, technically that is flourishing. Cardinal Newman expressed this sentiment in a poetic if stark manner:

“The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony … than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one willful untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse.” – John Henry Newman.

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Essay: Natural Moral Law

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Formally introduced by the 13th century philosopher Thomas Aquinas, Natural Moral Law (hereon NML) proposes that goodness can be achieved by discovering and acting upon what is natural. Everything has a purpose/telos, and by fulfilling this purpose, it is thought that goodness can be reached. Aquinas builds his argument upon the synderesis rule: “Good is to be done and pursued, evil is to be avoided”. Whilst the theory invariably has strengths, there are also issues and contradictions which must be assessed if we are to properly evaluate the validity of the theory.

Whilst Aquinas is accredited with having published NML, he was considerably influenced by his predecessors, particularly Aristotle. The role of these philosophers could be argued as being a strength of the theory. Living in the 4th Century BCE, Aristotle said that everything in the world had a “telos”, otherwise known as a Final Cause. It was when something achieved its purpose that Aristotle believed there to be goodness, and so by looking at something’s purpose, people can see what is natural for it to do. According to Aristotle, the ultimate purpose of man is Eudaimonia/Beatitude (reaching a perfect union with God); however, Whilst this may have been valid in the 4th century BCE, Aristotle’s words would not bode well with a secularist society and would consequently discourage people from following these laws. Aristotle defined nature as, “that which is equally valid everywhere… natural is unchanging and has the same power everywhere”, and this would later influence Aquinas in his hierarchy of Laws. Cicero (1st Century BCE) is another philosopher that is heavily tied up within NML; in fact he is often called ‘the father of NML’. In his book On the Republic, he wrote, “one eternal and unchanging law will be valid for all nations and all times”, further mirroring Aquinas’s Laws (Eternal Law, Divine Law, Natural Law and Human Law). The fact that people throughout history have accounted that there are laws to human nature adds greater validity to Aquinas’s words because there are people of other societies and religions that have come to similar conclusions. Even Plato, known as having opposite ideas to Aristotle, touched upon the idea of Natural Law in The Republic when he described, “a city which would be established according with nature”. The extent to which this acts as a strength is debatable because a large number of advocators does not necessarily signify truth. Whilst those that agree with the concept of Argumentum ad populum would claim that numbers equal truth, I would argue otherwise, using the example of of the world being flat — just because thousands believed that this was the case, it did not mean that they were correct.

Cicero and Aristotle were significant in the establishment of NML; however, perhaps the greatest influence was the Bible since Aquinas himself was heavily religious Christian monk who is known to have said in a poem, “we are all madly in love with the same God”. One can see substantial parallels between NML and the Bible, particularly in St. Paul’s Epistles to the Romans where it says, “When Gentiles, who do not possess the law, do instinctively what the law requires”. As with NML, it is implied that law is within human nature and that people have the same moral rules for themselves. “The creation of the world has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made”, (Romans 1:20) seems to have further influenced Aquinas. It seems that Aquinas interpreted that natural revelation refers to what God has allowed for man to understand naturally. Therefore, by understanding nature, one can understand God. It is inevitable that many Christians would observe this biblical influence as being a great strength on NMLs part since, in the eyes of many dogmatic Christians, the Bible is a reliable source to work with (especially since it is “the word of God”). As a secularist, however, I do not regard this as a strength and if anything, I would argue that it was a weakness. In NML, Aquinas does of course make the assumption that there is a God — he goes so far as to make one of his primary precepts worshipping God — however, 21st Century Western milieus are primarily secularist, and so one must question just how much truth a religious theory such as this holds nowadays. Some theologians may argue that a theory with such a biblical basis is able to offer practical benefits to society. Indeed, the American Philosopher, William James, said, “this sort of happiness is found nowhere but in religion”, and maintains that religion, even if false, can be the best path to follow. Within NML, Aquinas uses the Cardinal Virtues to distinguish between real and apparent goods and assist people in following the laws that God has set for us; these virtues — prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice — invariably offer positivity if individuals decide to adopt them. The three virtues of the Bible (faith, hope and charity) similarly promote care and compassion between people. The seven deadly vices additionally guide people, even non-Christians, in living a good life. According to Aquinas, “Vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Psalm 33:15: \”Turn away from evil, and do good,\” (Summa Theologica). If one avoids the vices and develops the virtues, they will ultimately always correctly use reason and keep to natural law. I do feel for this to be a reasonable strength of NML because it encourages more people to be selfless and kind, and thereby it can have a great practical effect on any society. However, I feel as though there is a contradiction in Aquinas’s reference to the importance of temperance since it is somewhat in contrast with the primary precept of survival — NML states that one should fight in self-defence instead of restraining themselves.

NML is an absolutist theory — in other words, it must be followed without question whatever the circumstances. Aquinas proposed the primary precepts, the primary precepts are the self-evident rules from which the dictates of reason logically flow, as a way of governing one’s morality. They are self-preservation, reproduction, education of children, living in society and worshipping God — the most important of these being survival. These precepts are universal and in his book, Summa Theologica, Aquinas says, “Natural law is the same for all… there is a single standard of truth… known by everyone.”. There are those that would argue for this to be a strength in Aquinas’s argument because it ensures that there is no ambiguity as to how man should react to any given situation. The fact that all people are aware of these fixed rules allows for their to be greater societal order and thereby has a practical effect in preventing political anarchy. This was described particularly well by Bossuet, an advocate for the absolutist rule of King Louis XIV who claimed that, “it is only attention and vigilance that can save us from surprises”, and that it could prevent social anarchy. I can see reason in these claims; after all, rules which are easily understood are more likely to be followed. The fact that the theory is deontological further develops this strength because each action is intrinsically good or bad in itself, which invariably makes it much simpler to follow. Additionally, the deontological element maintains that actions are non-consequential; individuals have no control over the outcomes, only their actions and intentions, and so it could be argued that this gives people more control over their morals. Others would question whether one can ever intrinsically judge an action? Surely one must also consider the consequences since ultimately this is the part that will have an effect.

There are those that have argued that absolutism is a negative thing since it offers no leeway; however, Aquinas’s secondary precepts challenge this weakness since they make the theory more flexible. The secondary precepts are specific rules, such as only having one spouse, which can be interpreted depending on the context of the situation and thereby make the theory more flexible. Aquinas himself said, ““It’s secondary precepts…though they are unalterable in the majority of cases…can nevertheless be changed on some particular and rare occasion.” (Summa Theologica). These dictates are achieved through a more complex process of reasoning. For example, reproduction is one of the primary precepts, and the sexual organs similarly have the purpose of reproduction. This means that it is wrong for one to use these organs in a way that does not create offspring. This is evident in the Bible when Oman is killed because he “spilled his seeds… knew the child would not be his” (Genesis 38:9). St. Paul recognised that it is not always possible to follow natural law and work towards goodness “since all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:23). Humans will always fall short of God’s best for them because of The Fall and man’s violation of their perfect relationship with him, and therefore it is important that there is flexibility within natural law. One could consider for this to act in favour of NML; however, it also raises the question of whether this makes the theory relative instead of absolute. If laws can depend on situation, surely it is not as objective as is first thought?

NML has further been labelled as outdated and no longer applicable in the 21st Century. Aquinas developed NML in a pre-scientific age before Darwin’s theory of evolution was published. Evolution suggests that man is the result of chance and not of God and explains that man is interested in survival not because of natural law but because of evolved instinct. It further states that man is a self-interested animal which contradicts Aquinas’s claim that all people are naturally inclined towards the good. Aquinas was additionally developing his theory in a milieu that did not have to worry about IVF, cloning and euthanasia. I think that this weakness is significant; it is true that NML does not cover many of the moral dilemmas that we face today.

However, one must consider Bernard Hoose and Richard McCormick’s development of a more modern version of NML (proportionalism). This can be used as a strength in favour of NML because it applies Aquinas’s original theory to a modern society. Proportionalism works inside of the framework of NML but does not insist upon an absolutist approach, providing a greater good can be served by laying it aside. To a certain degree, this view does actually adhere to Aquinas’s original theory since he claimed that it would be acceptable for a starving man to steal a loaf of bread in order to prevent himself from dying of hunger. This action adheres to justice because it is fair that the man gets the right to exist — a greater good is served by allowing the man to live. I personally feel that relativist, situational moral laws are more equitable and so I feel for proportionalism to be a substantially more reasonable theory seeing as it takes into account the situation. Consequently, it can be used in response to moral issues which are not covered in the Bible, and Christians can know what God thinks to be right instead of facing confusion. Unlike traditional NML, proportionalism recognises the holistic nature of man and as a result it is more applicable to humankind, making it a strength. Aristotle himself believed that the body and mind were separate and not one psychophysical unit (“we are enclosed in the confinements of the body”); however, he fails to take account of this when developing NML. The needs of the body can interfere with those of the mind, and Sigmund Freud touched upon this in his hierarchy of human needs which states that humans find physiological aspects (e.g. food, water, breathing) the most important, and self-actualisation (e.g. morality), the least important. It is a strength of proportionalism that this is taken into account since it recognises that man’s morals are not always under his control. Some Christian theologians have further observed that humans cannot strive for moral perfection, only moral compromise because we live in a fallen world where we cannot achieve the perfection of God — as Moses said, “their hearts were hard”. Therefore, people’s morals must sometimes be compromised; for example, proportionalism will not allow for somebody to suffer simply in the cause of upholding natural law, and recognises that some moral evils must be permitted if we are to achieve the greater good. Even Pope Francis has spoken in favour of this idea when he said that contraception can be considered as “the lesser of two evils” when having to choose between using contraception and abortion, and his claims that all contraception should be “the subject of serious conscious discernment” suggest that it can sometimes be a viable choice. Even before proportionalism was put forward in 1993, the Catholic Church has occasionally been shown to make NML situational — for example, from 1960-1965 in The Congo, Pope Paul VI “permitted nuns to use contraceptives in case of rape”. There are Catholics whom would argue that this leeway that has been shown on behalf of both the Popes and proportionality creates a gaping hole in the logic of NML since it allows for the authoritarian moral codes of the Catholic Church to be rejected. Whilst I feel that the flexibility of proportionalism is positive, it does lead to confusion as to whether or not it is an absolutist theory; I think that the alterations made by Hoose and McCormick are drastic enough for one to say that it is a completely different theory. It gives too much freedom to decide what is proportionally good, and thereby takes away from its claims of objectivity — which is considered to be a strength because there are no moral or emotional factors involved and it does not depend upon how the person feels on the day. Some have proposed that proportionalism is instead a form of utilitarianism since it takes into account the outcome of an action rather than its intrinsic worth.

The flexibility of the secondary precepts is additionally developed through the idea of Casuistry, derived from the latin word for “case”. This literally means that the morality of an action should be judged on a case by case basis, using NML as a standard to judge against. This can thereby be considered a strength of the theory since it can occasionally take into account the difficulties involved with a particular situation. In the Roman Catholic church, this part of the theory is used to apply the universal principles of Natural Law to specific situations; it is always done in a logical way because most principles have logical consequences. For example, it is principally wrong to kill innocent people, and so it would be wrong to bomb civilian targets (e.g. Dresden in WW2). However, it is acceptable to kill in self defence because this agrees with the primary precept of survival. Aquinas maintains that it can be morally acceptable for innocent people to die, providing that this is not the aim of the action — this is not dissimilar to one of the options of Philippa Foot’s Trolley Problem. Therefore, this is a strength of NML because it allows for greater flexibility in the choices that an individual can make, and the extent to which a person can use their conscience and reason for their own measures. However, we again are faced with the question of whether this makes NML a relativist theory instead of an absolutist theory.

In some situations, there will be an intended outcome and another significant but unintended outcome. Another strength of Natural Law therefore is the principle of Double effect which allows for an individual to morally perform an action that will produce both good and bad results. This is providing that the action itself is good or indifferent; the good effect is the one that is intended; there are no other means of achieving this good effect, and the good effect is not produced by means of the evil effect. In 1949, Joseph Mangan further added that, “there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect” (A historical analysis of the principle of double effect). This principle is able to cement Aquinas’s theory because it does not stray from the Aquinas’s ideas of interior and exterior actions — it is maintained that our intentions are more important that the consequences of our actions. Therefore, I feel that this is a moderate strength in support of the theory; however, on a large scale, I do not think that this is something that people should oblige by. Whilst bombing one hundred civilians could save one hundred and one civilians, I do not think that this would be morally acceptable and that it would be better to not perform the action at all. Aquinas sealed this issue in his claims that double effect does not condone unintended outcomes which have devastating effects. In light of this, I would say that this theory somewhat supports NML because it creates a stronger basis on which people can rely when following natural law, and is therefore helpful in encouraging people to practically adopt it.

NML maintains that both the intention and the action are important. This could be regarded as a strength because all judgement takes account of the motives and so one is never condemned for having unknowing performed an evil action (an apparent good). Aquinas states that a person can perform a good interior act but a bad exterior act, for example stealing money to help a friend in need, and whilst theft is a bad action in itself, the individual is not so harshly condemned. I do like the more compassionate element of NML and think that this strength should not be ignored. God wants our actions to be intrinsically good because this acts in accordance with man’s ultimate purpose and so God is glorified.

Aquinas maintained that human nature was essentially good and that man could never knowingly pursue evil; after all, humanity naturally wishes to achieve “be perfect as your heavenly father is perfect” (Matthew 5:48). Some could argue for this to a strength of the theory since Aquinas puts great faith in the actions of man; however, one could also argue that this is merely an ignorant claim which is not true. Aquinas said that there are such things called apparent goods which are actions not in the pursuit of happiness that do not fit with the perfect human ideal. The example that Aquinas uses in Summa Theologica is, “A fornicator seeks pleasure which involves him in moral guilt.”, and whilst this action is morally wrong, the person is doing it because of instinct and not reason and so it cannot be considered as a truly evil action. I must say that I agree strongly with Aquinas’s point; in my opinion, there is no such thing as an evil person or action because all actions have some sort of justification behind them, however strong or weak these may be — perhaps the best example is Adolf Hitler’s conduction of the Jewish Genocide from 1939-1945. Of course, his actions were wrong, but he thought for them to be right. Aquinas would say that Hitler’s choice of this apparent good is an error because it isn’t really good for us. One could have an error of reason if they believe something to be morally right which isn’t. To correctly distinguish between apparent and real goods is to use reason rightly, and Aquinas recognises that this is not always easy; indeed this was made evident when he said, “No evil can be desirable… it is sought indirectly, namely because it is the consequence of free will” (Summa Theologica). Whilst I personally feel for the idea of apparent goods to be correct, I am aware that there are people that do not, and if this is the case, I recognise that this strength is no longer regarded as very strong. Some have argued that there are actions which are simply not justifiable, for example the Stacey Rambold rape of his fourteen year old student. In the case of the Moors Murders, Ian Brady and Myra Hindley repeatedly denied their actions, and surely this is evidence that they knew that what they were doing is wrong. Therefore, Aquinas’s theory is shown to be false because people do recognise when they are performing a morally wrong action. I must however note that it is possible that these criminals thought for their actions to be right and the law to be wrong, which would explain why they tried to deny their actions.

NML has also been acclaimed for its universality — all men and women share a common purpose and so natural law is applicable to everybody. This is a strength and perhaps the greatest practical result of this is the exchangement of judgement between cultures. Having a standard against which all people can be judged, means that one society can involve themselves in another’s political affairs without the fear of disrespecting their country’s morals. For example, countries can rightfully say that events such as South African Apartheid and Pol Pot’s Cambodian Genocide are morally wrong. I must say that this, as a practical effect, is extremely important because without some sort of universal law, some milieus could conduct barbaric events without any consequences. However, I do not feel that these universal laws should be taken from NML; the general standard of morality can instead be set via the UN human rights council. The strength in itself is strong and I agree that it acts in support of the motion.

Aquinas said that our purpose was God-given and evidence for this can be found in the Bible when God created man imago dei, or “in his own image”. Christians would consider for this to be a strength on NML’s part because for them, the Bible is a reliable source from which conclusions can be drawn. However, the 21st Century Secularist Society must question whether beatitude is really the ultimate purpose for those that do not believe in a God. I am a secularist myself and would not consider for my ultimate purpose to be union with God, and surely I could not be working towards this final cause without knowing such. Therefore, I do not feel for this strength to be viable since it is no longer relevant in the modern, scientific age. I do however feel that Aquinas’s proposed purpose of good can be seen as a strength because it encourages people to act compassionately and kindly to their fellow man. Aquinas said that God’s purpose for us is to be good and so by following this, with help from reason to rationalise whether an action fulfills its purpose in nature, we can locate our purpose. Aquinas said this in terms of ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’, two things which Aristotle had claimed that all things had. Potentiality is the possibilities of change within an existing thing, e.g. an acorn has the possibility of becoming an oak tree; and actuality is what something actually is. Aquinas said that it was better for something to have more of its potentialities realised (so a fully grown oak tree is better than the acorn or a stunted tree; a healthy man is better than a sick, ignorant or vicious man). This fulfillment is an essence of goodness. In my opinion, this is a fairly weak strength because it unrightfully criticises some people of not being good. If the potential of a man includes being able to run, it would be unjust to say that a disabled individual is not good because they cannot walk. Aristotle is being somewhat elitist here and consequently takes the value from the lives of some people. Anything that does this cannot be considered to be a strength.

Aquinas’s use of the hierarchy of laws and the three norms could be argued as being a strength of NML since it demonstrates that his ideas are well thought-out and so arguably more reliable. The three norms are the three different constituents of NML: the discriminating norm, the binding norm (norma obligans), and the manifesting norm. The Discriminating Norm is human nature itself; the binding/obligatory Norm is the divine authority which imposes man with the obligation to live in accordance with his nature; and the Manifesting Norm is, in effect, reason, which determines the moral quality of actions performed by the discriminating form. Aquinas’s use of the three norms strengthens his theory since it allows for us to understand how our morals reflect our nature, and thereby increases our comprehension of the theory, making it easier to follow in practise. This strength does not stretch to a large extent because it only minorly helps us in understanding the theory, and still does not close all of the gaps in NML.

Critics have argued that there is no such thing as a “common purpose” which invariably leaves Aristotle’s argument in shreds. One such individual who has argued this is the Canadian Professor of Philosophy, Kai Nielsen. Nielsen challenges the primary precepts and maintains that humans do not have shared nature and preservations. He used the example of the Inuits who would kill their elderly so as to achieve Valhalla, an action that is considered immoral in much of the world. In my opinion this weakness is both strong and rational; however, Aquinas might have argued that these Scandinavian people were simply not using their reason correctly.

Existentialists, including Sartre, Nietzsche and Camus, would further see weakness in Aquinas’s fixed purpose since they would argue that people have no ultimate purpose. They would look towards the 1943 words of Sartre: “Life has no meaning a priori… It is up to you to give it a meaning, and value is nothing but the meaning that you choose.” (Being and Nothingness). If Sartre is correct then Aquinas’s argument deteriorates. Whilst I understand that existentialism has become popular in postmodern philosophy, and is something that I agree with to some degree, I do not think that it is able to disprove Aquinas’s argument. There is not enough logical evidence to say that either theory is correct and so I do not think that this theory either weakens or strengthens the validity of natural law.

Infamous atheist, Richard Dawkins, would again find weakness in the common purpose idea. Whilst Dawkins does propose that everybody has a common purpose, he does not think for this to be God-given, or indeed metaphysical at all. In his novel The Selfish Gene, he proposed that the only purpose of man is to pass on our genes to the next generation. Dawkins has said, “We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes”. Since there is scientific evidence to back Dawkins’s claim, I do feel that it is an important weakness to consider — Aquinas was after all living in a pre-science age and so this is not something that he could have taken account of when developing his theory.

Some Christian critics have argued that Aquinas’s theory does not fit with Christianity because not all people have the same purpose. In 1 Corinthians 7:7 it says, “Each man has his own gift from God”, which implies that not all people are the same and that people have different jobs to do whilst on earth. Indeed, Mother Theresa did not comply with the primary precept of reproduction and remained celibate so as to help the people of the Indian slums. Despite telling people to “become one flesh” (Genesis 1:1), the Bible also teaches that people should remain celibate — “It is good for a man not to touch a woman” (1 Corinthians 7:1), which suggests that people all have different purposes from God. This would render Aquinas’s argument incorrect. Whilst I am not Christian, I feel that this is the strongest weakness that has so far been stated because Aquinas decided to base Natural Law from Christianity. The fact that the two contradicts suggests that his theory was not properly thought out, and could suggest that there are further flaws which he was trying to hide.

Other Christians have further argued that Aquinas’s argument contradicts the Christian principles of Agape. Joseph Fletcher, the founder of situation ethics, has claimed that this “legalistic approach” is wrong since it does not take account of Jesus’s most important teachings. NML says that you can kill somebody in self-defence; however, on the sermon on the mount, Jesus taught for people to “turn the other cheek”. Furthermore, sometimes the most loving thing to do will not follow the guidelines of NML. For example, euthanasia goes against the primary precept of survival, yet surely it is most loving to respect somebody’s request to die? Again, I feel that this argument is a significant weakness of the argument because it further illuminates the differences between NML and Christianity. I believe for the teachings of Jesus to be the most important rules that Christians can follow since they are supposedly from God himself. Therefore, Aquinas has neglected a huge part of Christianity in the theory, which significantly weakens its validity in the eyes of the religious.

A few Christians, such as Karl Barth (20th Century), have even claimed that natural law contradicts The Fall (Genesis 1:2). According to these Christians, we cannot use reason to the extent that Aquinas implied because we are living in a Fallen world where humans are tainted and imperfect as a result of the sins of Adam and Eve. Consequently, reason is not reliable enough to judge our morals, and instead people must use the Bible and revelations of God to help us decide on how we should act. Barth has said that people should recognise and accept the revelation of God as the only source of truth, instead of looking towards human reason. This point does not considerably weaken NML because it is a matter of opinion and interpretation whether or not reason can be used to know God. From my secularist perspective, God is the result of reason and so it is only fitting that we can use our reason to determine what he is and how he wishes for us to act. If anything, Aquinas does not rely on reason enough: people should use their own morals to distinguish between right and wrong.

Other critics, such as G.E. Moore, have used Naturalistic Fallacy to find weakness in NML. In his book Principia Ethica (1903) Moore argued that just because something is, it doesn’t mean that we ought; just because something is in our nature, it doesn’t mean that we have to do it. In Moore’s words, “moral obligation is heavenly”: a natural property does not necessarily lead to moral judgement. Nielsen further developed Naturalistic Fallacy when he said, “These statements can very well be true but no moral or normative conclusions follow from them”.

Another weakness that has been found in NML is the over-simplicity of it. In their book, The Puzzle of Ethics, Vardy and Grosch argue that Aquinas’s theory is un-holistic and only focuses on parts of human nature as opposed to it as a whole. For one, homosexuality is not considered by the primary precept of religion. The lesbian country pop artist Vicky Beeching claimed that her homosexuality was a part of her “God-wired design”, and so surely Aquinas should have taken account of this when developing his theory? Vardy and Grosch further took the example of the sexual organs which, they observed, were used for things other than just sexual relations. The fact that there are gaps in Aquinas’s theory suggest that he could not tailor it to meet the genuine requirements of human nature. People act so differently that I think it would be ludicrous to assign just one fixed nature to all: it simply is not logical. Therefore, this weakness is able to greatly reduce the reliability of NML.

Lastly, we must consider the question: is everything natural good? I think it would ludicrous to conclude that cancer, tsunamis and earthquakes were good. This query greatly weakens Aquinas’s theory because he assumes that everything in the world is good, and everything can achieve goodness by fulfilling its purpose. Stephen Fry used the specific example of eye-burrowing worms, whose whole existence depends upon nesting in the eyes of children and making them blind. In his words, “What sort of God would do this?”. An omnibenevolent God such as the one described in Christianity, and thereby NML, would surely not define goodness in such a way.

Whilst there is strength and logic in Aquinas’s argument, there are also weaknesses that are impossible to overlook. In my view, new scientific advancements and an increasingly secularist society do not allow for NML to any longer be a valid ethical theory, since these new-found weaknesses greatly outweigh the strengths that we have seen. One can never govern their morals on such strict guidelines. As Arthur Schopenhauer observed, “compassion is the basis of morality”.

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Natural moral law 30 - religious stidies essay

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Evaluate the view that natural moral law is a suitable ethical, theory for today's society.

Natural moral law is an absolutist, deontological ethical theory developed by St Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and is outlined in his book Summa Theological. The focus of Aquinas’ theory was eudaemonia (human flourishing) which can be found through God - who gave us a priori reason. Aquinas utilises philosophical ideas of virtue from Aristotle and reason from Cicero. By today’s society, I am referring to 21st century America, where there has been a deviation from traditional belief to a more individualistic and pluralistic perspective. This essay will interpret the word ‘suitable’ to mean a viable and usable ethical theory. I will consider the idea of clear- cut rules; then, I will evaluate whether or not humans have the same ‘telos’/ purpose, then I will examine the use of NML in medical practices, the existence of God including looking at Nietzsche / Karl Marx sociology changes. Finally, I'm going to argue that proportionalism Bernard Hoose is a better ethical theory. Overall, in this essay, I will argue that NML is not a suitable ethical theory for today’s society.

Firstly, some believe that NML is a suitable ethic, because presents a clear-cut set of moral rules hence why it is an absolute and deontological ethical theory, meaning that offers people a strict rather pure standard to live their lives and doesn't compromise this standard to fit with particular situations, and since it is based on reasoning from human experience (a prior knowledge), it gives people clear guidance as moral agents meaning it's very obvious what behaviour follows these principles and what behaviour breaks them. This makes theory very suitable to use in everyday life, for not only theist but also atheists too. This theory is contradictory to both Jeremy Bentham and Fletcher ethical theory of Situation Ethics and Utilitarianism because it might not be clear if you did the right thing until the consequences happen, meaning that for both utilitarianism and situation ethics a person may not know if a situation is bad or good until the consequences. But NML presents a set of clear- cut rules to determine if an action is good. Therefore, Aquinas NML theory is necessary, in today’s secular theory because people need to know immediately which action is wrong or right without considering the consequences, making it a suitable ethical theory.

However, a problem with Aquinas’ absolute ethical theory is that assumes that everyone has the same God-given purpose, in the sense that it suggests that every human adult should marry and aim to have children. However, this would

mean that Mother Teresa was wrong to become a nun and devote her life to the poor when she could have been at home raising a family, or that Aquinas himself should have not been a priest/ monk which’s according to his ethical theory is wrong, because the main goal believed for many theists and God is to procreate. This point is emphasised in the bible verses Genesis 9;7 ‘go forth and multiply’, and is that important that Aquinas named it as one of his primary precepts ‘reproduction’. This point emphasises that Aquinas went against his ethical theory but this doesn’t make him a bad person. This point undermines the whole theory because around 6 million people in the United States ages 15-44 are infertile, does this make them a bad person? According to Aquinas ethical theory, this makes them a bad person because they are unable to fulfil God purpose. Therefore, for a secular society like the 21 century, where there is a deviation away from traditional apostolic belief to a more secular individualistic perspective, This ethical theory is not suitable because everyone has different goals and dreams, this point is emphasised by Clarence Darrow and Nietzsche who both say ‘The meaning of life is to live authentically and powerfully, creating one’s own goals and values. Those of us who live by a moral code, be it religious or otherwise, are weak and only get in the way of the “supermen.” Therefore, emphasises that NML, weaken a person’s desires.

Therefore, overall, the assumptions that Aquinas shares that everyone has the same purpose are flawed, this makes NML an unsuitable ethical theory to use in the 21 century, because there is plenty of evidence on the news every day to suggest that not everyone is naturally inclined towards the same purpose/goals. Some people choose wrong, for example, murders or rapists and in the case of Clarence Darrow, it was Leopold and Loeb who decided to be curious and kill Bobby Franks. Besides since Christianity, the largest religion in the United States fell from 73% to 65% in 2019. At the same time, those identifying as "no religion" or "unaffiliated" rose to 26% of the total population. This shows people deviation away from religion, meaning that people are becoming more individualistic. Therefore an ethical connoting that everybody has the same purpose is unsuitable ethical theory today.

The theory is not relative meaning that it is hard it applies to a certain situation, for example, linking to medical ethics, religious groups like Roman Catholics, argue that every life has intrinsic valve meaning that “such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia or willful suicide" is unlawful because God has given us life therefore only God can take it away, this point is emphasised In Job 1: 20-21 it says, "The Lord gave and the Lord has taken

This argument cause major significant to whether NML is a suitable ethical theory is today society, because in today’s where it is estimated that about one in five, or about 1 billion people, suffer from chronic pain (CP), an ethical theory ‘that tells them that they should deal with it’ doesn’t help or improve their situation, therefore shouldn’t be used in today’s society.

Instead, I believe Bernard Hoose ethical theory of Proportionalism is better suited for today’s society. Proportionalism is a hybrid of deontology and teleology, it is a part of the Natural moral law, however, the key difference is that where Natural Law Theory believes that there are intrinsic evils, proportionalism maintains that there might be proportionate reasons where one might have to against one's basic morality. The "evil" caused as a result of aiming at a proportionate good, such as the scars or loss of a limb, are called ontic evils. Therefore, there are no intrinsic evils, whereas the Catholic Church believes in intrinsic evils. In the example of the Doctor giving a patient high dose of painkillers, a follower of proportionalism will accept that even though the act that caused death was evil, it was morally right that the doctor upheld their duty to reduce pain, which links to Joseph Fletcher ethical theory of situation ethic and agape love. Therefore in today’s society, where every situation is different, I believe that proportionalism is a more suitable ethical theory compared to NML.

In addition, Aquinas natural moral law assumes that God exists, Aquinas believes humans are created by God and given a purpose by their creator, meaning that there is an eternal law, which is god's purpose for the entire universe and everyone in it, and since he is a loving creator, he reveals portions of his eternal law to humans in a direct way. This is divine law, which is revealed to prophets and through the life of Jesus Christ, Aquinas emphasises his belief in the existence of God by investing his cosmological argument in his book ‘Summa Theologica’ which is a posteriori argument {based on facts about the world} and tries to use inductive based argument and logical thinking to argue about the existence of God. Aquinas makes these inductive statements: 1: Everything in the world is contingent. 2: If everything could exist at some point nothing existed3; Something cannot come from nothing4: Something necessary must have existed to create nothing 5: That something is God. This cosmological links logic and faith and shows that God is a necessary being, therefore, this simple ethical theory makes Natural Moral law stronger, therefore makes it suitable for theists and atheist to understand.

However, the problem is that Aquinas cosmological argument can easily be disproved by the likeliness of Bertrand Russell. Bertrand Russell in his 1948 radio debate with the Jesuit priest F. Copleston, argues that Aquinas’ cosmological argument commits the ‘Fallacy of Composition’, which is the error of assuming that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of part of the whole, or every part of the whole. Bertrand Russell uses the analogy of humanity, he says ‘that every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to Aquinas that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously, the human race hasn’t a mother’. Bertrand Russell, criticism is focused at Aquinas cosmological theory where he particularly says ‘every single event in the universe has a cause and then says the universe has a whole cause’.

This disproval of God existence causes major significant for whether NML is a suitable ethical theory. Aquinas puts such a huge emphasis on God’s existence, that if it can be proven that he does not exist, his theory won’t be suitable, because natural moral law consists of two vitals laws natural law and divine law. Therefore, if divine law can be disproven, Natural moral law can’t exist. This point is further emphasised by Carl Sagan, who says that “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” meaning that God who is a transcendent ‘maximally perfect’ being in the eyes of Aquinas needs to have proof of his existence. Therefore, in this today’s secular society where there is a decline in Christianity from around 77 % to 65% from 2018 to 2020. An ethical theory that is based on God existence isn’t suitable anymore, because people have moved away from the traditional doctrine. This point is emphasised by Nietzsche in his book famously quotes that ‘God is dead’ meaning that the social construct of 'God is now past its sell-by date meaning there is no need for God anymore, he believes that Science and rationalism have made God redundant. Since in the 21st century where there an increase in science, NML is not suitable for today’s society.

In conclusion, I do believe that NML is a suitable ethical theory with the right moral laws to teach good valves to those who follow it, however, we have to remember Aquinas was a thirteenth-century philosopher, which is a period where the church was heavily dominant throughout the world, therefore Aquinas wrote these Natural moral laws in response to those times. It is impossible that Aquinas could have foreseen events such as the Enlightenment in 1715 or the rise in individualism in the 1960s which caused massive changes in sociological and psychological views causing people to deviate away from religious teaches to their own secular belief and ideas, this point is emphasised

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The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics

‘Natural law theory’ is a label that has been applied to theories of ethics, theories of politics, theories of civil law, and theories of religious morality. We will be concerned only with natural law theories of ethics: while such views arguably have some interesting implications for law, politics, and religious morality, these implications will not be our focus here.

This article has two central objectives. First, it aims to identify the defining features of natural law moral theory. Second, it aims to identify some of the main theoretical options that natural law theorists face in formulating a precise view within the constraints set by these defining features and some of the difficulties for each of these options. It will not, however, attempt to recount the history of the development of natural law thought. (For a very helpful detailed history of natural law thought up to the beginning of the modern period, see Crowe 1977. For a very helpful detailed history of natural law thought in the modern period, see Haakonssen 1996. For an article-length recap of the entire history of natural law thought, see Haakonssen 1992.)

1.1 Natural law and divine providence

1.2 natural law and practical rationality, 1.3 the substance of the natural law view, 1.4 paradigmatic and nonparadigmatic natural law theories, 2.1 natural goodness, 2.2 knowledge of the basic goods, 2.3 the catalog of basic goods, 2.4 from the good to the right, other internet resources, related entries, 1. key features of natural law theories.

Even though we have already confined ‘natural law theory’ to its use as a term that marks off a certain class of ethical theories, we still have a confusing variety of meanings to contend with. Some writers use the term with such a broad meaning that any moral theory that is a version of moral realism — that is, any moral theory that holds that some positive moral claims are literally true (for this conception of moral realism, see Sayre-McCord 1988)— counts as a natural law view. Some use it so narrowly that no moral theory that is not grounded in a very specific form of Aristotelian teleology could count as a natural law view. It might be thought that there is nothing that can be done to begin a discussion of natural law theory in ethics other than to stipulate a meaning for ‘natural law theory’ and to proceed from there. But there is a better way of proceeding, one that takes as its starting point the central role that the moral theorizing of Thomas Aquinas plays in the natural law tradition. If any moral theory is a theory of natural law, it is Aquinas’s. (Every introductory ethics anthology that includes material on natural law theory includes material by or about Aquinas; every encyclopedia article on natural law thought refers to Aquinas.) It would seem sensible, then, to take Aquinas’s natural law theory as the central case of a natural law position: of theories that exhibit all of the key features of Aquinas’s natural law view we can say that they are clearly natural law theories; of theories that exhibit few of them we can say that they are clearly not natural law theories; and of theories that exhibit many but not all of them we can say that they are in the neighborhood of the natural law view but nonetheless must be viewed as at most deviant cases of that position. There remain, no doubt, questions about how we determine what are to count as the key features of Aquinas’s position. But we may take as the key features those theses about natural law that structure his overall moral view and which provide the basis for other theses about the natural law that he affirms.

For Aquinas, there are two key features of the natural law, features the acknowledgment of which structures his discussion of the natural law at Question 94 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae . The first is that, when we focus on God’s role as the giver of the natural law, the natural law is just one aspect of divine providence; and so the theory of natural law is from that perspective just one part among others of the theory of divine providence. The second is that, when we focus on the human’s role as recipient of the natural law, the natural law constitutes the principles of practical rationality, those principles by which human action is to be judged as reasonable or unreasonable; and so the theory of natural law is from that perspective the preeminent part of the theory of practical rationality.

While our main focus will be on the status of the natural law as constituting the principles of practical rationality, we should consider for a moment at least the importance within Aquinas’s view of the claim that the natural law is an aspect of divine providence. The fundamental thesis affirmed here by Aquinas is that the natural law is a participation in the eternal law (ST IaIIae 91, 2). The eternal law, for Aquinas, is that rational plan by which all creation is ordered (ST IaIIae 91, 1); the natural law is the way that the human being “participates” in the eternal law (ST IaIIae 91, 2). While nonrational beings have a share in the eternal law only by being determined by it — their action nonfreely results from their determinate natures, natures the existence of which results from God’s will in accordance with God’s eternal plan — rational beings like us are able to grasp our share in the eternal law and freely act on it (ST IaIIae 91, 2). It is this feature of the natural law that justifies, on Aquinas’s view, our calling the natural law ‘law.’ For law, as Aquinas defines it (ST IaIIae 90, 4), is a rule of action put into place by one who has care of the community; and as God has care of the entire universe, God’s choosing to bring into existence beings who can act freely and in accordance with principles of reason is enough to justify our thinking of those principles of reason as law.

When we focus on the recipient of the natural law, that is, us human beings, the thesis of Aquinas’s natural law theory that comes to the fore is that the natural law constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality for human beings, and has this status by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 2). The notion that the natural law constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality implies, for Aquinas, both that the precepts of the natural law are universally binding by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 4) and that the precepts of the natural law are universally knowable by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 4; 94, 6).

The precepts of the natural law are binding by nature: no beings could share our human nature yet fail to be bound by the precepts of the natural law. This is so because these precepts direct us toward the good as such and various particular goods (ST IaIIae 94, 2). The good and goods provide reasons for us rational beings to act, to pursue the good and these particular goods. As good is what is perfective of us given the natures that we have (ST Ia 5, 1), the good and these various goods have their status as such naturally. It is sufficient for certain things to be good that we have the natures that we have; it is in virtue of our common human nature that the good for us is what it is.

The precepts of the natural law are also knowable by nature. All human beings possess a basic knowledge of the principles of the natural law (ST IaIIae 94, 4). This knowledge is exhibited in our intrinsic directedness toward the various goods that the natural law enjoins us to pursue, and we can make this implicit awareness explicit and propositional through reflection on practice. Aquinas takes it that there is a core of practical knowledge that all human beings have, even if the implications of that knowledge can be hard to work out or the efficacy of that knowledge can be thwarted by strong emotion or evil dispositions (ST IaIIae 94, 6).

If Aquinas’s view is paradigmatic of the natural law position, and these two theses — that from the God’s-eye point of view, it is law through its place in the scheme of divine providence, and from the human’s-eye point of view, it constitutes a set of naturally binding and knowable precepts of practical reason — are the basic features of the natural law as Aquinas understands it, then it follows that paradigmatic natural law theory is incompatible with several views in metaphysics and moral philosophy. On the side of metaphysics, it is clear that the natural law view is incompatible with atheism: one cannot have a theory of divine providence without a divine being. It is also clear that the paradigmatic natural law view rules out a deism on which there is a divine being but that divine being has no interest in human matters. Nor can one be an agnostic while affirming the paradigmatic natural law view: for agnosticism is the refusal to commit either to God’s existence or nonexistence, whereas the paradigmatic natural law view involves a commitment to God’s existence. On the side of moral philosophy, it is clear that the natural law view is incompatible with a nihilism about value, that is, the rejection of the existence of values. It is also incompatible with relativist and conventionalist views, on which the status of value is entirely relative to one’s community or determined entirely by convention. It is also incompatible with a wholesale skepticism about value, for the natural law view commits one to holding that certain claims about the good are in fact knowable, indeed, knowable by all.

The center of Aquinas’s natural law view as described thus far concerns what we might call the metaphysics of morals: its role in divine providence and the universally authoritative character of its norms. What, though, of the normative content of Aquinas’s natural law position? Is there anything distinctive about the normative natural law position? Here it is difficult to say much that is uncontroversial, but we can say a sufficient amount about Aquinas’s natural law theory to make clear that it is an interesting alternative to utilitarian (and more generally consequentialist) ethics, Kantian views, and standard Aristotelian positions. (For a magisterial treatment of Aquinas’s natural law ethic, see Rhonheimer 2000.)

Aquinas says that the fundamental principle of the natural law is that good is to be done and evil avoided (ST IaIIae 94, 2). This is, one might say, a principle of intelligibility of action (cf. Grisez 1965): only action that can be understood as conforming with this principle, as carried out under the idea that good is to be sought and bad avoided, can be understood as an intelligible action. But no one can in acting simply pursue good — one has to pursue some particular good. And Aquinas holds that we know immediately, by inclination, that there are a variety of things that count as good and thus to be pursued — life, procreation, knowledge, society, and reasonable conduct (ST IaIIae 94, 2; 94, 3) are all mentioned by Aquinas (though it is not clear whether the mentioned items are supposed to constitute an exhaustive list).

So on Aquinas’s view it is the good that is fundamental: whether an action, or type of action, is right is logically posterior to whether that action brings about or realizes or is some good . The good is, on Aquinas’s view, prior to the right. But on Aquinas’s view we are, somehow, able to reason from these principles about goods to guidelines about how these goods are to be pursued. Aquinas’s thoughts are along the following lines: first, there are certain ways of acting in response to the basic human goods that are intrinsically flawed; and second, for an act to be right, or reasonable, is for it to be an act that is in no way intrinsically flawed (ST IaIIae 18, 1).

The important task, then, is to identify the ways in which an act can be intrinsically flawed. Aquinas does not obviously identify some master principle that one can use to determine whether an act is intrinsically flawed (though for an attempt to identify such a master principle in Aquinas’s work see Finnis 1998, p. 126), though he does indicate where to look — we are to look at the features that individuate acts, such as their objects (ST IaIIae 18, 2), their ends (ST IaIIae 18, 3), their circumstances (ST IaIIae 18, 4), and so forth. An act might be flawed through a mismatch of object and end — that is, between the immediate aim of the action and its more distant point. If one were, for example, to regulate one’s pursuit of a greater good in light of a lesser good — if, for example, one were to seek friendship with God for the sake of mere bodily survival rather than vice versa — that would count as an unreasonable act. An act might be flawed through the circumstances: while one is bound to profess one’s belief in God, there are certain circumstances in which it is inappropriate to do so (ST IIaIIae 3, 2). An act might be flawed merely through its intention: to direct oneself against a good — as in murder (ST IIaIIae 64, 6), and lying (ST IIaIIae 110, 3), and blasphemy (ST IIaIIae 13, 2) — is always to act in an unfitting way. Aquinas has no illusions that we will be able to state principles of conduct that exhaustively determine right conduct, as if for every situation in which there is a correct choice to be made there will be a rule that covers the situation. He allows for the Aristotelian insight that the particulars of the situation always outstrip one’s rules, so that one will always need the moral and intellectual virtues in order to act well (Commentary on NE, II, 2, 259). But he denies that this means that there are no principles of right conduct that hold everywhere and always, and some even absolutely. On Aquinas’s view, killing of the innocent is always wrong, as is lying, adultery, sodomy, and blasphemy; and that they are always wrong is a matter of natural law. (These are only examples, not an exhaustive list of absolutely forbidden actions.)

Part of the interest of Aquinas’s substantive natural law ethic lies in its not falling into the neat contemporary categories for moral theories. His natural law view understands principles of right to be grounded in principles of good; on this Aquinas sides with utilitarians, and consequentialists generally, against Kantians. But Aquinas would deny that the principles of the right enjoin us to maximize the good — while he allows that considerations of the greater good have a role in practical reasoning, action can be irremediably flawed merely through (e.g.) badness of intention, flawed such that no good consequences that flow from the action would be sufficient to justify it — and in this Aquinas sides with the Kantians against the utilitarians and consequentialists of other stripes. And while Aquinas is in some ways Aristotelian, and recognizes that virtue will always be required in order to hit the mark in a situation of choice, he rejects the view commonly ascribed to Aristotle (for doubts that it is Aristotle’s view; see Irwin 2000) that there are no universally true general principles of right. The natural law view rejects wholesale particularism.

To summarize: the paradigmatic natural law view holds that (1) the natural law is given by God; (2) it is naturally authoritative over all human beings; and (3) it is naturally knowable by all human beings. Further, it holds that (4) the good is prior to the right, that (5) right action is action that responds nondefectively to the good, that (6) there are a variety of ways in which action can be defective with respect to the good, and that (7) some of these ways can be captured and formulated as general rules.

Aquinas was not the only historically important paradigmatic natural law theorist. Thomas Hobbes, for example, was also a paradigmatic natural law theorist. He held that the laws of nature are divine law ( Leviathan , xv, ¶41), that all humans are bound by them ( Leviathan , xv, ¶¶36), and that it is easy to know at least the basics of the natural law ( Leviathan , xv, ¶35). He held that the fundamental good is self-preservation ( Leviathan , xiii, ¶14), and that the laws of nature direct the way to this good (Leviathan, xiv, ¶3). He offered a catalog of laws of nature that constitute the “true moral philosophy” ( Leviathan , xv, ¶40). There are also a number of contemporary writers that affirm the paradigmatic view. These writers, not surprisingly, trace their views to Aquinas as the major influence, though they do not claim to reproduce his views in detail. (See, for example, Grisez 1983, Finnis 1980, MacIntyre 1999, and Murphy 2001.)

It is also easy to identify a number of writers, both historical and contemporary, whose views are easily called natural law views, through sharing all but one or two of the features of Aquinas’s paradigmatic position. Recently there have been nontheistic writers in the natural law tradition, who deny (1): see, for example, the work of Michael Moore (1982, 1996) and Philippa Foot (2001). There were a number of post-Thomistic writers in the medieval and modern periods who in some way denied (2), the natural authority of the natural law, holding that while the content of the natural law is fixed either wholly or in part by human nature, its preceptive power could only come from an additional divine command: the views of John Duns Scotus, Francisco Suarez, and John Locke fit this mold. Arguably the Stoics were natural law thinkers, but they seem to deny (4), holding the right to be prior to the good (see Striker 1986). Some contemporary theological ethicists called ‘proportionalists’ (e.g. Hallett 1995) have taken up the natural law view with a consequentialist twist, denying (6). (For a discussion of the relationship between proportionalism and natural law theory see Kaczor 2002.) And while some see Aristotle as being the source of the natural law tradition, some have argued that his central appeal to the insight of the person of practical wisdom as setting the final standard for right action precludes the possibility of the sort of general rules that would (at least in a theistic context) make Aristotle’s ethics a natural law position. There is of course no clear answer to the question of when a view ceases to be a natural law theory, though a nonparadigmatic one, and becomes no natural law theory at all.

2. Theoretical Options for Natural Law Theorists

Even within the constraints set by the theses that constitute the paradigmatic natural law position, there are a number of variations possible in the view. Here we will consider several issues that must be addressed by every particular natural law view, and some difficulties that arise for possible responses to these issues.

It is essential to the natural law position that there be some things that are universally and naturally good. But how is universal, natural goodness possible? Given the variability of human tastes and desires, how could there be such universal goods?

Natural law theorists have at least three answers available to them. The first answer is Hobbesian, and proceeds on the basis of a subjectivist theory of the good. On subjectivist theories of the good, what makes it true that something is good is that it is desired, or liked, or in some way is the object of one’s pro-attitudes, or would be the object of one’s pro-attitudes in some suitable conditions. One might think that to affirm a subjectivist theory of the good is to reject natural law theory, given the immense variation in human desire. But this is not so. For one might hold that human beings’ common nature, their similarity in physiological constitution, makes them such as to have some desires in common, and these desires may be so central to human aims and purposes that we can build important and correct precepts of rationality around them. This is in fact what Hobbes claims. For while on the Hobbesian view what is good is what is desired, Hobbes thinks that humans are similarly constructed so that for each human (when he or she is properly biologically functioning) his or her central aim is the avoidance of violent death. Thus Hobbes is able to build his entire natural law theory around a single good, the good of self-preservation, which is so important to human life that exceptionlessly binding precepts can be formulated with reference to its achievement.

The second answer is Aristotelian. The idea here is to reject a subjectivism about the good, holding that what makes it true that something is good is not that it stands in some relation to desire but rather that it is somehow perfective or completing of a being, where what is perfective or completing of a being depends on that being’s nature. So what is good for an oak is what is completing or perfective of the oak, and this depends on the kind of thing that an oak is by nature; and what is good for a dog is what is completing or perfective of the dog, and this depends on the kind of thing that a dog is by nature; and what is good for a human depends on what is completing or perfective of a human, and this depends on the kind of thing a human is by nature. So the fact of variability of desire is not on its own enough to cast doubt on the natural law universal goods thesis: as the good is not defined fundamentally by reference to desire, the fact of variation in desire is not enough to raise questions about universal goods. This is the view affirmed by Aquinas, and the majority of adherents to the natural law tradition.

The third answer is Platonic. Like the Aristotelian view, it rejects a subjectivism about the good. But it does not hold that the good is to be understood in terms of human nature. The role of human nature is not to define or set the good, but merely to define what the possibilities of human achievement are. So one might think that some things — knowledge, beauty, etc. — are just good in themselves, apart from any reference to human desire or perfection, but hold that the pursuit of these are only part of the natural law insofar as they fall within the ambit of human practical possibility. This view of the good is not much defended — in part because of the scathing criticism offered of Plato’s view by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE I, 6) — but it was affirmed by Iris Murdoch (1970), and forms part of the natural law view defended by Michael Moore (1982).

None of these answers is without difficulties. While there are contemporary defenders of Hobbesian moral theories (see Gauthier 1986), there is no one who is on record defending Hobbes’s interesting combination of a thoroughgoing subjectivism about the good along with an account of a dominant substantive good around which the moral rules are formulated. The basic reason for this just seems to be that Hobbes’s arguments that the human desire for self-preservation is such an entirely dominant desire are implausible, and there do not seem to be any better arguments available. The Platonic version of the view has struck many as both too metaphysically ornate to be defensible, on one hand, and as not fitting very well with a conception of ethics grounded in nature, on the other. While the Aristotelian version of the view has also been charged with some of the metaphysical excesses that the Platonist view allegedly countenances, most contemporary natural law theory is Aristotelian in its orientation, holding that there is still good reason to hold to an understanding of flourishing in nature and that none of the advances of modern science has called this part of the Aristotelian view into question. (For defenses of such Aristotelian accounts of the good, see Foot 2001, Thompson 1995, and Thompson 2004.)

Another central question that the natural law tradition has wrestled with concerns our knowledge of the basic goods. How can we come to know these fundamental goods?

Return to Aquinas’s paradigmatic natural law position. His account of our knowledge of the fundamental goods has been understood in different ways (Murphy 2001, ch. 1). Some have understood Aquinas as affirming a theory of our knowledge of the fundamental precepts of the natural law that we can label ‘derivationism.’ The idea here is that we can derive from a metaphysical study of human nature and its potentialities and actualizations the conclusion that certain things are good for human beings, and thus that the primary precepts of the natural law bid us to pursue these things (cf. Lisska 1996). One can imagine a Hobbesian version of this view as well. One might say that by a careful study of the human being’s desire-forming mechanisms, one can see that there are certain things that would be necessarily desired by biologically sound human beings, and thus that the human good includes these items. (Hobbes in fact produces such arguments at [EL], I, 7.) While a natural law theorist might downplay the importance of derivationist knowledge of the natural law, it is hard to see how a consistent natural law theorist could entirely reject the possibility of such knowledge, given the view that we can provide a substantial account of how the human good is grounded in nature: for to show that the human good is grounded in nature is to show that human nature explains why certain things are goods, and it is hard to see how one could affirm that claim while entirely rejecting the possibility of derivationist knowledge of the human good (see Murphy 2001, pp. 16–17). Some have thought, echoing criticisms of natural law theory by those entirely hostile to it, that derivationist theories of practical knowledge fall prey to ‘Hume’s Law,’ that it is impossible to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ that is, any normative truth from any set of nonnormative truths. The most that this can show, though, is that the natural law theorist needs an account of those bridge truths that enable us to move between claims about human nature and claims about human goods.

It must be conceded, however, that a consistent natural law theorist could hardly hold that derivationist knowledge of the human good is the only such knowledge possible. For it is part of the paradigm natural law view that the basic principles of the natural law are known by all, and the sort of arguments that would need to be made in order to produce derivationist knowledge of the human good are certainly not had (or even have-able) by all. (Recently Jensen (2015) has offered a thorough defense of a derivationist account that aims to take such worries into account.) Another way that Aquinas’s account of knowledge of the fundamental goods has been understood — and it is an understanding better able to come to grips with the widespread knowledge of fundamental goods — can be labeled ‘inclinationism.’ On this view, one’s explicit grasp of the fundamental goods follows upon but is not derived from one’s persistent directedness toward the pursuit of certain ends, which directedness involves an implicit grasp of these items as good. So human beings exhibit a tendency to pursue life, and knowledge, and friendship, and so forth; and reflection on this tendency occasions an immediate grasp of the truth that life, and knowledge, and friendship, and so forth are goods. The affirmation of the claims ‘life is good,’ ‘knowledge is good,’ ‘friendship is good,’ etc. makes intelligible the persistent pursuit of these ends by rational beings like us.

While inclinationism and derivationism are distinct methods, they are by no means exclusive: one can hold that knowledge of fundamental goods is possible in both ways. Indeed, it may well be that one way of knowing can supplement and correct the other. There may be some goods that are easier to recognize when taking the speculative point of view, the point of view of the observer of human nature and its potentialities, and some that are easier to recognize when taking the practical point of view, the point of view of the actively engaged in human life. Indeed, by connecting nature and the human good so tightly, the natural law view requires that an account of the good reconcile these points of view.

There are, of course, reasons to be worried about both of these ways of knowing basic goods — worries that go beyond general skeptical doubts about how we could know any normative truths at all. Derivationists have to explain how we come to know what counts as an actualization of a human potency, and have to explain how we connect these via bridge principles with human goods. Inclinationists have their own troubles. In particular, they need to deal with the fact that, even if they are not in the business of deriving goods from inclinations or identifying the goods precisely with what we tend to pursue, they take as their starting point human directedness. And it has been rightly noted that human directedness is not always a lovely thing. Power and prestige seem to be a matter of human directedness — at least as much so as, say, aesthetic enjoyment and speculative knowledge — but they do not make it to the natural law theorist’s catalog of goods (though they do appear to be part of the good in Aristotle’s picture; cf. the discussion in Hare 2001, p. 14). While these difficulties persist for inclinationist and derivationist accounts of knowledge of the basic goods, they may well be eased if one affirms both accounts: one might be able to use inclinationist knowledge to provide some basis for bridge principles between knowledge of human nature and knowledge of human goods, and one might be able to use derivationist knowledge to modify, in a non-ad-hoc way, the objectionable elements of the account that one might be bound to give if proceeding on an inclinationist basis alone. (Reconciling the inclinationist and derivationist approaches is a theme in Murphy 2001 and Wall 2010.)

The dialectic between inclinationist and derivationist accounts of knowledge of the first principles of the natural law is central to natural law epistemology, but there are other accounts of knowledge of the natural law that focus on its social dimension. Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, for example, that the first precepts of the natural law are to be understood as those that make possible communal inquiry into the nature of the good: both the positive and the negative precepts are enabling rules, norms that enable humans to engage in common pursuit of knowledge of what is valuable. The norms of the natural law preclude our acting toward other potential partners in inquiry in way that would undermine the possibility of common pursuit of the good (MacIntyre 1994, 183–184). To come to know the primary precepts of the natural law, then, is a matter of coming to know what sorts of social relationships make possible common pursuit of common goods.

A distinct sort of social emphasis on knowledge of the natural law asks why we should think of knowledge of the natural law as arising exclusively or even predominantly either from one’s own immediate rational insight into what is implicit grasped or from some sort of derivation from the fact that one’s own inclinations of the will have certain determinate objects. One might hold that we have excellent reason to believe that knowledge of the natural law unfolds historically. Jean Porter, for example, argues that by close attention to the various sorts of social structure exhibited cross-culturally, we can extract the necessary “starting points” (Porter 2005, p. 132) to begin assessing various proposed norms of action. And Jonathan Crowe emphasizes knowledge of the natural law as the outcome of the attempt to interpret human practices, and will be an historically-extended process that will be necessarily an unfinished task (Crowe 2019, pp. 6-7; there is also discussion of interpretation of social practices as a means to knowing the natural law in Murphy 2007).

A developed natural law theory includes within it a catalog of the fundamental goods, the basic values upon which the principles of right are founded. Suppose that we follow at least the inclinationist line, taking it to be faithful to the natural law idea that knowledge of the basic goods is widely distributed. Our task then is to provide an explicit account of those goods implicit knowledge of which is manifested in human inclination toward certain ends. What are the goods affirmation of which makes intelligible these inclinations?

It is clear from this way of putting the question that even if natural law theorists are right that this implicit knowledge is widely distributed, it would be easy for natural law theorists to disagree in their catalogs of basic goods. For the task here is that of formulating propositionally, and in as illuminating a way as possible, what items need be affirmed as intrinsically good in order to make sense out of our inclinations. And there are, unsurprisingly, disagreements in catalogs of basic goods. The goods that Aquinas mentions in his account include life, procreation, social life, knowledge, and rational conduct. Grisez 1983 includes self-integration, practical reasonableness, authenticity, justice and friendship, religion, life and health, knowledge of truth, appreciation of beauty, and playful activities (pp. 121–122). Finnis 1980 includes life, knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, play, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion (pp. 86–90). Chappell 1995 includes friendship, aesthetic value, pleasure and the avoidance of pain, physical and mental health and harmony, reason, rationality, and reasonableness, truth and the knowledge of it, the natural world, people, fairness, and achievements (p. 43). Finnis 1996 affirms a list much like Grisez 1983, but includes in it “the marital good” (p. 5). Murphy 2001 includes life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, excellence in work and play, excellence in agency, inner peace, friendship and community, religion, and happiness (p. 96). Gomez-Lobo 2002 includes life, the family, friendship, work and play, experience of beauty, theoretical knowledge, and integrity (pp. 10–23). Crowe (2019) includes life, health, pleasure, friendship, play, appreciation, understanding, meaning, and reasonableness (p. 35).

Aside from the inevitable differences in lists of goods produced by natural law theorists, there are also more focused debates about the inclusion of particular alleged goods within the natural law theorists’ lists. Note, for example, that of the lists above, only Chappell’s includes pleasure and the absence of pain. Whatever else we say here, it seems that common sense is initially on Chappell’s side: what seems more obvious than that pleasure and the avoidance of pain are basic reasons for action? The reasons for rejecting pleasure and the absence of pain from the list of goods are various: some writers argue, following Aristotle, that pleasure is not a good in abstraction from the activity in which pleasure is taken; some that the absence of pain is not a completion or a fulfillment of human nature, and thus cannot be among the basic goods; some that the avoidance of pain is simply an instance of some other basic good, such as inner peace. What this debate illustrates is the extent to which the formulation of a catalog of goods is not a straightforward matter. Everyone agrees that one who avoids touching a hot stove in part to avoid the awful pain has some reason to avoid touching the stove. The difficulty is to bring together our various sources of knowledge about the good to formulate an account that explains well precisely why it is that such an act is reasonable. These sorts of debates reappear with respect to goods like life (is life intrinsically or instrumentally good? is merely being alive intrinsically good, or is life only intrinsically good when one is enjoying a certain level of vitality?), religion (is harmony with God really a human good? is it merely a kind of friendship? does its status as a good depend on whether there is a being such as God?), and what Finnis and Grisez now call the ‘marital good’ (is the good of marriage simply an amalgam of various other goods, as friendship, procreation, rational agency, or is it really a distinct, analytically separable value?). Thus Echeñique denies that life can be a basic good in the way that natural law theorists typically take it to be (Echeñique 2016); Cuneo has rejected religion as a basic good (Cuneo 2005, pp. 116–118); and Macedo has argued against the marital good (Macedo 1995).

Suppose that we were to have in hand satisfactory accounts of natural goodness and our knowledge of it, along with a rationally defensible account of the basic goods that are the fundamental reasons for action. All that we would have so far is the natural law theorist’s account of what we might call minimally rational action — action that seeks to realize some good. What we would not have yet is a full account of right action. For we are frequently in situations in which there are various different courses of action that we might pursue, each of which promises to realize some good; are there no guidelines to which we might appeal in order to show some of these choices superior to others? After all, some of even the most obviously morally wrong actions can be seen to promise some good — a robber might kill in order to get the money he needs to pursue genuine goods — and the natural law theorist wants to be able to say why these obviously morally wrong actions are morally wrong. As we have seen, the paradigmatic natural law view holds that there are some general rules of right that govern our pursuit of the various goods, and that these rules of right exclude those actions that are in some way defective responses to the various basic goods. How, though, are we to determine what counts as a defective response to the goods?

There are at least three possibilities. One might appeal to a master rule of right that can be used to generate further rules; call this the master rule approach. One might appeal to a methodological principle by which particular rules can be generated; call this the method approach. Or one might appeal to some standard for distinguishing correct and incorrect moral rules that is not understandable as a method; call this (for reasons we shall see shortly) the virtue approach.

On the master rule approach, the task of the natural law theorist is to identify some master rule which bears on the basic goods and, perhaps in conjunction with further factual premises, is able to produce a stock of general rules about what sorts of responses to the basic goods are or are not reasonable. While it is far from clear whether there was a single way that Aquinas proceeded in establishing moral norms from the primary precepts of the natural law in the Summa Theologiae , John Finnis has argued (Finnis 1998, p. 126) that Aquinas employed this master rule approach: on his view, Aquinas held that this master rule is the rule of universal love, that one should love one’s neighbor as oneself. This rule bids us to respond to the good lovingly wherever it can be realized, and from it we can see that certain ways of responding to the good are ruled out as essentially unloving. Grisez clearly employs this approach: he writes that the first principle of morality is that “In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment” (Grisez 1983, p. 184). This first principle, Grisez says, contains implicitly within it various “modes of responsibility” from which particular moral rules can be derived.

The central difficulty with this employment of the master rule approach is that of explaining how we are to grasp this first principle of morality as correct. What is the relationship between our knowledge of the basic goods and our knowledge of the master rule? When Grisez defends his master rule, he writes that its status is due to a certain function that a first principle of morality must perform: “It must provide the basis for guiding choices toward overall human fulfillment. As a single principle, it will give unity and direction to a morally good life. At the same time, it must not exclude ways of living which might contribute to a complete human community” (Grisez 1983, p. 184). But this presupposes an awful lot: why should we assume in advance that a proper response to the basic goods must be one that is oriented toward a “complete human community”?

On the method approach, by contrast, there is no need for a master principle that will serve as the basis for deriving some particular moral rules. The idea here is the natural law theorist needs not a master rule but a test for distinguishing correct moral rules from incorrect ones. We know from our earlier consideration of the paradigmatic natural law view that the test for distinguishing correct moral rules from incorrect ones must be something like the following: if a moral rule rules out certain choices as defective that are in fact defective, and rules out no choices as defective that are not in fact defective, then it is a correct moral rule. What would distinguish different employments of the method approach is their accounts of what features of a choice we appeal to in order to determine whether it is defective. The knowledge that we have to go on here is our knowledge of the basic goods. If a certain choice presupposes something false about the basic goods, then it responds defectively to them. So a moral rule can be justified by showing that it rules out only choices that presuppose something false about the basic goods.

This is very abstract. Here is an example of an employment of this approach. While Finnis now affirms Grisez’s master rule approach, in his 1980 work he defends various principles of practical reasonableness without adverting to a master rule. He argues, for example, that it is always wrong to intend the destruction of an instance of a basic good (Finnis 1980, pp. 118–123). (So, no lying, for lying is an intentional attack on knowledge; no murder, for murder is an intentional attack on life, and so forth.) Why is it always wrong to do so? It would be unreasonable simply to try to destroy an instance of a basic good, for no further purpose: for that would treat an instance of a basic good as something that it is not — that is, as valueless. And it would be wrong to destroy an instance of a basic good for the sake of bringing about some other instance of a basic good: for that would make sense only if the good brought about were more valuable than the good destroyed, but on Finnis’s view all distinct instances of basic goods are incommensurable — none is of more, less, or equal value with any other. So the rule forbidding intentional destruction of an instance of a basic good is justified because it rules out only choices that presuppose something false about the nature of the basic goods. (For a working out of the method approach, see Murphy 2001, ch. 5.)

The method approach presupposes less of substance about morality than the master rule approach presupposes. But it requires us to draw upon an interesting and rich knowledge of the features of the basic goods. Whether this information is available is a matter for debate. But the method approach has the advantage of firmly rooting natural law arguments for moral principles in the goods the pursuit of which those moral principles are supposed to regulate.

Neither the master rule nor the method approach implies that the natural law theorist must hold that all right action can be captured in general rules. The natural law view is only that there are some such rules. It is consistent with the natural law position that there are a number of choice situations in which there is a right answer, yet in which that right answer is not dictated by any natural law rule or set of rules, but rather is grasped only by a virtuous, practically wise person. It is, however, open to the natural law theorist to use this appeal to the judgment of the practically wise person more widely, holding that the general rules concerning the appropriate response to the goods cannot be properly determined by any master rule or philosophical method, but can be determined only by appeal to the insight of the person of practical wisdom. If it really is wrong in all cases to tell lies, as Aquinas and Grisez and Finnis have argued, our grasp of this moral truth is dependent on our possessing, or our being able to recognize the possessor of, practical wisdom. If such a person never tells lies, because she or he just sees that to tell lies would be to respond defectively to the good, then that lying is always wrong is a rule of the natural law.

It may be true that by the virtue approach we can learn of some general rules of the natural law. What is more interesting is whether a defender of the virtue approach would be right to dismiss the claims of the master rule or method approaches. (For, after all, one might be able to learn that lying is wrong either through moral argument or through the perceptive insight of practical wisdom.) And it does not seem that the defender of the master rule or method approach should be particularly concerned to discredit the virtue approach. For if defenders of the master rule or method approach recognize the existence of a capacity of judgment like practical wisdom, then it would be strange to allow that it can be correctly exercised on a number of particular occasions while denying that we might learn of general rules from observing patterns of its exercise on various occasions.

One challenge to these various natural law attempts to explain the right in terms of the good denies that the natural law theorist can provide adequate explanations of the range of norms of right conduct for which moral theories ought to be able to provide explanations. That is, one might allow for the sake of argument the natural law theorist’s identification of some range of human goods, while denying that he or she can identify, and justify in natural law terms, adequately concrete modes of appropriate response to those goods. This challenge cannot be profitably addressed here; what would be required would be a close examination of the merits of particular natural law explanations of particular moral norms (a task taken up in, for example, Grisez 1993). One might also look to recent attempts to apply the natural law view to pressing contemporary moral problems — those of research ethics (Tollefsen 2008), economic justice (Chartier 2009), environmental ethics (Davison 2009), business ethics (Gonzalez 2015), the ethics of suicide and euthanasia (Paterson 2015), and population ethics (Delaney 2016), for example — as tests of the fruitfulness of that position.

A more radical critique of the paradigmatic natural law account of the connection between the good and the right calls into question the very idea that one can get principles of moral rightness merely from what constitutes a defective response to the good. According to this critique, while it is true that one might be able to come up with some notion of unreasonableness by appeal to the notion of what is defective response to the human goods, the notion of moral rightness belongs to a family of concepts distinct from that to which the notion of reasonableness belongs. On this view, moral rightness belongs to the obligation family, and the concept of obligation is irreducibly social : one is under an obligation only if one is subject to some sort of demand in the context of a social relationship (see, for an example of this view from a theological voluntarist perspective, Adams 1999, pp. 238–241; see, for an example of this view with a Kantian twist, Darwall 2006). It is part of the logic of obligation that when one is under an obligation, that condition has resulted from a demand imposed on him or her by some other party. So, according to this line of criticism, the paradigmatic natural law view is unable to show that the natural law is intrinsically morally authoritative: the precepts of the natural law can be rules that all of us human beings are obligated to obey, that it would be wrong for us to disobey, and that we would be guilty for flouting only if these precepts are imposed upon us by an authoritative being — perhaps a being like God.

The intrinsic moral authority of the natural law has been a matter of debate since Aquinas: it was a central issue dividing Aquinas’s view from those of Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez. It continues to be an issue between natural law theorists like Grisez (1983) and Finnis (1980) on one hand and theological voluntarists like Adams (1999) and Hare (2001) on the other. Natural law theorists have several options: they can argue against any meaningful distinction between morality and the reasonable more generally (Foot 2000, pp. 66–80); or they can embrace the distinction, but hold that on the clearest conception of the moral that we possess, the natural law account of reasonableness in action adequately satisfies that conception (Murphy 2001, pp. 222–227); or they can hold that the notion of ‘morally right’ is so muddled that it should be jettisoned, leaving in its stead the notion of the reasonable (cf. Anscombe 1958). It is at present far from clear which of these avenues of response the natural law theorist has most reason to embrace.

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Religious Studies - Ethics: Natural Moral Law

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Religious Studies – Ethics

Natural Moral Law

Critically examine what is meant by Natural Moral Law. (8 marks)
Analyse and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Natural Moral Law as a definitive ethical theory. (12 marks)

a) Natural Moral Law is the ancient belief that we can deduce what is right and wrong by looking at nature, this being the one moral code that is applicable to all people. The main features of Natural Moral Law as an ethical theory are that it is unchanging, universally applicable and relevant to all circumstances. The theory is absolutist, objective, deontological and thought to be God-given. Natural Law has also been interpreted to promote the idea that human law through government is an extension of divine law. Although Natural Law is consistent with Christian thinking and scripture, it is not reliant upon them and fundamentally, it is a system of morality based on human reasoning.

The origins of Natural Law can be found in the ancient world amongst the philosophers Plato and Aristotle who believed that there was a law within nature that could be applied to everyone. In the 4 th Century BC, Plato presented the idea through a debate between ‘Nomos’ (human law) and ‘Phusis’ (natural law). Aristotle, who wrote ‘Nichomachean Ethics’, distinguished natural justice from human justice in his claim that human justice was subject to change according to culture and nation whilst natural justice was independent of this, emphasising this concept in his statement that “ Fire burns here as it does in Persi a”. The Roman Cicero also believed in the idea of an “ eternal and unchangeable law…valid for all nations and all times ” that was “right reason in agreement with nature.” This concept of an objective right and wrong was expressed in his work ‘De Re Republica’.

Though the seeds of Natural Law are in the ancient world, it was St. Thomas Aquinas who developed it and turned it into a formal ethical theory in the 13 th Century, which was later adapted by the Roman Catholic Church and absorbed into Catholic Morality. Aquinas sought to establish a purpose to human life and in his development of Natural Law promoted the concepts of efficient and final causes and primary and secondary precepts. The key concept of Aquinas’ theory is that right and wrong is revealed in nature, and that naturally, humans are endowed with the inclination to do good and avoid evil. In his work ‘Summa Theologica’ Aquinas asserted the idea that Natural Law did not need scripture in order to back it up, as it was a theory based on human reason. From this, he believed humans were to make ethical choices based on these observations of nature.

Aquinas presented the idea of efficient and final causes; the efficient cause being what gets something done and the final cause being the end product, for example, an efficient cause could be sexual intercourse and the final cause would be a baby. Aquinas believed that humans could use their reasoning to work out what the final causes of there existence were, and by acting in accordance with them would be a good action whilst seeking to frustrate them would be considered a bad action.

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Aquinas sought to work out what these final causes were along with the purpose of human life, and broke down the purpose of human existence into five final causes known as the primary precepts. These are recognised as to reproduce, to live in society, to worship God, the educate children and to protect life. Anything that was considered to frustrate these final purposes was deemed morally wrong. Aquinas believed that people must follow Natural Law to fulfil God’s will and glorify him, and that human nature was created so that one could look at nature and work out what is right and wrong. This belief opposes the Protestant viewpoint where emphasis is put on scripture and revelation.

Aquinas thought that human nature is essentially good and are generally drawn to what is good and right, however, he accepted that it was possible for humans to be mislead into following an ‘apparent good’ rather than a real good. An example of this way of thinking would be if one were to have an extra-marital affair, which would be considered an apparent good owing to the fact that it is both pleasurable and may even fulfil the final cause of reproduction, however, fundamentally it is wrong.

It was believed by Aquinas that natural law exists to assist humans to act in such a way that they may reach their eternal destiny with God, and covers both the outward external view of actions and the internal motivation for doing so. Aquinas emphasised the concept of Natural Law evaluating both what one does and why one does it and encouraged the idea of exterior and interior acts. For Aquinas, both the intention and act are important, and to act in a good way for the wrong reason is to perform a good exterior act but a bad interior act. For example, helping a blind person to cross a road in order to impress someone would be considered morally wrong as Aquinas felt that a good action should be done out of charity and not for the sake of admiration by others. Aquinas appreciated the fact that good intentions didn’t always result in good actions, however, the only end that was valued by Aquinas was God.

Whether or not actions lead toward God depends upon if the action fits a human’s purpose. Acts that accord with Aquinas’ primary precepts are intrinsically good and acts that frustrate the natural order are intrinsically wrong. Aquinas presented the concept of ‘secondary precepts’, which were designed to help humans concerning things we should and shouldn’t do because they uphold or fail to maintain the original primary precepts. His secondary precepts were deduced from the primary precepts and they are recognised as being to not murder, to not abort the unborn, to defend the defenceless and to not commit suicide.

b) Natural Moral Law’s strengths lie in its absolutist deontological view of morality as its principles are universally understandable and therefore ease the process of making moral decisions and determining what is right and wrong. Natural Law provides justification for certain ideas that are recognisable in modern times, such as human rights and equality, and provides a complete system of moral living in accordance with what it is to be human. Though absolutist, Natural Law has certain flexibility in its secondary precepts and allows it to be applied to a wider spectrum of circumstances.

Natural Law’s absolutist stance states that certain actions, such as the abuse of the innocent, will always be wrong and therefore is immune to modern flexible morality or cultural relativism. This means that Natural Law upholds values such as human rights, for example, it is never right to torture someone to get information. The problem with this deontological viewpoint however, is that sometimes one needs to consider the consequences of an action. If, for example, the torturing someone resulted in the prevention of a disaster such as September 11 th 2001, one could argue that it was necessary to torture that one person to save the lives of thousands of others. Natural Law leaves no room for thinking about consequences and therefore is undermined as an ethical theory.

Its basis on reason prevents cultural and religious discrimination and can be used by both those who believe in God and those living without a moral system. However, although Natural Law can exist without religion and secular thinkers can relate to Natural Law in a somewhat limited sense, it is so closely aligned to religion that the theory makes little sense without belief in God. The theory also relies on the belief that God created the universe and the moral law within nature. Therefore, Aquinas’ assumption that all men seek to worship God may seem unnatural to many and the idea of a God-given moral code within nature is meaningless to those who do not believe in God as a creator.

Natural Law holds that there is an objective morality that humans can all aim for and that good and bad is not merely relative. Taking this into consideration, Natural Law is a potentially insensitive and authoritarian moral system where general principles are applied to specific situations regardless of particular circumstances. For example, if reproduction is one of the final causes, how can we explain those who are homosexual or infertile? Furthermore, if one considers the possibility that homosexuality may derive from genetic traits, and therefore be a part of someone’s nature, the final cause of reproduction has no basis. If this were the case, it could be said that sexual intercourse has as its purpose recreation and not reproduction. Vardy and Grosch have also challenged Aquinas’ final cause of reproduction in ‘The Puzzle of Ethics’ with this argument, stating the possibility that the function of genitalia is pleasure and not reproduction.

Aquinas suggests that human reason is a shared tool for moral understanding since we all have this, all humans can be moral and can understand morality. It is this concept of a common human nature that has been disputed by several academics, including Kai Nelson, who has claimed that Natural Law obscures the basic moral differences between cultures. With his example of Eskimos who kill babies and family members who they think will not survive the winter, Nelson has shown that common human nature is unlikely. Furthermore, Aquinas’ understanding of human purpose is limited, as although he states one of the final causes for humans to be reproduction, he himself was a celibate priest. The theory as a whole is focused upon humanity working towards the goal of glorifying God with little room for individual purposes in a relationship with God, and so therefore is narrow and restrictive in suggesting that we have particular functions to fulfil.

Whilst Natural Law upholds the idea that some things, such as the preservation of human life, have intrinsic value, one could also observe that Aquinas’ thinking is typical of its time. His belief that every individual has a purpose and function that is God-given and unchangeable could be considered outdated. Alongside this argument, although Natural Law is supposedly a Christian ethic, Jesus opposed the legalistic morality of his time, the Pharisees.

Although the weaknesses of Natural Moral Law outweigh the strengths, given the above criticisms, it is worth noting that natural law may not be as rigid as it first appears. Aquinas accepted that while the primary precepts were unalterable, the secondary precepts were subject to change owing to particular circumstances.

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Natural Law ethics – A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies
“Participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law”. – Aquinas. The Primary Precepts & Synderesis. Reason is a power of the human soul. Synderesis is the habit or ability of reason to discover foundational ‘first principles’ of God’s natural moral law. “the first practical principles …
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Jul 20, 2019 · Cicero (1st Century BCE) is another philosopher that is heavily tied up within NML; in fact he is often called ‘the father of NML’. In his book On the Republic, he wrote, “one eternal and unchanging law will be valid for all nations and all times”, further mirroring Aquinas’s Laws (Eternal Law, Divine Law, Natural Law and Human Law).
Natural moral law 30 - religious stidies essay - Evaluate the ...
In addition, Aquinas natural moral law assumes that God exists, Aquinas believes humans are created by God and given a purpose by their creator, meaning that there is an eternal law, which is god's purpose for the entire universe and everyone in it, and since he is a loving creator, he reveals portions of his eternal law to humans in a direct way.
Natural Moral Law in Contemporary Society on JSTOR
The essays of this volume examine natural moral law, different natural law theories, and the role that natural law can and should play in our contemporary socie...
The Evolution and Significance of Natural Law Ethics - StudyMoose
Jul 2, 2016 · Throughout the annals of history, the concept of Natural Law has played a significant role in shaping ethical frameworks and moral reasoning. From its origins in the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations to its development by theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, Natural Law has evolved and left an indelible mark on ethical philosophy.
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Sep 23, 2002 · Some writers use the term with such a broad meaning that any moral theory that is a version of moral realism — that is, any moral theory that holds that some positive moral claims are literally true (for this conception of moral realism, see Sayre-McCord 1988)— counts as a natural law view.
Moral Relativism and the Natural Law — Thomistic Institute
14 hours ago · Parts of this lecture were adapted from portions of two published essays: Francis J. Beckwith, “Moral Relativism: Arguments For and Against,” in The New Apologetics, ed. M. Melson (Word on Fire, 2022), and Francis J. Beckwith, “Catholicism and the Natural Law: A Response to Four Misunderstandings,” Religions, 12.6 (2021). Used with ...
Microsoft Word - Natural Moral Law.doc - resources.r9paul.org
law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.”* Whilst this does not subtract from the value of natural moral law as a theory, it does raise questions about Aquinas’s synthesis of religion and morality. Natural Moral laws relies on our ability to reason correct, that is to use casuistry to
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Critically examine what is meant by Natural Moral Law. (8 marks) Analyse and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Natural Moral Law as a definitive ethical theory. (12 marks) a) Natural Moral Law is the ancient belief that we can deduce what is right and wrong by looking at nature, this being the one moral code that is applicable to all ...
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4 Pages • Essays / Projects • Year Uploaded: 2021. 1. Examine the strengths of natural moral law 2. To what extent do the weaknesses of NML outweigh the strengths. Also includes room for improvement at the bottom.